



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

Stanford University Libraries


3 6105 117 491 147



432hc

**THE CONSULATE AND EMPIRE
OF FRANCE**

VOL. V.





Karl Grosse del.

Paul Groussier sc.

JOSEPH BONAPARTE

1000

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON

By LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS

TRANSLATED, WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL
OF THE AUTHOR, BY
D. FORBES CAMPBELL AND JOHN STEBBING

With Thirty-six Steel Plates



IN TWELVE VOLUMES

VOL. V.

London

CHATTO & WINDUS, PICCADILLY

PHILADELPHIA: J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY

1894

118863

YRABU
ROPA. OROBAT OPA. E.
YTOREVRU

CONTENTS OF VOL. V.

BOOK XXVIII.

FONTAINEBLEAU.

Joy caused in France and in the allied countries by the peace of Tilsit—First acts of Napoleon after his return to Paris—Mission of General Savary to St. Petersburg—Fresh distribution of the French troops in the north—Marshal Brune's *Corps d'Armée* directed to occupy Swedish Pomerania and to besiege Stralsund in case of the resumption of hostilities against Sweden—Solicitations to induce Denmark to enter into the New Continental Coalition—Seizure of English merchandise over the whole Continent—First explanations of Napoleon with Spain after the restoration of peace—Summons addressed to Portugal in order to compel her to drive the English out of Lisbon and Oporto—Assemblage of a French army at Bayonne—Similar measures in regard to Italy—Occupation of Corfu—Dispositions relative to the navy—Events which occurred at sea from the month of October 1805 to the month of July 1807—System of cruising squadrons—Squadron of Captain L'Hermitte on the coast of Africa, of Rear-Admiral Willaumez on the coasts of both Americas, of Captain Leduc in the Northern Seas—Succours sent to the French Colonies, and state of those Colonies—Increased attention of Napoleon to the navy—System of naval warfare which he determines to pursue—Internal affairs of the French Empire—Changes in the high offices—M. de Talleyrand appointed Vice-Grand-Elector, Prince Berthier Vice-Constable—M. de Champagny appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs; M. Cr  tet, Minister of the Interior; General Clarke, Minister of War—Death of M. Portalis, who is succeeded by M. Bigot de Pr  ameneu—Definitive suppression of the Tribunalate—Purification of the Magistracy—State of the Finances—Budgets of 1806 and 1807—Balance re-established between the receipts and the expenses without having recourse to loans—Creation of the *Caisse de Service*—Institution of the Court of Accounts—Public works—Loans derived for these works from the Treasury of the army—Assignments granted to the marshals, generals, officers, and soldiers—Institution of titles of nobility—State of manners and of French society—Character of literature and of the arts and sciences under Napoleon—Legislative session of 1807—Adoption of the Code of Commerce—Marriage of Prince Jerome—Close of the short session of 1807, and translation of the imperial court to Fontainebleau—Affairs in Europe during the three months devoted by Napoleon to the internal affairs of the Empire—State of the Court of St. Petersburg since the peace of Tilsit—Efforts of the Emperor Alexander to reconcile Russia with France—He offers his mediation to the British Cabinet—State of parties in England—The Fox and Grenville administration is succeeded by that of Canning and Castlereagh—Dissolution of Parliament—Formation of a majority favourable to the new ministry—Evasive answer to the offer of the mediation of Russia, and despatch of a fleet to Copenhagen to secure the

Danish navy—Landing of English troops under the walls of Copenhagen, and preparations for bombardment—The Danes summoned to give up their fleet—On their refusal, the English bombard the city for three days and three nights—Disastrous fate of Copenhagen—General indignation in Europe, and redoubled hostilities against England—Efforts of the latter to cause the odious act committed by her against Denmark to be approved at Vienna and St. Petersburg—Dispositions produced in the Court of Russia by recent events—She determines to ally herself more closely with Napoleon in order to obtain thereby Moldavia and Wallachia, in addition to Finland—Solicitations of Alexander to Napoleon—Resolutions of the latter after the disaster of Copenhagen—He encourages Russia to take possession of Finland, keeps up his hopes in regard to the Danubian provinces, concludes an arrangement with Austria, moves his troops from the north towards the south of Italy with a view to prepare an expedition against Sicily, reorganises the Boulogne flotilla, and hastens the invasion of Portugal—Formation of a second *Corps d'Armée* to support the march of General Junot towards Lisbon, under the designation of Second Corps of Observation of the Gironde—The question concerning Portugal gives rise to that of Spain—Inclinations and hesitations of Napoleon in regard to Spain—The systematic idea of excluding Bourbons from all the thrones of Europe is gradually formed in his mind—The want of a sufficient pretext for dethroning Charles IV. causes him to hesitate—The part performed by M. de Talleyrand and Prince Cambacères on this occasion—Napoleon determines upon a provisional partition of Portugal with the Court of Madrid, and signs the treaty of Fontainebleau on the 27th of October—While he is disposed to an adjournment in regard to Spain, important occurrences at the Escorial demand his whole attention—State of the Court of Madrid—Administration of the Prince of the Peace—The navy, the army, the finances, the commerce of Spain in 1807—Parties into which the Court is divided—Party of the Queen and the Prince of the Peace—Party of Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias—An illness of Charles IV., which excites fears for his life, suggests to the Queen and the Prince of the Peace the idea of depriving Ferdinand of the throne—Means devised by the latter to defend himself against the plans of his enemies—He addresses himself to Napoleon to obtain the hand of a French princess—Some imprudences committed by him excite suspicion respecting his way of living, and occasion the seizure of his papers—Arrest of the Prince, and commencement of a criminal process against him and his friends—Charles IV. reveals to Napoleon what is passing in his family—Napoleon, urged to interfere in the affairs of Spain, forms a third *Corps d'Armée* towards the Pyrenees, and gives orders for the departure of the troops by post—While he is preparing to interfere, the Prince of the Peace, alarmed at the effect produced by the arrest of the Prince of the Asturias, decides to obtain his pardon if he will make a disgraceful submission—Pardon and humiliation of Ferdinand—Temporary calm in the affairs of Spain—Napoleon takes advantage of it to visit Italy—He sets out from Fontainebleau for Milan about the middle of November 1807

BOOK XXIX.

ARANJUEZ.

Expedition against Portugal—Composition of the army destined for that expedition—First entry of the French into Spain—March from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara—Dreadful hardships—General Junot,

hastening towards Lisbon, follows the right of the Tagus, along the back of the mountains of Beyra—Arrival of the French army at Abrantes in the most deplorable state—General Junot determines to march to Lisbon with the companies of élite—On learning the approach of the French, the Prince Regent of Portugal decides to sail for Brazil—Precipitate embarkation of the Court and of the principal Portuguese families—Occupation of Lisbon by General Junot—Further occurrences at the Escorial—State of the Court of Spain since the arrest of the Prince of the Asturias, and the humiliating pardon granted to him—Continuation of the proceedings against his accomplices—Mistrust and fears which begin to seize the Court—The idea of proceeding to America, after the example of the Court of Braganza, occurs to the Queen and to the Prince of the Peace—Opposition of Charles IV. to this scheme—Before recurring to this extreme resource, the Spanish government seeks to reconcile itself with Napoleon, and renews, in the King's name, the application made by Ferdinand for a French princess—To this application are added urgent solicitations for the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau—These communications cannot reach Napoleon till he is in Italy—His arrival at Milan—Works of public utility ordered in all the places through which he passes—Journey to Venice—Meeting of princes and sovereigns in that city—Plans of Napoleon for restoring Venice to her former commercial prosperity—Trip to Udine, Palma-Nova, and Osopo—Return to Milan by Legnago and Mantua—Interview at Mantua with Lucien Bonaparte—Residence at Milan—Fresh military orders relative to Spain, and postponement of the answers to be given to Charles IV.—Political affairs of the kingdom of Italy—Adoption of Eugène de Beauharnais, and the succession to the crown of Italy secured to his descendants—Milan decrees opposed to the new maritime ordinances of England—Departure of Napoleon for Turin—Works ordered to connect Genoa with Piedmont, Piedmont with France—Return to Paris on the 1st January 1803—Napoleon is unable to delay any longer his answer to Charles IV. and the adoption of a definitive resolution respecting Spain—Three parties are formed—A marriage, a partition of territory, a change of dynasty—Irresistible impulsion of Napoleon towards the change of dynasty—Though decided as to the end, Napoleon is not fixed in regard to the means, and meanwhile he increases the number of the troops which he has in the Peninsula, and answers Charles IV. in an evasive manner—Levy of the conscription of 1809—Colossal force of France at this period—System of military organisation suggested to Napoleon by the dislocation of his regiments which have battalions in Germany, in Italy, in Spain—Napoleon is desirous of terminating this time all the affairs of the south of Europe—Aggravation of his quarrel with the Pope—General Miollis is ordered to occupy the Roman States—The movement of the English troops towards the Peninsula strips Sicily, and furnishes the long looked for occasion for an expedition against that island—Union of French squadrons in the Mediterranean—Attempt to convey sixteen thousand men to Sicily and immense supplies to Corfu—Continuation of occurrences in Spain—Conclusion of the proceedings at the Escorial—Charles IV., on receiving the evasive answers of Napoleon, sends him another letter full of grief and uneasiness, and requiring an explanation relative to the accumulation of the French troops towards the Pyrenees—Being pressed with questions, Napoleon feels the necessity for coming to the point—He at length fixes upon his means of execution, and purposes by frightening the Court of Spain to induce it to run away like the house of Braganza—This serious enterprise renders the Russian alliance more necessary for him than ever—Attitude of M. de Tolstoy at Paris—His alarming reports to the Court of Russia—Explanation of Alexander with M. de Caulaincourt—Apprised by the latter of the danger which threatens the alliance,

Napoleon writes to Alexander, and consents to enter into discussion on the partition of the Empire of the East—Joy of Alexander and M. de Romanzoff—Various plans of partition—First idea of an interview at Erfurt—Invasion of Finland—Satisfaction at St. Petersburg—Napoleon, rendered easy respecting the Russian alliance, makes dispositions for bringing about a *dénouement* in Spain in the course of the month of March—Various orders given between the 20th and the 25th of February to intimidate the court of Spain, and to dispose it to flight—Appointment of Murat to command the French army—Ignorance in which Napoleon leaves him respecting his political designs—Instructions relative to the march of the troops—Order for surprising St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, and Barcelona—The plan adopted placing the Spanish colonies in danger, Napoleon wards off that danger by an extraordinary order despatched to Admiral Rosily—Entry of Murat into Spain—His reception in the Biscayan provinces and Castille—Character of those provinces—Entry into Vittoria and Burgos—State of the French troops—Their youth, their destitution, their diseases—Embarrassment of Murat, arising from his ignorance of Napoleon's political object—Surprise of St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, and Barcelona—Mischievous effect produced by the capture of those three places—Alarm conceived at Madrid on receiving the last news from Paris—Definitive plan to retire to America—Opposition of Caballero, the minister, to this plan—Reported preparation for the voyage—Extraordinary emotion among the population of Madrid and Aranjuez—The Prince of the Asturias and his uncle, Don Antonio, opposed to all idea of retiring—The departure of the Court fixed for the 15th or 16th of March—The population of Aranjuez and its environs, moved by curiosity, indignation, and secret tampering, collects in crowds about the royal residences, and exhibits alarming demonstrations—The Court is obliged to publish on the 16th a proclamation contradicting the rumours of a voyage—It nevertheless continues its preparations—Revolutions at Aranjuez in the night between the 17th and 18th of March—The populace breaks into the palace of the Prince of the Peace, utterly destroys it, and seeks the Prince himself with the intention of putting him to death—The King is obliged to strip Emmanuel Godoy of all his dignities—The search after the Prince is continued—After hiding for thirty-six hours under some rush mats, he is discovered at the moment of leaving his retreat—A few of the life-guards succeed in rescuing him from the fury of the people, and conduct him to their barracks, after receiving several wounds—The Prince of the Asturias persuades the mob to disperse, by promising them that the Prince of the Peace shall be brought to trial—The King and Queen, alarmed at the three days' commotion, and hoping to save the lives of themselves and the favourite by abdicating, sign their abdication on the 19th of March—Character of the Revolution of Aranjuez. 183

BOOK XXX.

BAYONNE.

Disturbances at Madrid on the news of the events at Aranjuez—Murat hastens his arrival—On approaching Madrid he receives a message from the Queen of Etruria—He sends M. de Monthyon to her—The latter finds the royal family in deep affliction and full of regret for having abdicated—Murat, on the return of M. de Monthyon, suggests to Charles IV. the idea of protesting against an abdication which was

not free, and defers acknowledging Ferdinand VII.—Entry of the French into Madrid on the 23rd of March—Secret protest of Charles IV.—Ferdinand VII. hastens to Madrid to take possession of the crown—Displeasure of Murat at the entry of Ferdinand—M. de Beauharnais advises Ferdinand to go to meet the Emperor of the French—Effect of the news from Spain on the resolutions of Napoleon—New course adopted by him on hearing of the Revolution at Aranjuez—He conceives at Paris the same plan as Murat at Madrid, that of not acknowledging Ferdinand, and of making Charles IV. resign the crown to him—Mission of General Savary to Madrid—Return of M. de Tournon to Paris—Momentary doubt which arises in the mind of Napoleon—Singular despatch of the 29th, which contradicts all that he had thought and wished—News from Madrid, arrived on the 30th, induces Napoleon to return to his former projects—He approves of Murat's conduct, and the removal of the whole family of Spain to Bayonne—He sets out for Bordeaux—Murat, with Napoleon's sanction, assists General Savary in the execution of the arranged plan—Ferdinand VII., having brought together at Madrid his confidants, the Duc del'Infantado and the Canon Escociquiz, deliberates on the conduct to be pursued towards the French—Motives which induce him to have an interview with Napoleon—A meeting with General Savary confirms his decision—He resolves on his departure, and leaves his uncle, Don Antonio, at the head of a regency at Madrid—Sentiments of the Spaniards on seeing him depart—The aged sovereigns, on hearing that he is going to Napoleon, wish to follow his example, in order to plead their cause in person—Joy and foolish hopes of Murat on seeing the Spanish princes give themselves up—Spirit of the Spanish people—Their feelings towards our troops—Conduct and position of Murat at Madrid—Ferdinand VII.'s journey from Madrid to Burgos, and from Burgos to Vittoria—His stay at Vittoria—His motives for stopping in this town—Savary leaves him, in order to receive fresh instructions—Establishment of Napoleon at Bayonne—His letter to Ferdinand VII., and orders given concerning him—Ferdinand VII. at length decides on going to Bayonne—His arrival there—His reception by Napoleon—First mention of what they require of him—Napoleon openly declares his intention to take possession of the crown of Spain, and offers him as compensation that of Etruria—Resistance and illusions of Ferdinand VII.—Napoleon, to put an end to the affair, awaits the arrival of Charles IV., who insisted on coming to Bayonne—Departure of the aged sovereigns—Deliverance of the Prince of the Peace—Meeting at Bayonne of all the Spanish princes—Napoleon's reception of Charles IV.—He receives him as king—Ferdinand resumes the rank of Prince of the Asturias—Agreement of Napoleon with Charles IV. to ensure him a retreat in France on his giving up the crown of Spain—Resistance of Ferdinand VII.—Napoleon is ready to finish by an act of arbitrary power, when the events at Madrid brought it to the desired conclusion—Insurrection during the 2nd of May at Madrid—Energetic measures taken by Murat—Counter-movement at Bayonne—Emotion of Charles IV. on hearing of the 2nd of May—Violent scene between father, mother, and son—Terror and resignation of Ferdinand VII.—Treaty for the cession of the Spanish crown to Napoleon—Departure of Charles IV. for Compiègne, and of Ferdinand VII. to Valençay—Napoleon destines the crown of Spain for Joseph, and that of Naples for Murat—Sorrow and rage of Murat on hearing Napoleon's resolutions—He takes no less trouble to obtain from the Spanish authorities an expression of their wishes in favour of Joseph—Equivocal declaration of the Junta and Council of Castille, expressing a conditional vote for Joseph—Dissatisfaction of Napoleon with Murat—Whilst waiting for Joseph's answer in order to proclaim the new dynasty, Napoleon attempts to repair the violence used towards Spain by an extraordinary use of his resources—Monetary aid to Spain—Division of the army so as to defend the coasts and prevent any resistance—Vast maritime projects—Arrival of Joseph at Bayonne—He is proclaimed

CONTENTS.

King of Spain—Junta convoked at Bayonne—Its deliberations— Spanish Constitution—Acceptance of it, and acknowledgment of Joseph by the Junta—Conclusion of affairs at Bayonne, and departure of Joseph for Madrid, of Napoleon for Paris	PAGE 303
NOTE ON THE MARRIAGE OF PRINCE JEROME BONAPARTE	394
REPLY TO THE NOTE ON THE MARRIAGE OF PRINCE JEROME BONA- PARTE	395

BOOK XXXI.

BAYLEN.

State of Spain during the events that were occurring at Bayonne—Disposition of the different classes of the nation—Repressed indignation, ready to burst forth every moment—Official publication of the abdications extorted from Ferdinand VII. and Charles IV.—Prodigious effect of this publication—Simultaneous insurrection in the Asturias, Galicia, Old Castille, Estramadura, Andalusia, the kingdoms of Murcia and Valencia, Catalonia, and Aragon—Formation of insurrectional Juntas; declaration of war against France; levy en masse; and massacre of the captains-general—First measures ordered by Napoleon for suppressing the insurrection—Old regiments drawn from Paris and the camps of Boulogne and Bretagne—Polish troops sent to Spain—General Verdier suppresses the movement at Logroño, General Lasalle that at Valladolid, General Frère that at Segovia—General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, at the head of a column, composed principally of cavalry, disperses the Aragonese at Tudela, Mallen, and Alagon, but is stopped short before Saragossa—Battles of General Duhesme around Barcelona—March of Marshal Moncey for Valencia, and his stay at Cuenca—Movement of General Dupont towards Andalusia—He encounters the insurgents of Cordova at the bridge of Alcolea, overthrows them, breaks open the gates of Cordova, and forces his way into the city—Pillage of Cordova—Slaughter of the French sick and wounded on all the routes—General Dupont remains at Cordova—Dangerous situation of Admiral Rosily's squadron at Cadiz, the French not arriving there as expected—Attacked in the road of Cadiz by the Spaniards, it is obliged to surrender after a most obstinate resistance—General Dupont, surrounded by insurgents, makes a retrograde movement in order to be nearer to the reinforcements for which he has applied, and takes a position at Andujar—Inconveniences of that position—Absolute ignorance at Madrid of what is passing in the different corps of the French army owing to the murder of all the couriers—Anxiety respecting Marshal Moncey and General Dupont—Frère's division sent to the aid of Marshal Moncey, Vedel's division to the aid of General Dupont—Fresh reinforcements despatched from Bayonne by Napoleon—Columns of gendarmerie and of national guards stationed on the frontiers—Formation of Reille's division, to relieve General Duhesme, blockaded in Barcelona—Assemblage of an army for siege before Saragossa—Composition of a division of old troops under the command of General Mouton to awe the north of the Peninsula and to escort Joseph—March of Joseph in Spain—Slowness of that march—Affliction felt by him on finding all his subjects in revolt against him—Military events in the provinces through which he passes—Fruitless attack on Saragossa—Assemblage of the insurrectional forces of the north of Spain under Generals Blake and Cuesta—Movement of Marshal Bessières towards them—Battle of Rio Seco, and

brilliant victory won by Marshal Bessières—Under the auspices of this victory, Joseph hastens to enter Madrid—His reception there—Military occurrences in the south of Spain—Campaign of Marshal Moncey in the kingdom of Valencia—Passage of the defile of Las Cabrerías—Unsuccessful attack of Valencia—Retreat by the route to Murcia—Importance of the events in Andalusia—Gobert's division sent after Vedel's division to the assistance of General Dupont—Situation of the latter at Andujar—Difficulty which he finds to procure subsistence—Suffocating heat—Vedel takes a position at Baylen, after forcing the defiles of the Sierra Morena—Gobert establishes himself at La Carolina—Obstinacy of General Dupont in continuing at Andujar—The insurgents of Grenada and Andalusia, having formed a junction, appear on the 15th of July before Andujar, and cannonade that position without serious result—Vedel, hastening unseasonably from Baylen to Andujar, is sent back just as unseasonably from Andujar to Baylen—While Baylen is left exposed, the Spanish general Reding forces the Guadalquivir; and General Gobert, attempting to oppose him there, is killed—General Dufour succeeds him—On a false report, which induces a belief that the Spaniards have proceeded by a cross-road to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, Generals Dufour and Vedel hasten to La Carolina, and a second time leave Baylen uncovered—Council of war in the camp of the insurgents—In this council it is decided that, having found too much difficulty at Andujar, they will attack Baylen—Baylen, attacked in consequence of this resolution, is occupied without resistance—On receiving this intelligence, General Dupont marches thither—He finds the insurgents there in mass—Unfortunate battle of Baylen—General Dupont, unable to force a passage to rejoin his lieutenants, is obliged to solicit a suspension of arms—Tardy and useless return of Generals Dufour and Vedel towards Baylen—Conferences terminating in the disastrous capitulation of Baylen—Violation of that capitulation as soon as signed—The French, who should have been conveyed back to France, with permission to serve, are detained prisoners—Barbarous treatment which they experience—Prejudicial effect of these tidings throughout all Spain—Enthusiasm of the Spaniards and dejection of the French—Joseph, alarmed, determines to evacuate Madrid—Retreat of the French army upon the Ebro—General Verdier, having entered Saragossa by main force, and being master of part of the city, is forced to evacuate it to join the French army at Tudela—General Duhesme, after a fruitless attempt upon Girona, is obliged to shut himself up in Barcelona, without having received succour from General Reille—Counterpart to these events in Portugal—General rising of the Portuguese—Efforts of General Junot to suppress the insurrection—Eagerness of the British government to second the insurrection in Portugal—Several corps sent to the Peninsula—Landing of Sir Arthur Wellesley at the mouth of the Mondego—His march upon Lisbon—Brilliant combat of three thousand French against fifteen thousand English at Rolica—Junot hastens with insufficient forces to meet the English—Unfortunate battle of Vimeira—Capitulation of Cintra, stipulating the evacuation of Portugal—The French have nothing left of the whole Peninsula but the country comprised between the Ebro and the Pyrenees—Despair of Joseph, and his vehement desire to return to Naples—Mortification of Napoleon, speedily and severely punished for his faults

PLATES IN VOL. V.

JOSEPH BONAPARTE	<i>Frontispiece</i>
MARSHAL VICTOR	<i>To face page 173</i>
GENERAL LASALLE	„ 427

HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

BOOK XXVIII.

FONTAINEBLEAU.

THE peace of Tilsit had caused profound and universal joy in France. Under the conqueror of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Friedland, people could not be afraid of war; yet they had felt a moment's uneasiness on seeing him venture so far in such a rancorous struggle; and, moreover, a secret instinct said plainly to some, indistinctly to all, that, in his career, as in every other, a man must know where to stop; that after successes there might come reverses; that Fortune, prone to be fickle, ought not to be pushed to extremity; and that Napoleon would be the only one of the three or four heroes of humanity whom she would not have doomed to expiate her favours if he ventured to abuse them. In all human things there is a limit which must not be overstepped, and according to an impression which was then general, Napoleon was approaching that limit, which the mind discerns more easily than the passions choose to recognise it.

They felt, besides, the want of peace and of its soothing enjoyments. Napoleon had, it is true, procured for France internal security, and to such a degree had he procured it for her, that during an absence of nearly a year, and at a distance of 400 or 500 leagues, no disturbance whatever had broken out.

A brief anxiety, produced by the carnage of Eylau, by the dearth of provisions during the winter, by the timid language held in the drawing-rooms of certain discontented persons, had been the only agitation that marked the crisis through which the country had just passed. But though the people no longer dreaded the horrors of '93, and indulged an entire confidence, still it was on condition that Napoleon should live, and that he

should cease to expose his precious person in the field; it was with the desire of enjoying, without any mixture of uneasiness, the immense prosperity which he had conferred on France. Those who were indebted to him for high situations aspired to enjoy them; the classes that live by agriculture, industry, and commerce—that is to say, nearly the whole of the nation—wished at length to profit by the consequences of the Revolution and the vast extent of markets opened to France; for if the seas were closed against us, the entire continent offered itself to our activity, to the exclusion of British industry. The seas themselves would, it was hoped, be opened afresh in consequence of the negotiations of Tilsit. The two greatest powers of the continent, enlightened respecting the conformity of their present interests, the uselessness of their contest, had, in fact, been seen embracing each other, in a manner, on the banks of the Niemen, in the person of their sovereigns, and joining to shut out England from the shores of Europe, and to turn the efforts of all nations against her; and people flattered themselves that this power, alarmed at her loneliness in 1807, as in 1802, would accept peace on moderate conditions. It was not to be supposed that the mediation of the Russian cabinet, which had just been offered her, rendering easy to her pride a pacification claimed by her interests, could be rejected. On the continent people enjoyed peace; they had a glimpse of peace on the seas; and they were happy at once in what they possessed and what they hoped for. The army, upon which rested more particularly the burden of the war, was not, however, so eager after peace as the rest of the nation. Its principal leaders, it is true, who had already seen so many distant countries and bloody battles, who were covered with glory, whom Napoleon was about to load with wealth, wished, like the nation itself, to enjoy all that they had acquired. A great number of old soldiers, assured of their share in the munificence of Napoleon, were of the same way of thinking. But the young generals, the young officers, the young soldiers, and these formed a great part of the army, desired nothing better than to see fresh occasions of glory and fortune springing up. At any rate, after a severe campaign, an interval of rest was not displeasing to them; and we may say, that the peace of Tilsit was hailed by the unanimous acclamations of the nation and of the army, of France and of Europe, of the victors and of the vanquished. Excepting England, who found the continent once more united against her; excepting Austria, who had for a moment hoped for the ruin of her controller: there was not a person but applauded this peace, following suddenly upon the greatest bustle of warfare that has occurred in modern times.

Napoleon was awaited with impatience; for, besides the

reasons which people had to take no pleasure in observing his absences, always occasioned by war, they were glad to know that he was near them, watching over the peace of the whole world, and endeavouring to draw from his inexhaustible genius new sources of prosperity. The cannon of the Invalides, which proclaimed his arrival at the palace of St. Cloud, pealed in all hearts as the signal of the happiest event; and at night a general illumination, not commanded either by the police of Paris, or by the threats of the mob, and which was displayed in the windows of the citizens as well as on the fronts of the public edifices, attested a feeling of joy, genuine, spontaneous, universal.

My reason, tempered by time, enlightened by experience, is well aware of all the dangers concealed beneath this immeasurable greatness—dangers, moreover, which it is easy to appreciate after the event. Still, though devoted to the modest worship of good sense, let me be allowed a moment of enthusiasm for so many wonders, which did not last, but which might have lasted, and to relate them with an entire forgetfulness of the calamities which followed. In order to retrace with a more just feeling those times so different from ours, I will not turn my eyes to those calamitous days which have since succeeded until they arrive.

A vulgar sign, but a true one, of the disposition of minds, is the rate of the public funds in the great modern States which make use of credit, and which, in a vast market, called Exchange, permit the sale and purchase of the titles of loans which they have contracted with the capitalists of all nations. The 5 per cent. stock (signifying, as everybody knows, an interest of 5 allowed for a nominal capital of 100), which Napoleon had found at 12 francs on the 18th Brumaire, and which afterwards rose to 60, got up, after the battle of Austerlitz, to 70, and then passed that point to reach 90, a height at that time unprecedented in France. The disposition to confidence was even so strong, that the price of this stock rose still higher, and towards the end of July 1807 reached 92 and 93. Previously to the time of the assignats, when a fondness for financial speculations did not exist—when the public funds had not yet made the fortune of great speculators, and had, on the contrary, brought ruin on the legitimate creditors of the State—when the value of money was such that it was easy to find in solid depositories an interest of 6 or 7 per cent.—it required immense confidence in the established government to cause the titles of the perpetual debt to be accepted at an interest of 5 per cent.

On the morning of the 27th of July Napoleon arrived at the palace of St. Cloud, where he was accustomed to pass the summer. With the princesses of his family, eager to see him again, were assembled the grand dignitaries, the ministers, and the principal

members of the bodies of the State. Confidence and joy beamed from his face. "There," said he, "you are sure of continental peace; and as for maritime peace, we shall soon obtain that by the voluntary or the forced concurrence of all the continental powers. I have reason to believe the alliance that I have just concluded with Russia to be solid. A less powerful alliance would have sufficed to enable me to control Europe, to deprive England of all resource. With that of Russia, which victory has given me, which policy will preserve to me, I shall put an end to all resistances. Let us enjoy our greatness, and now turn traders and manufacturers." Addressing himself particularly to his ministers, Napoleon said to them: "I have had enough of the trade of general, I shall now resume with you that of *first minister*, and recommence my *great reviews of affairs*, which it is time to substitute for my *great reviews of armies*." He detained at St. Cloud Prince Cambacérès, whom he admitted to his family dinner, and with whom he conversed upon his plans; for his ardent head, incessantly at work, never finished one operation without beginning another.

On the following day he employed himself in giving orders, which embraced Europe from Corfu to Königsberg. His first idea was to secure immediately the consequences of the Russian alliance which he had just concluded at Tilsit. By that alliance, purchased at the price of sanguinary victories and infinite hopes excited in Russian ambition, it behoved him to profit, before time or inevitable miscalculations should come to cool its first ardours. He had promised himself to force Sweden, to persuade Denmark, to draw off Portugal by means of Spain, and in this manner to decide all the States bordering on the European seas to declare against England. He had even proposed to himself to coerce Austria, in order to bring her into similar resolutions. England would thus find herself encompassed by a girdle of hostilities, from Cronstadt to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Trieste, unless she accepted the conditions of peace which Russia was commissioned to offer her. During his journey from Dresden to Paris Napoleon had already given orders, and the very day after his arrival at Paris he gave further directions for the immediate execution of this vast system. His first care was to send to St. Petersburg an agent who should continue with Alexander the work of seduction commenced at Tilsit. Most assuredly he could not find an ambassador so seductive as he was himself. It was requisite, nevertheless, to find one who was able to please, to win confidence, and to smooth the difficulties that may arise even in the most sincere alliance. This choice required some reflection. Till he should fix upon one who combined the desired qualifications, Napoleon sent an officer, usually employed; and fit for everything—for war, for diplomacy, for police, who

could be by turns supple and arrogant, and was very capable of insinuating himself into the mind of the young monarch, whom he had already contrived to please. This was General Savary, whose talents, courage, unscrupulous and unbounded devotedness we have elsewhere had occasion to notice. General Savary, despatched in 1805 to the Russian headquarters, had found Alexander full of pride on the day before the battle of Austerlitz, dismayed on the morrow—had not abused the change of fortune, had, on the contrary, skilfully spared the vanquished prince, and availing himself of the ascendancy which weaknesses give over another whose secret one has detected, had acquired a sort of influence sufficient for a temporary mission. In this first moment, when the point was to ascertain whether Alexander was sincere, whether he would have the courage to defy the resentment of his nation, which had not passed so speedily as he had done from the sorrows of Friedland to the illusions of Tilsit, General Savary was fitted by his shrewdness to penetrate into the young prince, to intimidate him by his boldness, and, if need were, to reply by a completely military insolence to the insolences that he might meet with at St. Petersburg. General Savary had another advantage, of which the malicious pride of Napoleon disdained not to avail itself. The war with Russia had commenced on account of the death of the Duke of Enghien: Napoleon was not sorry to send to that power the man who had figured most in that catastrophe. He thus galled the Russian aristocracy, which was inimical to France, without hurting the prince, who from his versatility had forgotten the cause of the war as quickly as the war itself.

Napoleon gave General Savary, without any apparent title, extensive powers and plenty of money, that he might live in suitable style at St. Petersburg. General Savary was to protest to the young emperor the sincerity of France, to urge him to come to an explanation with England, and to bring matters with her to a speedy result—either peace or war—and if it should be war, to take immediate possession of Finland—an enterprise which, while it flattered Muscovite ambition, would have the effect of definitively engaging Russia in the politics of France. The general, in short, was to apply all the resources of his mind to cultivate and give stability to the alliance concluded at Tilsit.

Having paid this attention to the relations with Russia, Napoleon directed it to the other cabinets called upon to concur in his system. He scarcely expected sensible conduct from Sweden, then governed by an extravagant king. Though that power had a twofold interest in not waiting till she should be forced—the interest of contributing to the triumph of the neutrals, and that of sparing a Russian invasion—Napoleon

nevertheless thought that he should soon be obliged to employ force against her. This would be a very easy matter, with an army of 420,000 men commanding the continent from the Rhine to the Niemen. He went, therefore, no further than making some dispositions for the immediate invasion of Swedish Pomerania, the only possession which her ancient and her recent follies had allowed Sweden to retain on the soil of Germany. With this view, Napoleon made various changes in the distribution of his forces in Poland and Prussia. He purposed not to evacuate Poland till the new Saxon royalty, which he had just re-established there, should be firmly settled; and Prussia not till the war contributions, as well ordinary as extraordinary, should be completely paid up. In consequence, Marshal Davout, with his corps, with the Polish troops of the new levy, with the greater part of the dragoons, had orders to occupy that part of Poland destined, under the title of grand duchy of Warsaw, for the King of Saxony. One division was to be stationed at Thorn, another at Warsaw, a third at Posen. The dragoons were to find forage on the banks of the Vistula. This was denominated the first command. Marshal Soult, with his *corps d'armée* and almost all the reserve cavalry, was commissioned to occupy Old Prussia, from the Pregel to the Vistula, from the Vistula to the Oder, with orders to retire successively, according to the payment of the contributions. The heavy and the light cavalry were to live in the island of Nogath, amidst the abundance afforded by the Delta of the Vistula. Into the bosom of this second command Napoleon introduced another, in some measure exceptional, like the place which required its presence—that was Dantzic. There he placed Oudinot's grenadiers, and likewise Verdier's division, which had formed the corps of Marshal Lannes; and these were destined to occupy that rich town, as well as the territory which it had recovered, together with the quality of a free city. Verdier's division was not intended to remain there, but the grenadiers had orders to stay till the complete settlement of European affairs. The third command, embracing Silesia, which was committed to Marshal Mortier, whom Napoleon was glad to place in the provinces where there was abundance of wealth to save from the disorders of war, and who had quitted his *corps d'armée*, recently dissolved by the reunion of the Poles and the Saxons in the duchy of Warsaw. This marshal had under his command the fifth and sixth corps, which Marshals Massena and Ney had lately left. These two and Marshal Lannes had obtained permission to go to France to rest themselves from the fatigues of war. The fifth corps were cantoned in the environs of Breslau, in Upper Silesia; the sixth around Glogau, in Lower Silesia. The first corps, transferred to General Victor since the wound of the Prince of

Ponte Corvo, had orders to occupy Berlin, accompanying in its retrograde movement the imperial guard, which was returning to France, to be there treated with magnificent festivities. Lastly, the troops which had formed the army of observation in the rear of Napoleon were rapidly moved towards the coast. The Italians, part of the Bavarians, the Baden troops, the Hessians, the two fine French divisions of Boudet and Molitor, were marched, with the park of artillery which had been employed in the siege of Dantzic, towards Swedish Pomerania. Napoleon increased this park with all the artillery and ammunition which the fine season allowed to be collected, and ordered them to be placed opposite to Stralsund, for the purpose of wresting that spot from the King of Sweden, in case that prince, adhering to his character, should single-handed resume hostilities, when all besides had laid down their arms.

Marshal Brune, who had been placed at the head of the army of observation, received the direct command of these troops, forming a total of 38,000 men, provided with an immense matériel. Chasseloup, the engineer who had so ably directed the siege of Dantzic, was charged with the direction of that of Stralsund also, if it should be necessary to undertake it.

Marshal Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, who had gone to Hamburg to recover from his wound, had the command of the troops destined to guard the Hanseatic towns and Hanover. The Dutch were drawn towards Holland, and marched upon the Ems; the Spaniards occupied Hamburg. These latter had traversed, some Italy, others France, to proceed through Germany towards the coast of the North Sea. They formed a corps of 14,000 men, under the command of the Marquis de la Romana. They were fine soldiers, with dark complexion, spare limbs, shivering with cold on the dreary and frozen shores of the Northern Ocean, exhibiting a singular contrast with our northern allies, and reminding one, by the strange diversity of nations subject to the same yoke, of the times of Roman greatness. Followed by a great number of women, children, horses, mules, and asses, laden with baggage, ill-dressed, but in an original manner, lively, animated, noisy, acquainted with no language but their own, living exclusively by themselves, exercising little, and spending great part of the day in dancing to the sound of the guitar with the women who accompanied them, they attracted the stupefied curiosity of the grave inhabitants of Hamburg, whose papers communicated these details to Europe, astonished at so many extraordinary scenes. The corps of Marshal Mortier having been dissolved, as we have related, the French division of Dupas, which had formed part of it, was marched towards the Hanseatic towns, to be ready to fly to the assistance of our allies, Dutch or Spaniards, in case

an enemy should pay them a visit. That enemy could not be any other than the English, who for a year past had kept promising in vain a continental expedition, and who might possibly, as it frequently happens after long hesitation, act when the time for action was past. The troops of Marshal Brune, charged to station themselves before Stralsund, and those of Marshal the Prince of Ponte Corvo, commissioned to observe Hanover and Holland, were to be joined, in case of need, by Dupas' division at first, and afterwards by the whole first corps concentrated at that moment around Berlin. Any attempt of the English could not but miscarry against such a combination of forces.

Thus everything was ready, if the Russian mediation should not succeed, to drive the Swedes from Pomerania into Stralsund, from Stralsund into the island of Rügen, from the island of Rügen into the sea, and to throw the English themselves into it in case of their landing on the continent. These measures were intended also to have the effect of obliging Denmark to complete by her adhesion the continental coalition against England. Everything was easy in reference to the course to be pursued towards the Swedes. They had behaved in a manner so hostile, so arrogant, that nothing more needed be done than to summon them, and then drive them into Stralsund. The Danes, on the contrary, had scrupulously observed the neutrality, had conducted themselves with such moderation, inclining in heart towards the cause of France, which was their own, but not daring to speak out, that it would not be right to treat them as roughly as the Swedes. Napoleon charged M. de Talleyrand to write immediately to the cabinet of Copenhagen, to represent to it that it was time to come to a decision; that the cause of France was its own; that if France was at war with England, it was on account of the question of the neutrals, and the question of the neutrals was a question of existence for all the naval powers, especially for the smallest, habitually least spared by British supremacy. M. de Talleyrand had orders to be friendly, but pressing. He was ordered also to offer Denmark the finest troops of France, and the concurrence of a formidable artillery, capable of keeping at a distance the best armed English ships.

It was by frightening England with this combination of forces, and by proceeding with the utmost rigour against her commerce, that Napoleon thought to second in a useful manner the Russian mediation. While he was taking the military measures that we have been detailing, he had caused English merchandise to be seized at Leipsic, where there was a considerable quantity. Dissatisfied with the manner in which his orders had been executed in the Hanseatic towns, he directed the

English factory at Hamburg to be seized, bills and goods to a large amount to be confiscated, and the letters of British commerce to be intercepted at all the post-offices, and more than 100,000 of them were burned. King Louis, on the throne of Holland, was incessantly aggravating him by his inconsiderate measures, by his vanity, by the projected reduction of the Dutch army and navy (notwithstanding which he purposed to institute a royal guard, to appoint marshals, to go to the expense of a coronation)—King Louis united with all his plans, devised to please his new subjects, a tolerance in regard to English commerce, which became downright treason against the policy of France. Napoleon, out of all patience, wrote to him that, unless there was a change of conduct, he should proceed to the last extremities, and have the ports of Holland guarded by French troops and custom-house officers. This threat had some success, and the prohibitions issued against English commerce in Holland were somewhat more strictly executed.

Napoleon required that all the goods seized should be sold, and the produce paid into the chest of the war contributions to increase the wealth of that chest, the application of which, at once noble, ingenious, and beneficial, we shall presently notice. He gave orders that Hanover, to which he granted no indulgence, because it was an English province, that Hesse, that the Prussian provinces in Franconia, lastly, that Prussia itself, should pay up their contributions before the army retired. It may be said with truth that the vanquished had not been treated very severely, especially when we recollect what occurred in the seventeenth century during the wars of Louis XIV., in the eighteenth during the wars of the great Frederick, and in our own times, when France was invaded in 1814 and 1815. Napoleon had added to the ordinary contribution, half of which at most had been paid, an extraordinary contribution, which was far from overwhelming, and which amounted to precisely the cost of the war that had been raised against him. By means of this contribution he caused all that was taken from the houses of the inhabitants to be paid for. He charged M. Daru, his able and upright representative for the financial affairs of the army, to treat with Prussia relative to the mode of discharging the contributions that were still due, declaring that, notwithstanding his desire to recall the French troops in order to move them to the coasts of Europe, he would not evacuate a province or even a place of Prussia before the integral payment of the sums which had been promised him. He hoped, in this manner, all the expenses of the campaign being paid, and by adding to the contributions of Germany the remnants of the contribution levied upon Austria, to reserve about 300 millions, a sum worth at that time double what it would be

worth now, and which in his skilful hands was to become a magical means of beneficence and of creations of all kinds.

While Napoleon was taking his measures for the north, he took them likewise for the accomplishment of his system in the south. During the campaign in Prussia, Spain had given him just causes for distrust, and the proclamation of the Prince of the Peace, in which he called the whole Spanish population to arms, upon pretext of resisting an unknown enemy, was not to be accounted for, unless by absolute treachery. And such in fact it was; for at that very moment, on the eve of the battle of Jena, the Prince of the Peace had begun secret relations with England. Though unacquainted with these details, Napoleon was not to be deceived; but he resolved to dissemble till he should have recovered the full liberty of his movements. The ignoble favourite who governed the Queen of Spain, and through the queen the king and the monarchy, had believed, like all Europe, in the invincibility of the Prussian army. But on the morrow of the victory of Jena he had thrown himself at the feet of the conqueror. Ever since that time there was no sort of flattery but he employed to appease the wrath, dissembled, but easy to be guessed, of Napoleon. There was but one kind of obedience which he did not add to his meanness—that was to govern Spain well, to raise her navy again, to defend her colonies, to render her at length a useful ally—a kind of expiation which, in the eyes of Napoleon, would have been sufficient, which would even have stifled the first feelings of his anger.

On his return to Paris, Napoleon began to direct his attention to this the most important portion of the coast of Europe; and he conceived that it behoved him to take some resolution in regard to that backsliding of Spain, which was always ready to transform itself into treason. But though his mind was never at rest, though it flew incessantly from one object to another, like his eagle flying from capital to capital, he thought that he ought not yet to take up that important question, being unwilling to complicate the present situation, and to throw obstacles in the way of a general pacification, which he ardently desired, which he had little hope of, and which if it were accomplished would render the regeneration of the Spanish monarchy much less necessary to him. If, on the contrary, England, under the guidance of the weak and violent heirs of Mr. Pitt, was bent on continuing the war in spite of her lonely condition, he then proposed to turn his serious attention to the state of Spain,* and

* I shall soon have to handle a most important subject, the invasion of Spain, and the moment is approaching when I shall have to relate the tragic catastrophe of the Spanish Bourbons, the origin of an atrocious and calamitous war for both countries. I announce beforehand that, furnished with the only authentic documents that exist, which are very numerous, frequently contradictory, and reconcilable only by means of great efforts of criticism, I think

to take a decisive resolution on that point. For the moment he thought of one thing only—to obtain from her the utmost strictness against British commerce, and the submission of Portugal to his vast designs.

Spain had at Paris, besides an ordinary ambassador, M. de Masserano, an absolutely useless official agent, charged solely with the honorary functions of his station, M. Yzquierdo, a secret agent of the Prince of the Peace, who was invested with the entire confidence of that prince, and with whom had been negotiated the financial convention, concluded in 1806 between the Spanish treasury and the French treasury. He alone was charged with real business, and he was well fitted for it by his astuteness and by his acquaintance with all the secrets of the court of Spain. The unfortunate sovereigns of the Escorial, conceiving that these two agents were not sufficient to soothe the wrath of Napoleon, bethought them of sending to him a

myself capable of giving the entire secret, which is yet unknown, of the unfortunate events of that period, and that on many points I shall disagree with the works which have appeared on the same subject. I am not alluding to the thousand rhapsodies published by historians who had neither mission, nor information, nor concern about truth. I speak of historians worthy of being taken into consideration, of those who have been permitted by exception to make researches in the dépôts of foreign affairs and war, or of those who, like M. de Toreno, having occupied the highest posts, had not only a knowledge of things, but the means of informing themselves concerning them. I shall have to contradict the assertions of both, for there is nothing relative to the business of Spain in the dépôt of the foreign office, Beauparnais, the ambassador, having never possessed the secret of his government; and in the dépôt of war there is only the detail of the military operations, and even that frequently incomplete. Lastly, as for the Spanish historians, they could not be acquainted with the secret of resolutions which were all taken at Paris. The whole is to be found in the private papers of Napoleon deposited in the Louvre, which comprehend both the French documents and the Spanish documents carried off from Madrid. In these documents, frequently contradictory, as I have just observed, one cannot come at the truth but by dint of comparisons, approximations, and the exercise of critical judgment. It will be evident from the various notes which, contrary to my custom, I shall be obliged to place at the foot of the pages of this book, what efforts I have been forced to make, even with the authentic documents, to arrive at the truth. But from this very moment I declare that all the historians who have represented the origin of Napoleon's designs upon Spain as dating so far back as Tilsit are mistaken; that all those who have supposed that Napoleon assured himself at Tilsit of the consent of Alexander to what he projected respecting Madrid, and that he was in haste to sign the peace of the north in order to return the sooner to the affairs of the south, are equally mistaken. At Tilsit, Napoleon settled nothing but a general alliance, which guaranteed the adhesion of Russia to all that he should do on his part, on condition that Russia should be suffered to do what she pleased on hers. At this period he did not at all consider it urgent to interfere in the affairs of Spain; he was full of resentment on account of the proclamation of the Prince of the Peace, promised himself to express his sentiments upon it some day, and to secure himself, but thinking at his return of nothing but imposing peace upon England, by threatening her with complete exclusion from the continent, and of making use of the cabinet of Madrid to bring the cabinet of Lisbon into his projects. We shall soon see how and through whom arose the temptation to intermeddle in the affairs of Spain. I correct that error at present; I shall correct others as the order of facts and the progress of my narrative require it.

third, who with the title of ambassador extraordinary should come to congratulate him on his victories, and to express a joy at his successes which they were far from feeling. For this ostentatious and puerile part was selected one of the highest grandees of Spain, the Duke de Frias, and permission to send him to Paris was solicited. So much homage was not required for disarming Napoleon. A little more activity against the common enemy would have appeased him with much greater certainty than the most magnificent embassies. Napoleon, unwilling to give unnecessary uneasiness to that court, which was conscious of its offences, received the Duke de Frias with great distinction, listened to the congratulations on his triumphs, then said to the new ambassador, repeated to the old one, and informed the most active of the three, M. Yzquierdo, that he accepted the congratulations which were addressed to him upon his triumphs and upon the restoration of the continental peace, but that he must make the continental peace produce a maritime peace; but this result, so desirable for Spain and for her colonies, could be attained only by intimidating the common enemy by a concurrence of energetic efforts, and by an absolute interdiction of her commerce; that it was necessary to second France, and in this view, to require of Portugal an immediate and entire adhesion to the continental system; as for himself, he was resolved to insist not on a sham exclusion of the English from Oporto and Lisbon, but a complete exclusion, followed up by an immediate declaration of war and the seizure of all British goods; that if Portugal would not consent to this at once, Spain must prepare her troops, for he was already preparing his, and they must forthwith take possession of Portugal, not for a week or a fortnight, as had been done in 1801, but for the whole time of the war, perhaps for ever, according to circumstances. The three envoys of Spain bowed to this declaration, which they were to transmit without delay to their cabinet.

Napoleon, at the same time, sent for M. de Lima, the ambassador of Portugal, and signified to him that if, in the time strictly necessary for writing to Lisbon and receiving an answer, he were not promised the exclusion of the English, the seizure of their commerce, persons, and effects, and a declaration of war, M. de Lima must take his passports and expect to see a French army march from Bayonne to Salamanca, from Salamanca to Lisbon. Such were the determinations of a policy agreed upon among the great powers, and indispensable for the re-establishment of peace in Europe. Napoleon, in his contest with the English, insisted on severities against both their property and their persons, because he knew that a feigned exclusion was already secretly arranged between the courts of London and Lisbon; and it was necessary that the latter should wholly

compromise itself, if one wished to arrive at a serious result. The course of events proved that he had guessed rightly. Besides having seen the English, on the rupture of the peace of Amiens, make seizures from us to the amount of more than one hundred millions, and capture a great number of commercial men sailing upon the faith of treaties, he sought everywhere to secure pledges, both in men and merchandise.

M. de Lima promised to write immediately to his court, and failed not to do so. But Napoleon, not satisfied with a mere declaration of his will, and clearly foreseeing that this declaration would not be efficacious unless it were followed up by an armed demonstration, made his dispositions for having in a few days a corps of 25,000 men at Bayonne, quite ready to recommence the expedition of 1801 against Portugal. It will no doubt be recollected that, some months before, while availing himself of the inaction of winter to carry on the siege of Dantzic, and to prepare on his rear an army of observation to secure him against any attempt of Austria and of England, he had conceived the idea of rendering the camps formed on the coasts disposable, and replacing them by five legions of reserve, of six battalions each, the organisation of which was to be consigned to five old generals, who had become senators. Four months had since elapsed, and he wrote immediately to the senators charged with this organisation, to learn if he could already dispose of two battalions out of the six in each of these legions. Trusting, till their arrival, to the terror which the speedy return of the grand army must strike into the English, having no fear that the expeditions against the continent, with which they were said to have been so long occupied, would be directed against the coasts of France, having all his precautions taken on those of Holland, Hanover, Pomerania, Old Prussia, he hesitated not to strip those of Normandy and Bretagne, and ordered the assemblage at Bayonne of the troops distributed among the camps of St. Lo, Pontivy, and Napoleon-Vendée. Each of these camps, formed of third battalions and some complete regiments, contributed a good division, and with the dépôts of dragoons collected at Versailles and St. Germain, and with detachments of artillery drawn from Rennes, Toulouse, and Bayonne, would compose an excellent army of about 25,000 men. This army had orders to concentrate itself forthwith at Bayonne. For the command of it Napoleon selected General Junot, who was acquainted with Portugal, where he had been ambassador, who was a good officer, entirely devoted to his master, and as governor of Paris had no other fault but indulging there too freely in his pleasures. He was said to have formed a connection with one of the princesses of the imperial family, which caused some scandal, so that several circumstances united to recommend this

choice. These measures were taken ostensibly, and in such a manner, that Spain and Portugal could not be ignorant how serious the consequences of a refusal would be to them. At the same time, the necessary orders were given for the two battalions of each of the legions of reserve to hold themselves in readiness to replace on the coast the troops that were about to be withdrawn from it.

It was in the same spirit that Napoleon directed his attention at this moment to the affairs of Italy. There, as elsewhere, redoubled severity against English commerce was his first care, always with the intention of rendering the cabinet of London more sensible to the overtures of Russia. The Queen of Etruria, daughter, as the reader knows, of the sovereigns of Spain, placed by Napoleon on the throne of Tuscany, who had become, by the death of her husband, regent for her son* of that petty kingdom, governed it with the carelessness of a woman and a Spaniard, and with very little fidelity to the common cause. The English carried on commerce at Leghorn as freely as in any port of their own country. Napoleon had collected all the depôts of the army of Naples in the Legations. With his accustomed vigilance, he kept them constantly supplied with conscripts and matériel. He ordered Prince Eugène to draft from them a division of 4000 men, to march across the Apennines upon Pisa, to fall suddenly upon the English commerce at Leghorn, to carry off both men and goods, and then to declare to the Queen of Etruria that he was come to secure that important port against any hostile attempt, an attempt both possible and probable, since the Spanish garrison had gone to join the corps of La Romana in Hanover. While prescribing this expedition, he sent orders for detachments of troops to march under General Lemarrois into the provinces of Urbino, Macerata, and Fermo, to occupy the coast, to drive the English from it, and to prepare safe harbours for the French flag, which was soon to make its appearance in those seas. Napoleon had, in fact, just recovered the mouths of the Cattaro, Corfu, and the Ionian Islands. He purposed to take advantage of circumstances for conquering Sicily, and to cover the surface of the Mediterranean with his ships. He recommended at the same time to General Lemarrois to observe the spirit of those provinces, and if a disposition, evinced in general by the provinces of the Holy See to escape from the government of priests and to place themselves under the lay government of Prince Eugène, should manifest itself among these, not to oppose either contradiction or obstacle to that disposition.

At that moment, the quarrel with the Holy See, the origin of which we have elsewhere noticed, but neglected to record its

* Afterwards Prince of Lucca and Parma.

daily vicissitudes, was every instant making fresh progress. The Pope, who, having come to Paris to anoint Napoleon, had carried back, together with many moral and religious satisfactions, the temporal mortification of not having recovered the Legations; who had since seen his independence rendered nominal by the successive extension of the French power in Italy; had conceived a resentment which he was unable to dissemble. Instead of coming to an understanding with an omnipotent sovereign, against whom powers even of the first order could then effect nothing, who, moreover, was a well-wisher to religion, and never ceased to confer benefits on it, who had no idea to possess himself of the sovereignty of Rome, and merely required him to behave like a good neighbour in regard to the new French States founded in Italy—the Pope committed the error of yielding to mischievous suggestions, which had the stronger influence over his mind, since they accorded with his secret sentiments. Animated by similar dispositions, he had opposed Napoleon in all the arrangements relative to the kingdom of Italy. He had insisted on reserving there all the rights of the Papacy, which are much greater in Italy than in France, and would not admit of an equal Concordat in the two countries. At Parma, at Piacenza, there were the like demands and the like disagreements. To these were added other annoyances of a still more personal kind. Prince Jerome Bonaparte, during his naval campaigns in America, had contracted marriage with a very handsome person, of good family, but at an age which rendered that alliance null, and without the concurrence of her parents, a defect which made it still more null. Napoleon, who purposed, in marrying that prince with a German princess, to found a new kingdom in Westphalia, had refused to acknowledge a marriage, null in the eye of the civil law as in that of the religious law, and in the highest degree contrary to his political designs. He had applied to the Pope soliciting its annulment, which the Pope had formally refused. Lastly, the city of Rome, in still more open hostility, which no religious scruple could justify—the city of Rome had become the refuge of all the enemies of King Joseph. The Pope had not only protested against the French royalty established in Naples in his quality of ancient lord paramount of the crown of the two Sicilies, but he had received, almost allured to him, the cardinals who had refused their oath to King Joseph. He had, moreover, given an asylum to all the robbers who infested the roads of the kingdom of Naples, and who, still covered with the blood of Frenchmen, took refuge without any disguise in the suburbs of Rome. Never was it possible to obtain justice or the delivery of any of them.

Napoleon, during his journey from Tilsit to Paris, wrote from

Dresden to Prince Eugène, who voluntarily made himself the advocate of the court of Rome, recapitulating his grievances against that court, commissioning him to inform the Vatican of them, and to give the pontiff to understand that his patience, seldom very great, was this time at an end, and that without touching his spiritual authority he should not hesitate, if necessary, to strip him of his temporal authority. Such were then the relations with the court of Rome, and these relations account sufficiently for the facility with which Napoleon adopted the measures we have just described respecting that part of the coast of the Adriatic dependent on the Holy See.

The treaty of Tilsit stipulated the restitution of the mouths of the Cattaro, as well as the cession of Corfu and all the Ionian Islands. No possession had been more coveted by Napoleon, none so highly gratified his imagination, so prompt and so bold. He beheld in it the complement of his Illyrian provinces, the dominion of the Adriatic, an approach to the conquests of Turkey in Europe, which were destined for him in case there should be a partition of the Ottoman empire, lastly, an additional means of making himself master of the Mediterranean, where he resolved to reign in an absolute manner, in compensation for the relinquishment of the ocean, in spite of himself, to England.

It will be recollected that the Russians, after the peace of Presburg, had taken advantage of the moment when the Austrian garrison was about to be replaced by a French garrison to get possession of the forts of the Cattaro. To prevent the English from doing the same this time, Napoleon had given orders from Tilsit itself to General Marmont, that the French troops should be assembled under the walls of Cattaro at the moment when the Russians were retiring from it. These orders had been executed point by point; and our troops, having entered Cattaro, strongly occupied that important maritime position.

But Corfu and the Ionian Islands interested him still more than the mouths of the Cattaro. He enjoined his brother Joseph to march secretly towards Taranto, and in such a manner as not to excite any suspicion in the English, the 5th Italian of the line, the 6th French of the line, some companies of artillery, artificers, ammunition, officers of the staff, and General Cæsar Berthier, appointed to the command of the garrison, and to form with them several convoys, to be transported in feluccas from Taranto to Corfu. The distance being but a few leagues, forty-eight hours would be sufficient to convey in several trips the 4000 men composing the expedition. Admiral Siniavin, commander of the Russian forces in the Archipelago, was commissioned to deliver up the Ionian Islands to the French. He performed the operation with extreme and undissembled

displeasure ; for the Russian navy, directed in general either by English officers or by Russians educated in England, was much more hostile to the French than the army itself, which had just fought at Eylau and at Friedland. The admiral, nevertheless, obeyed, and delivered over to the French troops those fine positions which he had been appointed to guard. But his vexation had a double motive, for besides the surrender of Corfu and the Seven Islands, which was painful to him, he would presently find himself in the middle of the Mediterranean, being prevented from returning to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles in consequence of the rupture with the Turks, and forced to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar, the Channel, the Sound, through the English fleets, which, according to the state of the negotiations commenced, might either suffer him to proceed, or stop him. Napoleon had foreseen all these complications, and had sent word to the Russian admirals that they would find in the Mediterranean, as well in those of Italy and France, Spain and Portugal, safe harbours to put into, provisions, stores, and means of refitting. He wrote to Venice, Naples, Toulon, Cadiz, even to Lisbon, to his maritime prefects, admirals, and consuls, and recommended to them, wherever the Russian ships should make their appearance, to receive them cordially, and to supply them with everything they might need. At Cadiz, in particular, where he was represented by Admiral Rosily, who commanded the French fleet lying in that port ever since Trafalgar, and where it was most probable that the Russians would seek an asylum, Napoleon enjoined the French admiral to prepare supplies that were not to be expected from the Spanish administration, accustomed to leave its own sailors to starve, and authorised him, if need were, to give his signature in order to obtain the necessary funds from the Spanish bankers.

The Russian naval forces, apprised by their own government and by ours, retired in two divisions in different directions. The division which had on board the garrison of Cattaro steered for Venice, where it landed the Russian troops, whom Eugène received with the greatest cordiality. The division which conveyed the troops from Corfu landed them at Manfredonia, in the kingdom of Naples, and then steered under Admiral Siniavin for the Straits. This admiral, who had not yet entered into the views of his sovereign, had no inclination to put into a French port or one dependent on French influence, and flattered himself that he should reach the seas of the north before the negotiations between his court and that of England should have terminated in a rupture.

The intention of Napoleon was not to stop at the precautions which he had already taken for the provinces of the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. The corps of 4000 men which he had sent

to Corfu appeared to him insufficient. He was well aware that the English would not fail to make great efforts, in case the war should be prolonged, to wrest from him the Ionian Islands, which were of such importance as to counterbalance that of Malta. He therefore ordered the French 14th light and several other detachments to be sent thither, so as to increase the French and Italian forces to 7000 or 8000 men, exclusive of some Arnauts and Greeks, enrolled under French officers, for guarding the small islands. Five thousand men were to reside at Corfu itself, and 1500 at St. Maura. Five hundred were to guard the port of Parga, on the continent of Epire. As for Zante and Cephalonia, Napoleon resolved to keep only mere French detachments there, to support and control the Arnauts. He directed Prince Eugène and King Joseph to despatch from Anconia and Taranto, by means of small Italian vessels, and in all favourable winds, corn, biscuit, powder, projectiles, muskets, cannon, gun-carriages, and to continue to send stores of these kinds without interruption, till there should be collected at Corfu an immense stock of things necessary for a long defence, so that they might not be liable, as at Malta, to lose through famine a position which the enemy could not take from us by force. Not relying upon the solvency of the treasury of Naples, he despatched sums in gold from the chest at Turin, in order to keep the troops constantly paid up, and to pay the workmen employed in constructing fortifications. Admirable instructions to General Cæsar Berthier (brother of the major-general), providing for all cases, and pointing out the conduct to be pursued under all imaginable circumstances, accompanied the resources which we have just enumerated.

General Marmont had already constructed fine roads in the provinces of Illyria, which he governed with great intelligence and zeal. He had orders to continue them to Ragusa and Cattaro, to push reconnaissances as far as Butrinto, a point of the coast of Epire facing Corfu, and to prepare the means for expeditiously leading a division thither. Napoleon caused application to be made to the Porte to give up Butrinto to him, that he might be able to use more freely that position, from which it was easy to send supplies to Corfu; and it was granted to him without difficulty. Lastly, he claimed, and obtained also, the establishment of relays of Tartars from Cattaro to Butrinto, that General Marmont might be speedily apprised of any appearance of the enemy, and might hasten up with 10,000 or 12,000 men—a force sufficient to throw the English into the sea if they should attempt a landing.

To these means Napoleon added those which the concurrence of the navy was capable of affording. He sent from Toulon Captain Chaunay-Duclos, with the frigates *La Pomone* and *La*

Pauline, and the corvette *La Victorieuse*, to form at Corfu the commencement of a navy. He directed, moreover, that two large brigs should be put on the stocks in the port of Corfu, that they should be equipped with the assistance of the sailors of the country and some detachments of French troops. This infant navy, composed of frigates and brigs, was to cruise incessantly between Italy and Epire, between Corfu and the other islands, so as that the passage should be always open to our merchantmen and closed to those of the enemy.

In addressing these multiplied instructions to King Joseph, to Prince Eugène, to General Marmont, not only with the imperious accent with which he always accompanied his orders, but with the impassioned accent which he always imparted to them when his orders were connected with any of the grand designs which occupied his mind, Napoleon wrote thus: "These measures belong to a system of projects which you cannot be acquainted with. Know only that in the state of the world the loss of Corfu would be the greatest misfortune that could befall the empire."

Indeed, few persons in Europe were acquainted with these projects. M. de Talleyrand, Napoleon's negotiator at Tilsit, had himself but a very incomplete idea of them. They were known to none but to Alexander and Napoleon, who in their long conversations on the bank of the Niemen had engaged to join in the partition of the Turkish empire—a partition in which the one sought the satisfaction of French greatness, the other the consummation of the ruin of the Ottoman empire, which Asiatic effeminacy could no longer defend against European energy. Napoleon was far from desiring to hasten this result; Alexander, on the contrary, longed for it most eagerly—and this constituted the peril of their alliance. But in the foresight of events Napoleon was disposed to lay his hand on the Turkish provinces situated within his reach, and moreover, whether this necessity should occur or not, he intended to make himself master of the Mediterranean. He conceived that when master of that sea, the shortest communication between the east and the west, he might console himself for being but the second upon the ocean. Napoleon, therefore, was resolved, the very day after the signature of the peace of Tilsit, to recover Sicily, which he considered as his own, ever since he had taken Naples for one of his brothers, and he hoped to keep it, either through the relinquishment of it by the English if the Russians should succeed in negotiating peace, or by the force of his arms should the war continue. Accordingly, as soon as winter was over, he had begun to send orders to his minister of the marine to despatch squadrons in the direction of Toulon, and thus to prepare a great expedition against Sicily.

These orders, the fulfilment of which was thwarted by circumstances and the inadequacy of the resources, were repeated with increased force after the signature of the continental peace. On the very day that this peace was signed at Tilsit, Napoleon wrote to four persons at once, to Prince Eugène, to King Joseph, to the King of Holland, to the minister of the marine, that, the continental war being at an end, he must turn his attention towards the sea, and think at length of deriving some benefit from the immense extent of coast at his disposal. England had undoubtedly the advantage of her insular position, the hitherto immovable foundation of her maritime greatness; but the possession of all the European coasts from Cronstadt to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Naples, from Naples to Venice, was likewise a means of maritime power, and a formidable means if one had the art and the time to make use of it. Napoleon had said in Berlin, in exultation over his victories, "*The sea must be ruled by the land.*" He had just realised so much of this idea as it was possible to realise, by obtaining at Tilsit the voluntary or forced union of all the powers of the continent against England; and it was requisite for him to hasten to take advantage of this union before the continental domination of France should become still more intolerable to the world than the maritime domination of England.

Twenty-two months had elapsed since that fatal battle of Trafalgar, in which our flag had displayed a sublime heroism amidst an immense disaster. Those twenty-two months had been employed with some activity, and here and there some glory, with that at least which is due to the courage that reverses cannot depress. Admiral Decrès, continuing to place at the service of the impetuous will of Napoleon profound experience and a superior mind, could not always succeed in persuading him that in the navy, with good-will, with courage, with money, with genius itself, it is not possible to make amends for time and long training. He had proposed to Napoleon to substitute for the system of great naval battles that of small and very distant squadrons. By this system you have the advantage of risking less at once, of acquiring, while cruising, that experience which you want, of doing great mischief to the enemy's commerce, and of having a chance of at length falling in with your adversary, inferior in numerical force; for the sea, from its very immensity, is the field of chance. Such a system was assuredly worth trying, and for us it would have had incontestable advantages over the other, if the numerical disproportion of our forces to those of the English had not been so great, and if our distant settlements had not been so utterly ruined, so destitute of all resource.

Conformably to the plan of M. Decrès, several squadrons had

been prepared at Brest, Rochefort, and Cadiz, for the purpose of running out towards the end of 1805, by taking advantage of the autumnal gales. One division of four frigates had sailed in order to cruise in the track of the Indian Ocean to destroy the English commerce there, and to support the island of Bourbon and the Isle of France by the produce of their prizes, since they could no longer support themselves by trade. These frigates, arriving without accident, did, in fact, procure tolerably abundant resources for our two islands. Captain l'Hermitte, with one ship of the line, the *Regulus*, two frigates, the *Cybele* and the *Président*, two brigs, the *Surveillant* and the *Diligent*, had sailed from Port Lorient on the 30th of October 1805, and steered for the Canaries. Running down the coast of Africa from north to south for many hundred leagues, for the purpose of seizing the English vessels engaged in the slave-trade, he took or destroyed a great number; for the English Admiralty, not foreseeing the visit of a French squadron in that quarter, had not taken any precaution. Having cruised during the months of December, January, February, and March, committed great ravages, made rich captures, this division, excepting the *Surveillant* brig, which had been sent to France with intelligence of its proceedings, would fain have put into some port to refit the ships, to repair the rigging, to rest the crews, and to procure fresh provisions. Not daring to return to France during the summer, not disposed to go to our West India islands, which were always closely watched, and having but few ports either French or allied to choose from, it was caught by the trade winds, which carried it towards the coast of America, and in April it reached San Salvador, a port of Brazil, where it had a chance of obtaining provisions, and selling to advantage the blacks taken from the English traders. Having put in there for twenty-two days, it again sailed to cruise off Rio Janeiro, was frequently pursued by English ships going to India, bore away for the latitude of the West Indies, continued to make prizes, and was at length overtaken on the 19th of August by a tremendous hurricane, one of the most terrible that had been experienced in those seas for a quarter of a century. It was dispersed. The *Regulus*, having lost sight of her frigates, and looked for them in vain, reached Brest on the 3rd of October 1806, after having been nearly a year at sea. The *Cybele* frigate, dismasted, had steered for the United States. The *Président*, separated from the division, had been taken. Captain l'Hermitte had destroyed twenty-six of the enemy's vessels, taken 570 prisoners, destroyed goods worth more than five millions, and brought back considerable sums, far exceeding the expenses of the cruise. The slave-trade was ruined for that year on the coast of Africa, and the English insurance companies cried out

furiously against the Admiralty. But our large squadrons were not destined to be so fortunate.

Cadiz presented nothing but wrecks, which required to be reunited and reorganised before a division could be formed out of them. Rochefort contained the division of Admiral Allemand, who was resting in that port after the difficult cruise which he had made in consequence of having missed Admiral Villeneuve, purposing to enter a port of France during the equinoctial gales, which drove off the enemy.

Brest alone afforded resources for equipping a very strong division. Of the twenty-one ships collected in the great harbour, six, the fittest for a long voyage, had been selected, and despatched, under the command of Rear-Admiral Willaumez, on the 13th of December 1805, to the American seas. This division was composed of the *Foudroyant*, an 80-gun ship, the *Vétéran*, the *Cassard*, the *Impétueux*, the *Patriote*, and the *Eole* of 74 guns, and two frigates, the *Valeureuse* and the *Comète*. It carried provisions for seven months. On the news of its sailing more than thirty English ships had started in pursuit of it, for the purpose of seeking it in all the seas. It had first cruised off St. Helena in the months of February and March 1806, taken several prizes there, and then, having sick on board, and being in want of fresh provisions, it had gone to San Salvador, from the same motives which had led Captain l'Hermitte to that port. After a rest of seventeen days, it had sailed to cruise again, and in June had touched at Madeira, with the intention of getting into the wind of the Antilles and there falling in with the great Jamaica convoys. At Martinique it had found but a small quantity of provisions, the colony having scarcely sufficient for its own consumption, few means of refitting, for the almost continual state of war for fifteen years had permitted scarcely any naval stores to be sent thither; and it went to lie in ambush in the passes of the Antilles, in the hope of making some rich capture equivalent to the expense of so large an armament. On the 28th of July, the ships of the squadron were sailing apart, with the intention of taking a convoy which had been descried, when, the wind freshening, the distance which separated them began rapidly to increase. Next morning, the 29th, at daybreak, the admiral had lost sight of the *Vétéran*, on board of which was Prince Jerome Bonaparte, and of the *Valeureuse* frigate. In the hope of meeting with these two ships, he stood to the northward along the coast of America, and proceeded to cruise thirty-eight leagues to eastward of New York; but not falling in with either the *Vétéran* or the *Valeureuse*, he steered for the rendezvous previously agreed upon for such ships as should part company, in latitude 29° N. and longitude 67° W. Here he was joined by the

Valeureuse, but not by the *Vétéran*, which had that moment sailed for the bank of Newfoundland, and he remained in that quarter till the 18th of August. During these vicissitudes the English divisions had missed him, as he had himself missed the Jamaica convoy, which passed within forty leagues of his squadron. Such are the hazards of the sea! Having waited at the rendezvous beyond the time assigned for his ships, Admiral Willaumez, who had intended to proceed to Newfoundland, assembled his captains, held a council of war with them, and having ascertained that they had a great number of sick, scarcely any water, wood, or provisions, he resolved to touch at Porto Rico, then to sail northward to the bank of Newfoundland, destroy the English fisheries there, and return to Europe. But scarcely was this resolution adopted when, in the night of the 18th of August 1806, the same hurricane which had dispersed l'Hermitte's division overtook the squadron of Admiral Willaumez, and for three successive days tossed it about upon the waves till it was on the point of perishing. The *Foudroyant* and the *Impétueux*, the only ships of the squadron which had not been separated by the tempest, lost all their masts, repaired themselves at sea as well as they could, and purposed to proceed in company, when fresh gales parted them also. Perceiving amidst the tempest the lights of several enemy's ships, they sought safety wherever they could. The *Foudroyant*, the admiral's ship, took refuge at the Havannah; the *Impétueux*, having lost her masts, one tier of guns thrown overboard, and part of her powder, suffered herself to drive at the mercy of the hurricane into the bay of Chesapeake, where she ran aground, pursued by two enemy's ships. The crew, seeing their ship lost, sought refuge on shore, where they were protected by the American neutrality, and assembled on board the *Cybele*, Captain l'Hermitte's frigate, which had likewise taken shelter in the Chesapeake. While the *Foudroyant* and the *Impétueux* were thus struggling against ill fortune, the *Eole*, completely dismasted, exposed to the winds and the enemy, had also fled into the Chesapeake. There, towed by American vessels, she was got aground sufficiently high to be safe from the English. The *Patriote*, having lost her topmasts, her mizenmast, and all her sails, had likewise reached the Chesapeake, and cast anchor at Annapolis. The *Valeureuse* frigate had fled to the Delaware. The *Cassard*, after being long buffeted by the waves, having lost the bar of her helm, having had fourteen stanchions stove in, had well-nigh been upset. As, however, she made no water in her hold, she was righted and repaired at sea. Her sails were in tolerably good condition, and she had still provisions for seventy-eight days. Upon the strength of these circumstances it was thought that she had no need to go to Porto Rico, and

she sailed for Europe, reaching Brest on the 13th of October. The *Vétéran*, Captain Jerome, which had been long separated from the squadron, after roving for some time on the coast of North America, had returned to Europe; but the blockade of Lorient had obliged her to take refuge in the bay of Concarneau, where she was scarcely safe.

Thus of the six ships which sailed from Brest, the *Foudroyant* had taken refuge at the Havannah; the *Impétueux* was destroyed; the *Patriote* and the *Eole* had ascended the Chesapeake in a deplorable state, and without much chance of getting out again; the *Cassard* was saved; the *Vétéran* had got to an anchorage at Concarneau, from which it was difficult to extricate her. As for the frigates of the expedition, the *Valeureuse* was in the Delaware; the *Comète* had taken shelter in an American port. A few prizes taken from the enemy formed a slender compensation for such disasters.

About the same time three frigates, the *Syrène*, the *Revanche*, and the *Guerrière*, had been despatched from Lorient for the northern seas, under the command of a brave Flemish seaman, Captain Leduc. The three frigates directed by this intrepid navigator had not experienced the same disasters as the large division of Willaumez, but had met with terrible seas and undergone great hardships. Captain Leduc, sailing from Lorient in March 1806, steered for the Azores, where he picked up some prizes, was separated for a moment from the *Guerrière*, then coming back towards the west coast of Ireland, had borne away for the point of Iceland, which he came in sight of on the 24th of May, and for the point of Spitzbergen, which he had descried on the 12th of June. In those latitudes he had met with frightful weather, and lost sight of the *Guerrière*. Diseases soon broke out; he numbered so many as 40 dead, 160 sick, 180 convalescent, out of 700 or 800 men who composed the crews of his two frigates. Continuing to cruise, sometimes off the coast of Greenland, sometimes off that of Iceland, now and then taking prizes, he had returned in September to St. Malo, and being unable to land there, he put into the little roadstead of Brehat. Notwithstanding these crosses and the severities of the weather, endured by Captain Leduc with extraordinary fortitude, he had taken fourteen English vessels and one Russian, made 270 prisoners, and destroyed nearly three millions' worth of property. Unfortunately he had lost ninety-five men. This cruise might be considered as advantageous, though the weather was so extremely unfavourable. It did the highest honour to Captain Leduc, the commander.

In September 1806, Rear-Admiral Cormao, the same who had behaved so nobly at Trafalgar, sailed from Toulon with the ships the *Borée* and the *Annibal*, the *Uranie* frigate, and the *Succès*, to

fetch from Genoa the ship, *Le Genois*, built in that port. Having crossed the gulf, he returned to Toulon, opening that sea to French and Italian commerce. He repeated this trip more than once, and always succeeded in driving off the enemy's cruisers.

At the same time Captain Soleil, sailing from Rochefort with four frigates and a brig belonging to Allemand's division, experienced a sanguinary disaster. The English had adopted a new system of blockade; it consisted in not keeping so close to the coast, in order to tempt our blockaded vessels to slip out, and thus to procure for themselves the means of cutting them off before they had time to turn back. This stratagem completely succeeded in the case of Captain Soleil. The custom then was to start at night, in order to pass the enemy's cruisers unperceived. The English not being in sight, owing to the distance at which they kept, Captain Soleil slipped out at night on the 24th of September 1806, met with none of them in his way, perceived them next morning, the 25th, in the offing, crowded all sail to outstrip them in speed, cleared the space of 100 miles without being overtaken, but on the 26th was surrounded by Sir Samuel Hood's whole squadron, composed of seven ships of the line and several frigates, and maintained for several hours an heroic fight with five of the enemy's ships. Excepting the *Themis*, which contrived to escape with two brigs, the whole French division was taken or destroyed.

About the same time with these encounters, to which the too great numerical superiority of the enemy gave sooner or later an unfortunate termination, there were others in which the courage of our seamen showed that, ship to ship, when circumstances were not too unfavourable, we were capable of facing the English, and even of beating them. On the 24th of April in the same year, Captain Bourayne, proceeding to the Cape with *La Canonnière* frigate, had fallen in with an English convoy, and dashed into the midst of it to make prizes, when a 74-gun ship, charged to escort this convoy, all at once made her appearance. Captain Bourayne at first wished to decline an unequal combat with this adversary; but finding himself pressed too closely, he gallantly accepted battle, and profiting by the circumstance that the swell of the sea prevented the enemy's ship from using her lower-deck guns, he had taken an advantageous position, and in a few moments brought down her mainmast, completely cut up her rigging, and obliged her to sheer off. Some stout merchantmen having sought to interfere in the fight, he bore down upon them, presently spoiled their stomach, and continued his route to the Cape, being yet unaware of its conquest by the English. These latter, in order to entrap French or Dutch vessels, had not struck the Dutch colours. No sooner had Captain Bourayne cast anchor, than at a signal all

the Dutch colours were hauled down, replaced by English, and a shower of bombs and balls poured upon the *Canonnière*. The undaunted Captain Bourayne cut his cable, sacrificed his anchors, and crowding sail, escaped all dangers. He arrived safe and sound at the Isle of France, where he was destined to signalise himself by fresh naval adventures not less bold, not less glorious.

Another circumstance of this kind, which occurred on our own coast likewise, proved all that could be expected from the ardour and intrepid courage of our seamen. The flute *La Salamandre*, having sailed from St. Malo with a cargo of ship-timber for Brest, being pursued by a large corvette of twenty-four guns, two brigs, and a cutter, ran herself aground near the mouth of Erquy, and the crew defended themselves as well as they could with small arms. Soon perceiving the impossibility of prolonging this defence, they got away in a boat and on the wreck of the mast, succeeded in reaching the land, proceeded to the battery called St. Michel, directed its fire upon the English corvette, which had approached too near to the coast, crippled her so that she could not be worked, and thus forced her to run aground. They then dashed into the water, and seconded by a few soldiers, who had run to the shore, took possession of the corvette in spite of the remnant of the English crew, part of whom were hors de combat, and part had run away.

Such were the actions, unimportant but gallant, by which our sailors signalised themselves against a power usually superior to us in number and training, and still more superior at a moment when all our forces were exclusively directed to the war on land. Thus, at the conclusion of 1806, the able and unfortunate minister, Decrès, having nothing but disasters to relate to a master who was receiving only favourable news from all quarters, was entirely discouraged and not less disgusted with the system of cruises than with the system of great battles. Being obliged to acquaint Napoleon with the reverses which we had sustained in this new system of warfare as well as in the old one, he gave him sound reasons which ought to have convinced him that all kinds of naval warfare were alike dangerous in the then state of things. In the first place, the numerical disproportion was so great, according to him, that the English could blockade our ports with several strong squadrons, and keep at the same time numerous divisions to run after our cruisers the moment they were descried; which proved that, even without pretending to fight general battles, very considerable forces were still required for carrying on war with petty divisions. In the next place, our matériel was too defective in comparison with that of the enemy; and though our sailors, never inferior in courage, were far behind in experience, the matériel which they employed was much more in fault than

their skill. Their ships withstood the tempest much less vigorously than they withstood it themselves. In the hurricane of the 19th of August, which had destroyed Willaumez's division and sadly shattered l'Hermitte's, the English had borne its fury better than we had done, because their rigging was not only better managed, but also because it was of far superior quality. More numerous, better equipped, they were always certain that among them enough would always escape the dangers of the sea to oblige our ships, some to surrender, others to run aground, and others to run away. But the inferiority of number and that of matériel were not, according to Admiral Decrès, the only causes of our disasters. The ships of Willaumez's division, on leaving the port of Brest, where they were selected with care from a considerable squadron, were not inferior in quality to good English ships. But ten months' continuance at sea, without finding any harbour to put into, well supplied with provisions and spare articles, had put them out of condition either to escape by their sailing from a stronger squadron, or to withstand a storm, or to prosecute their cruise without a fresh stock of provisions, which exposed them to the danger of being discovered by the enemy. Admiral Decrès therefore wrote to Napoleon on the 23rd of October 1806: "After ten months' continuance at sea the yards and topmasts break, the rigging gets relaxed, and wears the more, because one cannot follow up its gradual repair while out at sea; the lower masts *give*, the ships become loose; and there is no example of vessels having continued at sea for so long a time, without taking occasion to repair themselves afresh, and quietly, in some port." Unfortunately we had no longer any ports, or those which we had were scantily supplied with stores. We possessed, it is true, an excellent one, incomparable for its advantages, in the Indian Ocean; this was that of the Isle of France, which at the time of the American War had served the bailli Suffrein for the base of operations during his brilliant campaign in India. But amidst the disorders of the Revolution and the difficulties of the continental war, the government had not been able to supply it with naval stores. The Cape of Good Hope, which belonged to allies, could not be provisioned like a national port, and besides, it had just been taken. On the coast of Brazil we had nothing but a neutral and almost hostile port, as it was Portuguese—that of San Salvador. Lastly, in the West Indies we were masters of the magnificent road of Fort Royal, one of the safest and most capacious in the world; but Martinique was utterly destitute of naval stores, and as to provisions, it rather needed that our squadrons should leave part of their biscuit for the troops of the garrison, than have to renew the stock consumed at sea. With four well-stored places to resort to, one

in the West Indies, one on the coast of Brazil, one at the Cape of Good Hope, one in India, we might have kept advantageously at sea. But deprived of these resources we could but appear as fugitives, always hurried, always dreading an encounter, having not only the chances of inferior number against us, but all those of inferior and inadequate equipment. Such were the consequences of long domestic convulsions and of foreign wars, unparalleled for their magnitude, their duration, and their rancour.

Napoleon, whom it was not easy to discourage, and who thought that, notwithstanding many unfortunate accidents, these last expeditions had done great damage to the enemy's commerce, resolved to send out fresh cruises in 1807; but this was strongly opposed by M. Decrès, who said that the coast of Africa, ravaged in 1806 by Captain l'Hermitte, was this year provided with considerable means of defence, in consequence of the vehement complaints of English commerce; that we possessed no place of resort either at the Isle of France, which was destitute of stores, or at the Cape, which was taken, or at San Salvador, which was exhausted, or at Martinique, which had scarcely necessaries for itself. To consolidate, meanwhile, the continental peace, to occupy the English cruisers with squadrons fitted out in our ports, and to take advantage of certain moments for sending succours to the colonies in frigates, appeared to him to be the only allowable activity—an activity that could do little harm for the present and advantageous for the future. Napoleon, who, between Eylau and Friedland, had had to create new armies to overawe Europe on his rear, had admitted the negative system of M. Decrès, and the operations of our navy in 1807 were confined to some succours despatched to the East and West Indies.

Our colonies, though exposed to many hardships, received, nevertheless, frequent relief. Producing nothing but sugar, coffee, some spices, a few dyeing materials, and no provisions, no clothing, their prosperity consisted in selling their natural productions to advantage, in order to procure in exchange the means of clothing and subsisting themselves. At the period of which we are treating, it was difficult to forward these commodities, and provisions arrived with still greater difficulty, on account of the English cruisers. In this state of distress the severity of the exclusive system was relaxed in favour of our colonies. They were allowed that commerce with neutrals which in time of peace is reserved for nationals alone. The North Americans came to fetch their sugar and their coffee, and gave them in return corn and cattle. But as people are more eager to sell their own commodities than to buy those of another, the Americans brought provisions to a greater amount than that of the sugar and coffee which they exported. On account of

the difficulty of selling colonial produce again in Europe, they frequently insisted on being paid in cash for their corn and their cattle, which began to render ready money very scarce. Moreover, paying no custom-house duties at their departure, because they went in ballast, they occasioned a considerable diminution of the local revenues, which consisted almost solely in the produce of the customs, and in consequence nearly all the budgets of our settlements exhibited a deficit. This state, still endurable at the period in question, was likely to be soon aggravated: if peace were not restored, and the maritime contest should assume a character of increased rancour, the measures for crippling commerce would be more strictly enforced on the part both of France and of England. Thus far, however, the despatch of frigates to India, and that of brigs to our Antilles, furnished tolerably abundant resources in specie, provisions, and goods adapted for clothing. The *Semillante* and *Piémontaise* frigates had performed prodigies at the Isle of France in 1806, and captured between them property to the amount of nearly eight millions. They had powerfully seconded the brave General Decaen, who from that magnificent position devoured with his eyes the peninsula of India, and demanded 10,000 men only to throw the whole of it into insurrection. Guadeloupe and Martinique had been supplied with negroes by the cruisers, and several thousand of them had been received; so that the labouring population there had been increased in spite of the war. But the blockades being daily rendered stricter by the enemy, naval stores were wanting for the equipment of cruisers, and our colonies demanded articles of consumption, at least for the troops, specie to pay for the American provisions, armed vessels to continue the cruises, lastly, recruits to fill the vacancies which took place in our garrisons: thus at the Isle of France, which would have required 3000 or 4000 men, they were reduced to 1600. At Martinique, where there had been 4700, and which needed 5000 at least, there were left 3000 at most. At Guadeloupe there were scarcely 2000 left. These garrisons, it is true, seconded by inhabitants full of energy and patriotism, were sufficient to repel any force which the English squadrons could transport to so remote a distance. At St. Domingo, terrible convulsions and the destruction of a fine French army were followed by scenes equally ridiculous and atrocious. Dessalines, a negro, aping the Emperor Napoleon as Toussaint l'Ouverture had endeavoured to imitate the First Consul Bonaparte, was seen placing an imperial crown upon his black head, soon sinking beneath the daggers of the negro Christophe and the mulatto Pethion; then these two new competitors contending, like the generals of Alexander, for the power of Toussaint l'Ouverture, drenching with their blood that soil which they would not water

with their sweat, and leaving it sterile—for blood, let people say what they will, never fertilises the earth. After these sanguinary and burlesque scenes, we lost the French part of the island; we were confined to the Spanish part, where we occupied the town of Santo Domingo with 1800 men, the relics of an army equally unfortunate and heroic. General Ferrand conducted himself there with ability and vigour, profiting by the divisions of the blacks and the mulattoes to maintain his ground, and by the safety enjoyed under the protection of our bayonets, drawing to him numerous colonists, French and Spanish, black and white, masters and slaves.

Such was the state of our navy and of our maritime establishment on the return of Napoleon from his long campaign in the north. Encouraged by his prodigious triumphs to attempt everything, persuaded that, at the head of the continental powers, he should obtain peace, or that he should conquer England by a combination of overwhelming forces, he was full of ardour. Accustomed, moreover, to find in his genius inexhaustible resources for conquering men and the elements, he was far from sharing in the discouragement of Admiral Decrès. He discovered in the future new and as yet untried resources against the English. In the first place, all the inlets had not till then been closed against British commerce. By Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and the Hanseatic towns, by Portugal, which was hostile, by Spain, which was negligently watched, by Austria, which it had been necessary to treat with more delicacy, many doors had been left at least ajar; and English commodities being sold cheap (which they might well be at that period), had found means to penetrate to the continent. Now, on the contrary, every avenue was to be closed, and an immense injury was preparing for the manufactures of England. Napoleon, moreover, was about to be at liberty to increase his naval force, either with the resources of the French budget, daily becoming more wealthy, or with the produce of conquest, or with the timber and the hands of the whole coast of Europe. His numerous armies being, besides, disposable, he had conceived a vast system, the successive development of which we shall see hereafter, and which would have so multiplied the chances of a great expedition directed against London, Ireland, or India, that this expedition, once eluding the vigilance of the Admiralty, might perhaps have at last succeeded, or that British obstinacy might in the end have yielded to the threat of an ever imminent danger. Napoleon, in fact, was not much in favour of great naval battles, which, for the rest, he had accepted on certain occasions merely to avoid recoiling in too manifest a manner from the enemy. Neither was he more in favour of cruises, which the want of safe and well-stored places of resort rendered

too perilous. But his design was, uniting the Russian, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian navies—having armed fleets at the Texel, Flushing, Boulogne, Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, Cadiz, Toulon, Genoa, Taranto, and Venice—keeping numerous camps full of invincible troops near these fleets—his design was to oblige England to maintain before those ports naval forces inadequate to blockade all, and starting unawares from one that might be ill watched, to transport an army either to Egypt, to India, or even to London, and while waiting for the realisation of this chance, to exhaust the English nation of men, timber, money, perseverance, and courage. We shall see, in fact, that if he had not exhausted himself in a thousand enterprises foreign to this great object, if he had not wearied out the goodwill or the patience of his allies, certainly the means were so vast, so well conceived, that they would in the end have triumphed over England.

But before arriving at this immense development which two or three years would have sufficed for attaining, Napoleon began by issuing orders for redoubled activity in the building of ships throughout the empire, and then by trying in the Mediterranean that system of expeditions, ever ready and ever threatening, by making an attempt on Sicily, in order to add that island to the kingdom of Naples, already given to his brother Joseph.

Informing his brother Louis that the Dutch army was about to return, and thenceforward to absorb a smaller portion of his resources, he enjoined him to put the Texel fleet into good condition, and to collect there at least nine ships of the line fully equipped. At Antwerp and Flushing he had already obtained astonishing results. Five ships, some of eighty, the others of seventy-four guns, built at Antwerp, had descended without accident to Flushing, crossed the shoals of the Scheldt, and were equipping in the latter port. Three others, nearly finished, on the stocks at Antwerp, would increase the Scheldt squadron to eight. Dutch, Flemish, Picard sailors were collected from all the coasts to man them. Napoleon ordered the three ships finished to be launched, and fresh keels to be laid down upon the stocks which had become vacant, and the number of those stocks to be increased; for it was his intention that Antwerp should become the port for building, not only for Flushing but for Brest, on account of the timber of Germany and the north, floated down by the rivers into the whole of the Netherlands. He purposed to reserve the timber at Brest for the repair of the squadrons which were always equipping at that great port. He promised himself on his return to Paris to review the old Boulogne flotilla, and to organise it upon a different plan. He urged the building of frigates at Dunkirk, Havre, Cherbourg, and St. Malo. At Brest, where, ever since the squadron of

Willauvez sailed, there had remained twelve ships armed, five of which were bad and seven good, Napoleon ordered the five bad to be put out of service, and the seven good to be equipped in the best possible manner, reserving the sailors who had become disposable for the new ships which were preparing to be built. He directed that a ship, the building of which was just finished, should be added at Lorient to a division of two ships already there. He consented that the *Vétéran*, which had taken refuge at Concarneau, and was obstinately blockaded by the English, should be disarmed and the crew conveyed to Lorient to man a ship lately built. We had at Rochefort a fine division of five ships, equally well equipped and commanded. The commander was one of those men whom the sailors in their familiar language call *sea-wolves*, the brave Admiral Allemand, deprived of his frigates by the disaster of Captain Soleil, but impatient nevertheless to sail, and always stopped by an English squadron, which for eight or ten months had not lost sight of the Isle of Aix. Napoleon gave orders for launching a ship that was finished, for refitting another that might be rendered serviceable, and for increasing this division to seven. Whenever ships were launched he had other keels laid immediately upon the stocks. His financial resources, old and new, enabled him, as we shall presently see, to make these immense efforts. At Cadiz he had an excellent division of five ships, relics of Trafalgar, well organised, well manned, and commanded by Admiral Rosily. Napoleon would have wished to add to them some Spanish ships; but when he cast his eyes upon the Peninsula, he could not suppress a mingled feeling of pity, anger, and indignation, when thinking that, at Ferrol and Cadiz, Spain was not able to equip one division; that at Carthage alone she had six ships, which had been equipped several years before, the hulls of which were in a filthy state from lying in the port, with rigging hanging loose, and provisions insufficient for the shortest campaign; for the crews had consumed those on board, having none on shore. He said to himself that he must come to the point, and insist that Spain, for her own sake, for the sake of her allies, should govern herself differently; and meanwhile he addressed almost threatening representations to the cabinet of Madrid, to induce it to attach a few ships to those of Admiral Rosily, and recommended to the latter to hold himself in readiness to weigh anchor at the first signal. At Toulon there were three ships, two belonging to Toulon and one to Genoa. In conjunction with several frigates they made some successful sorties. Napoleon desired that the *Commerce de la Ville de Paris* and the *Robuste* should be launched at Toulon, and the *Breslau* at Genoa; that they should be equipped by dismantling either bad or inferior ships; that

fresh ships should be laid down on the stocks where they were built, and that there should be six ships ready in that port. He sent engineers to Spezzia to examine that position, which the continual study of the map had revealed to him. He enjoined his brother Joseph, after obtaining information concerning the ports of Naples and Castellamare, to commence there the building of two ships, and to proceed soon to the building of four. Recollecting that a French ship had found an asylum at Ancona, he thought that he might make use of that port, and ordered two ships to be built there, for the purpose of employing the timber and the workmen of the Roman State, caring but little about the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, whom he already treated as though it no longer existed. Lastly, at Venice there were five ships building. He ordered three more to be put upon the stocks on account of the treasury of Italy, and two on account of the treasury of France, and directed canals to be cut for taking the resuscitated navy of Venice from their arsenal to the Adriatic Sea. The same Italian provinces which were to furnish the timber and the workmen for these operations were also to furnish sailors, always very plentiful on their coasts. With these numerous new ships, with sailors to be found on the coasts of Europe, with an addition of young French soldiers and officers, the number of whom Napoleon never had difficulty to augment, he might hope to double or treble the naval forces of the empire before a year had elapsed. These ships, insufficient at first to match English ships, would be sufficient in a short time to carry troops, and would be so immediately to necessitate fresh blockades and to doom England to ruinous expenses.

While these immense armaments were in preparation, Napoleon intended forthwith to send succours to the colonies, and to assemble by the same operation forty sail in the Mediterranean. For this purpose he directed that the divisions of Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort should take on board 3100 men and a great quantity of stores; that they should land 1200 at Martinique, 600 at Guadeloupe, 500 at St. Domingo, 300 at Cayenne, 100 at Senegal, and 400 at the Isle of France, and on their return to Europe proceed through the Straits of Gibraltar to Toulon. The junction at Toulon of seven ships from Brest, three from Lorient, seven from Rochefort, six from Cadiz, and six from Toulon, would compose, with frigates, a total of forty sail, twenty-nine of them of the line, a force superior to any that the English, even if timely apprised, could bring into that sea under two or three months, and capable of throwing 15,000 or 18,000 men into Sicily, and as many as one pleased into the Ionian Islands.

Admiral Decrès, who applied himself with honourable courage

to oppose Napoleon's projects when the magnitude of them was not proportionate to the means, did not fail to impugn this scheme of junctions preceded by a voyage to the West Indies. He thought that to make the revictualling of the colonies dependent on the success of two or three great expeditions was an imprudent thing; for these great expeditions of several ships of the line and frigates to carry a few hundred men to the colonies incurred dangers which were not in proportion to the importance of the object; that it would be better to despatch single frigates, each carrying a certain quantity of stores and two or three hundred men; that if we lost one, the loss was inconsiderable; so the others arrived, the colonies would be always sure of receiving a portion of the succours which were destined for them. As for junctions in the Mediterranean, he maintained that the divisions ordered to pass through the Straits, in spite of the English squadron at Gibraltar, would have to run immense risks; that to escape them they ought to be left at liberty to take advantage of the first favourable gale; that, therefore, no other instruction ought to be given them but to pass the Straits, leaving them to seize the first favourable circumstance without complicating their mission by a voyage to the West Indies and a return to Europe. Lastly, he thought that it would be sufficient to send into the Mediterranean the Cadiz division placed so near to the goal, and perhaps that of Rochefort; but that we ought not to deprive ourselves of all the forces we had in the ocean, by despatching the Lorient and the Brest divisions also to Toulon.

Napoleon, who suffered his ideas to be modified by experienced men when those men furnished him with good reasons, received favourably the observations of M. Decrès. In consequence, he decided that, from the ports of Dunkirk, Havre, Cherbourg, Nantes, Rochefort, Bordeaux, in which there were many frigates, single vessels should sail for the colonies; that the naval divisions ordered to proceed to the Mediterranean should have that sole direction; and as for the number, he proposed to call two at least to Toulon, that of Rochefort and that of Cadiz, which would form, with the Toulon division, a squadron of seventeen or eighteen sail of the line, besides seven or eight frigates, a force sufficient to make him absolute master of the Mediterranean, and to execute there all that he meditated relative to Sardinia, Sicily, and the Ionian Islands. In consequence, Admiral Allemand at Rochefort, Admiral Rosily at Cadiz, had orders to seize the first propitious occasion for weighing anchor, passing the Straits, making any manœuvre which their experience and the circumstances of the sea should suggest. The court of Spain was required to equip a few ships at Cadiz, and to issue immediate orders that the Carthagena

division, commanded by Admiral Salcedo, should be supplied with the provisions necessary for a short expedition, and despatched to Toulon.

Such were the measures ordered by Napoleon in execution of the treaty of Tilsit, to intimidate England by an immense concurrence of means, to dispose her to peace, and if she were bent upon war, to force Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Portugal, Austria, to close their ports against the productions of Manchester and Birmingham, to prepare, with the junction of all the naval forces of the continent, expeditions, the ever threatening possibility of which would sooner or later weary out the perseverance or exhaust the finances of the English nation, without taking into account that the success of a single one would be sufficient to strike her to the heart. But the attention of Napoleon was not wholly engrossed by foreign affairs. He was anxious at length to direct it to the administration, the finances, public works, legislation, to everything that could conduce to the internal prosperity of France, which he had as much at heart as his glory.

Before he turned it to those points, he was obliged to make some indispensable changes in the high civil and military offices. M. de Talleyrand was the principal, if not the sole, cause of these changes. That able representative of Napoleon to all Europe, who was indolent, addicted to pleasure, never in haste to act or to bestir himself, and whose physical infirmities increased his fondness for indulgence, had been severely tried by the campaigns of Prussia and Poland. To live in the cold climate of those distant regions, to scamper over the snow after an indefatigable conqueror through bands of Cossacks, to sleep most frequently under thatch, and when favoured by the fortune of war, to live in a wooden house, decorated with the title of the castle of Finkensteen, harmonised no better with his taste than with his energy. He was tired, therefore, of the ministry for foreign affairs, and wished to resign, not the direction of those affairs, which were his favourite occupation, but to direct them under a different title from that of minister. His pride had been much hurt at his not becoming grand dignitary like M. de Cambacérès and M. Lebrun; and the principality of Benevento, which had been conferred on him in compensation, had only postponed, not satisfied, his longing. An occasion offered for increasing the number of the grand dignitaries; this was the indefinite number of the princes of the imperial family, who were at the same time grand dignitaries and foreign sovereigns. There were three in this predicament: Louis Bonaparte, who was king of Holland and constable; Eugène de Beauharnais, who was viceroy of Italy and arch-chancellor of State; Joseph, who was king of Naples and grand elector. M. de Talleyrand had insinuated to the emperor that they ought to

have deputies appointed, with the titles of vice-constable, vice-grand-elect, vice-chancellor of State, and that if, indeed, their by no means active functions scarcely required a double titular, still the high offices destined to reward signal services could not be multiplied too much. M. de Talleyrand would have wished to become vice-grand-elect, and leaving to a minister for foreign affairs the vulgar duty of opening and sending off despatches, continue himself to direct the principal negotiations. While with the army he had not neglected any opportunity of talking to the emperor on this subject, never ceasing to extol the advantages of these new creations, and alleging, in regard to himself in particular, his age, his infirmities, his fatigues, and his need of rest. By dint of perseverance he had obtained a sort of promise, which Napoleon permitted to be wrung from him against his will; for he never intended that the grand dignitaries should perform any active functions, seeing that, partaking in some measure in the inviolability of the sovereign, they were not expected to be responsible. On the contrary, Napoleon held it to be essential that he should possess the power of removing persons invested with active functions, and he especially disliked to place in a position of demi-inviolability a personage whom he distrusted, and whom he deemed it prudent to keep constantly under his all-powerful hand.

As soon as he had returned to Paris, at the moment when every one came to receive the reward for his services during the late war, M. de Talleyrand went to St. Cloud to remind Napoleon of his promises. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès was present. Napoleon betrayed a strong feeling of displeasure. "I cannot comprehend," said he sharply to M. de Talleyrand, "your impatience to become a grand dignitary, and to quit a post in which you have acquired importance, and from which I am aware you have reaped great advantages" (alluding to the contributions said to have been levied from the German princes at the time of the secularisations). "You ought to know that I will not suffer any one to be at the same time grand dignitary and minister; that the foreign affairs cannot then be reserved for you, and thus you will lose an eminent post, for which you are qualified, to gain a title which will be no more than a satisfaction granted to your vanity."

"I am worn out," replied M. de Talleyrand, with apparent phlegm, and with the indifference of a man who had not understood the emperor's cutting allusions; "I have need of rest."

"Be it so," rejoined Napoleon; "you shall be grand dignitary, but not you alone." Then addressing Prince Cambacérès, "Berthier," said he, "has rendered me as much service as any person whatever; it would be unjust not to make him grand dignitary too. Draw up a decree by which M. de Talleyrand

shall be raised to the dignity of vice-grand-elect, Berthier to that of vice-constable, and bring it to me to sign." M. de Talleyrand retired, and the emperor expressed more at length to Prince Cambacérès all the dissatisfaction that he felt. It was in this manner that M. de Talleyrand quitted the ministry for foreign affairs, and with great prejudice to himself and to public business withdrew from the person of the emperor.

The decree was signed on the 14th of August 1807. It was necessary to appoint successors to Prince de Talleyrand and Prince Berthier; the one as minister of foreign affairs, the other as minister of war. Napoleon had at hand M. de Champagny, minister of the interior, a mild, honest, industrious man, initiated by his embassy at Vienna in the ways, but not in the secrets, of diplomacy, and unfortunately not capable of withstanding Napoleon, whom it is true nobody would then have been capable of restraining, such was the overpowering influence of success and circumstances. M. de Champagny was therefore appointed minister for foreign affairs, and succeeded in the ministry of the interior by M. Crétet, a well-informed and laborious member of the Council of State, and at the moment governor of the Bank of France. He was preferred to Count Regnault de Saint-Jeand'Angely, whose double talent of writing and speaking seemed to render him indispensably necessary in the Council of State and in the Legislative Body, and whose character appeared unsuitable to the post of minister of the interior. M. Jaubert, another member of the Council of State, succeeded M. Crétet as governor of the Bank.

Napoleon, in raising Prince Berthier to the dignity of vice-constable, had no intention to deprive himself of his services as major-general of the grand army, a post in which none could equal him, and in which he therefore continued him. But he selected for his successor as minister of war General Clarke, whose administrative talents he had recently put to the test in the post of governor of Berlin—talents more specious than solid—but who, assuming the appearance of anxious docility and close application to business, had misled Napoleon. There was, however, sufficient ground for this choice, for the military men fit for active war were all employed; and among those who were better suited to the cabinet than to the field of battle, General Clarke appeared to be the one who had most of the spirit of order and of that comprehension of details which administrative matters require. M. Dejean continued in the post of minister of the matériel of war. General Hullin, whose attachment and personal courage Napoleon had had more than one occasion to appreciate, succeeded to the command of Paris, in place of Junot, appointed to head the army of Portugal.

About this time France sustained a serious loss in the person

of the minister of public worship (*ministre des cultes*), Count de Portalis, a learned lawyer, an ingenious and brilliant writer, an able co-operator in the two most meritorious works of Napoleon, the Civil Code and the Concordat, having in his relations with the clergy had the skill to preserve a due medium between weakness and rigour, esteemed by the French Church, and exercising a useful influence over it and over Napoleon; a personage, in short, much to be regretted at a moment when we were on the point of an open rupture with the court of Rome, and as much to be regretted in the administration of the *cultes*, as Talleyrand in the direction of the foreign affairs. That laborious man, struck with a sort of blindness, had had the art to supply the want of the sense of which he was deprived by a prodigious memory; and it once happened that, being summoned to write from Napoleon's dictation, he reproduced from memory his ideas, with their vivid expression, which he had made believe to take down in writing. M. de Portalis had become dear to Napoleon, by whom he was deeply regretted. His successor as *ministre des cultes* was another lawyer—another author of the Civil Code, M. Bigot de Préameneu, a man of no very brilliant understanding, but discreet and religious without weakness.

It was requisite to compensate M. Regnault de Saint-Jeand'Angely, who had approached the ministry of the interior without arriving at it. M. Regnault was one of the members of the Council of State most employed by Napoleon on account of his intimate acquaintance with matters of business, and his facility of expounding them in perspicuous and eloquent reports. As there was then no other disputation but that of a councillor of State discussing a subject in opposition to a member of the Tribunal before the mute Legislative Body, and adducing reasons agreed upon against arguments likewise agreed upon, nothing more was wanted for these contests, arranged beforehand in preparatory conferences, and resembling those of free assemblies as much as the manœuvres of a review resemble war, than fluency, variety, and brilliancy. Only it was requisite that this talent should be ready and indefatigable under a master prompt in conceiving and in executing, desiring, when he turned his attention to a subject, to go through with it at the moment that it suggested itself, in order to proceed immediately to another. M. Regnault was the first of orators for such a part; and it may be said that all the eloquence of the time was his alone. Napoleon, appreciating his services, resolved to compensate him with the title of minister of State, a title without definition, which gave the rank of minister without conferring the power, and with a place at court, to which was attached a very handsome salary; that of Secretary of State to the imperial family. M. Defermon, for his services in the section of the finances,

M. Lacuée, for those which he rendered in the direction of the conscription, obtained also the quality of ministers of State.

These appointments being decided upon with the arch-chancellor, the only person whom he consulted on such occasions, Napoleon bestowed on legislation, the internal administration, the finances, and the public works, an attention which he had never refused them during the war, but which, given at a distance, hastily, amid the pealing of cannon, was sufficient for superintending, not for creating.

The first point to which Napoleon turned his thoughts was the introduction into the imperial constitution of a modification which appeared necessary to him, though in itself of very little importance—that was, the suppression of the *Tribunate*... This body had ceased to be any more than a mere shadow, since it had been reduced to the number of fifty members, deprived of tribune, divided into three sections, those of legislation, internal administration, and finances. It discussed with the corresponding sections of the Council of State, in particular conferences, the *projets de loi* which were to be proposed by the government. We have explained elsewhere how this business was managed. The lapse of time had made no change in the proceedings; all that it had brought with it was a little more calmness and silence. After conferences held at the arch-chancellor's, a member of the *Tribunate* and a member of the Council of State went each of them to deliver a speech before the Legislative Body, either in a contrary sense, or in the same sense, according as there had been agreement or divergence. The Legislative Body then voted, without speaking a word, and by an immense majority, the *projets* (bills) presented, excepting in some very rare cases, which concerned material interests, the only interests on which members ventured to differ in opinion from the government; also excepting in some still more rare cases, in which the propositions in question wounded the sentiments of men attached to the Revolution—sentiments dormant, not extinguished, in their hearts. At such times minorities of forty or fifty voices proved that liberty was deferred, not destroyed, in France. Thus internal affairs were carried on silently and speedily, with the general approbation, founded on the persuasion that these affairs were perfectly conducted, the emperor having most frequently devised, the Council of State thoroughly examined, the *Tribunate* contradicted in their speech, the measures adopted. As for foreign affairs, which it would then have been high time to discuss boldly in order to stop him whom the impetuosity of his genius was soon to plunge into an abyss, they were reserved exclusively for the emperor and the Senate, in very unequal proportions, as may well be imagined. Napoleon decided at will upon peace and war in a manner

more absolute than the emperors of ancient Rome, the sultans of Constantinople, or the czars of Russia; for he had neither prætorians nor janissaries, neither Strelitzes, nor Ulemas, nor aristocracy. He had but soldiers equally submissive and heroic, but a salaried clergy excluded from public affairs, but an aristocracy which he created, with titles begotten by his imagination, and with a fortune derived from his vast conquests. From time to time he communicated in confidence to the Senate diplomatic negotiations when they had terminated in war. The Senate, which, since 1805, had, in the absence of the Legislative Body, received the attribution of voting levies of men, paid for those confidences with two or three conscriptions, which the emperor paid for in his turn with magnificent bulletins, with blackened and tattered colours, with treaties of peace, unfortunately too far from durable; and the country, dazzled with all this glory, delighted with its tranquillity, finding internal affairs conducted with superior ability, the external affairs raised to an unparalleled height, wished that this state of things might last for a long time to come; and now and then only, on seeing the French army wintering on the Vistula, and battles fought near the Niemen, began to fear that all this greatness might find an end in its very excess.

A slight agitation was manifested in this government only when one-fifth of the Legislative Body was to go out. Then some intrigues were formed about the Senate, which was required to choose the members of the deliberative bodies from the lists presented by electoral colleges formed for life. Applications to the principal senators were resorted to, and men solicited a seat in the Legislative Body, mute, but having a salary attached to it, as they would solicit a place in the finances. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès superintended the elections, in order to admit none but adherents; and for this very little picking and choosing was required. The worst that could happen was, that at the end of each list there might slip in a few creatures of the opposition in the Senate, timid and not numerous adversaries, whom Sieyès had deserted and forgotten, who repaid by forgetting him in their turn, and who found fault with Napoleon, not for the rash enterprises which were to bring ruin upon France, but for the Concordat, for the Civil Code, and for many other equally excellent creations.

Such were the forms of that heroic despotism which sprang from the Revolution. It was of little consequence to change them, for the groundwork must have remained the same. Certain details might no doubt have been rectified in the organisation of those dependent and submissive bodies. This might have been done, and Napoleon had so designed in regard to the Tribunal. The Tribunal, confined to criticism on words

in the private conferences, annoying to the Council of State, to which it was nothing but the obscure rival, had a false position, a position unworthy of its title. The Legislative Body, though not desiring more importance than it had, and by no means disposed to use the liberty of speaking in case that were restored to it, was sometimes confused at its mute condition, which exposed it to ridicule. There was one very simple thing to be done, and which could scarcely have been prejudicial to the liberty of the time—this was to unite the Tribune to the Legislative Body, by blending together attributions and persons. This Napoleon, after conferring with the arch-chancellor, resolved to do. In consequence, he decided that the Tribune should be suppressed, that its attributions should be transferred to the Legislative Body, thus put again in possession of the liberty of speech; that at the opening of every session there should be formed in the bosom of the Legislative Body, and by ballot, three commissions, of seven members each, destined, like the suppressed commissions of the Tribune, to attend, the first to legislation, the second to internal administration, the third to finances; that these sections should continue to discuss with the corresponding sections of the Council of State, and in private conferences, the *projets de loi* submitted by the government; that when they should find themselves agreed with the Council of State, a member of that Council should come and explain from the tribune of the Legislative Body the motives which the government had had for proposing the *projet* in question; and that the president of the commission should give, on his part, the motives which it had for approving it; but that in case of disapproval all the members of the commission should be admitted to produce publicly the reasons on which their opposition was founded; and that, lastly, the Legislative Body should continue to vote, without any other debate, on the measures submitted to its approbation. It was further determined that, to avoid changing the present state of things in the session that was about to open, and all the business of which was already prepared, the *senatus-consulte*, containing the new arrangements, should not be promulgated till the day on which that session should close.

In fact, the Legislative Body, recovering the faculty of speech, since twenty-one of its members, elected annually by ballot, were called to the discussion of the matters under consideration, the suppression of the Tribune merely put out of sight a body which had long been deprived of life. The Legislative Body was sensible of this restitution of speech, not that it was ready to make use of it, but because it would relieve it from a ridicule which had become annoying. At any rate, there was one word suppressed, a word which had had some importance: it was

that of Tribune. This was enough to displease certain constant friends of the Revolution, and to please Napoleon, who was not afraid, in order to get rid of a word which the recollections of 1802 rendered disagreeable, to restore to the Legislative Body prerogatives of some value. It is true that a precaution was taken against these new prerogatives, namely, to fix at forty years the age at which a member could sit in the Legislative Body—a paltry precaution, which would not have prevented an assembly from being enterprising if the spirit of liberty could have then awakened, and which caused the political education of public men to begin too late.

After getting rid of this troublesome shadow of the Tribune, it still remained to be considered what was to become of the persons whom Napoleon, from natural kindness of disposition as much as from policy, never liked to ruffle. He therefore resolved that the members of the Tribune should go with their prerogatives and seek an asylum in the bosom of the Legislative Body, where they were to find a title and appointments. Still Napoleon was unwilling to render the Legislative Body, then limited to 300 members, too numerous by pouring into it the whole Tribune. He therefore opened this asylum to the most obscure members only of the body. As for those who had displayed intelligence and application to business, he destined them for high employments. He first placed in the Senate M. Fabre de l'Aude, who had presided over the Tribune with distinction, and M. Curcé, who had commenced his career by the manifestation of an ardent republicanism, but who had finished it with a motion for restoring monarchy by instituting the empire. As for the other members of the Tribune distinguished by their merit, Napoleon ordered the ministers of the interior and of justice to propose them to him for the vacant places of prefects, first presidents, and *procureurs-généraux*. Lastly, he reserved some others to make them figure in a new magistracy, which was to be the complement of our financial institutions—the Court of Accounts, the creation of which we shall presently relate.

There was another measure which Napoleon was not less impatient to take, and which he considered as much more urgent than the suppression of the Tribune: this was the purification of the magistracy. The government of the Consulate, at the moment of its installation, had brought an excellent spirit into its selections; but in haste to establish itself, it had chosen in haste the members of all the administrations, and if it had erred less than the governments which preceded it, still it had erred too much not to be obliged to reform some of its first nominations. In all the classes of functions it had amended several of them, and these changes of persons had been the more approvable and approved, since it was never political influence

that dictated them, but the knowledge acquired of the merit of each. In the magistracy nothing of the kind could be effected, on account of the irremovability established by the constitution of M. Sieyès; and certain selections made in the year VIII., in ignorance of the individuals, in the hurry of a reorganisation, had become in time a permanent scandal. There had, indeed, been attributed to the Court of Cassation a disciplinary jurisdiction over the magistracy; but this jurisdiction, sufficient in ordinary times, was not so in regard to an establishment of magistrates nominated in mass on the eve of an immense convulsion, and among whom wretches, unworthy of the rank which they occupied, had slipped in. While decency and application prevailed among almost all the agents of the government placed under an active superintendence, the magistracy alone sometimes set pernicious examples. Against such it was requisite to provide; and Napoleon, who deemed himself called in 1807 to lend a finishing hand to the reorganisation of France, had decided to put a stop to such disorder. He had asked the opinion of the arch-chancellor, supreme judge on the like matters. That mind, equally fertile and wise, had found on this occasion, as on many others, an ingenious expedient, founded, moreover, on solid reasons. The constitution of the year VIII., though it declared the members of the judicial order irremovable, nevertheless subjected them to a condition common to all the members of the government, namely, that they should appear in the lists of eligible persons. It had not, therefore, ensured to them the perpetuity of their offices excepting conditionally, and when they should deserve all their life the public esteem. This precaution having been done away, along with the lists of eligible persons, since abolished, we must supply its place, said Prince Cambacérès; and he proposed two measures, the one permanent, the other temporary. The first consisted in not considering the nominations in the magistracy as definitive and conferring irremovability till after the expiration of five years, and according to the experience had of the morality and the capacity of the magistrates chosen. The second consisted in forming a commission of ten members, and charging this commission to review the whole of the magistracy, and to point out such of its members as had proved themselves unworthy to administer justice. This ingenious and cheering combination was adopted by Napoleon, and converted into a *senatus-consulte*, which was to be laid before the Senate. At any other time this measure would have been considered as a violation of the Constitution. At this period, succeeding immense convulsions, in presence of an acknowledged necessity, and with the intervention of a body whose elevation ensured impartiality, it appeared no more than

what it really was, a reparative and necessary act. This purification, soon carried into effect with justice and discretion, was more approved in its execution than in its principle.

While engaged upon these constitutional and administrative measures, Napoleon directed his attention to the finances also. There was no department of the administration with which he had reason to be so well satisfied as with this; for abundance prevailed at the treasury, and order was completely re-established there. We have seen the budget, fixed at first at 500 millions in 1802, soon swelling by the definitive liquidation of the public debt, by the development given to public works of general utility, by the successive re-establishment of the services of the Church in the smallest communes in France, by the creation of a vast system of instruction, by the extension of shipbuilding; lastly, by the institution of monarchy and the creation of a civil list, to about 600 millions, and on the breaking out of the war to 700 millions (820 including the expense of collection). In 1806, Napoleon, on his return from Prussia, had declared to the Legislative Body, with the intention that Europe should be apprised of it, that 600 millions were sufficient for peace, 700 millions for war, and that without recurring to loans, a system to which at that time France had an antipathy, he should obtain that sum by the re-establishment of the natural collections, which the French Revolution had abolished, instead of confining itself to the reform of them. In consequence, he had re-established, under the name of *droits réunis*, the taxes upon liquors, and instead of the tolls at the barriers, a tax upon salt. These imposts soon justified his foresight and firmness; for the *droits réunis*, after producing 20 millions in the first year, yielded 48 in the year 1806, and promised 76 in the year 1807. The salt-tax, which had produced from 6 to 7 millions in 1806, brought in 29 millions in 1807, and encouraged a hope of much more in the following years. The old taxes had likewise shown considerable improvement. The registration had increased from 160 millions to 180; the customs from 40 millions in 1806 to 66 in 1807; for if maritime commerce was prohibited, the commerce with the continent was prodigiously increasing.

Hence the ordinary revenues, which Napoleon in 1806 had estimated at 700 millions, rose far higher in 1807, and might be computed approximatively at 740 millions, made up in the following manner: 315 millions arising from the direct contributions (tax on land, buildings, doors and windows, rent, &c.); 180 from registration (duty on stamps, legacies, changes of property, with the addition of the produce of the forests); 80 produced by the *droits réunis*, 50 by the customs, 30 by salt, 5 by salt and tobacco beyond the Alps, 5 by the salt-

works of the east, 12 by the lottery, 10 by the posts, 1 by powder and saltpetre, 10 by instalments due from purchasers of national domains, 6 by various receipts, 36 by the Italian subsidy, representing the cost of the French army employed in guarding Italy. This total sum of 740 millions, increased by special items to the amount of 30 millions, that is to say, by the additional centimes to the direct contributions for the departmental expenses, and the tolls established on certain rivers for the maintenance of the navigation, would make altogether 770 millions. Some of these items, such as the produce of the registration, of the *droits réunis*, of the customs, might rise or fall, but the total amount must reach and exceed successively the mean revenue of 740 millions, 770 with the special items.

It is true that the expenditure had surpassed not less than the receipts the limits specified in the law of the finances. Napoleon in 1806 had estimated at 700 millions the budget of the state of war, at that time the most usual state; which, with 30 millions of special items, must carry the total expenditure to 730 millions. We know already that it would be 760 millions for that same year, 1806. It was afterwards known that it amounted even to 770. It had therefore exceeded the estimated sum by 40 millions. In 1807, the history of which year we are at this moment relating, the expenditure, computed at 720 millions, 750 with the special items, threatened to be much more considerable. It was subsequently fixed at 778 millions. The cause of these augmentations may easily be guessed; for the expense of the war (for the two ministries, of the personnel and of the matériel), estimated at 300 millions, had amounted to 340. Even this sum is far from revealing the whole extent of it; for independently of the expenses charged to the State, the countries occupied by our troops furnished part of the provisions, and the treasury of the army, into which the war contributions were paid, had defrayed part of the expenses of the matériel and of the pay. The supplements drawn from this treasury amounted to not less than 40 or 50 millions for 1806, and to at least 140 or 150 for 1807. But the current receipts of the year furnishing already 740 millions (770 with the special items), and the treasury of the army being capable of furnishing some supplements without being impoverished, we are authorised to assert that Napoleon had attained his aim, to make the receipts balance the expenses, even during a state of war, without having recourse to loans.

For the rest, the total expenditure of 770 millions for 1806, of 778 for 1807, was not yet wholly revealed; for French account ability, though then in progress, had not yet arrived at the perfection which at present enables us, a few months after the turn

of the year, to ascertain and to fix the expenditure of it. It took not less than two or three years to arrive at such a liquidation. Napoleon then estimated the expenses of the year at 720 millions, 750 including the services paid out of the special items; and excepting a few extra sums for the maintenance of the army, that estimate was correct. In this total of 720 millions, the public debt would require 104 millions (54 of five per cent. *rentes perpétuelles*, 17 of life annuities, 24 of ecclesiastical pensions, 5 of civil pensions, 4 of the debt of Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, and Piacenza); the civil list, 28 (including the princes); the service of foreign affairs, 8; the administration of justice, 22; the expenses of the interior and of the public works, 54 (not including the works in the departments, paid for out of the 30 millions of special items); the salaries of the clergy, 12; the general police, 1; the finances, 36 (including 10 millions for the Sinking Fund); the administration of the treasury, 18 (including 10 millions paid for discount); the navy, 106; war, 324; lastly, a reserve of 10, destined for unforeseen expenses—total, 720 millions, 750 with the expenses of the departments.

This total of the expenses forming 750 millions, compared with the produce of the receipts forming 770 millions, left in hand a balance of 20 millions. Napoleon immediately resolved to restore the benefit of it to the country by the abolition of the 10 war centimes imposed in 1804, in place of the voluntary donations voted by the departments for the building of the Boulogne flotilla. It was a considerable relief upon the direct contributions, the heaviest of all at that period, and the third of the kind granted since the 18th Brumaire. Napoleon ordered that, when the law of finances was presented to the Legislative Body, which was about to be assembled after a prorogation of a year, this important improvement in the condition of the taxpayers should be immediately proposed to him, and that thus the termination of part of the burdens of the war should be proclaimed before the termination of the war itself.

His ardent mind, fond of diving into the future, had already inquired what would be the state of the finances of the country in a few years; and he had ascertained that, in fifteen years, the rapid extinction of the life-annuities and ecclesiastical pensions, that the equally rapid redemption of the *rentes perpétuelles*, provided with a Sinking Fund, to which the sale, daily more advantageous, of the national property gave a very powerful operation, would reduce the public debt from 104 millions to 74. But long before this result, for which he should be obliged to wait several years, the restoration of peace might reduce the public expenses far below 720 millions, causing the revenue to rise much higher, and afford abundant means for either alleviations or useful creations. But for the faults which

we shall soon have to record, these fair prospects would have been realised, and the finances of France would have been saved with her greatness.

With the favourable state of the finances was combined, ever since the preceding year, a completely new facility in the service of the treasury. It will be recollected that various causes, one of them permanent, the other accidental, had rendered this service extremely difficult, and given the treasury the appearance of a rich man in embarrassments, who, either from want of order, or from the difficulty of recovering his revenues, cannot provide for his current expenses. The permanent cause arose from the system of obligations and bills at sight, which the receivers-general subscribed, and which, payable at their chest, month by month, were the medium by which the produce of the taxes reached the treasury. The obligations, representing the amount of the direct contributions, were drawn only at distant dates, and one-fourth at least was not payable till four, five, or six months after the year to which they belonged. The bills at sight, representing the indirect contributions, and drawn at indefinite periods, subsequently to the actual receipt of the tax, kept back the produce of these contributions from the State for fifty or sixty days after they had been paid into the chests of the receivers-general. These latter had, therefore, the benefit of the funds, which constituted part of their emoluments. But what occasioned much more serious inconvenience than the excessive emoluments allowed to the receivers, was the necessity under which the treasury found itself to realise its revenues at seasonable times, to get those obligations and bills at sight discounted, sometimes by the bank, sometimes by great capitalists, who made it pay as high a discount as 12 and 15 per cent., and had even, like M. Ouvrard, turned its paper to strange purposes. The sums which were thus carried back beyond the twelve months of the year were computed at 124 millions. Nevertheless, as the expense was not paid any more than the tax in those twelve months, the service of the treasury might have been carried on almost without discount, if other causes, wholly accidental, had not supervened to complicate the ordinary situation. On the one hand, the anterior budgets of 1805, 1804, and 1803 had left arrears, for which endeavours were made to provide with the current resources; and, on the other hand, the extraordinary financial adventure of the United Merchants, who by blending the affairs of France and Spain had deprived the State of a sum of 141 millions, had thrown the treasury into a double embarrassment. It had found itself obliged to meet an anterior deficit of 60 to 70 millions, and a debit of 141 millions, created by the United Merchants. It had, it is true, solid assets, but difficult to be realised, in pledge for this debit. It had, therefore, been

necessary, in addition to the annual discount of 124 millions' worth of obligations, not due till the following year, to meet a deficit of about 200 millions. This accounts for the financial distress of 1805 and 1806, even amidst the prodigious successes of the campaign which was terminated by the victory of Austerlitz.

But the arrival of Napoleon in January 1806, returning victorious, and his hands full of metals taken from Austria, had revived confidence, and afforded a first relief, for which there was great need. Credit soon recovered itself; the interest of twelve and fifteen per cent. fell to nine and even to six per cent. on the discount of the assets of the treasury.

Other means had been pursued for removing the difficulties of the moment, and rendering their recurrence impossible. In the first place, the national domains, which constituted the endowments of the Senate, the Legion of Honour, and the University, were withdrawn from them; annuities were allotted to them in compensation, and the domains transferred to the Sinking Fund, that might effect a gradual sale of them, which it did with prudence and advantage. These domains were valued at 60 millions, and upon this pledge rescriptions to that amount had been created, bearing an interest of six and seven per cent., according to the time they had to run, and payable successively by the said fund in the course of five years. These rescriptions, on account of the interest which they yielded, the security of the pledge, and the confidence inspired by the fund which was surety for them, had acquired the credit of the best assets, and had never ceased to be negotiable at a rate nearly approaching to par. They had thus furnished a medium for discharging the arrear of the budgets of 1803, 1804, and 1805. The domains given in pledge acquiring in time a more considerable value, the amount of these rescriptions might be increased to 70 and even 80 millions, in order to defray the charges successively revealed by the liquidation of anterior assets.

After this arrear had been provided for, great pains were taken for the recovery of the 141 millions constituting the debit of the United Merchants. M. Mollien, who had become minister of the treasury on the removal of M. de Marbois, and was incessantly stimulated by Napoleon, had displayed remarkable zeal and ability in the realisation of the assets composing this debit. In the first place, immovable property belonging to the sieurs Ouvrard and Vanlerbergh, worth 10 or 11 millions, had been seized. M. Vanlerbergh's warehouses had next been taken possession of; and as the emperor was much pleased with his activity, he had continued to him the supply of the provisions for the army and navy; and by paying only in part for his supplies, means had been secured for soon recovering a sum of

about 40 millions. Messrs. Ouvrard, Desprez, and Vanlerbergh had further advanced, in different payments, or in effects upon Holland, a sum of 30 millions. Lastly, Spain, acknowledging herself personally a debtor to the total amount of 60 millions, had paid in assignations upon Mexico for 36 millions of piastres, and promising to pay directly 24 millions in the course of 1806, at the rate of 2 millions per month—Spain was the worst debtor of all; for of the 24 millions payable by monthly instalments in 1806, she had paid but 14 millions in August 1807, after showing an evident ill-will before Jena, and after Jena a deplorable exhaustion. It was by means of loans in Holland that she discharged, in August 1807, 14 of the 24 millions due in 1806. As for the 36 millions of piastres to be received in the counting houses of Mexico, Vera Cruz, the Caraccas, the Havannah, and Buenos Ayres, M. Mollien devised a very ingenious expedient for recovering that amount; this was to transfer them to the Dutch house of Hope, which made them over to the English house of Baring; and on account of the scarcity of the precious metals in England, the latter obtained permission to bring them over from the Spanish ports in English frigates. France guaranteed only the delivery in harbour to English boats, at the rate of 3 f. 75 c., the rate at which she took them. The profit of 1 f. 25 c., relinquished to those who risked the difficulties of the operation, was, therefore, not at her cost, but at that of Spain, which thus paid by an enormous discount for the distance of the sources of her wealth and the weakness of her flag, obliged to leave to that of England the transport of the metals of America. The houses of Baring and Hope afterwards remitted to the French treasury, by transfers of assets, the amount of the ceded piastres. The bargain had been made on these conditions for more than 25 millions, part of which had just arrived. The surplus had been applied to the payment, in the United States, or in the Spanish colonies, of debts contracted by our ships, and especially those of Admiral Willaumez, which had sought refuge, some in the port of the Havannah, and others in the Delaware and the Chesapeake.

It was by the aid of these various combinations that in August 1807 the French treasury had found means to recover 100 millions of the 141 composing the enormous debit of the United Merchants. The payment of the balance of 41 millions was secured within about 4 or 5 millions, and at very short intervals.

The treasury, deeply in debt in the winter of 1806, soon relieved by the metallic succours which Napoleon had brought from abroad, by the revival of confidence, by the integral payment of the arrear of the budgets, by the almost total recovery of the debit of the United Merchants, had had to provide in

1807 for only a small part of that debit, and for the 124,000,000 of obligations usually recoverable in the following year, which was an easy matter, as we have already observed, the payment of the expenses being deferred nearly as long as that of the taxes. The emperor, therefore, had been able to demand and to obtain that the pay of the grand army, which amounted to 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 per month, and from the immediate payment of which he had dispensed the French treasury, should gradually accumulate at Erfurt, at Mayence, at Paris, and there form a *dépôt* of specie to the amount of more than 40,000,000, an excessive precaution, which proves how prudent in war was that man so imprudent in politics.*

But a new institution, which was the necessary complement of our financial organisation, facilitated in 1806 the operations of the treasury, and in the course of 1807 caused an abundance previously unknown to prevail there. According to the system proposed to the First Consul by M. Gaudin on the morrow of the 18th Brumaire, a system pursued till 1807, the receivers-general signed, as we have said, for the profit of the treasury, bills of exchange, with the title of obligations or bills at sight, falling due month by month. Such was the method employed for getting in the public revenue. The treasury thus had the certainty of a fixed term for payments, and left as emoluments to the receivers-general the profits thence resulting; for the taxes always came in before these obligations or bills at sight were due. It was no doubt a great improvement, in reference to the time at which this system was devised; for it ensured fixed terms for the payment of the taxes. In 1807 there was one step more left to be taken—that was to oblige the receivers to hand over their funds to the treasury the very moment that they received them. But to suppress all at once this system of bills of exchange, and to substitute for it the more natural

* The details which I am here recording may appear trivial, but to me they seem indispensable for conveying a notion of the course of our finances, of the administrative ability of Napoleon and his agents, and of the singular times in which they lived. These details, and in particular those which are about to follow concerning the creation of the new system of the treasury, are extracted, not from official publications, which had become extremely rare at this period, left, moreover, very incomplete, and above all, perfectly silent respecting the means of execution, but from the archives of the treasury itself. With the authorisation of Messrs. Human and Dumon, the ministers of the finances, I have availed myself of these archives in the composition of a considerable work, for which, long as it may be, I have been compensated by the information which I have obtained respecting the progress of our financial administration. I have also been much enlightened as to what concerns this period by the perusal of the unpublished and highly important memoirs of Count Mollien. I guarantee, therefore, the perfect accuracy of the details which have preceded and are about to follow, in regard to the facts themselves and in regard to the figures; only I have given the round sums, and for amounts varying from day to day, the mean sums, which best expressed the durable truth of things.

system of an immediate payment, under the form of an account current between the treasury and the receivers-general, would have been too abrupt a change, and perhaps a dangerous one. The experience and the inventive spirit of M. Mollien suggested to him one of the happiest of transitions.

M. Mollien, as the reader no doubt recollects, was director of the Sinking Fund, when Napoleon, satisfied with the manner in which he had directed that fund, called him in 1806 to the ministry of the treasury, as successor to M. de Marbois, dismissed in consequence of the affair of the United Merchants. Mollien was a shrewd, ingenious talker, full of the doctrines of the economists, very clever at business, though he expounded it in affected language, timid, susceptible, easily agitated in the presence of Napoleon, who disliked long dissertations, but soon finding in himself the independence of an honest man and the firmness of a convinced mind. Napoleon sometimes treated the theories of M. Mollien with the freedom of omnipotence and of genius, and then left that able minister to act, knowing how conscientious, how zealous, and above all, how well qualified he was to reform the mechanism of the treasury, where still reigned old practices, protected by obstinate interests.

When the negotiation of the assets of the treasury was taken from M. Desprez, the representative of the company of United Merchants, a committee of receivers-general had been charged to supply his place. This committee existed for some time, and its service consisted in discounting the obligations and bills at sight, acting on account of the receivers-general. The funds employed by this committee came to it from the receivers-general themselves, who always received the amount of the taxes before the time when the maturity of the obligations and the bills at sight obliged them to pay it in. M. Mollien, struck with the remark that the money with which this committee discounted the assets of the treasury was the money of the treasury itself, conceived the idea of requiring its immediate payment by means of a combination which, without depriving the receivers of the use of the funds by which they made a profit, should lead them to pay over the produce of the taxes to the chests of the treasury directly, and without intermediate agent. To accomplish this he created a chest called *caisse de service*, a title borrowed for its very object, to which the receivers-general were to send, the moment they received them, all the funds obtained from the taxpayers, for which an interest of 5 per cent. was to be allowed. This chest, in order to acquit itself towards them, was afterwards to give them back their obligations and bills at sight, when they became due. To induce the receivers-general to pay the sums collected into this chest, he addressed to them a circular, in which he said that, if on the one hand the funds were

not owing till their obligations became due, on the other they were but depositaries of those funds, and had no right to employ them in private speculations; that the *caisse de service*, instituted to receive them, would be the most natural and the safest depositary, and would pay them a reasonable interest, that of 5 per cent. He added that their account current with this chest would be submitted every month to the inspection of the emperor, whom everybody knew to be attentive, and full of memory and justice. This was enough to stimulate the zeal of those who were well disposed. With the others M. Mollien took a different course. Relieved by the abundance of money which he began to enjoy from the necessity of recurring so frequently to the discount of the obligations and bills at sight, he suffered not one of those papers to be seen on the Place; and if in certain pressing emergencies he was obliged to apply to the Bank of France to discount a few millions in paper, it was on condition that it should keep those assets in its portfolio. Thenceforward the receivers-general who employed the funds arising from the taxes in jobbing upon obligations and bills at sight had no other resource than the *caisse de service* itself, and they sent those funds to it. Some from zeal, from emulation to distinguish themselves in the eyes of the emperor himself—others, from the impossibility of finding elsewhere an employment for their capitals, since the obligations had ceased to appear on the Place, paid the realised produce of the taxes into the *caisse de service* for the sake of the interest of 5 per cent., and the chest acquitted itself towards them by giving them back their obligations whenever they became due. The operation of discount was thus naturally suppressed, and succeeded by an immediate payment to the treasury on condition of an interest of 5 per cent. for the time to run between the period of payment and the period when the obligations and the bills at sight would become due.

Instituted at the conclusion of 1806, at the moment of the departure of Napoleon for Prussia, the *caisse de service* was disgorging funds in 1807 at the moment of his return. M. Mollien, whose ingenious and skilful combinations on this occasion cannot be too much admired, did not stop at directing the funds of the receivers-general towards the *caisse de service*; he went further. It was not the receivers only who had recourse to the obligations and the bills at sight for the employment of funds at their temporary disposal; it was also individuals, who sought to place them there for a short term (as is done at the present day by the French capitalists, who look out for bills of the treasury, or by the English capitalists, who buy Exchequer Bills); it was also public establishments which had capitals to place out, such as the Mont-de-Piété, the bank, the Sinking Fund, &c. These different capitalists applied to the bankers

usually jobbing in obligations and bills at sight, in order to procure some. M. Mollien authorised the *caisse de service*, by the decree of institution, to issue bills on itself, bearing an interest of 5 per cent., and at a fixed term. Instead of giving obligations or bills at sight to private individuals, it gave them the bills upon itself, and it had soon issued to the amount of 18 millions, which put it in possession of a like sum in cash. It concluded, moreover, a particular treaty with the Mont-de-Piété, which usually needed from 15 to 18 millions' worth of obligations for the employment of its funds. Instead of giving it obligations, notes of the *caisse de service* were delivered to it, with a guarantee of the reserve of 18 millions' worth of obligations, kept at the treasury in a special portfolio. In this manner the obligations and bills at sight were withdrawn from circulation, and the notes of the *caisse de service* were taken by the public in their stead. In July 1807 this chest had existed a year, and it had already received 45 millions from the receivers-general (half on their own account, half on account of capitalists in the country), 18 millions from the public, and 18 millions from the Mont-de-Piété, that is to say, a sum total of 80 millions.

It may be conceived what facility the creation of the new chest must have given to the service of the treasury, which, relieved from the arrear of the budgets by the creation of the 70 millions' worth of rescriptions, reimbursed for the greatest part of the debit of the United Merchants, found besides, in this floating loan of 80 millions, resources which dispensed it from recurring to the discount of obligations and bills at sight. This loan had in reality always existed, since capitals had always sought a temporary location in the good paper of the treasury. But the treasury had not been their intermediary. Speculators, placed between it and the public, drew away the capitals to themselves, and then made their customers beg, pray, frequently wait, and pay at an exorbitant rate the discount of the obligations and bills at sight. Sometimes even these speculators were no other than its own receivers, who lent it the funds from the taxes, and not only fleeced it without shame, but likewise contracted the mischievous habits of jobbing. The *caisse de service* having become the intermediary, also became master of that permanent loan, of the rate at which it was contracted, and liberated itself from the receivers, whom it reduced to mere depositaries of the public money, and left them nothing more of the part of bankers than the business of moving the funds of the treasury from one point to another. The sudden and extraordinary reduction in the expenses of negotiation for 1806 and 1807 furnished the material proof of all these advantages. For the service of 1806, which, on account of the change in the calendar, comprehended not only the twelve months of 1806

but the last three months of 1805, the amount of the expense of negotiation rose to the exorbitant sum of from 27 to 28 millions.* For the first four months it had been 14 millions (equal to $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions per month, or 40 millions per year). For the seven following months it had been nearly 9 millions (being on an average no more than 1,200,000 francs per month, and 14 or 15 millions per annum). Lastly, for the last four months it had been 4,300,000 francs (which would be equal to, at most, 12 millions per year). This expense was reduced in 1807 to 9 or 10 millions, a considerable saving, which left to the capitalists only legitimate profits, and by no means to be grudged if we consider in particular how it was to be divided. Of these 9 millions the bank received 1,400,000 francs, the Sinking Fund 1,500,000, the Mont-de-Piété 1,350,000, the receivers-general and private individuals, for their perquisites and expenses, 5 millions. What a change if we look back to the preceding years, when the receivers-general made enormous profits by the sum which they retained, if we go back especially to the times of the ancient monarchy, when the farmers-general paid the court, the ministers, the employés, and amassed immense fortunes besides, during a lease of a few years!

The *caisse de service*, in addition to these different advantages of emancipating the treasury, of producing great savings, of bringing the receivers into better habits, was attended with this consequence, to put a stop, in the general circulation of paper, to false movements, which resolved themselves, for the State and for the country itself, either into banking expenses, or the useless displacing of cash; when, for instance, the treasury was not yet in direct and daily communication with its receivers, by means of an account current with them, and it had need of money somewhere, ignorant as it was of this, it got obligations discounted at Paris, and despatched the amount to the spot, where frequently there were abundant funds in the chest of the receiver-general. The receiver-general, on his part, interested in ridding himself of unprofitable funds, sought to transmit them to Paris or to other points, and loaded the public conveyances with specie; whereas if the account current had existed, merely writing would have spared the treasury the sending of cash to the departments, and the departments the sending of it to Paris.

M. Mollien had not confined himself to the creation of a

* 27,369,022 f. for 465 days, divided as follows:—
 for 130 days, 14,385,680 f.
 for 197 days, 8,609,872
 for 138 days, 4,373,470

TOTAL . 27,369,022 f.

caisse de service in the centre of the empire; he had instituted a similar one in the departments beyond the Alps. There, still more than in Old France, prevailed the pernicious contradiction of stagnant capitals in the hands of the receivers, with urgent wants for which it was necessary to provide by the transmission of specie. To put an end to this serious inconvenience, M. Mollien established, not at Turin, but at Alessandria, in the circuit of the great fortresses erected by Napoleon, a transfer chest (*caisse de virements*), into which all the receivers of Liguria, Piedmont, and all French Italy were to pay their funds, and which in its turn forwarded them to the places where they were needed, to Milan in particular, where the French army had to be paid. This chest, placed under the direction of an able agent, M. Dauchy, had soon produced the same advantages as that which had been instituted in Paris, that is to say, rendered the service easy, the sources abundant, the transmission of specie useless; and, in truth, it was worth while to introduce such order into this portion of the finances of the empire; for French Italy (by this name we mean that which was converted into departments, and not that which was constituted under Prince Eugène into an allied but independent State) yielded at this period so much as 40 millions, 18 of which were expended on the local administration, justice, the police, the roads; and 22 millions remained, either for the construction of fortresses, or to contribute to the maintenance of 120,000 men, who barred the routes of Lombardy against the Austrians.

Napoleon, while making war in the north, had watched attentively the course and progress of these new financial creations, and at his return, on the very day that the ministers had come to hail in him the fortunate conqueror of the continent, he had congratulated M. Mollien with a sort of effusion of heart. Never satisfied with doing good by halves, he proposed to render what he called the emancipation of the treasury more complete. The new *caisse de service*, owing to the floating loan of 80 millions which has just been adverted to, was almost dispensed from discounting obligations and bills at sight, save in certain pressing emergencies, when it applied to the bank. But Napoleon resolved to ensure its resources in a definitive manner, with the aid of a combination, the idea of which he had conceived while bivouacking amidst the snows of Poland. The sum of the obligations and bills at sight, not due till the following year, and which it was consequently necessary to discount, amounted to about 124 millions. It is true that if the money was not received, neither was the expense paid till the next year. But Napoleon proposed to have, as far as possible, the expenditure paid during the same year, and for this end to realise the revenues of the State within the same interval of

time. Conformably to this design, which he had conceived in Poland, he directed that the obligations of 1807, which would not fall due till 1808, should be left for the service of 1808; that those of 1808, which would not be due till 1809, should be left in like manner for 1809; so that to the service of each year should be attached only the paper becoming due in the twelve months of its duration. But to accomplish this it would be requisite to furnish 1807 with an equivalent for the 124 millions' worth of paper transferred to the following years. Napoleon resolved to make a loan for the *caisse de service* of 124 millions, which would settle the matter, thanks to the resources which he had at his disposal. After various combinations, he fixed on the idea of making the treasury of the army furnish 84 of the 124 millions, and those establishments which were in the habit of placing their funds in assets of the treasury supply the remaining 40. The new chest would thenceforward find itself in extraordinary abundance, having 84 millions coming to it all at once from the army, and having no more than 40 millions to apply to the public for instead of 80, which it had borrowed of it in 1807. It would be dispensed in future from discounting the obligations and bills at sight, since the service of each year would thenceforward have at its disposal nothing but paper falling due in that same year. Napoleon decided, moreover, that the 124 millions' worth of obligations and bills at sight transferred from one year to another should be shut up in a portfolio and not taken out till the following year, at the moment of replacing them by an equal sum in new paper. It would then become easy to suppress them as useless, for their only function would consist in remaining in deposit in the portfolio, or in affording the receivers-general, by paper at prolonged dates, those profits from interest which it had been thought proper to grant them. The same results might be obtained by regulating the account of interest kept between the treasury and the receivers-general, so as to indemnify the latter. This, in fact, was done afterwards. The *caisse de service*, instituted upon the same principles, is called central chest of the treasury. The receivers-general have an account current with this chest. They are debited, that is to say, made debtors, for all that they have received during the ten days. In like manner they are credited, or made creditors, for all that they have paid into the chest during the same days. The interest, which runs against them when they are debtors, runs for them when they are creditors. The interest account is then balanced every three months, and at the end of the year besides they are allowed, for the mass of the direct contributions formerly represented by the obligations, an improvement of interest which indemnifies them if the receipts have not taken place in the twelve months, which

rewards them if they have managed to effect them in that interval of time, and which finally interests them in the speedy and easy collection of the public money.

This fine operation completed the reorganisation of the finances by the good constitution of the treasury. It was agreed that it should not be definitively carried into execution till 1808, as well on account of the debit of the United Merchants, which could not be entirely discharged before that period, as on account of the collection of the foreign contributions, which it was impossible to effect sooner. The loan of 124 millions was to be applicable to the service of 1808, which, owing to this sum of 124 millions, would cause all the obligations and bills at sight falling due after the 31st December 1808 to stand over for the service of 1809; so that the service of 1809 was to be the first that should have at its disposal nothing but paper becoming due in the twelve months of its duration.*

This loan, granted to the treasury of the State by the treasury of the army, was not to be temporary, but definitive, by means of a profound combination, which revealed still more clearly the use that Napoleon intended to make of the produce of victory. He surmised that after he had paid the extraordinary war expenses of 1805, 1806, and 1807, he should have left about 300 millions, which were already in part deposited, and the whole of which was to be deposited in the chest of the Sinking Fund. He purposed to draw from this treasury as from a wonderful spring, not only wealth for his generals, his officers, his soldiers, but the prosperity of the empire. If to this sum be added from 12 to 15 millions which he had the art to save every year out of the 25 millions of the Civil List, besides a number of domains in Poland, Prussia, Hanover, and Westphalia, we shall have an idea of the immense resources which he had reserved, in order to ensure at once private fortunes and the public fortune. But in the desire to derive from them a double benefit, he should take good care not to reward his generals, his officers, his soldiers with sums of money, for the sums would soon be consumed by those whom he designed to enrich, and who, sensible that they were continually exposed to death, meant to enjoy life while it was left them. It was sufficient, therefore, for him that the treasury of the grand army was rich in revenues, and he was not solicitous that it should be so in ready money. In consequence, he decided that, for the 84 millions which he was about to pay into the *caisse de service*, the State should furnish the treasury of the army with an equivalent sum in inscriptions of 5 per cent. rentes. Fully resolved not to have recourse to the public for contracting loans, he had thus in the

* The definitive decree ordering the loan of 84 millions was not signed till the 6th of March 1808.

treasury of the army a capitalist always at hand to lend the State at a reasonable interest, without either any jobbing or any depreciation of assets; and, moreover, he could complete with assignments in rentes the military fortunes which he had already commenced with assignments in lands.

Upon this principle it was that he finished regulating the budgets of 1806 and 1807, which were not yet definitively liquidated. The war contributions imposed on conquered countries served to defray the extraordinary expenses of subsistence, matériel, and remounts of the army; and Napoleon left nothing to the account of the treasury but the annual and ordinary pay. But this charge alone of pay would make the budget of 1806 amount to 770 millions, and that of 1807 to 778, and as we have seen, the ordinary resources of the taxes had not yet attained that standard. Napoleon thought that the produce of victory ought to serve not only to enrich his soldiery, but also to relieve the finances and to keep them in equilibrium. He resolved, therefore, that the chest of the army should make provision for those excesses of expense which the taxes could not cover, as far as the payment of 33 millions for 1806 and 27 millions for 1807. Thanks to this assistance, the fourteen months' pay, the payment of which had been deferred, and the amount of which had been gradually accumulated in specie in the provident chests established in Paris, Mayence, and Erfurt, would be liquidated. If we add this supplement to those which the chest of the contributions had already furnished for the extraordinary expenses of the war, we shall come at the sums of 80 millions for 1806, and 150 millions for 1807; which would make the total expenses of the army amount to 372 millions for 1806, and to 43 millions for 1807, to say nothing of many other local consumptions escaping all computation. It is this that explains how, out of the 60 millions imposed on Austria in 1805, and the 570 imposed on Germany in 1806 and 1807, there should be left in the treasury of the army no more than about 20 millions of the first contribution, and 280 of the second. But this kind of service was not the only one that the treasury of the army was to render to the budgets of 1806 and 1807. The treasury had counted as receipts for the services for the two years upon assets not susceptible of being immediately realised, such as the 10 millions' worth of property given up by the United Merchants, 6 millions of the price of the salt-works of the east, 8 millions of old accounts of purchasers of national property, the whole amounting to 24 millions. Napoleon consented that the treasury should pay with these assets what it owed to the army for the settlement of the pay. These assets of more or less remote date, but certain realisation, suited the treasury of the army, which had no need of money but of revenues, and

did not suit the treasury of the State, which wanted immediate resources.

Napoleon completed the fine financial measures of this year by the establishment of the new system of accounts by double entry (*en partie double*), which put the finishing hand to the introduction into our finances of that admirable clearness which has ever since reigned in them.

The new *caisse de service* having created for the receivers-general the duty, the interest, the necessity of paying in their funds to the treasury at the very moment when they received them, without any further than the inevitable delay of the local collection, of the centralisation in the chief town of the department, and of forwarding money for expenses either to Paris or to the places where they occurred, had furnished the means of observing more accurately the facts of which the receipt and the paying in of the taxes are composed. M. Mollien had formerly been employed in the department of the farms, in which were not followed in the keeping of accounts the vague and antiquated forms of the ancient treasury, but the simple, practical, and sure forms of commerce, had introduced them at the Sinking Fund when he was director of it, and at the *caisse de service* since he had induced its institution. He had made use at that chest of bookkeeping by double entry, which consists in keeping a day-book of all the operations of receipt and expenditure at the very moment when they take place; in extracting from this day-book the facts concerning each particular debtor and creditor with whom you have done business on the same day; in opening with each of them a particular account which places, facing one another, what they owe and what is owing to them; lastly, in entering the substance of all these particular accounts in a general account, which is but a daily and accurate analysis of the transactions of a trader with all others, and gives him natural contradictors in all those who are named in his books, who, on their part, have been obliged to keep similar books, and to keep them correctly upon pain of fabrication. M. Mollien, observing by the aid of such accounts the proceedings of the *caisse de service* and the situation of the receivers towards it, being enabled at any moment to satisfy himself about their punctuality in paying in, and also to ascertain every moment what resources or engagements it had, naturally asked himself why this system of accounts should not become that of the treasury itself, its sole and obligatory system. The receivers-general at that time sent in to the general office of accounts declarations containing a summary of their receipts and of their payments, at distant intervals of time, and without annexing to them a daily journal of their operations. Neither did the sub-receivers, who handed the funds to them, the paymasters,

who received them from their hands, in order to apply them to the expenses of the State, and who were both their natural contradictors, send in any journal of their operations. All of them furnished nothing more than general results collected later, and too late to enable the general office of accounts, by comparing them, to settle the account of each. Thus the receivers-general could place themselves in debit without the treasury knowing it, and what is worse, without being aware of it themselves. When, it is true, there was any one of them who collected thirty or forty millions in the course of the year, it was easy for him to retain annually 200,000 or 300,000 f. out of such a sum, and by thus gaining four or five years without settling his account, to accumulate three or four debits, and to get one or several millions in arrear with the treasury. There were some who owed 1,200,000, 1,500,000, 1,800,000 f., and who employed them either in embarking in hazardous speculations, or in entering into foolish expenses, or even, considering themselves rich before they were so, in purchasing properties which involved them in ruin, because they were disproportionate to their real fortune. A rigid investigation proves that many of them were in these various situations. The receivers-general who did not deceive the treasury, or who in deceiving it did not deceive themselves, were those who, without saying so, made use for their own benefit of the daily, strict, contradictory system of accounts employed by commerce under the denomination of bookkeeping by double entry, and which M. Mollien had recently introduced both at the Sinking Fund and at the *caisse de service*. This circumstance being soon ascertained by the inspectors of the treasury, was sufficient to serve for a decisive lesson both to the minister and to Napoleon himself, always informed of what was passing in the administration. M. Mollien, not venturing to change suddenly the system of accounts of the empire, nor to extinguish a light, however faint it might be, till he had first caused another to be lit up, conceived the idea of creating a second office of accounts, by the side of the old one, and concurrently with it. He instituted for himself an office of accounts directed by an experienced accountant,* placed under him bookkeepers selected from various commercial houses, and a number of young men belonging to old financial families, some of them even sons of those farmers-general whom the Revolution had sent to the guillotine. In this office he had the accounts with several receivers kept by double entry; these, having no intention to conceal the truth from the treasury, sought, on the contrary, the best means of discovering it. Some others, who, without any ill intention, had no reasons for disliking the new system of bookkeeping but

* M. de Saint-Didier.

its novelty and their ignorance, took young men obtained from the office instituted in Paris to teach them how to make use of it. Lastly, those of whom there was any suspicion were overawed. It took but a very short time to discover that many of the receivers were debtors, some from blindness to their situation, others from engaging in false speculations, or indulging in extravagant luxury. There were some who had at last come to regard their debits standing over for a series of years, from one year to another, as a capital belonging to them, and who had bought estates in proportion to the fortune which they fancied they possessed, but which was not theirs. Several were obliged to give up the secret of their connection with the wealthy speculators of Paris; and thus it was discovered that their funds—that is to say, the funds of the State—had been employed in jobbing in the obligations and bills at sight, which jobbing cost the treasury 25 millions in expenses of negotiation instead of 10. The receiver-general of La Meurthe alone was constituted debtor to the treasury to the amount of 1,700,000*f*. The mystery once unveiled, there was no need to hesitate longer, and it became necessary to change the system of accounts. The thing was easy, since government possessed the means of substituting everywhere the new method for the old one. Napoleon, who always gave force to good innovations by rejecting bad ones, had since his return closely watched the course of this financial experiment; and he authorised M. Mollien to draw up a decree for rendering the new system obligatory throughout the whole empire, from the 1st of January 1808. The relations of each accountable person with the *caisse de service*, accurately described and rendered obligatory, furnished the model for this decree. Every receiver-general or private individual, every paymaster, every depositary, in short, of the public money, charged to receive or to pay it in, was thenceforward required to keep a day-book of his operations, and to send it every ten days to the treasury, which, on comparing these different journals with each other, has since been enabled to ascertain exactly the incoming and outgoing of assets, so as not to pay, not to require, any interest but what it owes, or but what is due to it. The dispositions of this decree are the same as those practised at the present day; and they have rendered the French system of accounts the surest, the most accurate, and the clearest in Europe. They have permitted the accounts of each year to be closed ten months after the end of the year to which they belong, that is to say, on the 1st of the November following. Owing to this reform, the agents of the treasury, checked the one by the other, and with the aid of the daily and direct testimony of their accounts, flooded, as it were, with light, could not have either means or temptation to deceive, and were even secured from the danger

of getting into debt with the State. Napoleon and M. Mollien, agreeing on this point, as on all others, were of opinion that receivers detected in a fault should not be punished, unless in case of evident dishonesty; but that involuntary inaccuracies or dilatoriness, the consequence of old habits, should be pardoned; for the vicious method had been the seducer and accomplice of faulty receivers, and was, indeed, more faulty than they. In consequence, three receivers-general only were dismissed; the others were brought back to better habits, but not deprived of their places.

Napoleon, delighted with this excellent order, resolved to reward the minister who had established it, and whom he had besides powerfully seconded by his approbation, and by the force which he had lent him against interested resistances. Not always approving his ideas in regard to political economy, though he approved all his ideas in regard to financial accounts, he had one day in the Council of State directed some keen shafts against innovators. M. Mollien conceived that those shafts were aimed at him, and complained in a letter which, though respectful, betrayed the mortification which he had felt. Napoleon hastened to answer him in terms full of nobleness and cordiality, and to express his high esteem for him, and his regret that he had been misunderstood. He then sent him one of those high decorations which he conferred on his servants, and a considerable sum of money to purchase an estate, where that minister is now passing the closing years of a useful and justly honoured life.

A single institution was still wanting in order to leave the administration of France nothing more to desire. In the central office of accounts had been collected, as in a focus in which the rays of light concentrate themselves in order to diffuse greater lustre, all the means of control and mathematical verification. But this office had only a purely administrative authority. Its decisions respecting accountable persons were insufficient in certain cases to constrain or to liberate them, and in regard to the country they were of no other moral value than that of a testimony borne by the administrators of the treasury concerning themselves and concerning their subordinates. There was yet left to be created a more exalted jurisdiction, that is to say, a magistracy settling all accounts, discharging validly the accountable agents, releasing their persons and their property pledged to the State, affirming, after an investigation made out of the office of the finances, the accuracy of the accounts delivered, and giving to their annual settlement the form and the solemnity of an *arrêt* of a supreme court. Napoleon had often thought of this, and on his return from Tilsit he realised that grand idea.

There had formerly existed in France, under the title of Chambers of Accounts, tribunals exercising an active superin-

tendence over the accountable agents, supplying in a certain degree the place of that which an ill-organised treasury could not then exercise, having the powers of a criminal jurisdiction over them, charged to punish acts of extortion, but liable also to be dispossessed of those powers by an arbitrary government, and having been so sometimes when proceeding against wealthy agents, having high protectors because they had been in a high degree corrupters. This was the first model which needed improving and adapting to the institutions, the manners, and the regularity of the new times. Ever since the abolition of the Chamber of Accounts in 1789, buried with the parliaments in one common ruin, there had been only a commission of accounts, independent indeed of the treasury, but destitute of character, not sufficiently numerous, and having left an immense number of accounts in arrear. Napoleon, indulging his fondness for unity, and conforming to the character of the new French administration, centralised in all its parts, resolved to have but a single Court of Accounts, which should have equal rank with the Council of State and the Court of Cassation, and should come immediately after those two great bodies. It was to judge directly, individually, and every year the receivers-general and the paymasters, that is to say, the agents of the receipt and of the expenditure. No criminal proceeding against them was attributed to it, for this would have been encroaching upon other jurisdictions, but it was invested with authority to declare them every year acquitted towards the State for their annual conduct, and to liberate their property, that is, to decide questions of mortgage. They were at length charged to keep books of observations respecting the faithful execution of the laws of finances—observations transmitted every year to the head of the State by the prince arch-treasurer of the empire. Warm discussion took place before Napoleon and in the Council of State whether the new Court of Accounts should judge or not judge the *ordonnateurs*, that is to say, whether it should be limited to certifying that the agents of the receipts had collected the moneys legally voted, and had rendered a faithful account of it; that the agents of the expenditure had paid the expenses legally authorised; or if it should go so far as to decide whether the *ordonnateurs*, that is to say, the ministers, had administered well or ill, had, for instance, bought well or ill the corn destined for the support of the army, the horses destined to remount the cavalry; whether they had been, in short, or had not been, intelligent, economical, and skilful dispensers of the public money. To go so far would have been giving to magistrates, who ought to be irremovable that they may be independent, the means, and with the means holding out the temptation, to obstruct the operations of the government itself. By permitting them to

rise from the judgment of accounts to the judgment of the supreme agents of power, the government would have abdicated its authority in favour of a jurisdiction irremovable, and consequently invincible in its errors. It was therefore resolved that the new Court of Accounts should judge only accountable agents, never *ordonnateurs*, and for the greater security it was settled that its decisions, so far from being without appeal, might be referred to the Council of State, the sovereign jurisdiction, at once impartial and imbued with the spirit of government, besides irremovable, and easy to bring back if it could go out of the way.

The organisation of the new Court still remained to be settled. It was proposed to proportion the number of its members to the extent of its duties. In the first place, in order that the investigation which it was to undertake should be real and not a mere assent to the papers drawn up in the office of finances, there was instituted a first class of magistrates, called councillors referendary, having no deliberative voice, as numerous as the multiplicity of the accounts required, and charged to verify each of those accounts, having the accountable papers before them. They were to lay the result of their labours before the high magistracy of master-councillors, who alone should have deliberative voices, and should be divided into three chambers of seven members each, six councillors and once vice-president. It was settled that, according to the importance of the questions, the three chambers were to unite into a single assembly, under the presidency of a first president, who, with a *procureur-général*, was to be at the head of the company, to give it an impulsion and direction. This respectable body, which has since rendered such great services to the State, was to rank immediately after the Court of Cassation, and to receive the same appointments. At its very outset a difficult task was assigned to it, which it alone could perform, that of settling all the accounts in arrear, the number of which amounted to not fewer than 2300, which dated back to the creation of assignats, and the examination of which the last commission of accounts had never been able to finish. This examination was difficult, for it was necessary to distinguish between the honest accountable agents, who had suffered by the continual fluctuations of the paper-money, and the fraudulent agents, who had profited by them. It was not only difficult, but urgent—urgent for the State, which had to claim considerable sums, and for the families of the accountable agents deceased or dismissed, who had to get rid of the legal mortgage laid upon all their property. The new Court was invested with the power of arbitrating in regard to the accounts in arrear, but was limited for the new accounts to the rigorous application of the laws. It soon acquitted itself

of this arbitration, with as much justice as it afterwards exhibited in the pure and simple application of the finance laws, of which it is the keeper, as the Court of Cassation is keeper of the civil and criminal laws of our country.

This institution, which was destined to have such useful and such durable results for the whole administration, had, moreover, the secondary advantage of furnishing honourable and lucrative places for the most distinguished members of the Tribunal, for whom Napoleon was anxious to provide in a suitable manner; for in his conceptions all these things were strongly and intimately connected. He composed, therefore, the new Court of Accounts with the members of the Commission of Accounts, which had just been suppressed, and with the members of the Tribunal, likewise recently suppressed. Messrs. Jard-Panvilliers, Delpierre, and Brière de Surgy, the two former members of the Tribunal, the third a member of the Commission of Accounts, were appointed vice-presidents of the new Court. The important post of president still remained to be filled. This afforded opportunity for making amends to a respectable man for the temporary severities to which he had been exposed. This man was M. de Marbois, removed in 1806 from the post of minister of the treasury for want of shrewdness and firmness in the transactions with the United Merchants. Napoleon had been wrong to expect those qualities of him, and to punish him because he had them not. This wrong he repaired by putting him into his proper place, that of first president of the Court of Accounts; for M. de Marbois was much better fitted for the first magistrate of the finance than its active and circumspect administrator.

To the attention paid to the system of the accounts of the empire, Napoleon added a not less active concern for the great works of public utility. Consulting on this subject with M. Crétet, minister of the interior, with Messrs. Regnault and de Montalivet, members of the Council of State, with the ministers of finances and of the public treasury, he took numerous resolutions, which had for their object either to give greater activity to the works already begun, or to order new ones. The restoration of peace, the supposed approaching diminution of the public expenses, the faculty of recurring to the treasury of the army, either for contracting loans at a moderate rate, without having recourse to credit, permitted Napoleon to follow the inspirations of his creative genius. Thirteen thousand four hundred leagues of highroads, forming the vast network of the communications of the empire, had been either repaired or kept up at the expense of the public treasury. Two monumental routes, those of the Simplon and Mont Cenis, had just been finished. Napoleon ordered funds to be allotted for at

length setting about that of Mont Genève. He opened the necessary credits for trebling the workshops of the highroad from Lyons to the foot of Mont Cenis, for doubling those of the road from Savona to Alessandria, destined to connect Liguria with Piedmont, for trebling those of the highroad from Mayence to Paris, one of those to which he attached the greatest importance. He decreed, moreover, the opening of a route not less useful in his estimation, that from Paris to Wesel. Four of the bridges previously decreed were finished. Ten were building, particularly those of Roanne and Tours on the Loire, of Strasburg on the Rhine, and of Avignon on the Rhone. He ordered that of Sèvres on the Seine; the completion of that of St. Cloud, partly of wood, on the same river; that of the Scrivia, between Tortona and Alessandria; lastly, that of the Gironde, before Bordeaux, which is become one of the grandest monuments in Europe.

The canals, then the only known medium of obtaining for land conveyance the facility and low price of conveyance by sea, had not ceased to engage the attention of Napoleon. Ten great canals, destined to unite together all the parts of the empire, the Scheldt with the Meuse, the Meuse with the Rhine,* the Rhine with the Saone and the Rhone,† the Scheldt with the Somme, the Somme with the Oise and the Seine,‡ the Seine with the Saone and the Rhone,§ the Seine with the Loire, the Loire with the Cher, the sea to the north of Bretagne with the sea to the south; some so natural, so ancient, that they had been projected, and even undertaken, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; some entirely planned by Napoleon; all either continued or commenced by him, were in full progress. That called the canal of the north, which was to form the communication between the Scheldt and the Meuse, the Meuse and the Rhine, and to emancipate the Netherlands from Holland, conceived by Napoleon, possible for him only, on account of the incorporation of the countries traversed by this canal with France, was definitively resolved upon and marked out. The works recently prescribed were begun. The tunnel of St. Quentin, the principal difficulty of the canal which was to unite the Scheldt with the Somme, the Somme with the Seine, was completed, and promised the speedy opening of the navigation from Paris to Antwerp. The canal of the Ourcq, four-fifths finished, would soon bring to Paris the waters of the Marne. Until the waters of the Beuvronne could be brought into the basin of Villette, Napoleon resolved to introduce them immediately into the quarters of St. Denis and St. Martin.

* Canal of the north.

† The Napoleon Canal, from the canal of the Rhone to the Rhine.

‡ Canal of St. Quentin.

§ Canal of Burgundy.

The canal of Burgundy, a plan and creation of the eighteenth century, had been long relinquished. Napoleon had caused that part of it from Dijon to St. Jean de Losne to be continued. Out of twenty-two locks comprehended in this part, eleven executed during his reign had just been finished. The navigation from Dijon to the Saone would therefore soon be rendered practicable. From the Yonne to Tonnerre eighteen locks were required, and these were in progress. But the important point of the work consisted in crossing the heights which separate the basin of the Seine from that of the Saone. The means hitherto proposed appeared inadequate. Napoleon ordered this great line of navigation to be resumed, at first by surveys, and as soon as possible by operations upon the soil. After he had investigated the difficulties presented by the canal from the Rhone to the Rhine, the construction of which he had much at heart, and to which he had permitted his name to be given, he assigned to it further funds. The canal of Beaucaire was finished. He had the state of that of the south, the everlasting glory of Riquet, examined, purposing to continue it to Bordeaux. He caused that of Berry, tending to prolong the navigation of the Cher from Montluçon to the Loire, to be resumed. He gave orders for fresh works upon that of La Rochelle, indispensable to that great naval establishment, and on those of Ille-et-Rance, and of the Blavet, from Nantes to Brest, destined to cross the peninsula of Bretagne in all directions, to render it navigable at all points, and to facilitate the transit of stores to our great military ports.

To this artificial navigation of canals he justly conceived that there ought to be added the natural navigation of streams and rivers, and that for this purpose their courses required to be improved. He ordered surveys to be made of eighteen rivers, upon which, it is true, certain works were already undertaken. Always consistent in his conceptions, he passed from canals and rivers to ports. He assigned fresh funds to that of Savona, which was one of the terminations of the Alessandria road. It is well known what wonders were accomplishing at Antwerp, where vast basins, scooped out as by enchantment, already contained three-deckers, which they had received from the stocks established within the compass of that great city, and which they transmitted by the Scheldt to Flushing. In arrangement with Holland for obtaining the cession of Flushing, Napoleon gave orders for works there, for the purpose of facilitating the entry into, the departure from, and the anchoring in that port, and for placing ships there out of the reach of the enemy. He allotted funds for lengthening the piers of Dunkirk and Calais. At Cherbourg, the great pier destined to form a harbour was above the water, and had been crowned by a

battery called the Napoleon Battery. New funds were granted for the continuation of this superb undertaking, the work of Louis XVI., though it commemorated one of the glories of the ancient monarchy. Lastly, Napoleon prescribed a new examination of the whole system of the fortresses of the empire. He resolved to devote to them not less a sum than 12 millions a year, and he distributed it among them according to their importance, which he appreciated and fixed, classing them in the following manner: Alessandria, Mayence, Wesel, Strasbourg, Kehl, &c.

But never did he turn his attention to great works without thinking of Paris—Paris, his residence, the centre of his government, the city of his predilection, the capital which was an epitome of the greatness, of the moral pre-eminence, of France over all nations. He had promised himself before the conclusion of his reign to cover it with monuments of art and of public utility, to render it not less salubrious than magnificent. Already, thanks to him, thirty fountains, instead of pouring forth water for a few hours, were running day and night. The forwardness of the canal of the Ourcy admitted even of an addition to this abundance, and allowed the water to be kept running without intermission in the other fountains, old and new. At this moment were raised by the hands of several thousand labourers the two triumphal arches of the Carrousel and l'Etoile, the column in the Place Vendôme, the façade of the Legislative Body, the church of La Madeleine, then the Temple of Glory, and the Pantheon. The bridge of Austerlitz, thrown over the Seine at the entry of that river into Paris, was finished. The bridge of Jena, spanning the Seine at its exit, was in progress, and the capital of the empire was thus about to be enclosed between two immortal memorials. Napoleon had enjoined the administration of the bank to build an hotel for that great establishment. He had decreed the palace of the new Exchange, and directed a site to be sought for it. The great Rue Imperiale, resolved upon in 1806, was soon to be commenced. For monuments of art these were sufficient, and it was requisite that he should direct his attention to monuments of public utility. Napoleon in one of his councils decided that long covered galleries should be erected in the principal markets to shelter buyers and sellers from the inclemency of the weather; that instead of the forty slaughterhouses in which cattle for the consumption of Paris were killed, and which were equally unwholesome and dangerous, there should be erected four large buildings for the purpose at the four principal extremities of Paris; that the cupola of the Halle aux Blés should be rebuilt; lastly, that vast magazines, capable of containing several million quintals of grain, should be erected towards the arsenal, near

the creek of the canal of St. Martin, at the point where all the navigable routes terminate. He had bestowed assiduous pains, and expended considerable sums, on the supplying of Paris with provisions, but he thought that it was not sufficient to lay out 20 millions of francs for corn, as he had done at a preceding period; that it was necessary to have besides a place in which it could be deposited; and to this idea are owing the granaries (*greniers d'abondance*) existing at this day near the Place of the Bastille.

For all these works, spread from the centre to the circumference of the empire, the budget of the interior rose instantaneously from 30 odd millions to 56. The reserve funds placed in the budget by way of resource, and lastly, supplementary sums which one knew where to find, were to meet these excesses of the regular expenses, not with interested views of local utility, and not overstepping the bounds of discretion, notwithstanding the creative ardour of the head of the State. Napoleon was nevertheless desirous to ease the treasury, or rather to furnish it with the means of providing continually for fresh undertakings, and he devised various combinations for attaining this end. In the first place, the abolition of the ten war centimes recently granted appeared to him an occasion by which it would be right to profit. It would be sufficient to keep back a small part of that benefit in some of the departments, for instance three or four centimes, to create considerable resources. Napoleon thought that certain works, though having a high character of general utility, such as the canal of Burgundy, the canal of Berry, and the road from Bordeaux to Lyons, presented at the same time an evident character of particular and local utility; that the departments would cheerfully make sacrifices to accelerate their completion: and that in their concurrence there might be found more considerable means of execution, along with greater distributive justice. This was not a vain hope, for several departments had already voluntarily taxed themselves in order to contribute to these vast works of general and particular utility. But these votes had the inconvenience of being temporary, subject to the deliberations of general councils, and on such a groundwork one could scarcely found durable undertakings. Napoleon therefore resolved to present a law, by virtue of which the participation of the departments in certain works should be equitably adjusted, and the centimes judged necessary imposed for a specific number of years. Thirty-two departments were in this predicament. The longest duration of the centimes was to be for twenty-one years, the shortest for three, the mean for twelve; the maximum of the centimes imposed 6, the minimum 2½. Thus the departments of the Côte-d'Or and the Yonne, with the arrondissement of Bar, were to contribute to

the canal of Burgundy; those of the Allier and the Cher to the canal of Berry; those of the Rhone, the Loire, Puy de Dôme, La Corrèze, the Dordogne, and the Gironde, to the highroad from Bordeaux to Lyons. It would be too long to enumerate the others. In general, the proportion to be contributed by the State and the department was fixed at a half each. This impost was after all but a reduction of the land-tax, and the source of immense advantages to the localities on which it was laid.

An annual subsidy being thus ensured by the law which imposed the centimes, it was possible to contract loans, because one had the means of serving their interests. Recourse was had to the usual lender, the treasury of the army, which, according to the intentions of Napoleon, was to seek to procure for itself solid revenues by the advantageous employment of its capitals. This treasury immediately lent the prefect of the Seine eight millions for the works in Paris. Other cities, as well as several departments, had recourse to this beneficent dispensation of the wealth acquired by victory. Always extracting from every idea whatever of utility it comprehended, Napoleon thought to carry the employment of this kind of resource much further. Three of those canals which we have enumerated above, those from the Scheldt to the Rhine, from the Rhine to the Rhone, from the Rhone to the Seine, appeared to him more worthy of fixing his attention, and of becoming the object of his all-powerful activity. Besides these three canals, and almost in their vicinity, there were three others finished, or nearly so, and capable of yielding speedy revenues; these were the canals of St. Quentin, Orleans, and the south. Napoleon resolved to finish them immediately, then to sell them to capitalists in shares which ought to bring in 6 or 7 per cent.; making sure of finding a purchaser for all those which the public would not take. This purchaser, as it may easily be guessed, was again the treasury of the army. These sums, said he to the minister of the interior, you will employ in pushing forward the execution of the three canals, the completion of which is of such importance to the prosperity of the empire; and when these three are completed, I shall sell them to a purchaser, who will take them too; and thus shifting from work to work a capital of three or four hundred millions accruing from moneys annually furnished by the State and the departments, we shall in a few years change the face of the country.

His plan was, after setting all these enterprises in motion, after getting voted in a short session, besides the budget, the legislative measures which he needed for the execution of his projects, to give before winter a few days to Italy, wishing to extend to her also the benefit of his creative looks. He purposed at his return to resolve the questions left undecided, that

in spring the works might commence all over the empire. He therefore ordered the minister of the interior to subject all these ideas to a thorough examination, that they might be realised as speedily as possible. "If we do not make haste," said he to him, "we shall die before we have seen the navigation opened on those three great canals. Wars, silly people, will come, and those canals will be left unfinished. Everything is possible in France at this moment, when one has more need to seek the way to employ money than money itself. . . . I have funds destined to reward the generals and the officers of the grand army. Those funds might as well be given them in canal shares as in rentes on the State, or in money. I should be obliged to give them money if something of that sort were not soon settled. I have made the glory of my reign consist in changing the face of the territory of my empire. The execution of these great public works is as necessary to the interest of my people as to my own satisfaction."

Napoleon, moreover, was deeply intent on the extinction of beggary. To accomplish its abolition, he resolved to create departmental houses, where mendicants should be furnished with work and food, and in which also they should be forcibly confined when found begging in the public places or on the high-roads. He required that houses of this kind should be opened shortly in all the departments. "I attach," he wrote in the letter to the minister of the interior quoted above, "a great importance and a great idea of glory to the suppression of mendicity. Funds are not wanting, but everything seems to me to proceed slowly, and meanwhile the years are flying away. We ought not to pass through this world without leaving traces that recommend our memory to posterity. I am about to be absent for a month. Contrive to be ready on my return on all these questions, to have examined them all in detail, that I may be able by a general decree to give a finishing stroke to mendicity. Before the 15th of December you must have found either in the reserved fourths or in the funds of the communes the resources necessary for the maintenance of sixty or a hundred houses for the extirpation of mendicity; let the sites for them be fixed upon, and the general regulations matured. Don't ask me again for three or four months for collecting information. You have young auditors, intelligent prefects, clever engineers of the *ponts et chaussées*—make all these run about, and don't go to sleep over the ordinary office business. The winter evenings are long; fill your portfolios, that during the evenings of those three months we may be able to discuss the means of arriving at those great results."

In this extreme ardour which impelled him to hasten, nay, to hurry, the accomplishment of good, he paid the like attention to the Bank of France, which he purposed to make one of the

principal instruments of the public prosperity. He had required in 1806 that this great establishment should change its constitution and take the monarchical form, instead of the republican form which it before had—a result obtained by giving it a governor and three regents, appointed by the minister of the finances. He desired, moreover, that the capital of the bank should be proportioned to the part which he destined for it, and that instead of 45,000 shares it should issue 90,000, which would raise its capital from 45,000,000 to 90,000,000. These shares had not yet been issued, because the bank was afraid that it should not find employment for the funds which they would produce, especially as Napoleon had judged it more expedient to cause the service of the treasury to be executed by the treasury itself, and had devoted to this service a sum of 84,000,000, more than half of which was already paid in. The result of this excellent measure was, however, to leave without employment the capitals accustomed to be invested in obligations and bills at sight. Napoleon was delighted at the embarrassment which he thus occasioned to certain capitalists, for, he said, it would reduce them to the necessity of seeking in commerce, in industry, in the great public works, investments which the paper of the treasury no longer offered them. The bank, which was usually engaged in the discount of that paper, and which could no longer procure any, hesitated to issue its 45,000 new shares. Napoleon forced it to issue them, promising soon to furnish it and all capitalists with employment for their money by the multiplication of undertakings of all sorts. In his figurative language he said to the Bank of France, “With the propensity which exists in our country to centralise everything in Paris, to centralise there payments as well as the government itself, the bank ought to become there the greatest of commercial agents; it ought to be truly worthy of its name; and to become for Paris what the Thames, which conveys everything to London, is for London.” He insisted, therefore, on the issue of the 45,000 new shares, which for the rest were disposed of with advantage; for, issued at 1200 francs (1000 francs representing the capital of the share, 200 francs representing old accumulated bonuses), they were negotiated at 1400 francs. The three public effects of the time were the 5 per cent. rentes, the bank shares, and the rescriptions on the national domains, devised to liquidate the arrear. The 5 per cent., at the time of which we are treating (August 1807), sold at 93 francs, the bank shares at 1425, the rescriptions at 92. The rate of the latter had become almost invariable.

Napoleon required that the interest should be reduced to 5 per cent. at the bank, a measure which it most cheerfully adopted. He ordered that the interest of securities should be reduced, for some from 6 to 5, for the others from 5 to 4. At last he carried

the impatience to do good so far as to desire to fix the interest allowed by the *caisse de service* to capitals at 3 and 3½. Having no need of money, pouring it into that chest in abundance, he maintained that only such funds ought to be kept as could be content with that remuneration; that all the others ought to be sent back to commerce; and that thus the reduction of interest ought to be forced by all the means that were at the disposal of the government. But M. Mollien stopped him by proving to him that such a result was premature; for the money promised to the chest was not wholly paid in, and it was still in need of the resources by which it was usually supplied. The success of such a measure would have been infallible in the following year, had not new enterprises abroad intervened to divert the capitalists as well as the soldiery of France from their better, more useful, and more sure employment.

The aspect, if not alarming, at least sad, which the war had assumed during the winter of 1807 [1806?], added to the severity of the season and to the absence of the imperial court, had slackened for a moment the activity of business, particularly in Paris. But the restoration of continental peace, and the hope of maritime peace, had again encouraged the highest flights of imagination, and in all parts people began to fall to work in the manufactories, and in commercial houses to plan speculations which embraced the whole extent of the continent. Though the productions of Great Britain still found their way beyond the coast of Europe by inlets unknown to Napoleon, they yet had difficulty to penetrate and still greater to circulate; cotton threads and stuffs, which, thanks to the prohibitory laws then issued in France, had been fabricated with profit, in great quantity, and with a commencement of perfection, superseded the English productions of the same kind, passed the Rhine in the train of our armies, and spread themselves in Spain, Italy, and Germany. Our silks, unrivalled at all times, filled the markets of Europe, which caused general satisfaction at Lyons. Our cloths, which had the advantage of raw material, since the English were shut out from the Spanish wools, of which we had a superabundance, drove the English woollens out of all the fairs of the continent; for they had the superiority not only in quality, but in beauty. Besides, it was not our productions alone that gained by the exclusion of English goods. Saxony, the most industrious of the German provinces, already sent charcoal by the Elbe to Hamburg, cloths made of the fine Saxon wools to markets to which they had never penetrated, and the metals of the Erzgebirge to all quarters where the metals of America were deficient. Our iron and that of Germany also profited greatly by the exclusion of English and Swedish iron, and was perceptibly improved.


Napoleon strove to encourage by the power of Fashion, a fickle, fantastic power, which shares with the sacred power of conscience the privilege of escaping from material power, but which, nevertheless, cheerfully obeys glory—Napoleon strove, then, by the power of Fashion to gain a preference for the use of articles manufactured from materials of continental origin. He wished, for example, that the linens and lawn, composed of flax and hemp, should be preferred to the muslin made of cotton. He also wished silks to be preferred to plain cloth, which must occasion a return towards the luxury of the *ancien régime*, towards that time when men, instead of dressing in the modest stuff called black cloth, wore stuffs as rich as those used for the dresses of the other sex. And he encouraged this return to luxury, as well as a return to nobility, to titles, to dotations, for reasons peculiar to himself, serious reasons which always guided him in things apparently the most frivolous.

Excepting our maritime branches of industry, which he sought to compensate for their inactivity by immense naval creations, our other industries found, therefore, a powerful cause of development in that extraordinary situation which Napoleon had procured for France. But, what is singular enough, the greatest of mechanical forces, that of steam, which from its expansive power animates at this day every branch of human industry, which gives motion to so many machines, which propels so many vessels, which is, with peace, the principal cause of the prosperity of the inferior classes, and of the luxury of the superior classes—the force of steam was developing itself by his side, without him. Those machines, then called fire-machines, from their most obvious phenomenon, rudely constructed, consuming an excessive quantity of fuel, were employed only in coal-mines, on account of the cheapness of fuel in works of that kind. The Society for the encouragement of industry offered a prize as a reward for those who should render its application more practical and more economical; and two thousand leagues from our shores, Fulton, scarcely listened to by Napoleon in 1803, because he wanted, for crossing the sea, not an untried but a tried agent, was obliged to go and make the experiment with a vessel moved by what was then called the fire-machine. He had performed the double trip from New York to Albany and from Albany to New York in four days, and had scarcely attracted the notice of the world, the face of which he was to change thirty years later. This is not the first time that a great invention, due to second-rate but special geniuses, has passed before the eyes of superior geniuses without exciting their attention. Gunpowder, which, destroying the empire of physical strength in war, contributed so powerfully to a revolution in all the European manners, was not only odious to the

heroic Bayard, but excited the disdain of Machiavel, that most profound judge of human things, that author, so admired by Napoleon, of the treatise on war, and was considered by him as an ephemeral invention, and of no consequence.

Thinking that a good legislation is, with capitals and markets, the greatest benefit that can be conferred on commerce, Napoleon had ordered the Arch-Chancellor Cambacères to get a commercial code prepared. This code had, in fact, just been drawn up. The groundwork of it had been borrowed from the most celebrated maritime nations, and the simple and analytical form from French intelligence, which shone more than ever in this respect in the digesting of the laws, because, conceived on a vast and uniform plan, and their composition carefully revised in the Council of State, they were never retouched by the Legislative Body, which adopted or rejected them without amendment. This code, completely prepared at the moment of Napoleon's return, was to be presented, with the other measures, of which we have just been treating, to the Legislative Body, in the short session for which preparations were making.

It was time that Napoleon should at length confer on his glorious soldiers the rewards which he had promised them, and which they had so richly deserved during the last two campaigns. But it was in the very form of these rewards that he particularly displayed his organising and mighty genius. He was sure, in fact, to take good care not to fling to them the spoils of the vanquished, that they might consume them in an orgie. He purposed, with what he should give them, to found great families, which should surround the throne, concur in defending it, contribute to the splendour of French society, without injuring public liberty, and above all, without incurring any violation of the principles of equality proclaimed by the French Revolution. Experience has proved that an aristocracy is not prejudicial to the liberty of a country; for the English aristocracy has contributed not less than the other classes of the nation to the liberty of Great Britain. Reason, moreover, tells us that an aristocracy may be compatible with the principle of equality on two conditions: in the first place, that the members who compose it should have no exclusive rights, and should be subject in all things to the general law; secondly, that the purely honorary distinctions granted to one class should be accessible to all the citizens of the same State who have earned them by their services or their talents. So much as this was but reasonable in the wishes of the French Revolution, and this it was that Napoleon purposed to maintain invariably. But in our opinion, in modern societies, in which envy has risen against aristocratic institutions, what a sensible government had best do is to leave the laws of human nature to act, without in any way interfering with them,



They lead back the free man to God, and, next to God, to another worship, that of ancestors. Whatever we may do or not do, the great warrior, the great magistrate, the illustrious man of science will bequeath to their descendants a consideration which will cause them to be distinguished from the multitude, and which, when they have merit, will spare them the most serious of the difficulties that merit meets with in this world, that of attracting the first notice of the public.

The laws have no need to interfere in order that it should be thus, for it is not written laws, it is Nature, that produces the aristocracy in all countries, and especially in republics. Nature had created the aristocracy of Venice long before it thought of attributing exclusive rights to itself by laws. It is a thing in which one ought not to intermeddle, whatever inclination one may have to do so. Time makes aristocracies everywhere; all that one has to do is to avoid the ridicule of making them one's self, and at most to prevent their being tempted hereafter to arrogate to themselves exclusive privileges.

If, however, there was a sovereign in the world who could escape the ridicule or the odium sometimes excited by the establishment of aristocratic institutions, it was he who dared and could re-establish monarchy on the morrow of the Republic, the difference of ranks (not that of rights) on the morrow of a brutal equality; who in his vast imagination figured to himself a society great as his genius and his soul; and who had immortal names and treasures for the creating of mighty families; who could call them Rivoli, Castiglione, Montebello, Elchingen, Auerstädt, and give them an annual revenue of not less than a million. He was therefore excusable, for he would not violate the true principles of the French Revolution, and he thought, on the contrary, to consecrate them in a striking manner by making, after the image of his own fortune, a duke, a prince, out of a child of the plough. Finally, a last consideration here presented itself to disarm the most austere reason, that was to procure for himself the innocent and inoffensive means of exciting and rewarding eminent services.*

Napoleon availed himself, therefore, of the glory of Tilsit, and of the spell with which he was surrounded at this moment, to accomplish the plan which he had long meditated of instituting a nobility. Already, in 1806, when he had given crowns to his brothers, to his sisters, to his adopted son, principalities to several of his servants, that of Ponte Corvo to Marshal Bernadotte, that of Benevento to M. de Talleyrand, that of Neufchatel to Major-General Berthier, he had announced that

* These lines were written in 1846, under the monarchy. I wrote them because I believed them to be true in all times. I shall not alter them, therefore, though times are changed.

a posterior statute should prescribe the system of the succession for the families in favour of whom there should be created principalities, duchies, and other distinctions destined to be hereditary. In consequence, he enacted by a *senatus-consulte* that the titles conferred by him, as well as the revenues attached to those titles, should be transmitted hereditarily in a direct line from male to male, contrariwise to the system of succession admitted by the Civil Code. He further enacted that the dignitaries of the empire of all degrees might transmit to their eldest son a title, which should be that of duke, count, or baron, according to the dignity of the father, on condition of having given proof of a certain revenue, at least one-third of which must remain attached to the title conferred on the descendants. These same personages had also the right of constituting for their younger sons titles always inferior to those which should have been granted to the eldest, and always on condition of setting aside out of their fortune a part which should be the hereditary accompaniment of those titles. Such was the origin of the *majorats*. The grand dignitaries, as the grand elector, the constable, the arch-chancellor, the arch-treasurer, were to have the title of *highness*. Their eldest sons were to have the title of *dukes*, if their father had instituted in their favour a *majorat* with a revenue of 200,000 livres. The ministers, the senators, the councillors of State, the presidents of the Legislative Body, the archbishops, were authorised to take the title of *count*, and to transmit that title to their sons or nephews, on condition of a *majorat* with a revenue of 30,000 livres. Lastly, the presidents of the electoral colleges for life, the first presidents, *procureurs-généraux*, and bishops, the *maires* of the thirty-seven good cities of the empire, were authorised to take the title of barons, and to transmit it to their eldest sons, on condition of a *majorat* with a revenue of 15,000 livres. The plain members of the Legion of Honour might call themselves chevaliers, and transmit that title on condition of a *majorat* with a revenue of 3000 livres. Another statute was to determine the conditions to which these portions of the fortune of the families thus placed under an exceptional government were to be subject.

Here, again, it was the Senate that received the commission to stamp a legal character on this new imperial creation by means of a *senatus-consulte*, which most expressly stipulated that these titles should not confer any particular right, or form any exception to the common law, or give any exemption from the charges or duties imposed on other citizens. There was nothing exceptional but the system of the substitutions imposed on the ennobled families, which acquired their new greatness by sacrificing for themselves the equal sharing of inheritances.

These dispositions being decreed, Napoleon distributed among his companions-in-arms part of the treasures amassed by his genius. While waiting till he had decreed to Lannes, Massena, Davout, Berthier, Ney, and others the titles which he purposed to borrow from the great events of his reign, he resolved to ensure their opulence to them immediately. He gave them estates situated in Poland, in Germany, in Italy, with power to sell them, and to invest the produce in France, besides sums in ready money to buy and furnish hotels. This was only a first gift, for these assignments were afterwards doubled, trebled, and even quadrupled, some of them. Marshal Lannes received a revenue of 328,000 f., and a million in ready money; Marshal Davout a revenue of 410,000 f., and 300,000 f. in money; Marshal Massena a revenue of 183,000 f., and 200,000 f. in money (he was afterwards one of the most richly endowed); Major-General Berthier a revenue of 405,000 f., and 500,000 f. in money; Marshal Ney a revenue of 229,000 f., and 300,000 f. in money; Marshal Mortier a revenue of 198,000 f., and 200,000 f. in money; Marshal Soult a revenue of 305,000 f., and 300,000 f. in money; Marshal Augereau a revenue of 172,000 f., and 200,000 f. in money; Marshal Bernadotte a revenue of 291,000 f., and 200,000 f. in money. Generals Sebastiani, Victor, Rapp, Junot, Bertrand, Lemarrois, Caulaincourt, Savary, Mouton, Moncey, Friand, St. Hilaire, Oudinot, Lauriston, Gudin, Marchand, Marmont, Dupont, Legrand, Suchet, Lariboisière, Loison, Reille, Nansouty, Songy, Chasseloup, and others, received, some a revenue of 150,000, others 100,000, 80,000, 50,000 f., and almost all 100,000 f. in money. The civilians also had their share in these largesses. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès and the Arch-Treasurer Lebrun obtained each a revenue of 200,000 f. Messrs. Mollien, Fouché, Decrès, Gaudin, Daru, obtained each 40,000 or 50,000 f. All, civil and military, were only provided for *ad interim* by these magnificent gifts, and were so in Poland, in Westphalia, in Hanover, which must interest them in upholding the greatness of the empire. Napoleon had reserved for himself in Poland domains to the amount of 20 millions, in Hanover of 30, in Westphalia a capital represented by a revenue of 5 or 6 millions, independently of 30 millions in capital, and of an income of 1,250,000 f. in Italy, already reserved in 1805. He had, therefore, wherewithal to enrich the brave men who served him, and to fulfil the fair promises which he had addressed to several of them. "Pillage not," said he; "I will give you more than you would take; and what I shall give you, amassed by my foresight, will not cost your honour or the nations we have conquered anything." And he said truly, for the domains which he distributed were imperial domains in Italy, royal or grand ducal in Prussia, in Hanover, in Westphalia. But these

domains, won by victory, might be lost by defeat; and fortunately for them, those who were so magnificently endowed were mostly to receive in France, either on the rentes or the canals, other assignments, less exposed to the risk of events than lands situated abroad.

The French generals were not the only participators in these largesses, for the Polish generals, Zayonsheck and Dombrowski, old servants of France, obtained each a million.

After the generals, the officers and soldiers also received marks of his liberality. Napoleon ordered all of them to be paid, besides the pay in arrear, considerable gratuities, in order to procure for them immediately a few pleasures, which they had well earned. Eighteen millions were distributed under this form, 6 millions among the officers, 12 among the soldiers. The wounded had a treble sum. Those who had been fortunate enough to be present at the four great battles of the late war, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, and Friedland, obtained twice as much as the others. To these gratuities of the moment were added permanent assignments of 500 f. for the soldiers who had lost a limb, and of 1000, 2000, 4000, 5000, 10,000 f. in favour of those officers who had distinguished themselves, from the rank of sub-officer to that of colonel. For the officers, as for the generals, this was but a first remuneration, followed subsequently by others more considerable, and independent of the salaries of the Legion of Honour, as well as the retiring pensions legally due at the end of the military career.

This glorious conqueror, therefore, designed that everybody should participate in his prosperity as in his glory. As for himself, simple, frugal, magnificent for others only, repressing the slightest misapplication of the public money, unmerciful for any expense which seemed to him unnecessary in his palace or in the State, he was prodigal only with noble views, and towards all who had contributed to the greatness of France or to his own. The slanderers of his glory and of ours have alleged that, in despoiling the vanquished, in glutting the greediness of his soldiers, he had taken from the one the means of exalting the bravery of the others. We must leave such calumnies to foreigners, or to parties associated with foreigners. These treasures were taken not from the people, but from emperors, kings, princes, convents, leagued against France ever since 1792. As for the vanquished people, they were spared as much as the war allowed them to be, much more than they had been spared in any times and in any country, much more than we have been ourselves. And as for those heroic soldiers whose value Napoleon is said to have stimulated with money, they had no more idea that, in running to Austerlitz, to Jena, to Eylau, to Friedland, they should meet with Fortune by the way, than they

expected it in running to Marengo, to Rivoli, and at an earlier period to Valmy or to Jemmapes. After flying to the defence of their country in 1792, they now dashed on to glory, impelled by the passion for great things, a passion which the French Revolution had begotten in them, and which Napoleon had inflamed to the highest degree. If, on the morrow of a long perseverance in defying cold, hunger, death, they found competence, it was a surprise of Fortune's which they enjoyed, as a soldier enjoys a little gold found on a field of battle; and these gratifications which had been contrived for them, they were ready to leave afresh, to expend again that life which they considered as not their own, and which they hastened to use as a loan made to them by Napoleon, till he should demand from them the sacrifice of it.

Napoleon took other measures as wise as they were humane. He ordered, according to his custom in every interval of peace, several reviews of the army, one after another, to withdraw from the ranks soldiers who were worn out or mutilated, and fit for no other service than to stimulate the young soldiers by their military stories. He caused their pension to be settled and their places in the ranks to be filled up by conscripts, repeating incessantly that the treasury of the army was not rich enough to pay for all old services, neither was the budget of the State to pay soldiers who could not serve actively. Thinking of civil merits as well as of military merits, he demanded and obtained a modification of the law of civil pensions, a law which ever since 1789 had varied as much under the influence of popular caprice as rewards varied before that period under the influence of royal caprice. At the time of the Constituent Assembly, the limit adopted for the very highest civil pension was 10,000 f., in the time of the convention 3000 f., in the time of the consulate 6000 f. Napoleon wished that limit to be fixed at 20,000 f., proposing to himself not to approach, not to come up to it, unless in favour of signal services. It was the death of M. Portalis, leaving a widow without fortune, which suggested this idea, attended with little danger to the finances of a State, and useful for the development of talents. He granted a pension of 6000 f. and a sum of 24,000 f. to Mademoiselle Dillon, sister of the first officer murdered in our popular disturbances. The mother of the empress, Madame de la Pagerie, having died at Martinique, he ordered the negroes and the negresses who had served her to be set at liberty, a dowry to be given to a young woman who had nursed her, and, in short, placed in comfort all who had had the honour to approach her.

The Church, as well as all the servants of the State, had a share in the munificence of the conqueror. On the proposal of Prince Cambacérès, who had acted *ad interim* as minister of the

cultes, during the interval between the death of M. Portalis and the appointment of M. Bigot de Préameneu, he decided that the number of the chapels of ease (*succursales*) should be increased from 24,000 to 30,000, in order to extend the benefit of divine service to all the communes in the empire. Perceiving, moreover, that the career of the priesthood was in less request than formerly, he granted 2400 exhibitions for the small seminaries. He wished to make known to the Church that if there were some differences of a purely temporal nature with its head, in regard to spirituals he was always equally disposed to serve and to protect him. At this moment he was engaged with the execution of the law of 1806, which authorised him to create a university out of the foundation of that great establishment. But this idea was not yet mature either with him or around him. For the present, he was content with increasing the number of the exhibitions in the lyceums.

While he was thinking so much about others, he nevertheless lent himself to a measure which seemed to interest his personal glory alone. He consented, agreeably to a wish, excited by sincere attachment in some, by adulation in others, to change the title of the Civil Code, and to call it the Napoleon Code. Assuredly if ever title was merited, it was this ~~for that Code~~ ^{was} as much the work of Napoleon as the victory of Austerlitz and Jena. At Austerlitz, at Jena, he had had soldiers who had lent him their arms, as he had lawyers who lent him their knowledge in the digesting of that Code; but to the force of his will, to the soundness of his judgment, was owing the completion of that great work. And if Justinian, who, according to an expression in the exposition of his motives, "fought by his generals, thought by his ministers," had a right to give his name to the code of the Roman laws, Napoleon had a greater right to give his to the code of the French laws. Besides, the memory of a great man protects good laws, and good laws protect the memory of a great man. Nothing, therefore, was more just than this measure, and it was conceived, proposed, and cordially adopted almost without leaving Napoleon the trouble of wishing ~~or~~ asking for it. At the same time, Napoleon wrote to his brothers and to the princes under his influence, to persuade them to introduce into their States this code of justice and civil equality. He had prescribed its adoption throughout all Italy. He enjoined his brother Louis to adopt it in Holland, and his brother Jerome to adopt it in Westphalia. He invited the King of Saxony, Grand Duke of Warsaw, to put it in force in restored Poland. It was already studied in Germany; and in spite of the repugnance which that country must then have felt to receive anything coming from France, all hearts there were attracted by the equity of a code which,

besides its precision, its clearness, its consistency, had the advantage of re-establishing justice in families, and putting an end to feudal tyranny in them. At Hamburg the Civil Code had been called for by the wish of the population. It began to be acted upon in Dantzic. It was announced that the same would be the case at Bremen and in the Hanseatic cities. The prince primate in his principality of Frankfort, the King of Bavaria in his aggrandised monarchy, had enjoined the study of it, in order to introduce it into the minds of their subjects before introducing it into practice. The Grand Duke of Baden had just admitted it into his duchy. Thus France indemnified humanity for the blood spilt in war, and made some compensation for the injury done to the present generation by an immense benefit ensured to future generations.

All sorts of glory would be in vain dispensed by Providence to a nation, if that nation had the keen regret to conceive that the glory of letters, of the arts and sciences, was refused it; and if the Romans had had no other merit than that of conquering the world, of civilising after they had conquered it, of giving it immortal laws which, adapted to our manners, still live in our codes; if they had but this eminent merit; if they had not numbered among their great men Horace, Virgil, Cicero, Tacitus, done nothing to charm mankind after having done everything to domineer over it, they would have left the Greeks the honour of being its delight, and they would occupy in the annals of the human mind a lower place than that small nation. But the genius of government and war never exists without the genius of letters, and of the arts and sciences, because it is impossible to act without thinking, and to think without speaking, writing, and painting.

France, which has shed so much generous blood on all the battlefields of Europe—France has also had this double glory; and while she won the victories of the Downs and of Rocroy, she created the Cid and Athalie, she had Condé and Bossuet to celebrate Condé. Napoleon in his immense desire to be great, but to be so with France, and through France, would also have been glad that she should have under his government all sorts of crowns, those of intelligence as well as those of power, and not renounce the glory of producing men of letters, men of science, painters, as he produced heroes. But the will can do everything among men except changing the times, and the times have a greater influence over the genius of nations than all the will of governments. Charlemagne, great as he was, smitten as he showed himself to be with the noblest studies, could not fertilise a barbarous age. St. Louis XIV. while admiring genius sometimes without comprehending it, sometimes maltreating it, had only to allow it to act in order to

have around him the finest spectacle that the human mind ever exhibited, for never did it produce works so grand and so perfect. Napoleon would have had the time, which he wanted through his own fault, which would have restored the French nation that youth of intellect which produces a Cid and an *Athalie*; and he would certainly have refused it a liberty which creates Ciceros and Sallusts when it exists, Tacituses when it has ceased to exist.

France, from 1789 to 1814, eminent in the sciences, fancying that she was so in the arts of design, even flattered herself that she was eminent in letters. In these sciences three savants, illustrious for their vast and noble works, ensured a durable glory to the period in which they lived. M. Lagrange, by pushing the Algebraic sciences beyond their former limits, gave a new power to abstract calculation. M. de Laplace, applying this power to the universe, did the only thing which, after Galileo, Descartes, Kepler, Copernicus, and Newton, was left to be accomplished; this was to calculate with a precision, till then unknown, the movements of the celestial bodies, and to display in its sublime totality the system of the world. Lastly, M. Cuvier, applying cool and patient observation to the wrecks with which our planet is covered, studying, comparing together the relics of the animals and plants buried in the ground, discovered the succession of time in that of those beings; and in creating the ingenious science of comparative anatomy, rendered positive that fine history of the earth which Buffon had conjectured by an effort of genius, and left conjectural for want of facts sufficiently observed at the period in which he lived.

In the arts of design a reaction, estimable for the intention, had taken place against the tastes of the eighteenth century. During that effeminate and philosophic age, Boucher, the adored painter of the Regency, had with light hand sketched upon the canvas licentious courtesans, remarkable not for beauty but for a certain lascivious gracefulness. Greuze, with chaster inspirations, had opposed to them charming virgins, painted with a soft and delicate pencil. But the art, debased by Boucher, had not been raised again by Greuze to the dignity of style, which, in default of genius, Poussin had preserved to it. It has been granted but once to a nation to display to the world the genius of a Michael Angelo and a Raphael; but all, when they practice the arts, ought to aspire at least to correctness, to nobleness of design, and can attain it by severe study. This it was that David, the celebrated painter, accomplished. Disgusted with the character of the art at the time of his youth, he went to Rome, was smitten there by the touching, picturesque, and sublime beauty of the masters of the Italian school, and his passion for the beautiful increasing gradually, he had raised

himself to a level with the Italians of the fifteenth century, with the ancients themselves; and instead of the courtesans of Boucher, or the modest young females of Greuze, he had sketched on canvas antique statues, elegant but stiff, destitute of life, even of colour; and in acquiring a better style of drawing, had lost that facility and brilliancy of pencil which still distinguished Boucher and Greuze. It was a school of imitation, grave, noble, and without genius. One painter, however, M. Gros, escaped from the imitation of antique basso-relievos by painting battles. Faulty in design, mediocre in composition, but excited by the spectacle of the time, and hurried away by a certain natural passion, he flung upon the canvas images which will live probably from a certain force of execution and a certain brilliancy of colour. It is the style which ensures the duration of works of the mind; it is that which ensures the duration of works of art, because it is not the only sign of inspiration, but the loftiest, the most constant. Another painter, M. Prudhon, by imitating Correggio, from a natural taste for grace, exhibited some appearance of originality at a time when an artist, if he did not paint Leonidas and Brutuses, was obliged to paint the grenadiers of the imperial guard. But neither M. Gros nor M. Prudhon, to whom the succeeding age has done more justice, excited so much enthusiasm as David, Girodet, Gerard. France imagined that she possessed in them nearly equals to the great masters of Italy—singular and honourable illusion of a nation captivated with all sorts of glory, aspiring to possess them all, and applauding even mediocrity in the hope of calling forth genius!

In literature France was still further from real superiority. But an exquisite judge in this matter, she did not deceive herself. A sort of inertness, by no means usual, had then seized the national genius. In the seventeenth century France, arrayed in all the brilliancy of youth and glory, had been seen excelling in the highest degree in the tragic representation of the passions of man, and in the comic representation of his oddities, giving lustre to the pulpit by a grave, energetic, sublime eloquence, unknown to the world, which has never heard it, which will never hear it again. She had been seen in the eighteenth century suddenly changing her taste, her genius, her creed, forsaking art for polemics, attacking the altar, the throne, all the social institutions, acrimonious, vehement, immortal, too, in the literature which occupies itself in depicting the human heart. She had thus been seen varying to infinity the productions of her understanding, never exhausted like that spring at which the ancients represented genius slaking its thirst, and which poured forth upon the world a perpetual stream. But all at once, after an immense revolution, the most humane in its object, the most

terrible in its means, the most vast in its consequences, the genius of France, which had desired, called, and produced it, appeared surprised, agitated, terrified at its own works, and as it were, exhausted. French literature subsequently to the Revolution of 1789, notwithstanding the influence of Napoleon, remained null and devoid of inspiration. Tragedy, which had already declined much when Voltaire depicted in his "*Zaire*" the conflicts of religion and love, crept along, sometimes applying to Greece, sometimes to England, sometimes to Sophocles, sometimes to Shakspeare, for inspirations, for which it is better to look to Nature, which never come when they are sought, for genius truly inspired has no need of extraneous excitement. Its own plenitude is sufficient for it. M. Chenier imitated in a pure and noble style the Greek tragedy; M. Ducis in an incorrect and touching style the English tragedy. Comedy, of which M. Picard was then the most renowned continuator in France, depicted without depth, but with some humour, undecided characters, the great characters having been drawn for ever by Molière and by one or two of his disciples. The pulpit having lost its authority, the tribune was mute. There was no other eloquence but that of M. Regnault, expounding in a brilliant and easy style the petty affairs of the time, and that of M. Fontanes, expressing sometimes at the head of the bodies of the State, and in a correct, elegant, and noble style, grand from the greatness of the events rather than from that of the historian, the admiration of France for the prodigies of the imperial reign. History, in short, wanted liberty, wanted experience, and had not yet contracted that taste for research by which it has since been distinguished.

French literature did not recover a genuine originality, a touching eloquence, till M. de Chateaubriand, celebrating the days of yore, addressed himself, as we have elsewhere observed, to that true melancholy of the human heart which always regrets the past, whatever it may be, how unworthy soever of regret, solely because it no longer exists. The age, however, had an immortal writer, immortal as Cæsar; this was the sovereign himself, a great writer because he was a great genius, an inspired orator in his proclamations, the bard of his own exploits in his bulletins, a powerful demonstrator in a multitude of notes which emanated from him in articles inserted in the *Moniteur*, in letters written to his agents, which will no doubt appear some day, and which will astonish the world as much as it has been astonished by his actions. High-coloured when he painted, clear, precise, vehement, imperious when he demonstrated, he was always simple as befitted the serious part assigned to him by Providence, but sometimes rather declamatory, from the remnant of a habit peculiar to all the children of the French Revolution. Singular

destiny of that prodigious man to be the greatest writer of his time, while he was its greatest captain, its greatest legislator, its greatest administrator. The nation having on a day of fatigue relinquished to him the trouble of willing, ordering, thinking for all, had in some measure, by the same privilege, conceded to him the gift of speaking, of writing, better than all.

Already at that period, in that restless agitation of an antiquated literature which seeks inspirations everywhere, a double literary tendency became observable. Some were for going back to the seventeenth century and to antiquity, as to the source of all beauty; others proposed to solicit from England, from Germany, the secret of stronger emotions—puny efforts of the spirit of imitation which changes its object without attaining the originality that is refused it! Napoleon, from a natural taste for the purely beautiful, and from an instinct of nationality, repulsed these new attempts, extolled Racine, Bossuet, Molière, and the ancients along with them, and strove to make classic studies flourish in the University. At length, seeking to act powerfully on the public mind, he devised a means, in his opinion the most efficacious, for producing good works, which was to give reputation, to give it justly, greatly, with authority. In a free country thousands of writers engaged in criticism, enlightened or ignorant, just or passionate, honest or base, discuss the works of mind, and then after a vain clamour are succeeded by Time, which decides in at once the mildest and the surest manner, by taking no notice of certain works, by continuing to speak of certain others. But in granting to literature the freedom of discussion, Napoleon was not resolved to permit it entire even for that; and as for Time, he was too impatient to await its decisions. He conceived, therefore, the idea of applying to each class of the Institute for thoroughly digested reports on the progress of literature and the arts and sciences since 1789, specifying the good or bad tendencies, the distinguished or indifferent works, and awarding praise or censure with strict impartiality. The reports were to be discussed by each of the classes, that they might have the authority of an *arrêt*, presented by one of the eminent men of the time, and read before the emperor in the Council of State, thus judging from the throne, and encouraging the works of French genius by this solemn attention.

In consequence, M. Chenier came to read before Napoleon, and in a meeting of the Council of State, a simple, firm, dignified report on the progress of literature since 1789. When the reading was finished, Napoleon answered M. Chenier in these beautiful words:—

“Gentlemen deputies of the second class of the Institute, if the French language is become a universal language, it is to the

men of genius who have sat or who still sit among you that we are indebted for this.

"I attach a value to the success of your labours; they tend to enlighten my people, and are necessary to the glory of my crown. I have heard with satisfaction the report that you have just made to me. You may rely on my protection."

When governments will interfere in the works of the human mind, it is in this lofty style that they ought to do so; and, moreover, to this manner of distributing glory by a decision of the public authority, Napoleon added a munificence, numerous instances of which we have already cited, and the most efficacious of all encouragements, the approbation of genius. In other sittings he heard M. Cuvier make a report on the progress of the sciences, M. Dacier on that of historical researches, and successively the representatives of all the classes on the subjects which concerned them. Desirous of giving to the arts of design a not less signal mark of attention, he went himself with the empress and part of his court to the studio of David the painter, to inspect the picture of the Coronation, and after viewing it, to address to him the most flattering expressions.

Such were the occupations of Napoleon after his return from Tilsit; such is also the spectacle which France exhibited during his reign, either from the effect of circumstances, or from the personal influence which he exercised over her. Most of the resolutions which he had just taken could not dispense with the concurrence of the legislative power. It was more than a year since it had met, and he was impatient to assemble it, as much to present to it the finance laws, the code of commerce, the laws relative to the public works, as to make a European manifestation before the bodies of the State. He had resolved to open the session of the Legislative Body on the 16th of August, the day following the 15th, fixed for the celebration of the festival of St. Napoleon. The 15th was a real festival for Paris and for all France. The people were still filled with the joy which the peace had occasioned; for, signed at Tilsit on the 8th of July, known at Paris on the 15th, it was scarcely a month that they had enjoyed it. To this joy for the continental peace was added the hope of a maritime peace. The presence of Napoleon at Paris had already exercised its usual influence. Fresh bustle prevailed everywhere. Money was plentiful. Those on whom Napoleon had just conferred wealth were building elegant hotels, and bespeaking costly furniture to adorn them. Their wives spent money in handfuls on the dealers in articles of luxury. It was announced that the court would make a long stay at Fontainebleau, whither all the high society of Paris would be invited, and where would be given festivities of which the

winter had been deprived. In short, the national glory, which deeply touched all hearts, contributed likewise to all these joys by heightening them. The evening of the 15th of August was as dazzling as a bright day. The whole population of Paris was at night under the windows of the palace, intoxicated with enthusiasm, loudly desiring to see the glorious sovereign who had conferred so many benefits, real or apparent, on France, and above all, who had rendered her so great. It must be acknowledged, for the honour of human nature, that what most attracts it is glory. Had Napoleon not been emperor and king, the people would still have desired to see in his person the greatest man of modern times. He showed himself several times holding the empress by the hand, scarcely discerned amidst a brilliant group, but cheered and applauded as though he had been distinctly perceived. He wished to be himself a closer witness of the popular enthusiasm, and went out disguised with his faithful Duroc to take a walk in the garden of the Tuileries. By favour of the night and of his disguise he could enjoy the sentiments which he inspired without being known, and amidst all the groups he heard his name pronounced with gratitude and love. He stopped in the garden to listen to a little boy who was shouting with transport *Vive l'Empereur !* He caught up the child in his arms, asked why he shouted in that manner, and received for answer that his father and mother taught him to love and bless the emperor. They were Bretons, who, being obliged to flee from the horrors of civil war, had found in Paris peace and competence in an humble employment. Napoleon conversed with them, and they knew not till next day before how powerful a witness they had poured forth the simple effusions of their hearts.

On the following day, the 16th, Napoleon repaired to the Legislative Body, surrounded by his marshals, followed by an immense concourse of people, and found the Council of State and the Tribune assembled with the members of the Legislative Body. M. de Talleyrand, in quality of vice-grand-elect, presented the members of the Legislative Body recently elected to be sworn ; and then the emperor, in a clear and penetrating voice, delivered the following speech :—

“Gentlemen deputies of the departments to the Legislative Body, messieurs the tribunes and the members of my Council of State, since your last session, new wars, new triumphs, new treaties of peace have changed the political face of Europe.

“If the house of Brandenburg, which first conspired against our independence, still reigns, it is indebted for this to the sincere friendship with which the powerful emperor of the north has inspired me.

“A French prince will reign on the Elbe ; he will understand

how to reconcile the interests of his new subjects with his first and most sacred duties.

"The house of Saxony has recovered, after fifty years, the independence which it had lost.

"The people of the duchy of Warsaw, and of the city of Dantzic, have recovered their country and their rights.

"All nations rejoice with one accord to see the mischievous influence which England exercised over the continent destroyed for ever.

"France is united with the people of Germany by the laws of the Confederation of the Rhine; to those of Spain, Holland, Switzerland, and the Italies, by the laws of our federative system. Our new relations with Russia are cemented by the reciprocal esteem of these two great nations.

"In all that I have done I have had in view solely the prosperity of my people, more dear in my eyes than my own glory.

"I am desirous for maritime peace. No resentment shall ever influence my determinations. I can never have any against a nation, the puppet and victim of the parties which tear it in pieces, deluded respecting the situation of its own affairs as well as that of its neighbours.

"But whatever be the issue which the decrees of Providence have allotted to the maritime war, my people shall find me ever the same, and I shall ever find my people worthy of me. Frenchmen, your conduct in these last times, when your emperor was more than five hundred leagues away, has heightened my esteem, and the opinion which I had formed of your character. I have felt proud of being the first among you. If during these ten months of absence and dangers I have been present to your thoughts, the marks of attachment which you have given me have constantly excited my warmest emotions. All my anxieties, all that could have relation even to the preservation of my person, touched me only from the interest which you took in them, and for the importance of which they might be for your future destinies. You are a good and a great people.

"I have contemplated various dispositions for simplifying and improving our institutions.

"The nation has experienced the happiest effects from the institution of the Legion of Honour. I have created several imperial titles to give new lustre to the principal of my subjects, to honour eminent services by eminent rewards, and also to prevent the revival of any feudal title incompatible with our constitutions.

"The accounts of my ministers of the finances and of the public treasury will acquaint you with the prosperous state of our finances. My people will experience a considerable relief in regard to the land-tax.

"My minister of the interior will inform you of the public works which have been commenced or finished; but what remains to be done is of far greater importance; for I intend that, in all parts of my empire, even in the smallest hamlet, the prosperity of the citizens and the value of land shall be augmented by the effect of the general system of improvement which I have conceived.

"Messieurs the deputies of the departments, your assistance will be necessary for me to arrive at this great result, and I have a right to rely firmly upon it."

This speech was heard with warm emotion, and applauded with transport. Napoleon returned to the Tuileries, accompanied by the same concourse, and greeted with the same shouts.

On the next and succeeding days were brought forward the various laws which fixed the budget of 1807 at 720 millions in receipts and expenditure, which demanded for 1808 mere provisional credits, conformably to the custom of the time; which for this same year, 1808, remitted to the country 20 millions on the land-tax; * which regulated the concurrence of the departments in the great works of general utility, instituted a Court of Accounts, and lastly, were to compose the commercial code. The measures concerning the institution of the new titles, the purification of the magistracy, the union of the Tribunate to the Legislative Body, were reserved for the Senate. After the presentation of all these laws came the report of the minister of the interior on the state of the empire. When that minister had, in a picture for which Napoleon had furnished the substance and almost the form, finished the sketch of the flourishing state of France, of the progress of her manufactures and commerce, of the impulsion given to all the works, of the simultaneous construction of canals, roads, bridges, and public monuments over the whole surface of the territory, of the regularity, order, abundance prevailing in the finances, of the efforts made to diffuse instruction, to extend to every commune the benefit of public worship, in short, of so many useful creations, the course of which a war of giants had not interrupted, for which it had even procured the means, thanks to the tribute levied from the conquered kings, M. de Fontanes, president of the Legislative Body, replied in the following speech, which he had been enabled to prepare beforehand, for the sentiments that were expressed in it filled all hearts:—

"Monsieur the minister of the interior, messieurs the councillors of State, the picture set before our eyes seems to

* I have said in another place 15 millions; it was nevertheless 20 millions; but the new centimes imposed for the concurrence of the departments in the public works reduced these 20 millions to 15.

present the image of one of those pacific kings, exclusively engaged in the internal administration in the heart of their dominions; and yet all these useful labours, all these wise projects, which are designed to improve upon them, were ordered and conceived amidst the din of arms on the furthest confines of conquered Prussia, and on the frontiers of threatened Russia. If it be true that, at the distance of five hundred leagues from the capital, amid the cares and the fatigues of war, a hero prepared so many benefits, how is he about to increase them by returning among us! The public welfare will wholly engage him, and his glory will be the more touching for it.

"We are far from refusing to heroism that homage which in all times it obtains. Philosophy more than once insulted military enthusiasm; let us now dare to avenge it.

"War, that ancient, and, unfortunately, necessary disease, which has ravaged all societies; that scourge, the effects of which it is so easy to deplore, and so difficult to extirpate the cause—war itself is not without utility for nations. It imparts new energy to old societies; it draws together great nations which have long been enemies, which learn to esteem each other on the field of battle; it stirs and fertilises minds by extraordinary spectacles; above all, it instructs present and future ages, when it produces one of those rare geniuses formed to change everything.

"But for war to have such advantages, it must not be too prolonged, or irreparable evils are the consequence. The fields and the workshops are depopulated, the schools in which minds and manners are formed become deserted, barbarism approaches, and the generations ravaged in their flower see the hopes of the human race perish along with themselves.

"The Legislative Body and the French nation bless the great prince who puts an end to war before it can subject us to such disastrous influences, and when it brings us, on the contrary, so many new means of strength, wealth, and population. War, which exhausts everything, has renovated our finances and our armies. The vanquished nations give us subsidies, and France finds soldiers worthy of her among the allied nations.

"Our eyes have beheld the most extraordinary things. A few years have been sufficient for renewing the face of the world. A man has traversed Europe, taking away and giving diadems. He displaces, he contracts, he extends the boundaries of empires; all are borne away by his ascendancy. Well! this man, covered with so much glory, promises us still greater; peaceable and disarmed, he will prove that this invincible force, which, as it runs, overturns thrones and empires, is beneath that truly royal wisdom, which preserves them by peace, which enriches

them by agriculture and industry, adorns them with masterpieces of art, and founds them everlastingly on the twofold support of morality and the laws."

The labours of the Legislative Body commenced immediately, and were prosecuted with the calmness and celerity natural in discussions which were purely formal; for the serious investigation of the proposed laws had taken place elsewhere, that is to say, in the conferences between the Tribunal and the Council of State. During this short session, which kept him in Paris and deferred his departure for Fontainebleau, Napoleon celebrated the marriage of the Princess Catherine of Wurtemberg with his brother Jerome. This young princess, endowed with the noblest qualities, beautiful and striking in person, proud as her father, but gentle and devoted to all her duties, and destined to become some day a pattern for wives in adversity, arrived at the château of Raincy, near Paris, on the 20th of August, rather uneasy about the situation that awaited her in a court, the splendour and power of which nobody in Europe denied, but which was represented as the abode of brutal force, and to which she was not to be accompanied by any of the servants whom she had had around her from her infancy. Napoleon received her on the 21st on the first step of the palace of the Tuileries. She was going to bow to him, when he caught her in his arms, and then presented her to the empress, to his whole court, and to the deputies of the new kingdom of Westphalia, convoked to Paris to be present at this union. On the following day the young couple were civilly married by the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, and the day afterwards they received in the chapel of the Tuileries the nuptial benediction of the prince primate, who, always alike attached to the emperor from inclination and from gratitude, had come to consecrate in person the new German royalty, founded in the north of the Confederation, of which he was chancellor and president.

The festivities held on occasion of this marriage lasted several days, and during this time Napoleon prepared for the departure of the young couple for Westphalia. Their kingdom, composed principally of the territories of the Grand Duke of Hesse, dethroned on account of his perfidies, was to have Cassel for its capital. It comprehended, besides electoral Hesse, Westphalia and the provinces separated from Prussia on the left of the Elbe. Magdeburg was its principal fortress. It had likewise hopes of being enriched by part of Hanover. The title of kingdom of Westphalia was suited to its geographical situation, to its extent, to its part in the Confederation of the Rhine. It had, moreover, a sort of consequence, and did not remind one, as the title of kingdom of Hesse would have done, of the dispossession of a great German family. Napoleon had charged

three councillors of State, Messrs. Simeon, Bengnot, and Jollivet, to go, under the title of provisional regency, and to commence the administrative organisation of this kingdom, so that Prince Jerome should on his arrival find a sort of government instituted, and after his arrival wise councillors capable of guiding his inexperience. Napoleon then despatched him with the following instructions:—

“My brother, I think you ought to go to Stuttgart, as you have been invited thither by the King of Wurtemberg. You will proceed thence to Cassel, with all the pomp with which the hopes of your people will induce them to surround you. You will convoke the deputies of the towns, the ministers of all religions, the deputies of the States now existing, taking care that there shall be half not noble, half noble; and before this assembly, so composed, you will receive the constitution and swear to maintain it, and immediately afterwards you will receive the oath of those deputies of the people. The three members of the regency shall be charged with the delivery of the country to you. They will form a privy council, which shall remain with you so long as you have need of it. Appoint at first only half of your councillors of State; that number will be sufficient for commencing business. Take care that the majority be composed of non-nobles, but without letting any one perceive this habitual caution, to keep up a majority of the third estate in all offices. I except from this some places at court, to which upon the same principles the highest names must be called. But in your ministries, in your councils, if possible in your courts of appeal, in your administrations, the greater part of the persons whom you employ should not be nobles. This conduct will go to the heart of Germany, and perhaps mortify the other class. It is sufficient not to use any affectation in this conduct. Take care never to enter into discussions, nor to let it be understood, that you attach such importance to the advancement of the third estate. The avowed principle is to select talents wherever they are to be found. I have here marked out for you the general principles of your conduct. I have given orders to the major-general to deliver up to you the command of the French troops which are in your kingdom. Remember that you are French, and guard against their suffering any wrong. By degrees, and according as they become unnecessary, you will send back the governors and the commandants of arms. My opinion is, that you should not be in a hurry, and that you should listen with prudence and circumspection to the complaints of the towns, which are only anxious to rid themselves of the embarrassments occasioned by the war. Remember that the army remained six months in Bavaria, and that those good people bore this burden with patience. Before

the month of January you ought to have divided your kingdom into departments, to have appointed prefects in them, and to have commenced your administration. What is of particular consequence to me is, that you delay not in the least the introduction of the Napoleon Code. The constitution establishes it irrevocably on the 1st of January. If you defer putting it in force this would become a question of public right, for if successions should chance to open, you would be embarrassed by a thousand claims. Objections will not fail to be made; oppose them with a firm will. The members of the regency, who are not in favour of what was done in France during the Revolution, will make remonstrances; give them for answer that this does not concern them. But call to your aid their intelligence and experience, from which you may derive great advantage. Above all, write to me very often. . . .

“ You will find annexed the constitution of your kingdom. That constitution contains the conditions on which I renounce all my rights of conquest and my acquired rights to your country. You ought to follow it punctually. The happiness of your people is of importance to me, not only for the influence which it may have upon your glory and mine, but also under the point of view of the general system of Europe. Listen not to those who tell you that your people, accustomed to servitude, will receive your benefits unthankfully. They are more enlightened in the kingdom of Westphalia than some persons would fain persuade you; and your throne will never be firmly founded but on the confidence and the love of the population. What the people of Germany desire with impatience is, that individuals who are not noble, and possess talents, should have an equal right to your consideration and to office; that every species of bondage, and all intermediate restrictions between the sovereign and the lowest class, should be entirely abolished. The benefits of the Napoleon Code, the publicity of law proceedings, the institution of juries, will be so many distinguishing characteristics of your monarchy; and if I must tell you my whole mind, I reckon more upon their effects for the extension and consolidation of that monarchy than upon the result of the greatest victories. Your people must enjoy a liberty, an equality, a prosperity unknown to the other people of Germany; and this liberal government must produce, in one way or another, changes the most salutary to the system of the Confederation and to the power of your monarchy. This mode of governing will be a stronger barrier to separate you from Prussia than the Elbe, than fortresses, than the protection of France. What people would be willing to return under the arbitrary Prussian government, after it has tasted the benefits of a wise and liberal administration? The people of Germany, those of France, Italy,

Spain, desire equality, and require liberal ideas. It is now several years that I have directed the affairs of Europe, and I have had occasion to convince myself that the grumbling of the privileged persons was contrary to the general opinion. Be a constitutional king. If the reason and the intelligence of your times were not sufficient, in your position good policy would enjoin it."

The session of the Legislative Body, though there were numerous *projets* to be converted into laws, could not last long, thanks, as we have observed, to the previous conferences, which rendered public discussion nearly useless, and a matter of mere form. The second half of the month of August and the first half of September were sufficient. The business of this session being finished, the *senatus-consulte*, which suppressed the Tribunate, and transferred its attributes and its members to the Legislative Body, was brought to the two assemblies. It was accompanied by an address, which bestowed due praise on the labours and services of the suppressed body. The president of that body, on receiving this communication, delivered a speech on his part, thanking the sovereign, who acknowledged the merits of the members of the Tribunate, and opened to them a new career. After these vain formalities, the session was closed, and a legal character was imparted to the last works of the imperial government.

At length, on the 22nd of September, the court set out for Fontainebleau, where it was to pass the autumn amidst festivities and pompous pageantry. Napoleon purposed to exhibit there a complete image of the manners of the old court. Many foreign princes had been invited thither, such as the prince primate, who had come to Paris on occasion of the marriage of the King and Queen of Westphalia, the Archduke Ferdinand, late sovereign of Tuscany and of Salzburg, now of Wurzburg, who had come in the hope of restoring good harmony between France and Austria; Prince William, brother of the King of Prussia, despatched to Paris to obtain a mitigation of the charges imposed upon his country, and a multitude of other great personages, French and foreign. In the daytime the company pursued the sport of coursing the deer of the forest. Napoleon had prescribed a dress indispensable for the chase, and had imposed the necessity of wearing it on both men and women. He disdained not to appear in it himself, excusing in his own eyes these puerilities by the opinion that etiquette in courts, and particularly in new courts, contributes to respect. In the evening the first actors in Paris came to perform before him the masterpieces of Corneille, Racine, Molière; for he admitted to the honour of his presence none but the great productions, immortal titles of the nation, and as if to complete this resur-

rection of the ancient manners, he cast on certain ladies of the court, renowned for their beauty, glances which distressed the Empress Josephine, and caused observations to be made respecting him less serious than those of which he was usually the object.

While Napoleon, mingling some recreations with a great deal of business, awaited at Fontainebleau the result of the negotiations commenced by Russia with England, the stipulations of Tilsit occupied cabinets, and produced in the world their natural consequences. Portugal, obliged to come to a decision, solicited permission of the court of London to comply with the requisitions of Napoleon, at least in such a manner as to do the least possible injury to British commerce, and to spare the English as well as the Portuguese the presence of a French army in Lisbon. The court of Spain, anxious in the highest degree about the consequences which its perfidious conduct last year might produce, alarmed at the thoughts which omnipotence and leisure might suggest to Napoleon, despatched to him, as we have seen, in addition to her ordinary ambassador, M. de Massaredo, an ambassador-extraordinary, M. de Frias, besides a secret envoy, M. Yzquierdo. Neither of the former had found means to penetrate the frightful mystery of his coming. Austria, bitterly regretting not having acted in the interval between the battles of Eylau and Friedland, extremely uneasy at the signs of intelligence which began to be perceived between the emperors of France and Russia, said to herself that their alliance, so natural when France was engaged with England on the sea, with Germany on the land, and so formidable at all times to Europe, was perhaps at this moment absolutely concluded, and that the provinces of the Danube, then occupied by the Russians, would in all probability be the price of the new union. If such were the case, it would crown all the disasters which had overtaken her during the present century; for despoiled in the course of fifteen years of the Netherlands, of Italy, of the Tyrol, of Suabia, forced back behind the Inn, behind the Styrian and Julian Alps, after so many misfortunes, only one greater could befall her, to see Russia established on the Lower Danube, cutting her off from the Black Sea, and enveloping her in the east as France enveloped her in the west. Hence in all the courts where the representatives of Austria met with ours they were seen restless, suspicious, seeking by all possible means to ferret out the secret of Tilsit, here offering to pay for it with money, there striving to discover it in an unguarded moment, and at length, on the refusal of our diplomatists to betray it, demanding it with a ridiculous indiscretion. And while they were everywhere endeavouring to penetrate the projects of the new alliance without succeeding, they gave out at Constantinople that they were

completely discovered, telling the Turks that France had deserted, betrayed them, and given them up to Russia; that they ought to turn their arms against the French, continue the hostilities against the Russians, and reconcile themselves with the English; who, they added, would not be the only people to support them. Prussia, overwhelmed by her calamity, concerned herself but little about the secret conditions stipulated at Tilsit, and caring still less what should befall the balance of Europe in the east, since it was already destroyed for her in the west, thinking only of obtaining the evacuation of her territory and a reduction of the war contributions imposed upon it; for in the exhausted state in which she found herself, every sum given to France was a resource withdrawn from her for reconstituting her army and for some day retrieving her reverses.

In Russia the spectacle was totally different: there the sovereign, who had sought in the French alliance prospects of greatness suited to indemnify him for his recent mishaps, was seen making continual efforts to lead the court, the aristocracy, the people, into his views. But having been exposed alone at Tilsit to the seductions of Napoleon, he could not persuade them to pass so quickly as himself from the horrors of war to the enchantments of a new alliance. He therefore strove now to persuade everybody that, in terminating by a reconciliation with France, things had taken the best possible turn; that his late ministers, in embroiling him with that power, had led him into a fatal track, from which he had extricated himself with equal good fortune and skill; that in all this he had committed but one error, that of having believed in the valour of the Prussian army and in the integrity of England, but he had soon dispelled this double illusion; that there were but two armies in Europe which deserved to be mentioned, the Russian army and the French army; that it was useless to make them fight in order to serve the cause of a perfidious and selfish power like Great Britain; and that it was better to unite them in one common aim of peace and greatness; of peace, if the cabinet of London would at length desist from its maritime pretensions; of greatness, if it did oblige Europe to lead the same life of torment and sacrifices; that in this case every one must take care of himself and his own interests; and that it was time for Russia to think of hers. Having arrived at this point of his explanations, Alexander, not daring to reveal all the hopes which Napoleon had permitted him to conceive, nor, above all, to avow the occult treaty which they had promised themselves to keep profoundly secret, assumed an air of mystery but of satisfaction, leaving all to be guessed that he durst not venture to tell, though strongly tempted to do so, and speaking, for instance, of Turkey, declaring openly that he was about to sign an armistice with her, but

should take care not to evacuate the provinces of the Danube, where he should stay for a long time, and that no difficulty would be met with at Paris on the subject of this prolonged occupation.

These demi-confidential intimations had rather excited an indiscreet and mischievous curiosity than gained over those to whom they were imparted to the ideas of the Emperor Alexander. He was, for the rest, warmly seconded by M. de Romanzoff, who was acquainted with everything, who had served Catherine, and inherited her oriental ambition. The minister, like the sovereign, repeated that they must have patience and leave events to unfold themselves, and that they should soon have a satisfactory explanation to give of the change of politics effected at Tilsit.

But the emperor was not always listened to and obeyed. The public, ignorant of the secrets of the imperial diplomacy, galled by the late defeats, exhibited a sorrowful aspect, and an especial ill-will towards the French. The grandees in particular called to mind the fickleness of Russian politics under Paul, and beginning to believe that this fickleness would be the same under Alexander, were fearful that the intimacy with France would soon lead to a war with England, which alarmed them on account of their revenues, always threatened when British commerce ceased to purchase their productions. Hence General Savary, on his arrival at St. Petersburg soon after the signature of the peace, had met with the coldest reception, excepting from the Emperor Alexander and two or three families composing the intimate society of that prince. The catastrophe of Vincennes, of which people were reminded by the appearance of General Savary, was assuredly not likely to reconcile with him hearts which politics estranged; but the true cause of this general estrangement was in the remembrance of recent hostilities and of great defeats, without any event which could console the national self-love. The emperor, fully aware of this situation, endeavoured to render General Savary's stay at St. Petersburg endurable, nay, even agreeable to him, paid him all sorts of attentions, admitted him to his presence almost every day; invited him frequently to his table, and in fear of the reports which he might despatch to Napoleon, begged him to have patience, saying that everything would change when the late impressions were effaced, and when France should have done something for the just ambition of Russia. He knew not how far General Savary might be initiated in the secret of Tilsit, and strove to discover this, to have the pleasure, if the general was acquainted with that secret, of conversing with him on the fondest subject of his thoughts. The French envoy was but partially informed, and even had orders to appear to know less than he did; for Napoleon had no wish that the young emperor, incessantly talking

over the subjects which had engaged him at Tilsit, should at last confirm himself in his own desires, and take mere eventualities for certain and speedy realities. General Savary replied, therefore, with extreme reserve to the insinuations of the emperor, with warm gratitude for his kind attentions, appeared satisfied, not at all vexed, at the disagreeable reception given him by Russian society, and full of confidence in a speedy change of dispositions. He had, besides, to defend him, sufficient understanding, plenty of assurance, and the immensity of the national glory, which permitted Frenchmen to hold their heads high everywhere.

The example of the Emperor Alexander, and the strong expression of his will, had opened to General Savary some of the most important houses in St. Petersburg, but most of the great families continued to exclude him ; for Alexander, though master of power, was, nevertheless, not master of high society, placed under a different influence from his. Having owed to a tragic catastrophe the anticipated possession of the sceptre of the czars, this prince strove to compensate his mother, who had descended before the time to the station of dowager, by leaving to her the exterior of supreme power. This princess, virtuous but haughty, consoled herself for having lost with Paul half of the empire by the ostentatious display of imperial splendour, with which her son desired that she should be surrounded. As for himself, he had no court. Disliking the empress, his wife, a cold and grave beauty, he hastened after his repasts to leave the palace, to employ himself in business with the statesmen his confidants, or to pursue his pleasures in the society of a Russian lady, of whom he was enamoured. The court assembled at his mother's. There were to be seen the courtiers fond of living in the society of the sovereign, having favours to obtain or thanks to pay for favours obtained. All came to solicit or to thank the empress-mother, as if she were the sole author of the acts of the imperial power. Alexander himself made his appearance there with the assiduity of a respectful, submissive son, who had not yet inherited the paternal sceptre. The empress-mother, who fondly loved that son, would neither hold nor suffer any language that could displease him, but did not disguise her own sentiments in manifesting a visible aversion to the French. She had therefore received General Savary with cold politeness. He had not shown any emotion, but had adroitly hinted to the son that none of these circumstances had escaped him. For a moment Alexander could not contain himself, and apprehensive lest, under this affected respect for his mother, a foreigner, an aide-de-camp of Napoleon's, should not recognise the real master of the empire, he grasped the general's hand, and said, "There is no sovereign here but myself ; I respect my mother, but everybody shall obey,

be assured of it; and at all events, whoever needs it, shall be reminded of the nature and the extent of my authority." General Savary, content with having brought the emperor to such a confidential communication by piquing his imperial pride, went no further, satisfied respecting his dispositions and his zeal to maintain the new alliance. For the rest, the court of the empress-mother showed not more politeness, for it had never ceased to show that, but more cordiality. "Let us wait," said the Emperor Alexander incessantly to General Savary, "and see what England will do. Let us know what course she will pursue; I will then break out, and when I have declared myself, nobody shall resist."

An explanation of the conduct which England intended to adopt was in fact awaited with keen impatience. The patent treaty of Tilsit had been published. Every one plainly perceived that it did not tell all, and that the new alliance with France inferred other secret stipulations. But, at any rate, according to the patent arrangements of that treaty, and without going any further, it was known that Russia would act as mediatrix for France with England, and France as mediatrix of Russia with the Porte. The result of this double mediation was therefore looked for.

Faithful to his engagements, no sooner had the Emperor Alexander arrived at St. Petersburg, than he addressed a note to the British cabinet, expressing a wish for the restoration of general peace, and offering his mediation with a view to bring about a reconciliation between France and England. This note had been received by the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, and by the minister for foreign affairs in London, with a coldness which left little hope of an accommodation. The new English ministers, in fact, disciples of Mr. Pitt, but of inferior abilities, were not inclined to peace. Their origin, their party connections, their accession to the ministry, are sufficient of themselves to explain the policy which they adopted in this decisive circumstance.

It will no doubt be recollected that when in 1806 [May 1804] Mr. Pitt resumed the direction of the counsels of George III., after maintaining, jointly with Mr. Fox, a strong contest with the Addington administration, he had either the weakness or the treachery to resume it without Mr. Fox on the one hand, without his old friends, such as Lord Grenville and Mr. Wyndham, on the other. He had come back to office with men who had then but little political importance, Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh. This conduct towards his friends, old or recent, had much weakened him in Parliament, and had rendered his second administration by no means brilliant. The battle of Austerlitz proved mortal to him. No sooner was Mr. Pitt dead than his feeble colleagues, Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh,

deeming themselves incapable of making head against such men as Lord Grenville and Mr. Wyndham, old and distinguished colleagues deserted by Pitt, and Mr. Fox, his old and illustrious rival—they retreated from before them in all haste, and Lord Grenville and Mr. Wyndham had re-entered the administration along with Mr. Fox. The wise Mr. Addington, by the name of Lord Sidmouth, the celebrated Mr. Grey, by the name of Lord Howick, formed part of this cabinet, which was a double compromise between persons and opinion. Mr. Sheridan himself had joined it in becoming treasurer of the navy. The reappearance of Mr. Fox in power, as short as that of Mr. Pitt had been, and terminating in like manner in his death, had not lasted long enough, as we have elsewhere said, to bring about the restoration of peace. After the fruitless negotiations of Lord Yarmouth and Lord Lauderdale in Paris, Napoleon had taken possession of Prussia and Poland. The administration, which was called Fox-Grenville, had maintained its ground after the death of Mr. Fox, thanks to the powerful men of which it was still composed, and of the system of compromise which it had continued to follow. At home the Catholics were conciliated, abroad the war was kept up, but with a sort of prudence, by the grants of subsidies to the continental powers, and by not risking the English troops, unless in expeditions of demonstrated advantage to Great Britain. The old colleagues of Mr. Pitt, blended with the old friends of Mr. Fox, no longer affected to wage against France a war of principle but of interest. They neglected what was likely to call to mind the crusade against the French Revolution, and occupied themselves exclusively in extending the conquests of England in all the seas. Urged by Prussia and Russia to send troops either to Stralsund or to Dantzic to effect a diversion on the rear of Napoleon, they had always delayed, sometimes upon pretext of Ireland, which required troops to guard it, at others upon pretext of the Boulogne flotilla, which had been kept constantly armed; and they had meanwhile sent out distant expeditions projected for the sole interest of England. Thus they had taken the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch. From the Cape of Good Hope they had proceeded to the shores of the La Plata, and attempted a *coup de main* against Monte Video and Buenos Ayres. The supineness of the Spanish government and the cowardice of its commandants had permitted the English to penetrate into Buenos Ayres, and to possess themselves of that metropolis of South America. But M. Liniers, a Frenchman, who, after the American war, had passed into the service of Spain, had rallied the Spanish troops and population, and driven the English out of Buenos Ayres, after reducing them to a capitulation mortifying for their glory. At Monte Video likewise, after having

entered and evacuated it, the English had been obliged to withdraw from the city, and they occupied some islands at the mouth of the La Plata. The Mediterranean also had become the theatre of their ambitious expeditions. They had, it will be recollected, forced the Dardanelles, without any result for themselves, and effected a landing in Egypt, which had been followed by their retreat. By all these enterprises the English had gained the Cape, the island of Curaçoa, and the animadversion of their allies, who said that they were deserted.

Such was the state of the Grenville ministry, when, in March 1807, a question unexpectedly arose, which put the moderate principles of that administration in opposition with the religious principles of old George III. Once before that devout prince had carried his infatuation against the Catholics of Ireland to such a length as to part from Mr. Pitt rather than grant a commencement of emancipation. The same cause was destined to separate the colleagues and successors of Mr. Pitt. The Irish rendered good service in the army; and at a moment when the contest with France assumed a new character of implacability, it was politic to satisfy those brave soldiers by permitting them to attain the same rank as the English officers, and thus to attach the Catholics to England by a first act of justice. A bill to this effect was therefore proposed by ministers, and owing to the obscurity of that bill, an obscurity purposely imparted to it by the ministers who had drawn it up, George III., misapprehending its object, consented that it should be presented; but no sooner was it brought in than the enemies of the cabinet, who were no other than the secondary personages by whom Mr. Pitt had surrounded himself at the time of his last administration, had by secret intrigues awakened the scruples of the old king, and caused such explanations to be laid before him as gave the bill an import which at first he had not suspected. George III. had then desired that it should be withdrawn. Lord Grenville and Lord Howick resigned themselves with difficulty to this humiliating step, declaring that the concessions now refused to the Irish must be granted to them sooner or later, to which George III. replied by demanding a promise that nothing of the kind should be in future proposed. In consequence of this royal requisition, Lord Grenville, Lord Howick, and their colleagues resigned in March 1807. The weak remnant of the ministers who had surrounded Mr. Pitt then returned to office, under the presidency of the old Duke of Portland, a veteran Whig, who had no longer any political importance on account of his great age, and who was introduced merely to give the cabinet some appearance of political coalition. Mr. Canning, Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Perceval, the principal members of this administration, justly acquired the denomination of the king's

creatures, availing themselves of the royal weakness to substitute themselves for the most considerable and the most capable men in England. Violent discussions in both houses of Parliament had well-nigh left them in a minority ; they had dared to threaten Parliament with a dissolution, and had finished by dissolving it, strong in the support of George III. The elections had taken place in June 1807, amidst cries of " Down with the Papists ! " a cry which always finds many echoes in England. Seconded by the popular fanaticism, which was carried to such a length that it might have been supposed that the Pope had actually landed in Ireland, ministers of no consideration, champions of a detestable cause, had obtained a considerable majority. Such were the men who at this moment governed England.

These newcomers, for whom Fortune destined at a later period the unmerited honour of reaping the fruits of the efforts of Mr. Pitt, naturally desired to distinguish themselves from their predecessors, and those predecessors having sought to temper the policy of Mr. Pitt, could do no other than seek to exaggerate it. They had at once given the promise, for which they were most bitterly reproached, not to propose any measure in favour of the Catholics ; and as to foreign politics, they affected great zeal for the allies of England, unworthily deserted, they alleged, by Lord Grenville, Mr. Wyndham, and Lord Howick.

Without loss of time they had promised expeditions to the continent ; so that, entering into the ministry in March, they might have been able in April, May, and June to afford useful aid to the belligerent powers, since Dantzic had not surrendered before the 26th of May ; but they had done nothing, either from incapacity or from being occupied by domestic affairs, an occupation which must have been urgent, for they had then to dissolve Parliament and to convoke a new one. Be this as it may, after they had assembled a considerable fleet in the Downs, and collected at that point numerous troops for embarkation, their co-operation in the continental war was limited to the despatch of an English division to Stralsund. The news of the battle of Friedland and the peace of Tilsit had filled them with alarm for their country, and still greater for themselves ; for after reprehending with extreme severity the inaction of their predecessors, they had rendered themselves liable to be much more justly reproached for their inertness during the three decisive months of April, May, and June 1807. It was therefore necessary, at any rate, to attempt some enterprise which should strike the public opinion, which should avert the reproach of inactivity, which, useful or useless, humane or barbarous, should be sufficiently specious, sufficiently dazzling to occupy discontented and alarmed minds.

In this situation they resolved upon an enterprise which has

long made the world ring as an outrage against humanity, an enterprise not only odious, but very ill-judged in regard to British interest. This enterprise was no other than the famous expedition against Denmark, projected for compelling her by violence to declare herself in favour of England. Paltry imitators of Mr. Pitt, the English ministers determined to inflict on Copenhagen a repetition of the signal blow by means of which England had in 1801 dissolved the coalition of the neutrals. But when the Addington administration had struck Copenhagen in 1801, it was to break up a coalition, of which Denmark publicly formed a part; it was an act of war opposed to an act of war; it was a rash operation, but clever in its temerity, cruel in its means, but necessary. In 1807, on the contrary, there was neither pretext, nor justice, nor skill in attacking Denmark. That State, scrupulously neutral, had taken extreme care to maintain her neutrality. She had, from an unfortunate habit of using greater precaution against France than against England, placed her whole army along Holstein, incurring, as had been the case at Lübeck, the risk of a collision with the French troops rather than suffer the line of her frontiers to be violated. Her diplomacy had acted in the same manner as her army, and had always manifested a jealous susceptibility in regard to France. At the very moment, she had not, as the English ministers falsely asserted, just been engaged in treating with Russia and France, and stipulating her adhesion to the new continental coalition. So far from it, she had just protested once more her desire to maintain her neutrality, though Napoleon had caused an intimation to be made to her with delicacy, but with firmness, that when England should have explained herself respecting the Russian mediation, Denmark would at length be obliged to come to a decision, and to declare for or against the oppressors of the seas. If on this occasion the English ministers had acted judiciously, they would have left to Napoleon the odious part of compelling Denmark to speak out, and sent a fleet into the Cattegat; then, in case of the approach of the French, they should have gone to the assistance of Copenhagen, and in assisting that capital they would have become the legitimate masters of the Danish fleet, the two Belts, and the Sound. At a period when Europe, already weary of suffering by the quarrel between France and England, was disposed to judge severely either of the two powers which should aggravate the evils of the war, this friendly conduct and assistance afforded to Denmark would have been the only line of conduct to pursue. The contrary conduct gave Denmark to Napoleon, spared him the embarrassment of himself exercising a tyrannical constraint, and the carrying off of a few crazy hulls of ships by the English was but a fruitless act of pillage, the more impolitic and odious since it was not

to be accomplished but by the abominable means of bombarding a population of women, children, and old men.

Supposing that enlightened ministers, placed in a simple position, had then directed the politics of England, the choice would not have been doubtful, and their conduct, which would have consisted in aiding Denmark in her resistance against Napoleon, would certainly have prevailed. But Mr. Canning, Lord Castlereagh, Perceval, were, with more or less of oratorical talent, sorry politicians, and ministers more intent on their own interest than on that of the country. They imagined that the repetition of the blow of 1801 was actually necessary; and in this they proved themselves puny imitators of Pitt's policy, and every imitator is a corrupter, for every imitator corrupts what he imitates by exaggerating it.

No sooner had the news of the peace of Tilsit arrived than the English cabinet, falsely pretending to have obtained from secret communications the knowledge of a stipulation, tending, as it alleged, to subject Denmark to the continental coalition, resolved to send a powerful expedition to Copenhagen for the purpose of securing the Danish fleet, upon the pretext that to deprive Napoleon of the maritime resources of Denmark was, on the part of England, only an act of legitimate defence. This resolution being adopted, the English cabinet immediately issued the necessary orders. The troops and the fleet were already in the Downs, and had nothing to do but to set sail. Ever since the check before Constantinople, the Admiralty had in its counsels made it a rule that every naval expedition ought to be accompanied by land forces. Conformably to this notion, 20,000 men had been assembled in the Downs; these, added to the English troops sent to Stralsund, would form an army of 27,000 or 28,000 men under the walls of Copenhagen. The proceedings were to be worthy of the object. Taking advantage of the circumstance that Denmark had all her troops, not in the islands of Seeland and Fünen, but on the frontiers of Holstein, it was resolved to throw a naval division into the two Belts, to intercept those passages, and thus to prevent the Danish army from coming to the succour of Copenhagen, then to land 20,000 men around that capital, to invest it, to summon it, and if it refused to surrender, to bombard and even to destroy it. This plan of attack, founded on the default of preparation towards the sea, and on the assemblage of all the Danish forces on the land side, was a complete demonstration of the good faith of Denmark and of the base ill faith of the British cabinet. Sir Home Popham, deeply compromised in the failure of the attempt on Buenos Ayres, and extremely impatient to retrieve his reputation, had greatly contributed to the conception of the plan, and also contributed greatly to its execution.

It was under these circumstances that the offer of the Russian mediation and the proposal to treat for a reconciliation with France arrived in London. There they were far too deeply engaged in a system of implacable hostilities, too strongly enticed by the hope of a signally prosperous expedition, to listen to any pacific proposal. It was decided, therefore, to return an evasive answer, hypocritically calculated, which, without precluding any ulterior reconciliation, would for the moment leave the ministers at liberty to prosecute the enterprise commenced. In consequence, in a note which was a parody of the former language of Pitt, they declared, like him, that they were quite ready for peace, but that it had always been prevented by the bad faith of France, and that, not disposed after so many fruitless negotiations to fall into a new snare, they requested to be informed on what bases Russia, on becoming mediatrix, was commissioned to treat. It was a shuffling answer, but of which posterior acts were soon to furnish a cruelly negative interpretation.

Admiral Gambier, commanding the English fleet, and Lieutenant-General Cathcart, commanding the land forces, set sail in several divisions towards the end of July. The expedition, starting from several ports in the Channel, was composed of 25 sail of the line, 40 frigates, and 377 transports. It carried about 20,000 men, and was to find 7000 or 8000 returning from Stralsund. The ships of war preceded the fleet of transports in order to surround the island of Seeland, and to prevent the return of the Danish troops towards Copenhagen. This fleet was on the 1st of August in the Cattegat, on the 3rd at the entrance of the Sound. Before proceeding up the Sound, Admiral Gambier had detached Commodore Keats with a division of frigates and brigs, and a few seventy-fours, drawing but little water, to secure the two Belts, and to station a squadron there, with orders not to suffer a single man to pass from the continent to the island of Fünen, or from the island of Fünen to that of Seeland. This precaution taken, the fleet passed the Sound without resistance, because Denmark knew nothing, and Sweden knew everything. It came to an anchor in the road of Elsineur, near the fortress of Kronenborg, which continued silent, and it despatched an English agent to address a summons to the Prince-Royal of Denmark, then regent of the kingdom. The agent chosen was worthy of the mission. It was Mr. Jackson, who had formerly been chargé d'affaires in France before the arrival of Lord Whitworth in Paris, but who could not be left there on account of the bad spirit which he manifested on all occasions. He did not meet with the prince-royal in Copenhagen, and went in quest of him to Kiel, where the royal family was residing at the moment. Being introduced to the regent, he alleged a pretended secret stipulation, by virtue of which

Denmark, it was said, was voluntarily or by force to join a continental coalition against England. As a reason for acting, he assigned the necessity in which the British cabinet found itself to take precautions lest the naval forces of Denmark and the passage of the Sound should fall into the power of the French; and in consequence he demanded in the name of his government that the fortress of Kronenborg, which commands the Sound, the port of Copenhagen, and lastly, the fleet itself, should be delivered up to the English army, promising that the whole should be held in deposit for the account of Denmark, which should be put again in possession of all that was to be taken from her when the danger should be over. Mr. Jackson gave an assurance that Denmark should not lose anything, that the English would conduct themselves in his country as auxiliaries and friends, that the British troops would pay for all that they should consume. "And with what," replied the indignant prince, "would you pay for our lost honour if we were to accede to this infamous proposal?" The prince continued, and contrasting with this perfidious aggression the upright conduct of Denmark, which had taken no precautions against the English, which had taken all against the French, and now found that her confidence was abused to surprise her. Mr. Jackson replied to this just indignation with an insolent familiarity, saying that war was war, and that one must submit to its necessities, and yield to the stronger when one is the weaker party. The prince dismissed the English agent with very harsh words, declaring that he should immediately return to Copenhagen to perform there his duties of Danish prince and citizen. He accordingly repaired thither, made known by a proclamation the dangers with which the country was threatened, addressed a patriotic appeal to the population, and prescribed all the measures which time and the unexpected investment of the island of Seeland allowed to be taken—an investment which had already become so close, that the prince had himself found the greatest difficulty to cross the two Belts. Unfortunately the means of defence were far from corresponding with the wants of Copenhagen, for there were scarcely 5000 troops in the city, 3000 of the line, and 2000 well-organised militia. To these was added a civic guard of 3000 or 4000 citizens and students. All the old ships were moored, as in 1801, outside the passages, so as to cover the city towards the sea with floating batteries. The fleet, the object of the predilection and the pride of the Danes, was carefully removed to the interior of the basin; and lastly, on the land side works were hastily thrown up, for it was known that the English had brought with them a great land force, and the heavy artillery, with which the Danish arsenals were abundantly provided, was mounted in battery in all quarters. But

if such means were sufficient to prevent the taking of the city by assault, they were far from sufficient against the danger of a bombardment. It would have been requisite to keep the enemy at such a distance as should render any bombardment impossible, or to have had outworks, which Denmark, relying upon the insular position of her capital, had never thought of erecting, or an army of the line, which her good faith had induced her to place on the frontier of her territory. Be this as it may, the prince, after making the dispositions adapted to the urgency of circumstances, left a brave officer, General Peymann, to command the city of Copenhagen, with orders to defend himself to the last extremity. As there was in the island of Seeland itself, and consequently within the Belts, a pretty numerous population, capable of furnishing some thousand militia, he ordered General Castenskiold to assemble this militia in all haste, and to introduce it, if possible, into Copenhagen before the investment of that city. As for himself, he left the place and hastened in person to Holstein to collect the army scattered on the frontier, and lead it to the relief of the capital, if he could succeed in crossing the Belts.

Meanwhile the English envoy, having returned to the fleet, directed the English legation to leave Copenhagen, and gave Admiral Gambier, as well as General Cathcart, the signal for the fearful execution prepared against a city, whose whole crime consisted in the possession of a fleet which the English ministers wanted to capture in order to place themselves on higher ground in Parliament. The parleys with the Danish government, the necessity for awaiting the arrival of the transport fleet, which sailed later than the ships of war, the tarrying for a favourable wind, had retarded Admiral Gambier's operations till the 15th of August. On the 16th he stood in shore at a point of the coast called Webeck, a few leagues to the north of Copenhagen, and there landed about 20,000 men, mostly Germans in the service of England. The division of troops from Stralsund was to land to the south towards Kioge. Encouraged by the presence in the Belts of Commodore Keats' division of light vessels, they commenced in security their criminal enterprise. The English well knew that they should not be able even with 30,000 men to carry by assault a place defended by 8000 or 9000 men, 5000 of whom were regular troops, and a population of very brave seamen. But they reckoned upon the means of destruction which they had at their disposal, thanks to the immense quantity of heavy artillery brought in their ships. To make the more sure of success, they had even brought with them Colonel Congreve, who was to make trial, for the first time, of his formidable rockets. In consequence, their operations did not consist in regular works of approach,

but in the solid and well-protected establishment of a few batteries for red-hot shot. Around Copenhagen there was a sort of lake, of oblong form, which embraced nearly all that portion of enclosure on the land side. They took a position behind this lake, and there entrenched themselves. Covered in this manner, on the side next to the city, against sallies of the besieged, they sought to cover themselves on the side next the country also by a second line of countervallation, in order to keep in awe the militia of Seeland, assembled under General Castenskiöld, or the regular troops themselves, if any of them should find means to cross the Belts. Having solidly established themselves, they began to construct their batteries for red-hot shot, and refrained from making use of them till they should be completely armed and in a state for opening a destructive fire. While they were thus engaged, their fleet had approached the side next the sea, and brisk skirmishes took place on the two elements between the besieged and the besiegers. A Danish flotilla, hastily equipped, contested with the English flotilla, and with advantage, the narrow passages by which it is possible to approach Copenhagen; while the troops of the line, shut up in the city, made frequent sorties against General Cathcart's troops. Having unfortunately the option of only two points of attack, the two extremities of the lake which separated them from the enemy, the Danes found, when they attempted sorties, the English forces drawn to those two points, and were not sufficiently numerous to force the lines of the besiegers. They were obliged every time to fall back after killing a few men, and having lost many more than they had killed, on account of the disadvantage of position.

The English, to make sure of success, awaited the arrival of their second division, which was before Stralsund. The Swedes having, at their instigation, resumed hostilities, Marshal Brune proceeded to lay siege to that place with 38,000 men and all the siege artillery, the use of which was restored to the French army by the reduction of Dantzic, and by the cessation of hostilities before Colberg, Marienberg, and Graudenz. Marshal Brune was accompanied by General Chasseloup of the engineers, the same who had contributed so much to the taking of Dantzic. That able officer, possessing this time all the means, which had been but successively accumulated before the fortress of Dantzic, purposed to make the siege of Stralsund a model of precision, vigour, and promptitude. He had planned three attacks, but with the intention of rendering only one of the three serious—that which, directed towards the Kneiper gate to the north, might carry destruction to the Swedish fleet. Having opened the trenches at all points at once, in spite of the fire of the place, he had in a few days established and armed his batteries,

and commenced an attack so tremendous that the hostile general, though he had 15,000 Swedes and 7000 or 8000 English, either in the fortress or in the isle of Rügen, found himself compelled to send a flag of truce, and to surrender Stralsund on the 21st of August.

During this siege, conducted by the French with a bravery and skill worthy of admiration, General Cathcart had been joined, agreeably to his orders, by the division of English troops which had been directed to co-operate with the Swedes. He had just disembarked it at Kiøge, and from that moment he had so closely shut up the city of Copenhagen within a double line of countervallation, that he had it in his power to destroy that unfortunate city, without having anything to fear from the effects of its despair. Nothing is more legitimate than a siege. Nothing is more barbarous than a bombardment, when one of those imperious necessities of war which justify all things does not render it excusable. And what necessity for justifying the atrocious proceeding prepared by the English, but that of pillaging a fleet and an arsenal reputed to be very rich.

Nevertheless, on the 1st of September, General Cathcart, having in battery sixty-eight pieces of artillery, forty-eight of which were mortars and howitzers, summoned Copenhagen in a language the feigned humanity of which could not deceive. He required that the port, the arsenal, and the fleet should be delivered up to him, threatening in case of refusal to burn the city, and adding to his summons pressing entreaties that he might be spared the employment of the means which, he said, were repugnant to his heart. General Peymann having replied in the negative, a tremendous fire of howitzers, bombs, and Congreve rockets burst over the hapless capital of Denmark. The barbarous authors of this enterprise had not even the excuse of their own danger, for they were so covered as not to lose a single man. After continuing this cruelty the whole night of the 2nd of September and part of the next day, the English general suspended the fire to see whether the place would surrender. Fires had broken out in various quarters; hundreds of unfortunate creatures had perished; several large buildings were in flames; the able population, employed in pouring the waters of the Baltic on the burning quarters, was exhausted with fatigue. General Peymann, with a heart rent by this spectacle, maintained a gloomy silence, waiting before he surrendered for humanity to silence honour. Insensible to all these calamities, the English recommenced their fire in the evening of the 3rd, keeping it up all night and the whole of the next day, excepting a short interruption, and persisting in this barbarity till the morning of the 5th. Nearly 2000 persons, men, women, children, and aged people, had perished. Half the

city was in flames; the fine churches were in ruins; the arsenal was on fire. General Peymann, unable to withstand any longer the horrible scenes which he had before his eyes, yielded at length to the threats of total destruction which the English general repeated, and surrendered Copenhagen to its barbarous conquerors. The capitulation was signed on the 7th. It gave up to the English the castle of Kronenborg, the city of Copenhagen, and the arsenal, with the faculty of occupying them for six weeks, the time judged necessary for equipping the Danish fleet and carrying it off to England. This fleet was given up to Admiral Gambier, upon condition that it should be restored at a peace.

This capitulation being signed, the English entered Copenhagen, and their seamen rushed to the arsenal. No spectacle since their entry into Toulon was comparable to that which they exhibited on this occasion. Before the face of a population overwhelmed with grief, which beheld its habitations ravaged, which numbered in its bosom thousands of victims dead or dying, which, besides its private sorrows, deeply felt the public misfortunes, for the loss of the Danish navy seemed to every one the ruin of his own existence—before the face of this afflicted population, coming ashore in great numbers, they rushed to the arsenal with unheard-of brutality. The English custom of granting to sailors a great part of the value of prizes, in adding to their animosity against all European navies the stimulant of personal greediness, officers and men displayed extraordinary ardour and activity to get afloat every vessel in Copenhagen that was in a state to put to sea. There were found sixteen sail of the line, and about a score of brigs and frigates capable of serving, with the rigging stowed away in storehouses kept in very good order. In a few days these forty and odd vessels were rigged, equipped, and warped out of the basins. The destructive zeal of the English sailors did not stop at this robbery. There were two ships building—they they demolished. All the timber and naval stores in the arsenal were carried on board the Danish squadron or the English squadron. They took away the very tools of the workmen, and destroyed whatever they could not carry off. Half of the English crews was then put on board the Danish ships to navigate them, and the entire expedition, the conquering as well as the conquered fleet, worked through the passages, taking care to receive on board in haste the army which it had landed, and which did not think itself safe in a city that it had drenched with blood, and on the approach of the French, who were coming in all haste to avenge such an atrocity. Passing Webeck, Kronenborg, and all the points of the coast, this immense naval armament picked up the English troops, and then made sail for the coast of England.

It would be impossible to express the sensation produced in Europe by the unheard-of act, which, not the English nation, which severely censured that act, but the administration of Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh, had authorised. The indignation was general among the friends of France, who at that time were not numerous, for she had too much success to have many friends, as well as among her most decided enemies. There was not a nation more highly esteemed than the Danish nation. Discreet, modest, laborious, attentive to her own commerce, without seeking to injure that of another, making a point of scrupulously maintaining her neutrality amidst a war of bitter animosity, and though inoffensive, yet capable, as in 1801, of devoting herself heroically for the principle of that neutrality which formed her whole policy, she was, like the Swiss, like the Dutch, one of those nations which make up for numerical weakness by moral strength, and know how to command universal respect. The surprise of which she had just been the victim furnished still more striking evidence of her good faith; for she suffered for having taken no precaution against England, and for having taken too much against France. Hence there was but one sentiment, but one cry, throughout all Europe. Before, it was said that nobody could rest quietly beside the redoubtable conqueror begotten by the French Revolution. Now it was said that England was quite as tyrannical at sea as Napoleon on land; that she was as perfidious as he was violent; and that between the two there was neither security nor repose for any nation. Such was the language of our enemies, such the language of Berlin and Vienna. But among our friends and among impartial men, it was acknowledged that good reason for endeavouring to unite all nations against an intolerable maritime despotism—a despotism which, once established, would be invincible, would suffer no flag but the English flag, no traffic but in English produce, and end in fixing at pleasure the price of English commodities, whether exotic or manufactured. It was necessary therefore to join in order to make head against England, to wrest from her the sceptre of the seas, and to compel her to restore to the world that peace of which, on her account, it had been deprived for fifteen years.

It is certain that there was nothing, excepting peace, which Napoleon wished for more than such an event. He should not hereafter have to resort to violence with Denmark, which, on the contrary, would throw itself into his arms, assist him to close the Sound, and furnish him with what was of more value than a few old ships, with excellent sailors, fit to man the innumerable vessels which France had on the stocks. He could push the Russian armies upon Sweden, and push the armies of Spain upon Portugal; he could even require at Vienna the

exclusion of the English from the shores of the Adriatic; lastly he could demand everything at St. Petersburg; for after what had passed at Copenhagen, Alexander could not meet with any further resistance to his policy in the opinion of the Russians. Had Napoleon at this moment profited by the fault of England, without committing an equal one, he would have been in a unique position; he would have become as morally strong through the wrongs of his enemy, as he was materially through his own armies. In fact, the trouble of his system of conquering the sea by land was saved, for the violence done to the continental powers to oblige them to concur in his designs would be thenceforward explained and justified. If he closed the ports of the Hanseatic towns, of Holland, of France, of Portugal, of Spain, of Italy; if he doomed the people to shift without sugar and coffee, and to substitute for those productions of the tropics costly and very imperfect European imitations; if he did violence to all tastes, after having done violence to all interests: he had a complete and signal excuse in the crime of Copenhagen. But, we repeat it, he ought to have left England to sin alone, and not himself have sinned so grievously—a difficult thing, for in a rancorous contest faults link themselves together, and it is rarely the case that the faults of the one are not speedily balanced or surpassed by the faults of the other.

Napoleon was well aware of the advantage which the conduct of England gave him, and if he lost a hope of accommodation, a hope which was but slender in his estimation, he all at once saw a concurrence of means, a union of efforts, preparing for him, which would promise him a peace, the conditions of which would compensate the delay. He failed not, therefore, to excite the journals of France, and all those that he could command out of France, against the abominable act which had roused the indignation of Europe. From Fontainebleau itself, from amidst the pleasures of that residence, his armies, his fleets were all prepared for a conflict still more vast and more terrible than that which for so many years had appalled the world.

For the rest, Napoleon had no effort to make in order to impart to the opinion of Europe that impulsion which it suited him to give to it. In England itself the misdeed committed against the city of Copenhagen was censured with extreme severity. In that great and moral country, there were, notwithstanding an unworthy administration, notwithstanding a debased parliament, notwithstanding the passion of the people for the success of the national navy, there were enlightened, honest, impartial men, who condemned the unparalleled act perpetrated against an inoffensive and disarmed power. Lord Grenville, Messrs. Wyndham, Addington, Grey, Sheridan, and others spoke out with vehemence against this odious act, which, according to

them, was but an iniquitous and mischievous parody of that of 1801; for in 1801 Denmark formed part of a coalition hostile to England, and the means employed for reducing her were the most legitimate of all—a naval battle. In 1807, on the contrary, that same Denmark was at peace, wholly occupied in defending her neutrality against France, disarmed in regard to England, and the method employed to reduce her was the atrocious bombardment of an inoffensive population. The result was, instead of dissolving a coalition of neutrals, to link Denmark and France more closely together, to spare the latter the odium of a general constraint exercised upon the continent, to take upon itself that odium, to close the Sound against itself; for the Danes closed it on their side, and the Swedes were soon forced to close it on theirs. Lastly, to balance such deplorable consequences, there was nothing to allege but the pillage of an arsenal, the carrying away of a fleet which was very old, and only four ships of which were worth the expense of repair. Such were the animadversions directed with deserved vehemence against Mr. Canning, who replied to them with an intrepidity in falsehood which is not of a nature to honour his memory, redeemed, it is true, by his posterior conduct. For his only excuse, he repeated incessantly that ministers had obtained the secret of the negotiations of Tilsit, and that this secret justified the Copenhagen expedition. His adversaries justly replied by desiring to be informed, not who was the author of this revelation, whom the feigned generosity of the British cabinet refused to name, but of the mere substance of what he had revealed. Now, on this point the cabinet returned but very confused and perplexed answers, and could not furnish any other; for it was true that, at Tilsit (as the British cabinet knew but very vaguely) Russia and France had promised to unite their efforts to force the continent into a coalition against England, this was only after an offer of peace on moderate conditions; it was, moreover, unknown to the cabinet of Copenhagen, which was not an accomplice in that design. In the conduct pursued towards Denmark, there was then iniquity in a moral point of view, and silliness in a political point of view; for the true means of having that neutral power on one's side, of having her fleet, her sailors, and the Sound, would have been to assist her, and to leave to Napoleon the trouble of doing her violence.

In spite, however, of the reprobation bestowed by all honest men in England on the Copenhagen expedition, a parliament subservient to the anti-Catholic prejudices of the Crown, and to the extravagant policy of Pitt, decided in favour of the ministers, but not without betraying the embarrassment which it felt. It adopted, in fact, the form of an adjournment, declaring that it would take the act into consideration at a future

time, when the ministers should have it in their power to say what they could not divulge at the moment. But all idea of peace was for ever abandoned. The British cabinet, not disguising from itself the mischievous impressions produced in Europe by its late violences, endeavoured to recover its credit with the two principal courts of the continent, those of Vienna and St. Petersburg. It sent Lord Pembroke to Vienna, General Wilson to St. Petersburg, to convey some of those proposals which one chooses rather to communicate orally than in writing. These proposals were the following.

From the apparent satisfaction which the Emperor Alexander seemed to have brought back from a war, marked nevertheless by reverses; from the demi-confidential communications which he had made, and which all led to the inference that great results would be seen to spring from the alliance with France; from his persisting to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia; it was evident to men endowed with any sagacity that France, in order to bring Russia into her views, had promised her great advantages in the east, and that she had singularly flattered her ambition in regard to that quarter. The British cabinet decided, therefore, without hesitation, on the sacrifices which circumstances appeared to command, and though it incessantly affected to defend the integrity of the Ottoman empire, it conceived that it would be better to give itself Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia, than to leave them to be given her by Napoleon. In consequence, General Wilson, bold and clever as a soldier and a diplomatist, a personage at that time of too little importance for ministers to be afraid of disavowing him in case of need, was charged to convey to St. Petersburg a message of the most alluring kind for the Emperor Alexander. He had no ostensible powers, but Mr. Canning, in conversation with M. d'Alopeus, the Russian minister, assured him that credit might be given to what General Wilson should say. Lord Pembroke, envoy-extraordinary to Austria, notwithstanding the presence of Mr. Adair, was directed to demonstrate to the court of Vienna the necessity for being on good terms with Russia, and consequently for making up its mind to all the sacrifices which this line of policy might entail. The real drift of this was nothing less than to dispose Austria to see with calmness Moldavia and Wallachia become the property of the Russians.

Lord Gower, ambassador in Russia, and General Wilson, who had been sent to second him, strove to persuade the Russian cabinet not to take amiss what had been done at Copenhagen; that ministers had merely endeavoured to deprive the common enemy of Europe of the means of doing mischief; that it ought to rejoice instead of being irritated at it; that England

relied upon Russia to bring back Denmark to a more just appreciation of the late events; and that, as for the fleet, it would subsequently be given back to her if she would join the good cause; that for the rest, without pretending to set itself up for judge of the new line of policy adopted by Russia, the British cabinet was certain that she would soon return to her old system, as the only good one; that it would not seek to involve her again in war with France, at a moment when she had such need of rest to recruit herself; that it should even see with pleasure any aggrandisement of her territory and her power; for there was but one mischievous sort of aggrandisement which must by all means be prevented—the aggrandisement of France; but that if Russia was desirous to have Moldavia and Wallachia, it would consent to her making the acquisition, provided that it was not in consequence of a partition of the Turkish provinces with the Emperor Napoleon.

The most compromising of these words, those which one would not hazard without the faculty of withdrawing them in case of need, were spoken by General Wilson to M. de Romanzoff, who reported them a moment afterwards to General Savary. The others were said by Lord Gower himself with an arrogance which was not likely to destroy the strangeness of their effect. That smart way of explaining the Copenhagen expedition, that commission given to Russia to justify England to Denmark, were one of the most offensive of familiarities to the Russian cabinet. The Emperor of Russia felt it deeply, and insisted that the overtures of England should be received with the greatest haughtiness. In reply to the proposal for justifying to Copenhagen the carrying off of the Danish fleet, he caused a formal demand of a formal explanation on that subject to be made, and he required Lord Gower to give an immediate and categorical answer to the offer of mediation which the Russian cabinet had addressed to the British cabinet. Lord Gower, since so honourably known by the name of Lord Granville, seems on this occasion to have shaken off his habitual indolence, insisted imperiously on being made acquainted with the secret of the negotiations at Tilsit, and declared that until England was informed of what had been done at that celebrated interview, she should hold herself dispensed from all explanation respecting what she had done at Copenhagen. As to the Russian mediation, Lord Gower, being pressed to declare definitively whether he consented to accept it or not, replied proudly that he did not.

Such was the issue of the explanations with Lord Gower. As for the overtures with which General Wilson was charged, M. de Romanzoff received them superciliously, as words of no importance, and dismissed Wilson himself, without seeming

to comprehend what the latter had meant to say. He had thoroughly understood him, however, as we shall presently see.

M. de Romanzoff, formerly a minister of Catherine's, retaining a reflection of the glory of that princess, heir of her vast ambition, a great personage in all respects, had become in these circumstances the intimate confidant of Alexander and of all his dreams. Minister of commerce, he had just been appointed minister for foreign affairs; and Alexander, seeking an ambassador who might be suitable for Paris, would not send him thither, though he possessed every quality for such a post, solely that he might keep him about his person. The young sovereign and the old minister ardently coveted the provinces of the Danube. Finland, an acquisition immediately more desirable, because it was a necessary, whereas the provinces of the Danube were but superfluities, did not interest them by far so much. Moldavia and Wallachia led to Constantinople, and this was what allured them. They would, therefore, have accepted them, no matter from what hand; and in the impatience of their desires, they retained only so much judgment as was requisite to appreciate the donor the most capable of giving speedily and solidly. In regard to this point, Napoleon had all their preference. From whom, in fact, could one at that period receive something, and something considerable, unless from Napoleon? To take territory in any part of the European continent without his assent would have entailed war with him; and war with him, by whatever number it had been waged, had not hitherto proved successful. Supposing even that a new general coalition could be formed, such battles as those of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland presented no very cheering prospect; and at this time, too, when in the state of the French army any encounter with it must have the same consequences. Besides, if England, throwing out slight baits here and there, had shown an easy disposition in regard to the provinces of the Danube, could Russia flatter herself that Austria would manifest the like disposition? Had she not at St. Petersburg her ambassador, M. de Meerveldz, who was every day inquiring aloud, and of everybody, the secret of the negotiations at Tilsit, and who declared that if Moldavia and Wallachia were the price of the new alliance, they must be prepared to destroy the last Austrian before they should obtain the consent of the court of Vienna? They must, therefore, not hope that a coalition would be formed to ensure such a gift to Russia. This gift, conferred in spite of Austria, could come only from the man who, for fifteen years, had invariably conquered her, that is to say, from Napoleon; and the Emperor of Russia leagued with the Emperor of France, not a creature in Europe would dare to oppose what they had jointly determined upon.

It was necessary, therefore, to persist in the career commenced at Tilsit, and to obtain from Napoleon, by contriving to please him, the realisation of the hopes to which he had so complaisantly lent himself on the banks of the Niemen. The value which he set on all that was expected from him it was easy to discover. If the war continued, he would attempt fresh enterprises in Italy, in Portugal, perhaps even in Spain. In those countries there were Bourbons, who must form a glaring, an intolerable contrast with his dynasty. He had said nothing on this subject at Tilsit or elsewhere to any creature whatever; if, nevertheless, peace were further adjourned, it was easy to foresee that he would not stop short in his activity, that he would prosecute in the west that work of renovation which consisted in dethroning the sovereigns who were allies or relations of the ancient house of Bourbon. But Russia was not at all interested in preventing enterprises of that kind. It was indeed of little consequence to Russia whether a Bourbon or a Bonaparte reigned at Naples, at Florence, at Milan, at Madrid. The ideas introduced in the train of the new dynasties created by Napoleon did not yet threaten the authority of the czars. As for the influence of France, Russia would have no reason to regret her aggrandisement, if that influence were employed to facilitate the march of the Muscovites towards Constantinople. The Emperor Alexander, therefore, had no cause to be uneasy about what Napoleon might be tempted to undertake in the south and west of Europe; and if he winked at it, he had every reason to hope that Napoleon would let him do what he pleased in the east. Napoleon might condescend more or less to the desires of Alexander, permit him to advance to the Danube, to the foot of the Balkans, or even to the Bosphorus; but the least that he could grant was Wallachia and Moldavia. All that Napoleon had said on this subject, at least all that Alexander conceived that he had heard, seemed to admit of no doubt. Alexander ruminating day and night over his recollections of Tilsit, M. de Romanzoff ruminating over what Alexander had related to him, had accustomed themselves to consider Moldavia and Wallachia as the smallest of the gifts which they might hope for. By dint of reckoning upon this gift, they had even arrived at a sort of anticipated satiety, and they began already to conceive new desires. Unluckily they had not confined themselves to this intimate and secret enjoyment of their future conquests; they had thought fit to communicate it to many confidants, to some in order to diffuse their inward satisfaction, to others to justify themselves for the sudden change in Russian politics. They had thus spread around them a conviction that Moldavia and Wallachia were the assured price of the new alliance; and they were instigated to wish for the possession of

them, not only by the passion for possessing them, but also by the urgent desire to escape passing for dupes.

Recent events served, therefore, only to confirm Alexander and M. de Romanzoff in the policy adopted at Tilsit. Since the mediation turned to war, they must derive from war all that Napoleon had promised to make it produce; only to bind him the more firmly, they must lend themselves to what he should desire. He was evidently about to require that the English and Swedish legation should be sent away; that the Russian army should march for Finland, to oblige Sweden to close the Sound. They must satisfy him on all these points, that he might consent to leave the Russian troops in Wallachia and Moldavia. Singularly enough, to march into Finland ought to have been the primary desire of Russia, as it was her primary interest.* However, so decidedly had they taken the route to the east, that marching to Finland was an absolute sacrifice on their part, which they made solely that they might be suffered to retain Bucharest and Yassy.

The Emperor Alexander then had in the department of foreign affairs an insignificant minister, without passions, without ideas, a disagreeable confidant to talk with about matters which left him perfectly cold: this was M. de Budberg. Alexander dismissed him, and executed his intention of confiding the foreign affairs to M. de Romanzoff himself. There was left in the cabinet one of the members of that little occult society, which had long governed the empire—Prince Kotschoubey. He was the youngest and the most reserved of them. But he was a witness of the past, a troublesome judge of the present; and, besides, Czartoryski and M. de Novosiltzoff, with whom he lived, scarcely disguised their disapprobation of the new turn which things had taken. He could not keep about him critics so annoying, and he was obliged, moreover, to give them a sign of his displeasure. The ministry of the interior was therefore

* Historians too often make historical personages think and speak without having any means of knowing either their thoughts or their language. I do not allow myself here to report the most secret thoughts and the most private conversations of the Emperor Alexander, solely because, in order to do so, I could support myself upon documents of incontestable authority. I have said in a note to Vol. IV., Book XXVII., that there is in the Louvre a series of conversations of Generals Savary and Caulaincourt with the Emperor Alexander and with M. de Romanzoff, daily conversations, of such familiarity and privacy that I durst not give them entire, for Alexander made the French envoys acquainted with his very pleasures; that these conversations, committed to writing at the moment when they had just taken place, reported with minute fidelity, in question and answer, and depicted with striking truth what was passing from day to day in the mind of the emperor and of his minister. From the solicitations and the ill-dissembled agitations of both, it is impossible not to discern clearly what they thought. Other authentic and secret documents, as, for instance, the personal correspondence of Napoleon and Alexander, complete this collection of proofs, and enable me to give as certain the details which I furnish in this part of my narrative.

withdrawn from M. de Kotschoubey. M. de Labanoff, one of the personages who had figured at Tilsit, was called to the ministry of war, M. de Tchitchagoff to the marine; M. de Novosiltzoff was recommended to travel. Prince Czartoryski, too particular a friend of the sovereign for friendship not to cause politics to be forgotten in regard to him, perceived that the affected silence which the emperor observed with him relative to the affairs of the empire was redoubled. Lastly, for the embassy to Paris was selected the person who seemed fittest for succeeding there: Alexander would have wished to send thither, as we have just said, M. de Romanzoff himself, but he chose rather to keep him about his person. He had for grand marshal of the palace a Russian nobleman who was devoted to him: this was M. de Tolstoy, and this nobleman had a brother, General de Tolstoy, an officer distinguished for his spirit and his services. Alexander thought that the latter, from attachment to his master, would not seek to render himself disagreeable in France, as M. de Markoff had made it his business to do; that from ambition he would be delighted to attach his name to a policy of aggrandisement, and that from profession he would find pleasure in a military court, and please it in his turn, and follow it everywhere in its rapid movements. At the same time, the emperor purposed to send to Napoleon on this subject, and submit to him the choice of General Count Tolstoy, before he should definitively appoint him.

General Savary had not ceased to be surrounded at St. Petersburg by the attentions of Alexander, and by the cold politeness of high Russian society. Though he knew not at first all that had been said at Tilsit, and had learned it only from a later communication of Napoleon's, who had thought fit to acquaint him with it in order to prevent any faults of ignorance on his part, he perceived that Russia was ready to do whatever was wished, in consideration of the relinquishment of one or two provinces, not in the north, but in the east. Without involving Napoleon more than he was obliged to do, without stepping out of his part, he had sought to render himself agreeable at St. Petersburg, and had succeeded in flattering with prudence the passions of the sovereign. Hence, no sooner had the news of the events at Copenhagen been received, no sooner had the warm explanations with Lord Gower taken place, than Alexander and M. de Romanzoff sent for General Savary, and in the language befitting each of them, communicated to him the resolutions of the Russian cabinet.

"You know," said Alexander to the general, in several very long conversations, "that our efforts for peace end in war; I expected it, but I confess I did not expect either the Copenhagen expedition or the arrogance of the British cabinet. My resolution is taken, and I am ready to fulfil my engagements. In my

interview with the Emperor Napoleon, we calculated that if the war were to continue, I should be led to declare myself in December, and I could wish that it were not earlier, that I might not have war with the English till after the shutting up of the Baltic. No matter—I shall declare myself forthwith. Tell your master that, if he desires it, I will send back Lord Gower. Cronstadt is armed, and if the English are determined to make an attack on it, they shall see that fighting the Russians is a very different affair from fighting the Turks or the Spaniards. However, I shall not decide upon anything without sending a courier to Paris, for we must not run the risk of thwarting the calculations of Napoleon. Besides, before a rupture, I should like my fleets to have all got back to Russian ports. Be this as it may, I am entirely disposed to follow that conduct which shall best suit your master. Let him even send me, if he chooses, a note ready written, and I will order it to be delivered to Lord Gower together with passports. As for Sweden, I am not prepared, and I ask for time to reorganise my regiments, which suffered severely in the late war, and which are some distance from Finland, and would have to be brought from the south to the north of the empire. Besides, on this theatre my army is not sufficient for me. In the shoal waters of the gulfs of the north, galley-flotillas are much used. The Swedes have a numerous one; mine is not yet equipped, and I will not run the risk of receiving a check from so weak a State. Tell your master, then, that as soon as my means are prepared I will crush Sweden; that he must give me till December or January; but as for the English, I am ready to declare myself immediately. I am even of opinion that we ought not to stop there, but require of Austria her adhesion, voluntary or compulsory, to a continental coalition. In this case, too, I am disposed to receive a note drawn up in Paris, to be sent to Vienna; for there is no demi-alliance, and in all things we must act in perfect harmony. I wish my friendship with Napoleon to be complete, and with this view I have chosen M. de Tolstoy. I have not, like your master, abundance of eminent men in every line. M. de Markoff possesses understanding, but yet he only stirred up discord. I have preferred M. de Tolstoy to any other, because he belongs to a family which is devoted to me, because he is a soldier, because he can ride, and attend the emperor to the chase, to war, and wherever it is fit that he should. If he is not liked, let me know it, and I will send another, so much have I it at heart to prevent the slightest cloud. We shall certainly not be urged to fight just yet; but tell Napoleon that I am weak, changeable, surrounded by his enemies; that he must not reckon upon me. I shall be told that Napoleon is insatiable; that he wants all for himself, nothing for others; that he is equally

crafty and violent; that he promises me much, that he will give me nothing; that he spares me just now, but when he has got out of me all that he wishes, he will fall upon me in my turn; and that, separated from my allies, whom I shall have suffered to be destroyed, I must make up my mind to endure the same fate. I believe it not. I have seen Napoleon; I flatter myself that I have inspired him with part of the sentiments with which he has inspired me; and I am certain that he is sincere. But when one is at a distance, and we cannot see each other, jealousies speedily spring up. On the first doubt, on the first unpleasant impression, let him write to me, or send me word through you or any other confidential person he shall choose, and all shall be explained. For my part, I promise him entire frankness, and I expect the like from him. Oh that I could see him, as at Tilsit, every day, every hour! what talent for conversation! what an understanding! what a genius! what a gainer I should be by living frequently near him! how many things he has taught me in a few days! But we are so far distant! however, I hope to visit him soon. In spring I shall go to Paris, and I shall have occasion to admire him in his Council of State, amidst his troops, in every place, in short, where he appears so great. But till then we must endeavour to understand each other through an intermediary, and to render the mutual confidence as complete as possible. For my part, I am doing all I can to that end, but I do not exercise here that ascendancy which Napoleon exercises in Paris. This country, you perceive, has been surprised at the rather too abrupt change which has taken place. It is apprehensive of the injuries which the English can inflict on its commerce; it is angry at your victories. These are interests which must be gratified, sentiments which must be soothed. Send French merchants hither; buy our naval stores and our productions; we will buy in return your Parisian commodities; the re-establishment of commerce will put an end to all the anxieties which the upper classes conceived on account of their revenues. Assist me, above all, to conciliate the whole nation for you, by doing something for the just ambition of Russia. Those wretched Turks, who are at this day slaughtering your partisans, who are striking off the heads of all that are reputed to be friends of the French (this is what was actually taking place at the moment in Constantinople, thanks to the suggestions of Austria and England)—those wretched Turks are no match for me, and I should think that if they were put into the balance with me, you would not find them to equal me in weight. Your master has, no doubt, told you what passed at Tilsit.”

Here the emperor appeared inquisitive and restless. He was impatient to open himself to General Savary on the subject that

interested him most, and at the same time fearful of committing an indiscretion by disclosing himself to one who was not acquainted with the secret. He had, however, a new motive for explaining himself to the representative of Napoleon. An armistice between the Turks and the Russians had been just signed in consequence of the French mediation—an armistice which stipulated the restitution of the vessels taken from the Turks by Admiral Siniavin, the interdiction of all hostility before spring, and lastly, the evacuation of the banks of the Danube. In reality, there was but this last condition which affected the Emperor Alexander, but this he would not admit, and complained in a general manner of the armistice, which he imputed to the unfriendly intervention of the minister of France.

He did not think, he said to General Savary, about the provinces of the Danube; it was your emperor who, on receiving the news of Selim's downfall, exclaimed at Tilsit: "One can do nothing with those barbarians! Providence releases me from restraint in regard to them; let us settle matters at their expense!" I entered into this track, continued the Emperor Alexander, and M. de Romanzoff with me. The nation has followed us, and it is not too notable an advantage on that point to render it favourable to France. Finland, to which you urge me to march, is a desert, the possession of which smiles on nobody, which, besides, must be taken from an old ally, by a sort of defection which wounds the national delicacy, and affords pretexts to the enemies of the alliance. We must, therefore, seek elsewhere specious reasons for our abrupt change of conduct. Tell the Emperor Napoleon all this; persuade him that I am far less influenced by the desire to possess an additional province, than by the desire of rendering an alliance from which I expect great things solid and agreeable to my nation. Ah! repeated the emperor, if I could but go to Paris at this moment, all would be settled in a few minutes' conversation; but I cannot, before the month of March.

On uttering these last words, the Emperor Alexander questioned General Savary with a restless inquisitiveness, in order to learn whether he had not heard from Napoleon, whether he was not in the secret of his plans, of his resolutions, in regard to the east and the west.

General Savary used infinite art not to discourage the Emperor Alexander; told him, and told him truly, that he could not yet know what grand ideas the continuation of the war might suggest to the Emperor Napoleon, but that he would certainly do everything to satisfy his powerful ally.

M. de Romanzoff was still more explicit than his sovereign, related to General Savary the overtures of General Wilson, the effect which they had produced on the Emperor Alexander, and

the eagerness of that prince to seize this occasion of proving his fidelity to France, by accepting from her hand what he might receive from the hand of England. He expressed to him more strongly than ever his resolution to declare himself against England and Sweden; against Austria herself, if it were necessary to bring over this latter power to the politics of Tilsit. Thus it was that, in the language of the day (for people create a language for every new circumstance), they termed the system of tolerance which they had reciprocally promised one another for the enterprises which they might be tempted to engage in, each for himself. M. de Romanzoff added, that Russia must obtain an equivalent for all that she was disposed to permit, were it only for the sake of rendering the new alliance popular and durable. Receiving at this moment despatches from Constantinople, which brought intelligence of fresh disturbances, M. de Romanzoff said, smiling, to General Savary, that he saw plainly that it was all over with the old Ottoman empire, and that unless the Emperor Alexander interfered, the Emperor Napoleon himself would soon be obliged to declare in the *Moniteur* that "the succession of the sultans was vacant, and that the natural heirs must come forward."

While everything was lavished on General Savary, solicitations, caresses, familiar effusions, and even presents, the Emperor Alexander, without saying a word about that, directed orders to be given to his army not to evacuate the provinces of the Danube, upon pretext that the armistice could not be ratified as it then stood. He and his minister repeated that they must be left in quiet on the subject of the Turks; that the Russians must not be required to abase themselves before barbarians; that they ought to turn their attention as soon as possible to a territorial arrangement in the east, to send confidential ambassadors to each other, and above all, to send French purchasers to St. Petersburg to supply the place of English purchasers. Alexander specially solicited two things: in the first place, to be authorised to send to France for education the cadets destined to serve in the Russian navy, who were usually brought up in England, where they contracted a factious spirit; secondly, liberty to purchase in the French manufactories muskets to supersede those of the Russian soldiers, which were of bad quality, adding, that the two armies being now destined to serve the same cause, might then use the same arms. He accompanied these gracious expressions with a magnificent present of furs for the Emperor Napoleon, saying that he would "be his furrier," and repeated that he expected M. de Tolstoy, whom he meant to despatch as soon as he should be definitely approved at Paris.

On learning these details, faithfully reported by General

Savary, Napoleon was at once gratified and embarrassed, for he saw that he could dispose at pleasure of the Emperor Alexander and his principal minister. But he had reflected coolly since Tilsit, and began to think that it was a serious matter to allow a fresh step to be taken towards Constantinople by the gigantic empire of Peter the Great—an empire which for a century past had so rapidly increased, that it was enough to terrify the world. General Sebastiani, on his part, wrote to him from Constantinople that the Russians were abhorred; that if the Turks had the slightest hope of deriving support from France, they would voluntarily throw themselves into her arms; and that instead of having to fight in order to force them to become subjects of Russia, a trifling assistance might perhaps suffice to aid them to become subjects of France; that all the parts of the empire, fit, from their situation, to become French, would give themselves up to us spontaneously; that in this case it was with Austria, not with Russia, that we ought to seek to arrange matters; that an understanding with Austria would be easier and more advantageous, whether one purposed to partition or to preserve the Ottoman empire; for if it were to be partitioned, she would demand less, always satisfied so that Russia had no share of the banks of the Danube; and if one decided to preserve it, she would deem herself so fortunate in such a resolution, that one would have her concurrence with very trifling sacrifices. These various ideas, which had all their specious side, had succeeded and alternately combated each other in the mind of Napoleon, whose activity never rested, and he resolved not to be in too great a hurry to decide what course to pursue on so important a subject. In a system of moderate ambition, to refuse satisfactions to Russian ambition would have been very wise. But with what France had undertaken, with what she was about further to undertake, it was adding to the temerity of French politics to engage in new events without attaching Russia completely to her by a sacrifice in the east.

Napoleon thought to satisfy Muscovite ambition, not towards the east, to which it was strongly attracted, but towards the north, which had very little attraction for it, and to give up Finland to Russia upon pretext of pushing her against Sweden. Such a conquest as Finland, said he to himself, is a fine acquisition, and the Emperor Alexander ought to find in it a first satisfaction for Russian opinion, which will give him time to wait for others. In fact, Finland was a fine acquisition, considering real European interests; for if Russia in taking Moldavia and Wallachia would take an alarming stride for Europe towards the Dardanelles, she would take a stride equally alarming towards the Sound by possessing herself of Finland. Unfor-

tunately, while she thus obtained an extension to be regretted for the future independence of Europe, she would be receiving a present in her estimation almost worthless. Napoleon gave a great deal in reality, very little in appearance; and this was the contrary to what he ought to have done to purchase, at as cheap a rate as possible, the new alliance which was about to become the foundation of all his ulterior enterprises. He flattered himself, therefore, that he should satisfy Russia with Finland; and as for the provinces of the Danube, he resolved to defer any decision in regard to them, without, however, destroying the hopes which he had need to keep up.

He, too, had had great difficulty to find an ambassador suitable for the court of St. Petersburg, and he had finally fixed upon M. de Caulaincourt, at this time grand equerry, a soldier by profession, reputed to be upright, intelligent, worthy, but most unjustly compromised in the affair of the Duke of Enghien (which Napoleon almost regarded as a recommendation for the embassy to Russia), but well fitted to acquire influence over the young emperor, to follow him everywhere, and to disguise by his very straightforwardness the somewhat artful tendency of a mission, the sole aim of which was not to perform all that he had been taught to hope for. Napoleon informed M. de Caulaincourt of what had passed at Tilsit, acknowledged that in striving to satisfy the Emperor Alexander he had no intention to make concessions too dangerous for Europe, and recommended to him not to spare any pains for maintaining an alliance upon which must thenceforth rest all his policy. He placed in his suite some of the most distinguished young men of his court, and allowed him the sum of 800,000 francs a year, that he might worthily represent the great empire.

He wrote at the same time to the Emperor Alexander, thanking him for his presents, offering magnificent ones in return (Sèvres porcelain of the greatest beauty), earnestly soliciting that he would assist him in restoring peace by forcing England to submit to it; requesting him to send away immediately the ambassadors of England and Sweden from St. Petersburg; apprising him that a French army was going to occupy Denmark, in virtue of a treaty of alliance concluded with the court of Copenhagen, and urging him to march a Russian army into Sweden, that the Sound might thus be closed on both coasts; giving him afresh his assent to the conquest of Finland; acquainting him with the measures which he was taking in regard to England in order to decide him to adhere to the policy of Tilsit, and also informing him of the entry of numerous armies into the Spanish Peninsula, for the purpose of closing it definitively against the English; telling him, finally, that he had nothing to do with the wording of the armistice with the Porte,

that he disapproved of it (which implied a tacit approbation of the prolonged occupation of the provinces of the Danube), and that in regard to the maintenance or the partition of the Ottoman empire, that question was so important, so interesting, both to the present and the future, as to require his mature consideration; that he could not discuss it in writing, and that he purposed to examine it thoroughly with M. de Tolstoy; that he reserved it for that ambassador; and that it was even to wait for him that he had deferred his departure for Italy, though he was in urgent haste to repair to that country. Let us unite, said Napoleon to Alexander, and we shall accomplish the greatest things of modern times! Napoleon, moreover, sent word to the emperor and M. de Romanzoff that the minister Decrès was about to purchase twenty millions' worth of naval stores in the ports of Russia; that the French navy would receive all the Russian cadets who should be sent to it for instruction; and lastly, that fifty thousand muskets, after the best model, were at the disposal of the imperial government, which might send for them to any place that it should be pleased to point out.

While he was writing thus cordially to the Emperor Alexander, Napoleon recommended to M. de Caulaincourt not to talk too much about an approaching interview; for in a new imperial tête-à-tête he should be obliged to come to a conclusion respecting Turkey, which he extremely dreaded. At any rate, Finland granted immediately, the provinces of the Danube left in prospect, the silence observed relative to their prolonged occupation, lastly, many demonstrations of friendship, appeared to Napoleon, and they really were, sufficient means for living in harmony for a longer or shorter, but limited time.

Napoleon, unfortunately, had not merely regarded the outrage of England against Denmark as an occasion for conciliating the opinion of Europe; he had, on the contrary, discovered in it a pretext for venturing upon fresh enterprises; and he resolved to take advantage of the prolongation of the war to complete all the arrangements which he meditated. He thought that, in order the better to attain this end, it might be well to conciliate Austria, and to put an end to that extremely unpleasant state with her, arising, independently of the ordinary grievances of that court, from the recent events of the war. Austria was angry with herself for having armed without profiting by the opportunity for acting which offered after Eylau and before Friedland, for having incurred useless expenses, and for having shown, for no benefit whatever, dispositions of which Napoleon could not be the dupe. She was uneasy about what he might require by way of punishing her, more uneasy still about what he might have promised Russia on the Danube, and but little cheered by the language of England, who was inces-

santly repeating that she must on the one hand prepare seriously for war, and on the other reconcile Russia, by herself conceding to her all that Napoleon was ready to grant her; that is to say, after the terrible calamities of the last fifteen years, she was to inflict upon herself a new one more terrible than all the others, namely, that of seeing Russia on the Lower Danube.

Napoleon, who had no difficulty to discern the uneasiness of Austria, was solicitous to put an end to it, that he might be more free in his actions. He had received at Fontainebleau with perfect courtesy the Duke of Wurzburg, brother of the Emperor Francis, transferred, as we have several times observed, from principality to principality, and most desirous to bring about a good understanding between Austria and France, that he might not have to suffer still more by their quarrels. Napoleon entered at length, and with the utmost frankness, into explanations with this prince, completely satisfied him respecting his intentions towards the court of Vienna, from which, he said, he had no desire to take anything, but to which, on the contrary, he was ready to give up the fortress of Braunau, left in the hands of the French ever since the treachery committed at the mouths of the Cattaro. Napoleon declared that, the mouths of the Cattaro having been restored to him, he considered himself as having a right and interest in keeping Braunau, an important place, which commanded the course of the Inn; that on the side of Istria he desired nothing more than the maintenance of the military road previously granted for the passage of French troops proceeding to Dalmatia; that, at most, if they should consent to it at Vienna, he should propose a rectification of the frontiers between the kingdom of Italy and the empire of Austria, a rectification limited to the exchange of the small Italian territories situated on the left bank of the Isonzo for the small Austrian territories situated on the right bank, so as to take the *thalweg* of that river for the boundary; that, this done, he should require nothing more, and would be quite disposed to respect scrupulously the letter of the treaties. In regard to general policy, Napoleon added that he joined Russia in soliciting Austria to assist him in restoring peace, by closing the coasts of the Adriatic to English commerce; that the atrocious affair of Copenhagen rendered this a duty for all the powers; that if Austria pursued this course, she would have the honour of re-establishing peace, for England would not hold out against the strongly expressed unanimity of the continent; that finally, this union on all points being obtained, the court of Vienna would no doubt renounce useless, expensive, and annoying armaments; that Napoleon, on his part, would not have any more urgent concern than to withdraw his armies, and to convey them to the coast of Lower Italy. As for Turkey, Napoleon spoke of

it very vaguely, and manifested no disposition for any speedy resolution. Moreover, he always gave it to be understood that nothing would be done in the east but in concert with Austria, that is to say, in allotting her share to her in case the Ottoman empire should cease to exist.

These explanations, which were honestly given, and which were received with joy by the Duke of Wurzburg—these explanations, transmitted to Vienna, imparted a real relief. Deep as was the regret felt for having neglected to seize the moment when Napoleon was marching towards the Niemen, to place himself between it and the Rhine, nothing better was desired, now that the opportunity was lost, than to remain quiet, and not to have such an enemy to contend with, when one was alone and had no other ally than England, a not very helpful ally, who, when she had urged on the continental powers to war, and made them fight, quietly drew back to her island, complaining of the bad quality of the auxiliary troops. To learn that it could recover Braunau without sustaining any loss in Istria, to learn, moreover, that nothing speedy was preparing in the east, would have afforded real joy to the Austrian cabinet, if in the present state of things it had been capable of feeling joy. It appeared inclined, therefore, to do all that Napoleon desired, as well respecting the *thalweg* of the Isonzo, as the steps to be taken with England, whose conduct at Copenhagen was so odious, that even at Vienna there was no hesitation to condemn it strongly. In consequence, powers were sent to M. de Metternich, ambassador of Austria at Paris, to sign a convention embracing all the objects upon which concert was desirable and appeared easy after the explanations exchanged at Fontainebleau.

It was agreed that the fortress of Braunau should be given up to Austria; that the *thalweg* of the Isonzo should be taken for the frontier of the Austrian and Italian possessions; and that a military road through Istria should continue open to French troops proceeding to Dalmatia. The convention containing these stipulations was signed at Fontainebleau on the 10th of October. To the written stipulations were added formal promises relative to England. Towards this old ally Austria could not proceed by an abrupt and firm declaration of war; but she promised to arrive at the desired result by having recourse to forms which would diminish in no respect the firmness of her resolutions. Accordingly, she directed M. de Stahrenberg, her ambassador in London, to complain of the act perpetrated upon Copenhagen as an outrage which must be deeply felt by all the neutral States; to require an answer to the offers of mediation made in April by the court of Austria, in July by the court of Russia, and to signify that if England did not soon reply to overtures of peace so often repeated, reserving a right afterwards

to debate the conditions in the presence of the mediating powers, Austria should be compelled to break off all connection with her, and to recall her ambassador. To these official communications was added the secret declaration that Austria, left entirely alone on the continent, was incapable of making head against Russia and France united; that she was of course obliged to give way; that, besides, at this moment France was granting her tolerable conditions; that decidedly she neither could nor would think of war; and that England, on her part, ought to think of peace, otherwise she would force her best friends to separate themselves from her. It is true, that if the cabinet spoke thus, the passionate partisans of war strove to induce a belief that this was only a transient resolution to obtain the restoration of Braunau, a resolution which would change as soon as Russia had been brought back to a different policy. Notwithstanding these assertions of the war party at Vienna, the Austrian cabinet in reality desired nothing better than to find its pacific representations listened to in London, and had resolved to break off its diplomatic relations with England in case the latter persisted in turning a deaf ear to any accommodation.

Respecting her armaments, Austria gave much less sincere assurances. She affirmed that she was making drafts from her skeletons, and dismissing the men who had momentarily filled them, that she was selling her magazines, that, in short, she was reducing herself to the strictest peace establishment. In reality she was only discharging those men who had nearly attained the age for liberation, and replacing them with young recruits, on whose military education she bestowed particular pains, under the direction of the Archduke Charles, who was always engaged in making new improvements in the organisation of the Austrian army. In fact, she was selling only such articles in the magazines as were unfit to be kept, and filling her arsenals with arms and stores of all kinds. In short, Austria, adhering temporarily to the views of Napoleon to spare herself a war, wished, nevertheless, to be ready to revenge her reverses, if fresh circumstances should lead to the resumption of arms. For the present she desired peace, even a general peace.

Napoleon, whose plan in all quarters was to carry back hostilities towards the coasts of the continent, and for this purpose to pacify the interior, had declared to Prussia that he would cheerfully resume the movement of evacuation, suspended for a while in consequence of delay in the payment of the contributions, but that it was necessary to settle as speedily as possible respecting the amount of those contributions and their mode of payment. Prussia having proposed to send Prince William, Napoleon intimated that he would receive him with all possible respect. That unfortunate power was so depressed, that it had declared not only

its adhesion to the continental system, but also its readiness to conclude a formal treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with France. As for Denmark, she had signed a treaty of this kind, stipulated for the despatch of French troops to the islands of Fünen and Seeland, to close the Sound, to cross it on the ice, and to invade Sweden at the moment when the Russians should commence operations against Finland.

Napoleon, being obliged by circumstances to continue the war with England, and armed with all the means of the continent, thought of employing them with all the energy and ability of which he was capable. Even before he was acquainted with the result of the Copenhagen expedition, and as soon as he knew that this expedition was directed towards the Baltic, he had ordered Admiral Decrès to go to Boulogne, to inspect the flotilla, and to see if it could take on board the army which he intended to bring back from Germany, as soon as Prussia should have paid her contributions. The departure of the English expedition, sent towards the Sound, was a unique occasion for surprising England when half disarmed. M. Decrès, repairing in all haste to Boulogne, Vimereux, Ambleteuse, Calais, Dunkirk, Antwerp, had unfortunately found the flotilla in a state which rendered it unfit to receive on board a numerous army. The circular port formed at Boulogne was covered two feet deep with sand; the ports of Vimereux and Ambleteuse, three feet; and a very few years more would suffice to bury those creations of the genius of Napoleon and of the perseverance of our soldiers. Most of the vessels, hastily built, and with green wood, required extensive repair. Out of the 1200 or 1300 of these boats, not more than about 300 had been kept in a state fit to serve at sea, and these 300 were incessantly employed in manœuvring and forming the line of defence from the Fort de l'Heurt to the Fort de la Crèche. As for the other 900 transport boats, picked up everywhere, and at every age, they were nearly past service, in consequence of having lain four years at moorings. The sailors, organised for the most part in battalions, had lost some of their qualities as seamen, but as landsmen they formed the finest troops in the world. General Gouvion St. Cyr, who commanded the camp of Boulogne, declared that they were not surpassed by any in the French army, the imperial guard included. Removed back into ships, and having soon become sailors again, they were sufficient to man twelve sail of the line. As for the Dutch flotilla, partly sent home, partly remaining at Boulogne, it suffered less in its matériel, being better built; but it was weary of its inactivity, and the men regretted the want of employment better suited to their energy and their courage. It was not possible, therefore, to send the flotilla to sea immediately, and to put 150,000 men on board of it, as in 1804. But

with an expense of five or six millions, and in two months' time, by destroying a fifth of the boats and repairing the others, one might embark in the two flotillas, Dutch and French, about 90,000 men and 3000 or 4000 horses. M. Decrès having returned to Paris after this inspection, Napoleon was of opinion, like his minister himself, that the sailors of Holland ought no longer to be detained for a service so uncertain as that of this flotilla, always going and never gone; that it was difficult to get out of these petty harbours with so great a number of craft at once, and that it would very soon be impossible for those harbours to contain them; that it would be better to divide this expedition, to send home the Dutch sailors with part of their matériel, to keep the best war-boats, to destroy the others, to repair those that should be preserved, and to fit them for the embarkation of 60,000 men, then to put the Dutch sailors who had been sent home aboard the Texel fleet, the useless French sailors aboard the Flushing squadron, and to procure in this manner, besides the flotilla, capable of throwing at once 60,000 men on the coasts of England, the Texel and Flushing squadrons, capable of carrying 30,000 from the mouths of the Meuse to the mouths of the Thames, without reckoning all the expeditions which might sail from Brest and all the other points of the continent. This opinion being adopted, orders were despatched, and the Boulogne flotilla, rendered more manageable, combined at the same time with the squadrons which were organising at the Texel, Flushing, Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, Cadiz, Toulon, Genoa, and Taranto, took its place in the vast system conceived by Napoleon—the system of camps formed near the great fleets, incessantly threatening Great Britain with a formidable expedition against her soil or against her colonies.

Napoleon issued likewise all the orders for the Sicilian expedition and for the complete provisioning of the Ionian Islands, to which his whole attention was at this moment called by the language held by the English agents at Vienna and St. Petersburg. From this language, in fact, it might be concluded that all imaginable efforts would be made to wrest these islands from the French. Napoleon prescribed to his brother Joseph, with a warmth of expression raised even to passion, to recover Scylla and Reggio, left in the possession of the English ever since the expedition to St. Euphemia; to assemble part of the regiments composing the army of Naples around Baïæ and around Reggio, and to hold them in readiness for embarkation. He enjoined Prince Eugène to make his troops fall back from Upper Italy towards Central Italy, in order to replace those which should be employed in maritime expeditions. He ordered King Joseph and Prince Eugène to multiply the supplies of provisions sent to Corfu, Cephalonia, and Zante. Lastly, he repeated more

expressly than ever the order to the two divisions at Rochefort and Cadiz, to contrive to get out of those ports, and to proceed to Toulon. He despatched Admiral Ganteaume to take the command of the fleet there, destined to sweep the Mediterranean, to complete the conquest of the kingdom of Naples by the reduction of Sicily, and to consolidate the French domination in the Ionian Islands by the transport of vast resources to those islands. Meanwhile the naval engineers were recommended to hasten the building of the ships begun on the whole coast of Europe.

While he was thus engaged with the maritime positions situated in Italy, Napoleon had urged anew the expedition to Portugal. The three camps of St. Lo, Pontivy, and Napoleon, collected under General Junot at Bayonne, presented there a nominal effective of 26,000 men, a real effective of 23,000, 2000 of whom were cavalry, and 36 pieces of artillery. A reinforcement of 3000 or 4000 men was on the march to join it. On the 12th of October, the second day after the signature of the convention with Austria, Napoleon ordered General Junot to cross the frontier of Spain, contenting himself with a mere notice given at Madrid of the passage of French troops. He prescribed to General Junot the route of Burgos, Valladolid, Salamanca, Ciudad-Rodrigo, Alcantara, and the right bank of the Tagus to Lisbon. He recommended to him the most rapid march. Spain had promised to join her forces to those of France in order to concur in the expedition, and naturally to participate in the distribution of the booty. Napoleon had not only accepted, but insisted on the real despatch of the Spanish force, reserving to himself to fix subsequently the composition and the price when they should have conquered Portugal. But not reckoning upon Spain or upon any troops that she could send, he prepared a second army for the possible case that Portugal might make some resistance, and for the far more probable case that England might assemble at the mouths of the Tagus the forces returning from the Copenhagen expedition. Immediately after his arrival at Paris, Napoleon directed that the five legions of reserve, so frequently mentioned, and which had orders to replace the camps charged with the defence of the coasts, should be completely organised, instructed, and armed. He had required the five senators who commanded them to make all necessary arrangements for marching off two or three of the six battalions of which they were composed. Having learned that these two or three battalions of each legion were ready, he ordered them to be assembled at Bayonne, and formed into three divisions under Generals Barbou, Vedel, and Malher; to be completed with two divisions of the Parisian guard, which the return of that guard, seasoned in Poland,

rendered disposable; with four Swiss battalions, stationed some at Rennes, the others at Boulogne and Marseilles; lastly, with the 3rd battalion of the 5th light, in garrison at Cherbourg, and the 1st of the 47th of the line, in garrison at Grenoble.

Here were 21 or 22 battalions, which were about to march from the seat of each legion, that is to say, from Rennes, Versailles, Lille, Metz, and Grenoble, and to reach Bayonne towards the end of November. They were to form a corps of 23,000 or 24,000 men, accompanied by forty pieces of artillery and some hundred horse, under the command of one of the most distinguished generals of division of the time, General Dupont, who had distinguished himself at Albeck, Dirnstein, Halle, and Friedland, and destined by Napoleon to be soon promoted to marshal. It was a second army, sufficient to support that of Junot, whatever importance the events in Portugal might acquire. It took the name of second corps of observation of the Gironde, Junot's army having already received the title of first corps. Neither of these armies was deficient in anything but cavalry. Napoleon was preparing for them a good and numerous cavalry at Compiègne, Chartres, Orleans, and Tours. During the campaign in Poland he had, as the reader must recollect, taken as great pains to keep up the dépôts of the cavalry as those of the infantry. He had incessantly supplied them with men and horses, and he could draft from them and employ in the south reinforcements which the peace of Tilsit rendered it unnecessary for him to send to the north. He ordered a brigade of 1000 hussars to be collected at Compiègne, at Chartres a brigade of 1200 chasseurs, at Orleans a brigade of 1500 dragoons, and a fourth, of 1400 cuirassiers, at Tours, which formed a total of 5000 horse drawn from the dépôts, and sufficiently numerous for the mountainous countries in which the two armies of the Gironde were called to act. These were mere precautions, for it was doubtful whether so large a force would be required in Portugal; but Napoleon had a great desire to draw the English to that quarter; and though the soldiers whom he sent thither were young, he thought them sufficient to be opposed to British troops, and more than sufficient to beat the southern armies, of which at that time he made no account.

Everything, therefore, was prepared for taking possession of Portugal, independently of the assistance promised by the Spaniards. An answer had been received from the court of Lisbon such as Napoleon had foreseen, and such as he needed, after the affair of Copenhagen, to dispense him from showing any indulgence. The Prince-Regent of Portugal, son-in-law, as we know, of the King and Queen of Spain, was no less from hereditary tradition than from personal weakness the devoted

subject of England. His ministers differed in opinion, it is true, and some of them thought that dependence on England was neither the situation desirable for Portugal, nor the surest means of selling her wines and procuring corn. But others thought that to live by England, and through England, was a good thing at all times, and a much better since France entered the career of revolution, as in approaching the latter they ran the risk of changing not only their industrial system, but also their social system. The prince-regent, apprised by M. de Lima, his ambassador at Paris, and by M. de Rayneval, chargé d'affaires of France at Lisbon, of the absolute will of Napoleon, had concerted with the British cabinet the conduct to be pursued, with the twofold object of sparing himself the presence of a French army, and causing the least possible injury to the English interests. In consequence, he had come to an understanding with Mr. Canning, through the medium of Lord Strangford, and had resolved to concede to France the apparent exclusion of the British flag, and even, if compelled, a sham declaration of war against England, but in regard to the merchants of the latter to refuse any measure against persons and property; for Lisbon and Oporto had become downright English factories, where merchants, capitals, shipping were all English. To grant the seizure of persons and property which Napoleon insisted upon would have been ravage and ruin to those factories. This answer being agreed upon, it was hoped that if France was content with it, the commerce of Portugal, so advantageous to British activity, so convenient to Portuguese indolence, would come off with a momentary restriction, and that the English royal navy would be quit also by sailing direct from Portsmouth to Gibraltar without touching at Lisbon. Still, it would not fail, in case of need, to put into some of the least frequented points of the coast of Portugal, upon pretext of stress of weather, for which the court of Portugal would excuse it, by alleging the laws of humanity. If France would not accept such conditions, the court of Lisbon, rather than break with England, had made up its mind to the last extremities, not to a contest with French troops (it was incapable of this noble despair), but to a flight beyond sea.

This race of Braganza, grown old, like its neighbour, the race of the Spanish Bourbons, sunk like the latter in ignorance, effeminacy, cowardice, had taken an aversion both to the age in which such appalling revolutions were occurring, and to the very soil of Europe, which served them for a theatre. It went so far in its shameful misanthropy as to resolve to retire to South America, the territory of which it shared with Spain. The flatterers of its vulgar propensities boasted incessantly of the riches of its Transatlantic possessions, as people boast before an

opulent man, whom they are encouraging to ruin himself, of his patrimony, which he knows nothing about. They told it, that it was not worth while to contest with the oppressors of Europe the possession of that petty country, Portugal, alternately rocky and sandy, while it had beyond sea a magnificent empire, almost as extensive of itself as that dreary Europe, which a million of greedy soldiers were fighting for—an empire sown with gold, silver, diamonds, where it would find peace, without a single enemy to fear. To flee from Portugal, to abandon its sterile shores to the English and to the French, who might drench it with their blood as much as they pleased, to leave to the Portuguese people, the old companion-in-arms of the Braganzas, to defend its independence, if it were still tenacious of that—such were the disgraceful projects which from time to time allayed the terrors of the Regent of Portugal and of his family. This unworthy weakness in the prince was combated only by another weakness, that is, by the trouble of taking an important resolution, of quitting the places where he had passed a luxurious life, of equipping a fleet to convey him with his household, his courtiers, and his wealth; lastly, of crossing the sea, and defying one novelty in fleeing from another. Between these two weaknesses the court of Portugal hesitated, but ready to embark if the footfalls of a French army should reach its ear. An official reply was, therefore, given to M. de Rayneval, that Portugal would break with Great Britain, though she could scarcely do without her; that the former would even go so far as to declare war against the latter; but that it was repugnant to the honour of the prince-regent to order the English merchants to be arrested and their property seized.

Napoleon was too sagacious to be satisfied with such subterfuges. He clearly perceived that the answer had been concerted in London,* that the exclusion of the English would be but a sham, and that his principal object would not be attained. He knew, moreover, that the family of Braganza entertained a design of retiring to Brazil; and he was not sorry for it, for, unfortunately, since the disaster at Copenhagen, his ideas had taken another direction. He purposed, not to complete by the occupation of Portugal the closing of the shores of the continent, but to appropriate Portugal to himself, to be disposed of at his pleasure. Instead of profiting by the moral advantage over England given him by the scandalous violence committed by

* This is no assertion invented for justifying the conduct of Napoleon towards Portugal, but an authentic truth officially proved. In fact, some time afterwards, when the court of Lisbon, having fled to Brazil, had nothing more to fear from the French armies, Mr. Canning acknowledged in Parliament that all the answers of Portugal to Napoleon had been concerted with the British ministry. Despatches since published furnish proof of this still more in detail, and with stronger evidence.

the latter against Denmark, he had resolved to lay himself under no restrictions towards the friends and favourers of the English policy, and to destroy them all for the profit of the Bonaparte family, saying to himself that at the end of the war there would be neither more nor less than another State suppressed in Europe, which would add nothing to the difficulties of peace; that he should adopt, according to custom, the *casus presens* as the basis of the negotiations; and that if the face of the Peninsula was changed, one would be obliged to admit it in the state in which it should be found, and to introduce it into the general treaty in its new state. In consequence, he resolved to appropriate Portugal to himself, designing to come to an understanding with Spain, and even to make use of it to revolutionise Spain, for she displeased him—she cramped him—she revolted him in her present state as much as the courts of Naples and Lisbon, which he had already driven, or which he was about to drive, from their tottering thrones. Such was the commencement of the greatest faults, of the greatest misfortunes, of his reign! My heart is wrung in approaching that sad story, for it is not only the origin of the misfortunes of one of the most extraordinary, the most seducing, of men, but it is the origin of the misfortunes of our hapless country, dragged down with its hero into an appalling abyss.

Napoleon, therefore, ordered M. de Rayneval to leave Lisbon, and passports to be delivered to M. de Lima, recommended to General Junot to hasten the march of his troops, and not to listen to any proposal whatever, upon pretext that he was not to enter into any negotiations, and that his only commission was to close Lisbon against the English. The intention of Napoleon, in making the troops march without relaxation or intermission towards Lisbon, was to seize the Portuguese fleet, and to confiscate all English property both at Lisbon and Oporto. If the court of Lisbon should betake itself to flight, he determined to carry off all the naval stores and commercial effects that he could. If it stayed, on the contrary, and submitted to his demands, the capture of the Portuguese fleet, and the booty taken from the English, would compensate him for not being able to destroy the house of Braganza, for it would be impossible to treat a submissive and unarmed court with rigour.

But Portugal would remain to be disposed of in case the house of Braganza should retire to America. To take possession of it for France was not admissible, even for a conqueror who had already constituted French departments on the Po, and who was soon to constitute more on the Tiber and on the Elbe. To give it to one of the princes of the house of Bonaparte, who had not yet received a crown, seemed more reasonable; but it was adopting for the whole Peninsula an arrangement which would

have a definitive character, and on that head Napoleon designed to leave a doubt that did not forbid any ulterior combination. For some time past a fatal idea had begun to predominate in his mind. Having already expelled the Bourbons of Naples from their throne, he frequently said to himself that he should be obliged some day to act in the same manner towards the Bourbons of Spain, who were not enterprising enough to attack him openly as those of Naples had done, but who at bottom were quite as hostile to him ; who had tried to betray him just before Jena ; who would not fail to seize yet the first opportunity to do so ; who at last, perhaps, would find a fatal one for him, and who, if they betrayed him not wilfully, would betray him *de facto*, by suffering the Spanish power to perish in their hands—a power as necessary to France as to Spain herself, and as completely annihilated in 1807 as if it had never existed. When Bonaparte thought of the danger of having Bourbons on his rear—a danger not very alarming for himself, but extremely annoying for his successors, who would not have his genius, and who might, perhaps, find in the successors of Charles IV. qualities which they no longer had themselves ; when he thought of all the meannesses, all the indignities, all the perfidies of the court of Madrid, not of the unfortunate Charles IV., but of his guilty wife and her ignoble favourite ; when he thought of the state of that power, still so great under Charles III., having then finances and a respectable navy, now having neither a dollar nor a fleet, and leaving inert resources which, in other hands, would have already served by their union with those of France to reduce England—he was seized with indignation for the present, with fear for the future. He said to himself that he must put an end to this state of things, and avail himself of the submission of the continent to his views—of the devoted concurrence which Russia offered to his policy—of the inevitable prolongation of the war to which England doomed Europe, and of the odium which she had recently excited by her conduct towards Denmark, to complete the renovation of the face of the west, to substitute everywhere Bonapartes for Bourbons, to regenerate a noble and generous nation lulled to sleep in sloth and ignorance, to restore its power to it, to procure for France a faithful, useful ally, instead of an unfaithful, useless, and vexatious ally. Lastly, Napoleon said to himself, that the greatness of the result would absolve him from the violence or the craft which it might perhaps be necessary to employ for the overthrow of a court always ready to betray him, while, in his incessant expeditions, he moved to any distance from the west, prompt to prostrate itself when he returned, finally giving a hundred real reasons, but no ostensible reason, for destroying it.

These thoughts would have been true, just, nay, even realisable,

if he had not already undertaken in the north more work than it was possible to accomplish in several reigns—if he had not already taken on himself the task of constituting Italy, Germany, Poland. Of all these works, not the easiest, but the most urgent, the most useful after the constitution of Italy, would have been the regeneration of Spain. Of the 400,000 veteran soldiers employed from the Rhine to the Vistula, 100,000 would have sufficed for that purpose, and could not have had a better employment. But to add to so many enterprises in the north a new enterprise in the south, to attempt it with troops scarcely organised, was extremely serious and extremely hazardous. Napoleon did not think so. He had not met with a difficulty which he had not surmounted from the Rhine to the Niemen, from the ocean to the Adriatic, from the Julian Alps to the Strait of Messina, from the Strait of Messina to the banks of the Jordan. He had a profound contempt for the southern troops, their officers, their commanders, made little more account of the English troops, and considered the Spains as not more difficult to subdue than the Calabrias. They were more extensive, it is true; which signified that, if 30,000 had sufficed in the Calabrias, 80,000 or 100,000 would suffice in Spain, especially when they should bring the brave Spanish nation, instead of the licentiousness into which it was plunged, a regeneration for which it most earnestly wished. It was not, therefore, the material difficulty which made Napoleon hesitate; it was the moral difficulty; it was the impossibility of finding in the eyes of the world a plausible pretext for treating Charles IV. and his wife as he would have treated Caroline of Naples and her husband. Now, a dynasty which, on his return from Tilsit, sent him three ambassadors to pay him homage; which, while betraying him secretly when it could, gave him its armies, its fleets whenever he asked for them—such a dynasty furnished no motive for dethroning it, which the public sentiment of Europe could accept as specious. Powerful and glorious as Napoleon was—though to the victories of Montenotte, of Castiglione, of Rivoli, he had added those of the Pyramids, of Marengo, of Ulm, of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Friedland; though to the Concordat, to the Civil Code, he had added a hundred measures of humanity and civilisation—it was not possible, without revolting the world, to come forward some day and say: Charles IV. is an imbecile prince, deceived by his wife, ruled by a favourite, who degrades and ruins Spain; and I, Napoleon, in virtue of my genius, of my providential mission, I dethrone him for the purpose of regenerating Spain. Such modes of proceeding humanity does not allow to any man whatever. It sometimes forgives them after the event, after success, and then it adores in them the hand of God, if benefit to nations

has resulted from them. But till then it regards them as an outrage on the sacred independence of those nations.

Napoleon could not then dethrone Charles IV. for his imbecility, for his weakness, for the adultery of his wife, for the debasement of Spain. He would have needed a grievance that should have conferred on him the right to enter his neighbour's dominions, and to change the dynasty reigning there. He would have wanted a treachery like that which the Queen of Naples ventured to commit, when, after signing a treaty of neutrality, she attacked the French army in rear; or a massacre such as that at Verona, when the republic of Venice slaughtered our wounded and our sick while the French army was marching to Vienna. But Napoleon had nothing to allege, excepting an equivocal proclamation, issued just before the battle of Jena, calling the Spanish nation to arms—a proclamation which he had affected to consider as insignificant, which was accompanied, it is true, by secret communications with England, since demonstrated, and strongly suspected at the time, but denied by the court of Spain; and such grievances were not to justify that Roman sentence already pronounced against the Bourbons of Naples—*The Bourbons of Spain have ceased to reign.*

Napoleon, however, expected the intestine divisions prevailing in the Escorial to furnish a pretext for interfering, for entering as deliverer, as peacemaker, perhaps as an offended neighbour. But if he had a general systematic idea as to the end to be attained, he had not fixed either the day or the mode of acting. He would even have accommodated himself to a family alliance between the two courts, which should have promised a complete regeneration of Spain, and through that regeneration a sincere and useful alliance between the two nations. In regard, therefore, to Portugal, he purposed not to take any definitive course which should bind him towards the court of Madrid. He could, for instance, have given Portugal to Spain, and this would have been the safest step to take, in exchange for the Balearic Islands, the Philippines, or some other distant possession. He would thus have transported the Spanish nation with joy, by gratifying the most ancient and most constant of its ambitions; he would have enchanted the court itself, by throwing a veil over its turpitudes; he would have awakened a fondness for the alliance of France, which hitherto had appeared only burdensome to the Spaniards. But to act in this manner would have been rewarding cowardice and treachery equally with the most tried and serviceable fidelity. It could scarcely be required of an ally so dissatisfied as Napoleon had reason to be. There was one other course to pursue, that was to appropriate to himself in exchange for Portugal some Spanish provinces bordering on our frontier, and to acquire a footing beyond the Pyrenees, as

he had done in Italy beyond the Alps, by the possession of Piedmont; a detestable policy, fit at most for Austria, which has always coveted the possession of the back of the Alps, and whose territories, besides, composed of conquests, ill bound together, are not so formed by Nature as to excite in her a fondness for well-defined frontiers. To make himself master of the Biscayan provinces, and those bordering the Ebro, such as Aragon and Catalonia, would therefore have been a fault against geography, a sure way to wound all Spaniards to the heart, and an inefficacious method of placing their government under the dependence of Napoleon; but, as for submissive, incapable of defending itself, this government was so, but skilful, active, attached, in short, all that could be wished, it would not have become so by the cession of Aragon or Catalonia to France. It would thereby have been rendered more contemptible, but not stronger, more courageous, more industrious.

This manner of disposing of Portugal would have been the worst of all, and the most dangerous. Napoleon was not inclined to it. He had, however, examined it like all the others; and at this very period, which proves that he had thought of it, he directed application to be made to the French legation at Madrid for a statistical account of the Biscayan provinces, and of the provinces watered by the Ebro in its course. He had about him at that time a dangerous counsellor—dangerous, not because he was deficient in good sense, but because he was deficient in the love of truth: this was M. de Talleyrand, who, having guessed the subject that engrossed the secret thoughts of Napoleon, practised the most mischievous of seductions upon him, by conversing with him incessantly on the topics that engaged his mind. Power has not a more dangerous flatterer than the disgraced courtier who is anxious to recover its favour. Fouché, the minister, having lost in 1802 the portfolio of the police for having disapproved of that excellent institution, the consulate for life, had exerted himself to recover his lost portfolio by seconding by a thousand intrigues the fatal institution of the empire. M. de Talleyrand was playing at this moment a similar part. He had sorely displeased Napoleon by insisting on relinquishing the portfolio of the foreign affairs for the situation of grand dignitary, and he strove to please him again by giving him advice, which he was fond of receiving. M. de Talleyrand was of the party at Fontainebleau. He saw, since the affair of Copenhagen, the series of wars resumed and continued, France pushing Russia to the north and to the east, that she might herself fall upon the south and the west. The question of Portugal became urgent, and if he had not genius sufficient to judge what arrangements were best adapted to Europe, he was well enough acquainted with human passions

to judge that Napoleon was full of thoughts, still vague but absorbing, relative to the Peninsula. This discovery made, he had endeavoured to lead the conversation to this subject, and he had seen the coldness of Napoleon towards him disappear all at once, conversation revived, and if not confidence, at least ease restored. He had profited by it, and had not ceased to add to the already hideous picture of the court of Spain colours not needed by that picture to offend the eye of Napoleon. In regard to Portugal, he had appeared to be strongly of opinion that to descend upon the Ebro, to establish himself there, in compensation for the cession to Spain of the banks of the Tagus, would be a position *ad interim* useful and advantageous to take. Napoleon was not inclined to this plan, and preferred another. But M. de Talleyrand had, nevertheless, become his most intimate confidant, after having been treated for two months with extreme coldness. Napoleon, on his return from the chase, or on leaving the circle of the ladies, was seen regularly in tête-à-tête with M. de Talleyrand, talking at great length, with animation, sometimes with a gloomy thoughtfulness, on a subject evidently of importance, of which everybody was ignorant, and of which even none sought an explanation, so powerful, so prosperous, so pacific did the empire appear since Tilsit. Napoleon, walking in the vast galleries of Fontainebleau, sometimes slowly, sometimes with a speed proportioned to that of his thoughts, put to the torture the infirm courtier, who could not keep up with him but by immolating his body, as he immolated his soul in flattering the mischievous and deplorable extravagance of genius. One man only, deprived of the confidence which he had enjoyed, the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, penetrated the subject of these conversations, durst not interrupt them, nor oppose his assiduities to those of M. de Talleyrand; for Napoleon, having become with time more imperious towards him, without being less friendly, was less accessible to the counsels of his timid wisdom. A few words dropped by the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès had been sufficient to reveal the opposition of that clear-sighted statesman to any new enterprise, and particularly to any interference in the inextricable affairs of the Peninsula, where corrupt governments reigned over half savage populations, where the difficulties which Joseph had encountered in the Calabrias would be found multiplied tenfold. Napoleon had, therefore, perfectly discerned the opinion of Prince Cambacérès, and fearing the disapproval of a wise man, he who feared not the world showed the same friendship for him as ever, but not the same confidence.*

* I report here the assertion of Prince Cambacérès himself, confirmed by the testimony of eye-witnesses, some formerly ministers of Napoleon, others members of his court, and by a variety of correspondence.

There had just appeared at Fontainebleau another personage, an obscure one, who was rarely admitted to figure in the presence of Napoleon, but clever and crafty as any secret agent could be : this was M. Yzquierdo, the confidential man of the Prince of the Peace, and sent to Paris, as we have said above, to treat seriously about the affairs which M. de Massaredo and M. de Frias entered upon merely as a matter of form. He was not only charged with the interests of Spain, but also with the personal interests of the Prince of the Peace, to whom he was much attached, having been so distinguished and appreciated by him as to be entrusted with the most important missions. He did the best he could for the affairs of his country and those of Emmanuel Godoy ; for though devoted to the latter, he was a good Spaniard. Endowed with extraordinary sagacity, he had foreseen that the critical moment for Spain was approaching ; for, on the one hand, Napoleon became daily more disgusted with an incapable and perfidious ally ; and on the other hand, having successively touched on all the European questions, he was naturally led to that of the Peninsula, and induced to turn to the affairs of the south by the conclusion, apparent at least, of those of the north. Accordingly this subtle and insinuating agent exerted all his efforts to be informed of what was passing in the counsels of the emperor. He had found means to accomplish his purpose through the grand marshal of the palace, Duroc, who had married a Spanish lady, daughter of M. d'Hervaz, formerly at the head of the financial affairs of the court of Madrid, afterwards Marquis d'Almenara and ambassador at Constantinople. M. Yzquierdo had cultivated this valuable connection, and sought, notwithstanding the integrity and discretion of the grand marshal, either to discover the designs of Napoleon, or to get some useful words conveyed to him. He had not failed, on occasion of Portugal, to appear more frequently at Fontainebleau, and to endeavour to obtain the most advantageous result for Spain and for his patron.

The court of Madrid, though it felt all its desire awakened at the idea of an operation against Portugal, nevertheless saw not without vexation the house of Braganza pushed towards Brazil, for it had felt great uneasiness about its American colonies ever since the United States had shaken off the yoke of England. The establishment of an independent European State in Brazil filled it with dread of a new commotion, which might lead Mexico, Peru, and the provinces of the La Plata to constitute themselves free States also ; and in the moments when its foresight got the better of its greediness, it would rather have seen the Braganzas remain at Lisbon than see a chance of acquiring Portugal arising from their departure. It was not probable, however, that the Braganzas, saved a first time in 1802 by Spain,

which had cost the latter the island of Trinidad, could be again saved in 1807. Spain must therefore submit to their removal, voluntary or compulsory, to Brazil. In this situation the court of Madrid could not do better than endeavour to acquire Portugal. But it was well aware that it had not deserved so rich a present from Napoleon; it feared that it should be obliged to purchase it with sacrifices, perhaps even to consent to its being divided, and in this case M. Yzquierdo had a secondary commission, which was to obtain one of the provinces of Portugal for his patron, the Prince of the Peace. The latter, seeing from day to day a formidable storm gathering against him, as well at court as in the nation at large, purposed, in case he should be precipitated from the pinnacle of greatness, to drop, not into nothing, but into an independent and solidly secured principality. The queen ardently wished her favourite so desirable a retreat. The good-natured Charles IV. thought it due to the eminent services of the man who, he said, had for twenty years assisted him to bear the burden of the crown. In consequence, M. Yzquierdo had received from his sovereigns, as well as from the Prince of the Peace himself, the express recommendation to follow up this result in case Portugal should not be integrally given to Spain. In case of the partition of Portugal, there was another ambition still to gratify, that of the Queen of Etruria, the favourite daughter of the King and Queen of Spain, widow of the Prince of Parma, mother of a king five years old, and regent of the kingdom of Etruria, instituted some years before by the First Consul. It was much doubted whether Napoleon would leave possessions in Italy to Spain any more than to Austria, and with this forecast part of Portugal was solicited for the Queen of Etruria. Portugal, divided then into two principalities, vassals of the crown of Spain, would become in reality a Spanish province. Moreover, the court of Madrid, in its indolence, in its debasement, cherished an ambitious desire, which was to acquire a title that should cover its present degradation, and it wished that Charles IV. should be called *King of the Spains and Emperor of the Americas*. Thus every one in that degraded court would have been satisfied. The favourite would have had a principality wherein to hide his turpitudes; the queen would have had the pleasure of providing for her favourite, and with him for her preferred daughter; and the king would have picked up in passing a title for the amusement of his imbecile vanity.

Such were the ideas to which M. Yzquierdo was commissioned to obtain assent at Fontainebleau. Of all possible projects, the latter was the one which differed least from the views of Napoleon. He wanted not at first, as we have observed, any arrangement which could become definitive. He meant purely and simply to give Portugal to the court of Madrid, a gift which it

had not deserved, and which would have raised it in the estimation of the Spaniards. He had renounced the idea lauded by M. de Talleyrand, of gaining a footing beyond the Pyrenees by the acquisition of the provinces of the Ebro. Thenceforward he should prefer, saving some modification, the plan of partition brought by M. Yzquierdo, and which had for the moment the only advantages to which he aspired. In the first place, Napoleon was resolved to clear Italy of all foreign princes, and after turning the Austrians out of it, he purposed to remove the Spaniards also, not as being dangerous. People, therefore, had rightly guessed his real intention, by supposing that he would seek to recover Etruria by means of an exchange for a portion of Portugal. Then, though filled with contempt for the favourite who was degrading and ruining Spain, he resolved to attach him a little longer, that he might have him at his disposal in the different circumstances which he foresaw or intended to bring about. But he thought that it was too much to give half of Portugal to the Queen of Etruria as the price of Tuscany, and the other half to the favourite as the price of his subservience. In consequence, taking little pains to persuade people to whom he had only to signify his will, he dictated to M. de Champagny, on the morning of the 23rd of October, a note containing his definitive resolutions.* He granted to the Queen of Etruria, for her son, a State containing a population of 800,000 souls, situated on the Douro, and having Oporto for its capital, which was to be called the kingdom of North Lusitania. At the other extremity of Portugal, in the southern part, he granted to the Prince of the Peace a State with a population of 400,000 souls, composed of the Algarves and the Alentejo, styled the principality of the Algarves. These two small States balanced the population of Tuscany, at that time computed at 1,200,000 souls. Napoleon was not sufficiently satisfied with Spain to give her more than he took from her. He reserved the central part of Portugal, that is to say, Lisbon, the Tagus, the Upper Douro, bearing the names of Portuguese Estramadura, Beyra, and Tras-os-Montes, and comprising a population of 2,000,000 inhabitants, in order to dispose of it at the peace. This wholly provisional arrangement suited him wonderfully well, since it left everything in suspense, for it afforded either the means of subsequently recovering the Spanish colonies, by restoring two-thirds of Portugal to the house of Braganza, or to make what arrangement soever he pleased with the house of Spain, if he should decide on suffering it to reign in attaching it to him by the bonds of a marriage. At any rate, it was agreed that the

* It is from this very note and the identical instructions sent from Madrid to M. Yzquierdo, both preserved in the Louvre, among the papers of Napoleon, that I am writing this account.

new Portuguese principalities should be constituted into sovereignties, vassals of the crown of Spain, and that poor King Charles IV. should be styled, agreeably to his desire, *King of the Spains and Emperor of the Americas*, and bear, like Napoleon, the double title of Imperial and Royal Majesty.

Besides these conditions, Napoleon required that Spain should unite with the French troops a division of 10,000 Spaniards to take possession of the province of Oporto, one of 10,000 or 11,000 to second the movement of the French upon Lisbon, and one of 6000 to occupy the Algarves. It was understood that General Junot should command the French and allied troops, unless the Prince of the Peace or Charles IV. should go to the army, which they had promised not to do, for Napoleon would not have entrusted to such generals the life of a single soldier of his. By disposing of Portugal in this manner, he should recover Etruria immediately; this, which Napoleon was solicitous to do, on account of his arrangements in Italy, would hold out an alluring bait to the ambition of the Prince of the Peace, enable him to defer every resolution in regard to the Peninsula, and not even require him finally to decide the question of the establishment of the Braganzas in America.

The treaty containing this provisional partition of Portugal was drawn up conformably to the note which Napoleon had dictated to M. de Champagny, and signed by M. Yzquierdo for Spain, and by the Grand-Marshal Duroc for France. It was signed at Fontainebleau itself, on the 27th of October; and it has obtained, by the title of Treaty of Fontainebleau, an unfortunate celebrity, because it was the first act of the invasion of the Peninsula.

No sooner were the signatures given, than orders were despatched to General Junot, whose troops, having entered Spain on the 17th, had already reached Salamanca, purposing to proceed to the Tagus through Alcantara, and to follow the right bank, while General Solano, Marquis del Socorro, with 10,000 Spaniards, would follow the left bank. General Junot had been expressly recommended to send to Paris all the Portuguese emissaries whom he should fall in with, saying that he had no power to treat, that his instructions were to march to Lisbon, as a friend if he were not resisted, as a conqueror if he met with any opposition whatever.

M. de Talleyrand, for having listened to all the effusions of Napoleon in regard to Spain, obtained what he desired, that is to say, a certain supremacy over the department of foreign affairs. Napoleon, irritated at first to see him relinquish the portfolio of foreign affairs for the purely honorary dignity of vice-grand-elect, had signified to him that he should no longer have any part in the diplomacy of the empire. But over-

come by M. de Talleyrand's address, he decreed that the vice-grand-electors should succeed in their functions not only the grand-electors, absent because he reigned at Naples, but also the arch-chancellor of State, because he reigned at Milan. The reader will recollect, no doubt, that part of the duties of the arch-chancellor of State consisted in the presentation of ambassadors, in the custody of treaties, in short, the honorary part of the imperial diplomacy. M. de Talleyrand, therefore, combining an office of formality conferred on him by decree with the important duty attributed to him by the confidence of the emperor, found himself at once dignitary and minister, a situation to which he had always aspired, and which Napoleon had declared that he would never grant. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès made this remark to Napoleon, who was slightly embarrassed, and promised that the decree should not be signed. But the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès was just then setting off to visit his native city, Montpellier, which he had not seen for a long time; and no sooner was he gone, than the decree so ardently desired by M. de Talleyrand was signed and published as an official act.* Thus in this decisive and fatal moment prudence withdrew and complaisance remained—complaisance more dangerous in M. de Talleyrand than in any other person, because with him it assumed all the forms of good sense.

Napoleon's intention was to set out for Italy as soon as he had received M. de Tolstoy, for he had not visited since 1805 that country of his predilection. He purposed to carry thither the benefit of his vivifying presence, to embrace his adopted son, Eugène Beauharnais, and his eldest brother, Joseph, and to converse with Lucien himself, whom he hoped to prevail upon to return into the bosom of the imperial family, perhaps even to place on a throne. But all at once, when on the point of setting off, intelligence from Madrid stopped and obliged him to suspend his departure.† The accounts from that capital, which had for some time begun to assume a grave character, were of the most strange and unexpected nature. They intimated that on the 27th of October, the very day on which the treaty of Fontainebleau was signed in France, the Prince of the Asturias had been arrested at the Escorial, and constituted a prisoner in his apartments; that his papers had been seized; that among them had been

* A circumstance well worthy of remark, and which will appear singular, is, that the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, in his valuable manuscript memoirs, relates that Napoleon adhered to his purpose, and that M. de Talleyrand did not obtain what he wished. This is a mistake of that grave personage, for the correspondence of Napoleon, and the *Moniteur* of November 7, 1807, No. 311, prove that the decree was signed. Napoleon, to avoid, no doubt, the embarrassment of an explanation, probably never spoke further on the subject to the arch-chancellor, who might believe that the decree did not exist.

† The correspondence of Napoleon proves this fact in the most authentic manner.

found proofs of a conspiracy against the throne; and that a criminal process would be commenced against him. Immediately afterwards, a letter of the 29th, signed by Charles IV. himself, informed Napoleon that his eldest son, seduced by miscreants, had formed a double design against the life of his mother and the crown of his father. The unfortunate king added that such a design ought to be punished; that search was making for its instigators; but that the prince, the author of or accomplice in such abominable projects, could not be permitted to reign; that one of his brothers, more worthy of the supreme rank, should have his place in the paternal heart and on the throne.

To prosecute criminally the heir to the crown, to change the order of succession, were resolutions of immense importance, which could not but move Napoleon, already deeply engaged with the affairs of Spain, and forbade his departure. The appeal made for his friendship, almost for his advice, in acquainting him with this family misfortune—a misfortune most terrible if it were true, most infamous if but a calumny of an unnatural mother, and believed by an imbecile father—obliged him to inquire minutely into the facts, and almost to interfere, in order to obtain a command of the consequences. Besides, just at this time arrived letters from the Prince of the Asturias, imploring the protection of Napoleon against implacable enemies, and soliciting to become not only his protégé, but his relation, his adopted son, by obtaining the hand of one of the French princesses.* Thus these unfortunate Bourbons, both father and son, themselves called upon, nay, almost forced, that dread conqueror to interfere in their affairs at the moment when he, thoroughly disgusted with their incapacity, was too well disposed to hurl them from a throne on which they were not only useless, but dangerous to the common cause of France and Spain.

We should not have a just conception of these strange circumstances, were we not to turn back and to take a survey of what had occurred at the court of Spain for a year past. We have seen elsewhere (Vol. III.) a picture of that degenerate court, ruled by an insolent favourite, who had contrived to usurp in a manner the royal authority, thanks to the passion which he had excited twenty years before in a queen devoid of modesty. If there were a country in Europe capable of exhibiting in its most hideous features the spectacle of the corruption of courts,

* The well-known letter, in which Ferdinand applies to Napoleon for his protection and for the hand of a princess of his family, is dated the 11th of October. But for reasons which we shall state elsewhere, it was not enclosed by M. de Beauharnais in a despatch till the 20th, left Madrid on the 20th or 21st, could not arrive in Paris before the 28th, and probably reached Fontainebleau on the 29th. It then took the couriers seven or eight days to travel from Madrid to Paris.

it was assuredly Spain. Behind the Pyrenees, between three seas, almost cut off from communication with Europe, sheltered by her armies and her ideas, amidst an hereditary opulence, which had its source in the treasures of the New World, which had kept up the indolence of the nation as well as that of its princes; in a hot climate, which excites the senses more than the mind; an old court might well fall asleep, become voluptuous and degenerate, between a clergy intolerant for heresy but tolerant for vice, and a nation accustomed to consider royalty, whatever it might do, as equally sacred with the Deity Himself. Towards the conclusion of the last century, a wise, enlightened, and industrious prince, and a minister worthy of him, Charles III. and M. de Florida Blanca, had endeavoured to stop the general decline, but had only suspended for a moment the melancholy course of things. In the next reign Spain had descended to the lowest step of abasement, though the fine qualities of the nation were only benumbed. King Charles IV., always upright, well-intentioned, but incapable of any other exertion than that of hunting, regarding it as a favour of Heaven that some one should undertake the task of reigning for him; his wife, always dissolute as a Roman princess of the Lower empire, always submissive to the old *garde du corps*, who had become Prince of the Peace, and reserving her heart for him while she gave up her person to vulgar gallants of his choosing; the Prince of the Peace, always vain, light, indolent, ignorant, deceitful, and cowardly, having every vice but cruelty, always domineering over his master, or taking the trouble to conceive for him soft and capricious resolutions, which sufficed to keep a debased government going—the king, the queen, the Prince of the Peace had brought Spain into a state difficult to be described. No finances, no navy, no army, no policy, no authority over colonies ready to revolt, no respect from the indignant nation, no relations with Europe, which disdained a cowardly, perfidious court, without a will of its own, no longer even a support in France, for Napoleon had been led by contempt to believe that everything was allowable towards a power which had arrived at so abject a condition—such was Spain in October 1807.

The first interest of the Spanish monarchy, ever since, shut up between the Pyrenees and the seas that surround her, she has neither Netherlands nor Italy to disturb her—the first interest is the navy, which then included the administration of her colonies and that of her arsenals. Her colonies contained neither soldiers, nor muskets to arm the colonists, in default of soldiers. Her captains-general were mostly officers so timid and so incapable, that the governor of the provinces of La Plata had given up Buenos Ayres to the English without fighting, and that a Frenchman, M. de Liniers, had to put himself at the

head of 500 men and himself undertake to expel the invaders, which he had done with complete success. The Spaniards, indignant, had deposed the captain-general, and resolved to appoint M. Liniers in his place, but he would accept only the provisional title of military commandant. In vain did the chain of the Cordilleras pour forth metals from its rich flanks; gold and silver dug out of their bowels lay useless in the cellars of the captains-general. There was not a Spanish ship that durst go to fetch them. The governor of the Philippines, for example, being in want of ammunition, provisions, money to buy them with, had been obliged to apply to the brave Captain Bourayne, commander of the French frigate *La Canonnière*, whose gallant fights we have already related, to procure piastres for him. Captain Bourayne had brought to the amount of 12,000,000, after making a trip from the Philippines to Mexico and back, and thus twice crossing half the globe. The Spanish government, in order to have a little of this valuable American coin at Madrid, was obliged to sell considerable sums to the United States and to Holland, and sometimes even to England, who, being in absolute need of it herself, consented to undertake the transport of it to Europe, and to give one-half the amount to the enemy, on condition of keeping the other half herself.

As for the navy itself, its state was this. Composed of 76 ships of the line and 54 frigates under Charles III., it had dwindled under Charles IV. to 33 sail of the line and 20 frigates. Of those 33 ships of the line, there were 8 to be destroyed immediately, as not worth refitting. There were left 25, 5 of them three-deckers, well built, and very fine ships; 11 of 74 guns, indifferent or bad; 9 of 54 and 64, mostly old, and on too small a scale since the adoption of the new dimensions in shipbuilding. The 20 frigates were divided thus: 10 equipped or fit for equipping, 10 bad or requiring repair. In this whole navy there were but 6 sail ready to put to sea, having on board provisions for barely three months, their crews incomplete, and their keels so filthy that they were scarcely navigable. These were the 6 sail at Carthagena, armed and equipped for three years past, and which had never weighed anchor but to show themselves at the mouth of the harbour and to go back immediately. There was not a ship capable of putting to sea either at Cadiz or at Ferrol. At Cadiz there were, it is true, 6 sail of the line, armed, but without provisions or crews. There was no want of seamen; but having nothing to pay them with, the government durst not engage them, and they were left unemployed in the harbours. The small number that had been raised, instead of being on board the squadron, were employed in gunboats between Algesiras and Cadiz, for the protection of the coasting trade. Thus the whole Spanish

navy in a state of activity was reduced to 6 sail of the line armed and equipped at Carthagená (and these without a single frigate), and 6 armed at Cadiz, but not equipped. Of the 20 frigates, there were but 4 armed and 6 capable of being armed. The future presented a prospect as dreary as the present; for in all Spain there were but two ships of the line building, and which had been upon the stocks so long, that they were looked upon as not susceptible of being finished.

Ferrol, Cadiz, Carthagená were destitute of timber, iron, copper, hemp. Those magnificent arsenals, built in several reigns, and worthy of Spanish greatness, as well for their extent as for their appropriation to all the wants of a powerful navy, were falling to ruin. The harbours were choked with mud. The superb wet dock of Carthagená was becoming filled with sand and filth. The numerous canals which place the harbour of Cadiz in communication with the rich plains of Andalusia were encumbered with mud and wrecks of vessels. In one of these canals lay sunk a ship of the line, the *St. Gabriel*, two frigates, a corvette, three large lighters, two transports, and a great quantity of boats. One of the two magazines of the arsenal of Cadiz, destroyed nine years before by fire, had not been rebuilt. The basins destined for dry docks were ruined by the filtering of water into them. Of the two basins at Carthagená, built fifty years before, and never repaired, the one destined to be kept dry had rendered it necessary to burn the timber of several ships for the service of the machine employed in emptying it. The *San Pedro de Alcantara*, which was under repair in it, had nevertheless been well-nigh swamped there. The rope-walks of Cadiz and Carthagená were the finest in Europe, but there were not even a few hundredweight of hemp to employ them. At the same time, Seville, Grenada, Valencia were earnestly soliciting that the stocks of hemp left upon their hands might be purchased. The beeches and oaks of Old Castille, Biscay, the Asturias, destined for Ferrol; the oaks of the Sierra de Ronda, destined for Cadiz; the noble pines of Andalusia, Murcia, Catalonia, destined for Carthagená and Cadiz; felled and lying on the ground, were rotting there for want of the means of transport to convey them to the stocks where they were to be employed. These materials were scarce, not only because none were bought, but because they were sold. Upon pretext of getting rid of refuse lumber, the administration of the port of Carthagená, in order to raise money to pay certain salaries, had sold the most valuable materials, especially metals. The board charged with the provisioning of the squadron at Carthagená could not obtain supplies, because it was 18 millions of reals in arrear with the contractors. The workmen deserted, not from treachery, but from sheer want. Out of 5000 work-

men, there were scarcely 700 left at Carthagena. Some had died of the epidemic disease which had desolated the coasts of Spain some years before, others had fled to Gibraltar, and would eat the bread of England in her service. Those at Cadiz found themselves, from the same causes, considerably diminished in number. In 1807 nine months' pay was owing them, and they were obliged to hold their hand. The sailors in like manner were dispersed in the interior, or in foreign countries. There were some of them to whom twenty-seven months' pay was owing. The few resources that were to be procured were expended in the maintenance of a staff that would have been sufficient for several great navies. This establishment included one high admiral, two admirals, 29 vice-admirals, 63 officers corresponding in rank with rear-admiral, 80 captains of ships of the line, 134 captains of frigates, upwards of 12 intendants, 6 treasurers, 11 *commissaires-ordonnateurs*, 74 commissioners of the navy, and all these for a naval power reduced to 33 sail of the line and 20 frigates, of which six ships of the line and four frigates only were armed and equipped! So low was sunk the navy of one of those nations of the globe most naturally destined for the sea, of an insular nation almost as much as the English, having finer harbours than theirs, such as Ferrol, Cadiz, Carthagena; timber which the English have not, such as the oaks of Old Castille, Leon, Biscay, the Asturias, and La Ronda; the pines of Andalusia, Murcia, Valencia, Catalonia; materials of all kinds, as the iron of the Pyrenees, the copper of Mexico and Peru, the hemp of Valencia, Grenada, Seville; lastly, skilful and numerous workmen, brave sailors, officers capable, like Gravina, of dying the death of heroes. All these facts which we have just stated were scarcely known at Madrid.* When

* The Spanish government, in fact, knew nothing, or as good as nothing, of the details we are giving respecting the state of the navy, and of those which we have given relative to the army and the finances. Napoleon was acquainted with the greater part of them by his agents, who were very numerous, and strongly stimulated by his incessant curiosity. But their reports were not the only source of his information. When, a few months later, he entered Spain, the facts relative to the navy were entirely known, thanks to an inspection ordered in the ports, and to a valuable work by M. Munoz, the ablest engineer in the Spanish navy. M. O'Farrill was ordered to draw up a similar work concerning the army, and M. de Azanza respecting the finances. These documents, prepared before the general insurrection in Spain, had for their groundwork, as to the army, general inspections; as to the finances, the papers of the chest of consolidation. The whole was sent, with the confirmatory papers, to Napoleon, who for several months governed Spain from his palace at Bayonne. There everything was cleared up, and he learned accurately what had before been suspected, the deplorable state of the Spanish administration. It is from the voluminous and very curious collection of these papers, deposited in the Louvre with the papers of Napoleon, that the authentic particulars which I here give respecting the administrative affairs of Spain are derived. I have made a careful comparison of all these statements, which does not allow me to conceive a single doubt respecting their accuracy. Messrs. Munoz, O'Farrill, Azanza, writing neither for the public nor for an

the Spanish administration was asked how many ships there were, and how many either building, or armed, or equipped, it could not tell. When asked at what time such a division would be ready to weigh anchor, it was still more embarrassed for an answer. All that the government knew was, that the navy was neglected. It knew it, and even wished it to be so. The navy appeared to it a secondary interest, secondary for a nation which had to defend the Floridas, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, La Plata, the Philippines! The engaging in a contest with England appeared to it a chimera—a chimera when France and Spain combined had ports such as Copenhagen, the Texel, Antwerp, Flushing, Cherbourg, Brest, Rochefort, Ferrol, Lisbon, Cadiz, Carthagena, Toulon, Genoa, Taranto, Venice, and could not send out 120 sail of the line! The government, that is to say, the Prince of the Peace, was sometimes base enough to pour forth jests upon the Spanish navy; he had sarcasms instead of tears for Trafalgar! The fact was, that at heart he detested France, that troublesome ally who reproached him incessantly for his criminal supineness; and he preferred England, because she gave him hopes, if he would betray the cause of the maritime nations, of the quiet so congenial to his cowardice. Thus while he affected contempt for the navy, the medium for contending against England, he professed great esteem for the land army, the medium for resisting the counsels of France. The Prince of the Peace was fond of talking about his grenadiers, his dragoons, his hussars. The state of that army, the object of his predilection, was nevertheless as follows.

The Spanish army was composed of about 58,000 infantry and artillery, 15,000 or 16,000 cavalry, 6000 royal guards, 11,000 Swiss, 2000 Irish, and lastly, 28,000 provincial militia, in all about 120,000 men, capable of furnishing from 50,000 to 60,000 combatants at most. The infantry was weak, puny, and recruited in part out of the scum of the population. The cavalry was formed of more select men; only a very small part of it was mounted; the fine breed of Spanish horses, so mettlesome and so gentle, declining from day to day. The royal guards, Spanish and Walloons, were the only portion that made a really imposing

assembly, entering into polemics with nobody, stating purely and simply the resources that could be disposed of, were forced to tell the truth, which they had no interest to conceal, and, moreover, supported by irrefragable documents, such as quite recent inspections or official registers and statements. For the rest, their statements very nearly corresponded with what Napoleon's agents had previously communicated to him. The study of all these documents has, therefore, enabled me to draw a complete picture of the state of the Spanish monarchy, which could not at this day be sketched in Spain; for the documents were transmitted to France at the moment of the invasion, and have remained there ever since. I have thought this picture useful, nay, even necessary, for the understanding of events; and it is for this reason that I have taken the trouble to compose it, and that I give my readers that of reading it.

appearance. The militia, composed of peasants who were not trained, who could not be displaced, were of scarcely any use. The Swiss auxiliaries were, as everywhere else, thorough soldiers, faithful, steady. After deducting, therefore, the 14,000 men sent to the north of Germany, there were left no more than 15,000 or 16,000 men to despatch towards Portugal of the 26,000 promised by the treaty of Fontainebleau. The presidios of Africa, especially Ceuta, that formidable *vis-à-vis* of Gibraltar, the capture of which by the English or the Moors would have rendered the passage from the Mediterranean to the ocean impracticable, contained neither garrisons nor provisions. At Ceuta, instead of a garrison of 6000 men prescribed by the regulations and by custom, there were but 3000. At the famous camp of St. Roch, before Gibraltar, there were at most 8000 or 9000 men. The rest of the Spanish army, dispersed in the provinces, was there employed in performing the duty of the police, because there was then no gendarmerie in Spain. The assemblage of any army whatever would have been impossible; for the 14,000 sent to Germany, and the 16,000 marched towards Portugal, almost entirely absorbed the disposable portion of the regular troops. For the rest, the whole of the military force, ill clothed, ill fed, rarely paid, destitute of emulation, of military spirit, of instruction, was a body without soul. There, as in the navy, the staff consumed all the resources. It numbered of officers of the highest rank three captains-general, answering to the rank of marshal, 87 lieutenant-generals, 127 *maréchaux de camp*, 252 brigadiers (an intermediate rank between that of *maréchal de camp* and that of colonel), and an unknown number of colonels; for there were some whose titles were real, others provisional or honorary, and between both they were not reckoned at fewer than 2000. Such was all that was left of those formidable bands which in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had made Europe tremble. Such, too, was all the service rendered by the marked predilection of the Prince of the Peace for the army!

As for the finances, which, with the land forces and the naval forces, constitute the complement of the power of a State, they corresponded to the state of those forces, and served to account for it. There were debts owing to Holland, to the bank, to the public, to the great farms, for loans at fixed and annual dates, 114 millions; in arrears of pay and salaries, 111 millions; in royal vales (paper money, 50 per cent. below par), 1033 millions; which formed a debt demandable of 1258 millions, part due shortly, part immediately, and which might be called *dribbling*; for 110 millions of arrears of pay and salaries, 32 millions owing to the great farms, 8 millions promised by monthly instalments to France and not paid, 7 millions of annual interest due to Holland,

7 millions of interest of vales not provided for, might well be termed dribbling debts for a government. The expenses and the revenues were composed as follows : 126 millions of revenues, and 159 millions of expenses, leaving, of course, a yearly deficit of 33 millions, that is to say, a fifth of the necessities of the State unprovided for. The customs, tobacco, the salt-works, tolls, bore the principal burdens. Land, thanks to its owners, mostly nobles or priests, paid nothing but tithe for the benefit of the clergy. With such a system of taxation, a revenue of not more than 100 millions would have been obtained if America had not furnished a supplement of 25 or 26 millions. Spain contributed much more considerable sums, but great part of which remained in the hands of the collectors of the public revenue. Manufactures, long since destroyed, no longer produced either beautiful silks or beautiful cloths, notwithstanding the mulberry-trees of Andalusia and the magnificent flocks of the Spanish breed. Some cottons, manufactured in Catalonia, were rather a pretext for smuggling than a real branch of industry ; for then, as at present, they served to attribute a Spanish origin to English cottons. Trade was ruined, for it was reduced to a few clandestine exchanges of piastres, the export of which was prohibited, for English goods, the import of which was alike prohibited, and to the importation (permitted in this case) of certain productions of French luxury. The supply of the colonies and of the navy, which alone had for a long time kept up a relic of activity in the ports of Spain, had dwindled to nothing in consequence of the war. The contraband trade of the English in South America, facilitated by the conquest of Trinidad, was sufficient there. Agriculture, behind-hand in its processes, scarcely capable of modification according to the new methods on account of the heat of the climate and an absolute want of water, ravaged, moreover, by the mesta, that is to say, by the annual migration of seven or eight million sheep from the north to the south of the Peninsula, had been for ages in a stationary state. Thus the people were poor, the middle class ruined, the nobility over head and ears in debt, and the clergy itself, though richly endowed, and more numerous than the army and navy put together, distressed also by the sale of a seventh of its property, demanded and obtained from the court of Rome on account of the public necessities. But amidst this general poverty there was a nation, strong, haughty, proud of its past greatness, as if that greatness had still existed ; having lost the habit of fighting, but capable of the most courageous self-devotion ; ignorant, fanatic, hating other nations ; knowing, nevertheless, that on the other side of the Pyrenees useful reforms had taken place, great things been accomplished, and calling for, but at the same time dreading, the intelligence of foreigners ; in short, full of contradictions, of

oddities, of noble and endearing qualities, and at the moment weary in the highest degree of its inactivity for a century past, deeply grieved at its humiliations, indignant at the spectacles which it had to witness.

It was before the face of a nation so nearly on the point of losing its patience that the silly favourite, the ruler of the indolence of his sovereign, of the vices of his queen, pursued his disgraceful course. While specie was scarce in a country possessing Peru and Mexico, and the country had to shift with a discredited paper money, Emmanuel Godoy, from a vague presentiment, was amassing sums in gold and silver, which the free command of all the resources of the treasury permitted him to accumulate, and which public rumour foolishly exaggerated, for it talked of several hundred millions hoarded in his palace. Thus while the nation felt itself impoverished, it believed that all the national wealth was in the possession of Emmanuel Godoy. To the public scandal of his adulterous intercourse with the queen were added many other scandals. After having married Doña Maria Luisa de Bourbon, Infanta of Spain, own niece of Charles III., cousin-german of Charles IV., sister of the Cardinal of Bourbon, whom he had chosen in order to draw near the throne, and whom he neglected from dislike of her modest virtues, he had publicly attached himself, by marriage according to some, by long habit according to others, to a young lady named Josefa Tudo, by whom he had several children. Desirous of giving a certain consecration to this connection, he had obtained for Mademoiselle Josefa the title of Countess of Castillo Fiél (*Château Fidèle*), and in addition to this title a grandezza for the eldest of her children. He loaded her with wealth, and surrounded her with a sort of power; for it was to her house persons went to see him when they wished to converse freely with him; thither, too, the agents of European diplomacy repaired to receive their instructions; it was with his discourse that ambassadors filled their despatches; and while pouring out to her the cares, the vexations, the anxieties to which his blind levity exposed him, he could find in the youth and beauty of a sister of Mademoiselle Tudo's pleasures which crowned the scandals of his life. And all Spain was acquainted with this disgraceful licentiousness; the queen herself was acquainted with it, and bore with it; the king alone was ignorant of it, and thanked Heaven for sending him a man who laboured and governed for him!

The unfortunate Spanish nation, not knowing, between an insolent favourite, a guilty queen, and an imbecile king, to whom to give its heart, had given it to the heir to the crown, the Prince of the Asturias, since Ferdinand VII., who was not much more worthy of the love of a great people than his parents. This prince, then twenty-three years old, was left a widower by

the Princess of Naples, who died, it was reported, by poison administered by the hand of the queen and the favourite; which was false, but admitted to be true by all Spain. Repulsed by his mother, who construed his habitual sadness into a censure, by the Prince of the Peace, who imagined that he discovered in it a jealousy of authority, oppressed by both, obliged to seek a refuge around him, he had found it in his young wife, to whom he had become fondly attached. As the two houses of Naples and Spain mortally hated each other, and the young princess arrived at the Escorial with sentiments derived from her family, she had not contributed to reconcile Ferdinand with his parents, but on the contrary fomented the aversion which he entertained for them. Accordingly, with his limited faculties of head and heart, listening to every report conformable to his hatred, Ferdinand believed that he had been deprived by a crime of the woman whom he loved, and this crime he imputed to his mother as well as to the adulterous favourite who governed her. It may be conceived what passions must have fermented in these vulgar, ardent, idle souls. The prince was awkward, weak, and false, whose whole understanding consisted in a certain shrewdness, and whose whole character in a certain obstinacy. But in the eyes of an impassioned nation, feeling a necessity to love one of its masters, and to hope that the future would be better than the present, his awkwardness passed for modesty, his unsociable sadness for the grief of a virtuous son, his obstinacy for firmness, and on the report of some opposition made to various acts of the Prince of the Peace, people had been pleased to invest him with the noblest and the most energetic virtues.

In the course of 1807 a rumour was suddenly spread that the health of the king was declining, and that he was near his end. Appearances, in fact, were alarming. This king, honest and blind, had no suspicion of the infamous proceedings which, unknown to him, disgraced his reign. Endowed, nevertheless, with a certain good sense, he was well aware that there were misfortunes around him, for in spite of the pains taken to deceive him, the loss of Trinidad, the disaster of Trafalgar, the paper money substituted for specie, could not wear the appearance of prosperity and greatness. He laid the blame on circumstances, and felt thoroughly convinced that but for the Prince of the Peace things would have gone on worse. In reality he was melancholy and ill. It was believed that his death was at hand. The nation, without any ill-will to him, regarded his death as the end of its humiliations; the Prince of the Asturias as the end of his slavery; the queen and Godoy as the end of their power. As for these last, it was more than the end of a usurped power—it was a catastrophe; for they supposed that the Prince of the Asturias would take his revenge, and they

measured that revenge by their own sentiments. From this motive it was that the Prince of the Peace had attached such value to becoming sovereign of the Algarves.

Various means were successively devised by the queen and by the favourite to secure them from the dangers they anticipated.

They thought at first of seizing the Prince of the Asturias, and forcing him to contract a marriage which would place him under their influence. For the accomplishment of this design they cast their eyes on Doña Maria Theresa de Bourbon, sister of Doña Maria Luisa, Princess of the Peace. They thought that in marrying this infanta, Ferdinand, having become brother-in-law of Emmanuel Godoy, would be either reconciled or controlled. But to this plan Ferdinand opposed invincible and even offensive refusals. I, said he, become brother-in-law of Emmanuel Godoy!—never!—that would be a disgrace! These refusals, expressed in such language, redoubled the anxieties of the queen and the favourite. They no longer thought of fortifying themselves against the consequences of the king's death, then supposed to be much nearer than it was destined to be. The Prince of the Peace was already generalissimo of all the Spanish armies. He resolved, and the queen warmly approved this resolution, to give himself new powers, in order to unite by degrees in his own hands all the prerogatives of royalty, and when he should consider himself strong enough, to exclude Ferdinand from the throne. He intended to get him declared incapable of reigning, the crown transferred to a younger head, to bring about in this manner the necessity of a regency, and to attribute that regency to himself, which would ensure to him the continuance of the power that he had exercised for so many years. This plan once resolved upon, they began by completing the nominal authority of the prince, for his real authority had long been as entire as it could be. They persuaded the king that, thanks to Emmanuel Godoy, the army was in a flourishing state, but that the navy was not in a like predicament; that the latter needed to receive the influence of that genius which upheld the Spanish monarchy; that to place it under the direct authority of the Prince of the Peace would render its reorganisation certain, and afford great satisfaction to the mighty Emperor of the French, who complained incessantly of the decline of the Spanish navy. Charles IV. adopted this proposal with the joy which he always felt in stripping himself of his authority in favour of Emmanuel Godoy; and the latter was gratified by a royal decree with the title of *grand* admiral, a title which had been borne by the illustrious conqueror of Lepanto, Don John of Austria, and more recently by Don Philip, brother of Charles III. To this title, which conferred on Emmanuel Godoy the command of all the naval forces, besides

the command of all the land forces, which he already had, was added that of Most Serene Highness. A council of admiralty, composed of his own creatures, was formed about the prince for the purpose of seconding him, and notwithstanding the public poverty, it was decided that a palace, called the Palace of the Admiralty, should be erected for it in the finest quarter of Madrid. Thus instead of any benefit, the navy beheld only the creation of new charges, tending solely to aggravate its distress.

It was not enough to unite the command of all the forces of the monarchy in the hands of the Prince of the Peace; it was proposed to make him master of the palace, and in some sort, of the person of the king. It was insinuated about the latter, that his unnatural son, detached from his parents by the mischievous influences of the house of Naples, and surrounded by perfidious subjects, was more and more to be feared every day; that the spirit of disorder peculiar to the age might perhaps second his evil designs, and therefore it was requisite that the powerful hand of Emmanuel (so Charles IV. called him in his confiding friendship) should extend over the royal dwelling, to preserve it from all danger. In consequence, the prince was further appointed colonel-general of the king's military household. From that moment he commanded in the palace itself, and was chief of all the troops composing the royal guard. No sooner had he received this new title, which completed his omnipotence, than he hastened to make reforms in different corps of the guard. Besides two regiments of foot, one called the Spanish guards, the other called the Walloon guards, which formed an effective force of 6000 men, there was a regiment of cavalry, called the royal carabineers, and further a corps of élite called the life-guards, divided into four companies, the Spanish, the Flemish, the Italian, and the American, commemorating by those names all the ancient dominions of Spain. On this corps, the most enlightened of all, thanks to the selection of the men of whom it was composed, and a good judge of what was passing in Spain, the Prince of the Peace could not place entire reliance. He conceived the idea of dissolving it, upon the pretext of putting an end to all denominations which no longer corresponded with the reality of things, and to compose out of it two companies only, designated by the titles of first and second. He availed himself of this occasion to remove from it all those men whom he distrusted, and in particular many French emigrants, who had sought an asylum with the Bourbons of Spain, and who, devoted with body and soul to the good Charles IV., were nevertheless from their better education more capable than the others of appreciating the unworthy administration which dishonoured the monarchy. Emmanuel Godoy, in excluding them, removed honest men whom he dreaded, and gave vent

to his hatred against France, which every instant became more violent.

Emmanuel Godoy did not confine himself to this measure. He created his brother a grandee of Spain, and appointed him colonel of the regiment of Spanish guards. Lastly, he chose a guard for himself from among the royal carabineers. All these precautions taken, he caused all the members of the council of Castille whom he thought he could influence to be sounded one after another for the purpose of preparing them for a change in the order of succession to the throne. The councils of Castille and of the Indies were two bodies which tempered the absolute authority of the kings of Spain, as the parliaments tempered that of the kings of France. There was, however, a difference in their attributions; for besides a jurisdiction of appeal from all the tribunals of the kingdom which belonged to them, they had administrative attributions, the council of Castille relative to the internal affairs of the kingdom, the council of the Indies relative to the vast affairs of the possessions beyond sea. In consequence of an uninterrupted enjoyment of the royal confidence for a century past, and the necessity which all royalty is under of surrounding itself with a certain public assent, no great affair of the monarchy was resolved upon without consulting the opinion of these two councils. The Prince of the Peace, who had already introduced into them a good number of his creatures, was naturally desirous to ensure their concurrence in his criminal designs. But enslaved as they were, they appeared by no means inclined to countenance a change in the succession to the throne. Secret efforts, however, to work upon them continued to be made, and underhand influence was resorted to with the colonels of the regiments. The language held to both, represented that the Prince of the Asturias was at once incapable and wicked, and that at the death of the king the monarchy might be brought into peril by hands as mischievous as they were unskilful.

The Prince of the Peace extended his intrigues far beyond the court of Spain. Though he detested France on account of the severe and annoying advice which he received from that quarter, he knew that all power resided in her, and that the plans to which he attached his salvation would be chimerical unless they had the support of Napoleon. He strove, therefore, to make sure of him by a thousand meannesses, especially since the famous proclamation, the recollection of which disturbed his sleep. Having learned that Napoleon, who liked to ride Spanish horses, had recently lost in the war one of those which the King of Spain had given him, he had offered him four, selected from among the finest in the kingdom. Having formed a false idea of the imperial court, borrowed from the court of Madrid, he had

taken it into his head that certain persons were worth the trouble of gaining, that Murat was the first military man, that he possessed a great ascendancy over Napoleon; him, therefore, he thought of gaining. With this motive he had commenced a secret correspondence with him,* reinforced by presents, and

* There are in the Louvre specimens of this correspondence, the communication of which Napoleon had procured, either through Murat himself, or by his own active vigilance. These specimens furnish a singular idea of the baseness of the Prince of the Peace. To make the reader better acquainted with this personage, his character, and his views, we quote the following letter, copied with all the faults of language that it contains. He will thus be enabled to judge the better of the kind of education received at that period by the persons composing the court of Spain:—

“To his Imperial and Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Berg.*

“The letter of your imperial highness, dated Venice, the 7th of December, is the greatest proof to me of the eminent character which constitutes the heart of a great prince like your imperial highness. I have never doubted the virtues that characterise you, and never has my soul conceived the base idea of mistrust. Yes, prince, I have vowed to your highness fidelity in the friendship with which you honour me, and my correspondence will last as long as my existence.

“I was very sorry to be obliged to keep from your imperial highness a secret which I was forced to do by the word of my sovereign, signed in a treaty with his imperial and royal majesty. My gratitude to your imperial highness would have induced me to reveal it, if the emperor had not required it. But as I cannot help thinking that your imperial highness must now be acquainted with it, I cannot but unfold my sentiments to you. It is now that I begin to enjoy the tranquillity afforded me by a treaty which places me under the protection of the emperor. I could not want for anything during the lifetime of my king, since his majesty honours me with his most singular esteem; but if, unfortunately, he should die, then my enemies would strive to disparage my services, and to destroy my reputation. I have not a friend in the world besides your imperial highness, and though I am persuaded that your power would have saved me from affliction, I nevertheless considered that your efforts would not have been powerful enough to avert the first stroke of infamy. Your imperial highness sees, therefore, whether that which has been agreed upon in the treaty is not to me of inestimable value. On this account I venture to take the liberty of expressing my gratitude to his imperial and royal majesty in the letter herewith enclosed. I should have made a point of acquitting myself earlier of this respectable duty, if the expression of the treaty itself had not opposed it.

“I wait with the utmost impatience for the explanations which your imperial highness shall be pleased to offer me immediately after your arrival in Paris; and since his imperial and royal majesty has demonstrated that he should see with pleasure the king my master distinguish Marshal Duroc with the Golden Fleece, I have the honour to accompany it with this letter; and at the same time your imperial highness will find another forwarded herewith, which the emperor will be pleased to give to the King of Westphalia, in demonstration of the alliance which exists, in fact, between his catholic majesty and all the sovereigns of the family of his imperial and royal majesty.

“The trial of the criminal seducers of the Prince of the Asturias is prosecuted according to the dispositions of our laws, because the king has been pleased to divest himself of his sovereign authority, by which he could have tried them alone, and left the judges at liberty to consult his majesty upon

* As we have not discovered in this letter any peculiarities of language worth mentioning, which might have rendered an exact transcript of the original desirable, we are content to furnish as close an English version of it as we are able.—TRANSLATOR.

particularly one of superb horses. The imprudent Murat, on his part, deeming it useful to form connections wherever crowns might chance to become vacant, had taken pains to procure for himself in the Peninsula a friend so powerful as the Prince of the Peace. The crown of Portugal, which seemed likely soon to be vacant, was not foreign to this calculation.

The secret intrigues of the Prince of the Peace for changing the succession to the throne, secret as they were, did not fail to transpire at Madrid, and added to an unexampled accumulation of titles, they had roused minds. The Prince of the Asturias, equally exasperated and alarmed, had opened himself respecting his situation to a few friends on whom he thought that he could rely. The principal were his former governor, the Duke de San Carlos, grand master of the king's household, a very honest personage, having no other merit but that of a courtier; the Duke de l'Infantado, one of the highest nobles in Spain, a military man not following his profession, having ambition, little talent, upright intentions, and enjoying universal consideration; lastly, an ecclesiastic, who had taught the prince the little he knew, the Canon Escoiquiz, then banished to Toledo, where he was a member of the archiepiscopal chapter, a clerical *bel-esprit*, a man extremely conversant in literature, very little in politics, tenderly attached to his pupil, and fondly loved by him, afflicted at the situation to which he beheld him reduced, resolved to extricate him from it by all the means in his power, and though very well intentioned, yet sensible to the prospect which opened before him of being some day the friend, the director of the conscience of the King of Spain. It was in the society of these personages and of a few ladies of the court attached to the deceased Princess of the Asturias, that Ferdinand poured forth the bitter sentiments with which he was filled. The Canon Escoiquiz being absent, he was secretly sent for to Madrid, because in the opinion of Ferdinand and his little court he was deemed the most capable of giving good advice. As he possessed more learning than the others, understood Virgil and Cicero, and was

their sentence. They have all incurred the penalty of being stripped of their dignities, and the two most inculpated have deserved capital punishment; but the queen has disposed the will of the king to clemency, and the punishment of death will be commuted into perpetual imprisonment; and as for the others, they are to be banished from the kingdom. Care has been taken to refrain from the slightest mention of subjects of his imperial and royal majesty, out of regard for what he has caused to be signified.

"I am very sorry that I am not able to write to your imperial highness in your own language, but I will not deprive myself of the satisfaction of addressing to you my original letter with this literal translation. It is not possible to transcribe the language of the heart, but on mine are imprinted the gratitude and admiration, with which will ever have for your imperial highness, with the highest consideration, your invariable servant,

"MANUEL.

"SAN LORENZO. *December 20. 1807.*"

acquainted with the French authors, a degree of science uncommon at the court of Spain, it was conceived that in this labyrinth of horrible intrigues he would best direct the oppressed prince. On the arrival of the canon from Toledo, it was agreed that, in the serious danger which threatened him, the prince had but one resource—to throw himself at the feet of Napoleon, to invoke his protection, and to ensure it more completely, to ask for a princess of the Bonaparte family in marriage. The Canon Escoiquiz saw the advantages in such an alliance: the first, to secure an all-powerful protector; the second, to attain the end which Napoleon must have had in view, that of attaching Spain to his dynasty by close and solid ties. This counsel was listened to, though it was not to Ferdinand's taste. The young prince, in fact, fostered at the bottom of his heart some of the least commendable of Spanish passions, and especially a bitter hatred of foreign nations, and above all, of the French Revolution and its illustrious chief. These passions, which were natural to him, had been further fomented by his wife, the Princess of Naples. However, full of confidence in the superior understanding of the Canon Escoiquiz, he adopted his advice, and resolved to conform to it. The canon had travelled; and for France and for Napoleon he entertained those sentiments which every enlightened Spaniard must feel.

But if the Prince of the Peace had the means of establishing relations of all kinds with the court of France, the Prince of the Asturias, on the contrary, banished to the Escorial, closely and continually watched, had no means of transmitting his thoughts and his wishes to Napoleon. He and his friends resolved to address themselves to the ambassador of France, M. de Beauharnais.

M. de Beauharnais, brother of the first husband of the Empress Josephine, had succeeded General Beurnonville at Madrid in 1806. He was a man of moderate understanding, an awkward and parsimonious ambassador, not fit for the delicate business of his station, and still less for making the figure which that station requires; endowed nevertheless with some good sense and perfect integrity. To all this he added a very ridiculous pride, arising from the sense of his situation, because he had, as we have just observed, the honour to be brother-in-law of the consort of his sovereign.

His gravity, his probity, his awkwardness, ill accorded with the trickery and the levity of the favourite, and he liked the latter as little as he esteemed him. He transmitted to Napoleon reports conformable to what he felt. Hence he was considered at Madrid as an enemy of the grand-admiral. These were favourable circumstances for Ferdinand's confidants. The Canon Escoiquiz undertook to call on M. de Beauharnais; and he

obtained access to him upon the pretext of presenting him with a poem which he had composed on the conquest of Mexico. The canon proceeded by degrees to more intimate communications, opened himself entirely to the ambassador of France, made him acquainted with the situation of the prince, with his dangers, with his wishes, and with the desire which he had conceived of obtaining a wife from the hand of Napoleon, being determined not on any account to have the one destined for him by Emmanuel Godoy.*

* M. de Toreno and several historians, both French and Spanish, have alleged that M. de Beauharnais had received from Paris, or had taken upon himself, the commission to enter into communication with the Prince of the Asturias, either for the purpose of instilling into him the idea of marrying a French princess, or of dividing the royal family of Spain, and thus securing the means of sowing dissensions in it, of which advantage was afterwards taken. This is a complete error, as is proved by the official and the secret correspondence of M. de Beauharnais. In this double correspondence the ambassador relates how the agents of the Prince of the Asturias came to him, and from his account, perfectly sincere, for he was incapable of lying, it evidently results that this intercourse originated with the Prince of the Asturias, and not with the French legation. We shall presently quote two papers, which perfectly clear up this point. The first is a despatch from M. de Champagny, in which that minister, in reply to a letter of M. de Beauharnais, full of reserve, enjoins him in very sharp language to express himself more clearly. This first despatch proves positively that it was not Napoleon who had the idea of interfering with the interior of the royal family of Spain, and that, on the contrary, application was made to him. The second is the very letter of Prince Ferdinand to M. de Beauharnais, in which that prince had enclosed the proposal of marriage addressed to Napoleon. The proposal of marriage has been published; but the letter in which it was enclosed was never known or published. The mere perusal of this second paper will prove that neither M. de Beauharnais nor his government commenced the intercourse with the Prince of the Asturias. From the tone of this letter, it is easy to perceive that the prince sought those to whom he addresses himself, and was not sought by them.

Here is the despatch of M. de Champagny to M. de Beauharnais :—

“PARIS, 9th September 1807.

“Monsieur l’Ambassadeur,—I have received your confidential letter, and lose no time in replying to it, without admitting an intermediary between you and me. All the means that you deem it proper to employ in order to make me acquainted either with the persons with whom you are likely to have to treat, or with the state of the affairs which you have to conduct, will appear very good to me if they shall tend to throw upon them more light, and in a surer manner. You need not have any fears about the use which I shall make of your letters. Any communication through the offices (*bureaux*), whenever it does take place, will always be without danger; they deserve the utmost confidence, and for several years past they have been guardians of the greatest interests of the government, and depositories of its most important secrets. Besides, it is one of the first duties of every minister to a foreign court to inform his government, without restriction and without reserve, of all that he sees, of all that he hears, of all that comes to his knowledge. Placed for the purpose of seeing and hearing, furnished with all the means of gaining information, what he learns does not belong to himself; it is the property of him whose representative he is. You know this duty better than any one, and it is no doubt in order to fulfil it in its whole extent that you wish to multiply these means of communication with me: I am far from objecting to that.

“Your confidential letter contains very important things, so important that it is to be regretted that you have not represented them in greater detail, and

M. de Beauharnais was much too new in the profession in which he was engaged not to be alarmed at so delicate a position, for the overture involved his assenting to a clandestine intercourse with the heir to the crown. He was fearful of being deceived by intriguers and compromised with the court of Spain. He refused at first to believe the Canon Escoiquiz, and received his overtures with a coolness capable of discouraging men less determined to make themselves listened to and understood. But the canon devised a singular method of obtaining credit: this

in particular, that you have not stated how they have come to you. Such was the reflection of the emperor when I had the honour of conversing with him on the subject. What have been your relations with the young prince of whom you speak? What are the positive reasons which you have for judging of him in a certain manner? He implores, you say, on his knees, the protection of the emperor; how do you know this? Has he told you so himself? or by whom has he desired that you should be told it? These questions are asked you by the emperor, and it is he who has made the reflection which I mentioned above, that a minister ought to have no secrets from his government. CHAMPAGNY."

Here follows the letter of Prince Ferdinand to M. de Beauharnais:—

"You will permit me, monsieur l'ambassadeur, to express to you all my gratitude for all the proofs of esteem and affection which you have given me in the secret and indirect correspondence that we have had hitherto through the person whom you know, and who has all my confidence. I owe, in short, to your kindness, which I shall never forget, the happiness of being able to express directly, and without risk, to the great emperor your master, the sentiments so long retained in my heart. I avail myself, therefore, of this happy moment to address by your hands to his imperial and royal majesty the accompanying letter, and fearful of annoying him by misplaced prolixity, I, as yet, only half express the esteem, respect, and affection which I feel for his august person; and I request you, monsieur l'ambassadeur, to make amends for this in the letters which you will have the honour to write to him.

"You will likewise do me the favour to add to his imperial and royal majesty, that I conjure him to excuse any faults against usage and style which there may be in my said letter, as well on account of my being a foreigner, as in consideration of the anxiety and restraint under which I am obliged to write it, being, as you know, beset even in my chamber with spies, who watch me, and forced to avail myself for this purpose of the few moments that I can steal from their malicious eyes. As I flatter myself that I shall obtain in this affair the protection of his imperial and royal majesty, and that in consequence the communications will become more necessary and more frequent, I charge the said person who has hitherto had this commission to take his measures in concert with you for conducting it safely, as he has thus far had no warrant for the said commission but the tokens agreed upon: being thoroughly assured of his integrity, his discretion, and his prudence, I give him by this letter my full and absolute powers for negotiating this affair till its conclusion, and I ratify all that he shall say or do on this point in my name, as if I had said and done it myself, which you will have the goodness to communicate to his imperial majesty with the most sincere expressions of my gratitude.

"You will also have the goodness to tell him that, if his imperial majesty should happen to deem it useful, at whatever time it might be, for me to send to his court with suitable secrecy some confidential person to give him more complete information concerning my situation than can be given in writing, or for any other purpose that his wisdom may judge necessary, his imperial majesty has but to send you word to be instantly obeyed, as he shall be in everything that shall depend on me.

"I repeat, sir, the assurances of my esteem and gratitude. I request you to preserve this letter as a testimony of the perpetuity of my sentiments, and I pray God to have you in His holy keeping.

"Written and signed by my own hand, and sealed with my seal.

"FERDINAND.

"THE ESCURIAL, 11th of October 1807."

was to establish an exchange of signs between the prince and M. de Beauharnais in the visits which the latter made to the Escorial for the purpose of paying his respects to the court. These signs, agreed upon beforehand, could not leave any doubt respecting the secret mission which the Canon Escoiquiz alleged that he had received from Ferdinand. In fact, M. de Beauharnais, on his first visit to the Escorial, observed the prince attentively, perceived the preconceived signs, was, moreover, on his own part the object of the most marked attentions, and could no longer feel any uncertainty respecting the mission of the Canon Escoiquiz. When he was satisfied on this point, he still deferred listening to him till he should be authorised by his court to enter upon business of that kind. He sent to Paris a mysterious despatch, saying that an innocent son, cruelly treated by his father and his mother, solicited the support of Napoleon, and desired to become his grateful and devoted protégé. Napoleon, angry at this ridiculous mystery, ordered M. de Beauharnais to be enjoined to make himself more clear and intelligible. The latter obeyed, and related all that had passed. He gave a detailed account of it in a secret correspondence, which exhibited alike his awkwardness and his sincerity, and which neither was to be, nor was, deposited in the office for foreign affairs. He was told in reply that he must hear everything, promise nothing more than a friendly interest for the misfortunes of the prince, and as for the proposal of marriage, to declare that the overture was too vague to be taken into consideration, and to be followed either by assent or refusal.

Commenced in July 1807, this intercourse was continued in August and September with the same fear of committing himself on the part of M. de Beauharnais, and the same desire to be accepted on the part of Ferdinand. That prince at length determined to have two letters delivered by the Canon Escoiquiz, one for the ambassador, the other for Napoleon himself, in which, deploring his wretched situation and the dangers with which he was threatened, he formally solicited the protection of France, and the hand of a princess of the Bonaparte family. These two letters, dated the 11th of October, were not despatched till the 20th, in consequence of the pains taken by M. de Beauharnais to procure a safe messenger, and did not arrive before the 27th or 28th, when other tidings not less important, the subject of which we are about to state, reached Paris.

While Ferdinand was applying to Napoleon, not knowing whether the French protection would be prompt enough, or signified strongly enough, to save him, he had resolved to take at the same time his precautions at Madrid itself. In accord with his friends, he conceived the idea of making an appeal to his father, in order to open his eyes, denouncing the crimes of the

Prince of the Peace, the complicity of the queen, and if not her adulterous connection with the favourite, at least her abject submission to the will of that ruler of the royal household; lastly, beseeching him to put an end to the scandals, to the calamities which desolated Spain, and to the dangers which threatened an unfortunate son. Ferdinand was to deliver to the king a paper containing these revelations, with a request that after reading he would return it to him, for an indiscretion might endanger his life. The minute of this paper was in the handwriting of the Canon Escoïquiz. Independently of this proceeding, the authors of the plan had conceived the further idea, in case the king should die suddenly, to give to the Duke de l'Infantado powers signed beforehand by Ferdinand, by virtue of which the duke should have the military command of Madrid and New Castille, that he might be enabled to resist by force of arms, if necessary, any attempt of the Prince of the Peace. Such were the means prepared by this coterie to guard against any design of usurpation, whether real or imaginary; and assuredly these means showed neither great depth of understanding nor great boldness of character. But during these proceedings of the prince and his friends, spies posted about them had observed unusual goings and comings. They had seen Ferdinand himself writing several times, which it was not customary for him to do, and they had heard him in his exasperation against his mother and the favourite use expressions of extreme bitterness. The entry of the French troops into Spain, a subject of endless conjectures, had also given occasion for very inconsiderate language on the part of the prince and his friends. The latter already looked upon themselves as certain of the protection of France, and liked to boast of it; though they had long made it a crime in Emmanuel Godoy to seek it, and to pay for it with a blind submission, they took pleasure in insinuating, nay, sometimes in saying plainly, that it was not for nothing that the French armies were crossing the Pyrenees, and that the contemptible government which oppressed Spain would not be long in discovering this; which was unfortunately more true than they themselves imagined, and than they soon had occasion to wish.

Among the persons commissioned to watch Ferdinand, one (it is said that she was a lady of the court) having either been entrusted with the prince's secrets, or having cast an indiscreet eye over his papers, revealed all to the queen. The latter on learning these particulars was seized with a violent paroxysm of rage. The Prince of the Peace was not at that moment at the Escorial, distant about a dozen leagues from Madrid. He was accustomed to pass a week alternately at the Escorial and Madrid. He was ill, it was said, in consequence of his debaucheries. He was sent for secretly, and left his palace by a

private door, desiring on this occasion that his presence at the Escorial should not be known, and to prevent all idea that he could be the instigator of the scenes which were preparing. The queen, more exasperated than he, strove to persuade the king that the circumstances denounced proved nothing less than an extensive conspiracy against his throne and life, insisted that it was necessary to act immediately, without fear of publicity, now become inevitable, to fall unawares upon the apartments of the prince, and to seize his papers before he had time to destroy them. The weak Charles IV., incapable of perceiving how far he was involving himself by such a step, consented to all that was desired of him, and that same evening, the 27th of October, the day on which the treaty was signed at Fontainebleau, permitted his son's apartments to be violated and his papers seized. The prince, who, excepting a little shrewdness, had neither understanding nor courage, was thunderstruck, and delivered without resistance all that he had. The papers which we have just mentioned, mixed with others more insignificant, were carried to the queen, who determined to examine them herself. One may conceive the rage of that princess on reading the paper in which all the turpitudes of the favourite were denounced, and her own at least hinted at. Imbecile and enslaved as was the unfortunate Charles IV., this paper would not have been sufficient to persuade him that his son meditated a crime, and it might perhaps, by opening his eyes, have attained the end proposed by the Canon Escobiquiz and Ferdinand. But unluckily there were other papers, such as a cipher destined for a mysterious correspondence, and the order appointing the Duke de l'Infantado commandant of New Castille, in which a blank had been left for the date to be inserted at the moment of the king's death. These last papers were sufficient for the queen to found all imaginable suppositions upon in order to deceive the unfortunate Charles IV., in order to deceive herself. After perusing these papers, unable to repress her passion, she said, perhaps she believed, that they furnished proofs of a conspiracy tending to dethrone her and her husband, to threaten even their lives; or why that cipher, if not to correspond with conspirators? why that appointment of a military commandant by Ferdinand, who was not yet king, if not to consummate a criminal usurpation? This demonstration, laid before poor Charles IV. with no other proofs than many outbursts of rage, filled him with affliction. He shed tears of sorrow over a son whom he still loved, and whom he was grieved to find so culpable. He then thanked Heaven for saving his life, his throne, his wife, and his friend Emmanuel from so great a danger. The queen, excited by the vehemence natural to the sex, to take an initiative in all this convenient for

the favourite—the queen declared that the case demanded a prompt, an energetic repression, which should satisfy the outraged majesty of the throne, and secure the State from the repetition of such plots. It was therefore resolved that the prince and his accomplices should be arrested that very instant, that the ministers and the principal personages of the State should then be summoned, that the discovery just made should be communicated to them, with the royal resolution to institute a criminal process against the culprits. This was an abominable and a senseless resolution, for after such a clamour it was imperative to prosecute the prince to the utmost, to convict him of the crime, were he innocent, to deprive him of his rights to the throne, and thus to give that throne, suspended on the brink of an abyss, such a shock as might, and actually did, precipitate it into that abyss. But to prosecute the prince, to get him condemned by sold judges, to deprive him of the crown, was precisely what that infuriated queen aimed at, whatever the peril incurred by it. All that she wished for was accomplished. Godoy was sent back to Madrid to induce a belief that he had never left it, and that he had no hand in the tragic scenes at the Escorial. The king went to Ferdinand, demanded his sword, and constituted him prisoner in his own apartments. Couriers were then despatched in all directions to give orders for the apprehension of the alleged accomplices of the prince. The ministers and the members of the councils were convoked, and with consternation in their countenances received the communication of all that had been decided upon. They gave their silent assent, not from zeal, but from timidity.

It was not possible, after such scandal, to conceal from the Spanish nation the deplorable events of which the Escorial had just been the theatre. In enslaved countries, where all publicity is prohibited, important news circulates not the less speedily, nor the less completely. It flies from mouth to mouth, propagated by an ardent curiosity, and exaggerated by a credulity that is not undeceived. The scenes passing at the Escorial were already known to all Madrid, and would soon be known to all Spain. Still, to publish officially the alleged discovery of the plot would be denouncing the prince to the nation, and rendering the misfortunes of the throne irreparable. But the queen and the favourite would have it so. In consequence, they required an act of publicity, and in a country where there was no such thing but for the most important events, such as a birth, the death of a king, a declaration of war, a signature of peace, a great victory, a great defeat, the following royal decree was communicated to all the authorities of the kingdom:—

“God, who watches over His creatures, does not permit the consummation of atrocious deeds when the victims are innocent ;

accordingly His omnipotence has preserved me from the most terrible catastrophe. All my subjects are perfectly acquainted with my religious sentiments and the regularity of my morals; all love me, and I receive from all proofs of the veneration due to a father who loves his children. I was living in the persuasion of this truth, when an unknown hand came to reveal to me the most monstrous and unheard-of plan framed against me in my own palace. My own life, so often threatened, had become an encumbrance to my successor, who, infatuated, blinded, and abjuring all the principles of the Christian faith, taught him through my care and my paternal affection, had entered into a conspiracy for dethroning me. I therefore resolved to ascertain myself the truth of the fact, and surprising my son in his own apartments, I found in his possession the cipher used for his communications with the villains, and the instructions which he received from them. I summoned the governor *ad interim* of the council to examine these papers in concert with the other ministers; they applied themselves assiduously to all the necessary investigations. Everything was done, and the result was the discovery of several culprits; I decreed that they should be apprehended, and my son was put under arrest in his own habitation. This sorrow was wanting to all those which afflict me; it is likewise that which it is most important to make its author expiate; and in the meantime, till I order the publication of the result of the proceedings commenced, I will not neglect to manifest to my subjects my affliction, which the proofs of their loyalty will have the effect of diminishing. You will consider this as understood, to the end that the knowledge of it may be diffused in the suitable form.

“SAN LORENZO (*the Escorial*), 30th October 1807.

“To the Governor *ad interim* of the Council.”

In this court, where one durst not do anything without referring to Paris, where the oppressed son, the involuntarily oppressing father, the favourite, the persecutor of both, sought in Napoleon a support under their misfortune, their silliness, or their crime, it was not possible to commit such deplorable extravagances without writing to him on the subject. In consequence, on the very day previous to the official act just quoted, a letter to Napoleon was dictated to the unhappy Charles IV. full of a ridiculous sorrow, destitute of dignity, in which he said that he was betrayed by his son, and threatened in his person and his power, and announced nothing less than a determination to change the order of the succession to the throne.*

* I subjoin the very text of that letter.

Letter of King CHARLES IV. to the Emperor NAPOLEON.

“Sir, my brother, at the moment when I was wholly occupied with the means of co-operating in the destruction of our common enemy, when I

Napoleon, as we have seen above, had not received the letter of the 11th of October, in which Ferdinand solicits his protection and a wife, till the 28th of the same month. He received successively, on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of November, those of his ambassador and of Charles IV., which informed him of the scandal which the sovereigns of the Escorial had not been afraid to occasion. He was therefore obliged in some measure to interfere in the affairs of Spain whether he would or not, and certainly much earlier than he had expected or wished to do so. For some time past, as we have already related, he said to himself, that it was dangerous to leave Bourbons on a throne at once so lofty and so near a neighbour; and that he must, besides, relinquish all hope of deriving any useful service from Spain while it should continue in the hands of a degenerate race. He knew not what pretext to use for striking the prostrate slaves at his feet, detesting him, well disposed to betray him, trying sometimes to do so, then disavowing with humility the treacheries in which they had scarcely engaged. Neither did he disguise from himself the danger in dethroning the Spanish dynasty of galling an ardent, untractable nation, desirous of changes, incapable of effecting them itself, and ready to revolt against the foreign hand that should attempt to effect them for it. He delayed, therefore, being in no hurry, nor yet decided what course to pursue; witness the treaty of Fontainebleau, which contained nothing but adjournments. But a son applying to him for a wife and his protection, a father denouncing that son to him as a criminal, offered, one might say forced upon him, an occasion for interfering immediately in the affairs of Spain; and still full of doubts and anxieties, desiring, dreading what he was about to undertake, undertaking it from a sort of fatal impulsion, he gave hasty orders, signs of a strongly excited mind.

Hitherto the only object of the movements of troops prescribed

believed that all the plots of the *ci-devant* Queen of Naples were buried with her daughter, I see with a horror which makes me shudder that the spirit of intrigue has penetrated into the very bosom of my palace. Alas! my heart bleeds in giving an account of so frightful a deed. My eldest son, heir-presumptive to my throne, had formed a horrible plot to dethrone me; he had gone to such an excessive length as to engage in an attempt against the life of his mother. Such an atrocious crime ought to be punished with the most exemplary severity of the law. The law which called him to the succession must be revoked; one of his brothers will be more worthy to take his place, both in my heart and on the throne. I am at this moment in search of his accomplices, in order to investigate thoroughly this plan of the blackest villainy, and I will not lose a single moment in making your imperial and royal majesty acquainted with it; beseeching you to assist me with your understanding and your counsels.

"Whereupon I pray God, my good brother, to have your imperial and royal majesty in His holy keeping.

CHARLES.

"SAINT LAURENT, 29th October 1807."

by him had been Portugal.* But from this moment the preparations received an extent and an acceleration which could not leave any uncertainty respecting their object. He had composed General Junot's army, destined to take possession of Portugal, with the three camps of St. Lo, Pontivy, and Napoleon; General Dupont's army of reserve (known by the name of second corps of the Gironde) with the first, second, and third battalions of five legions of reserve and some Swiss battalions. These two armies, the one already in Spain, the other on march for Bayonne, formed an effective of about 50,000 men. These would not be enough if serious events should take place in the Peninsula; for the second only of these armies could be employed in Spain. Napoleon hastened its march toward Bayonne, ordered General Dupont to go immediately and put himself at its head, and resolved to compose a third, which borrowed its title from the specious necessity for watching the coasts of the ocean, deprived of the troops which had been employed in guarding them. He called this third army corps of observation of the coasts of the ocean, and gave the command of it to Marshal Moncey, who had formerly served in Spain, and resolved that it should be about 34,000 strong. In order to compose it, he drafted from the depôts of the regiments of the grand army stationed along the Rhine from Basle to Wesel. These depôts, which had received several conscriptions, and had no further detachments to send to the grand army, were full of young soldiers, whose training had already commenced, and with some of them was nearly finished. For a corps of observation, whether in France or in Spain, Napoleon thought these young soldiers quite sufficient. He gave orders, therefore, for drafting from the forty-eight depôts stationed on the Rhine forty-eight provisional battalions, composed of four companies of 150 men each, being 600 men per battalion, making a total of 28,000 infantry. He ordered four of these battalions to be united and to form a regiment, two regiments to form a brigade, two brigades a division, and the entire corps to form three divisions, under Generals Musnier, Gobert, and Morlot. The points where they were to be organised were Metz, Sedan, Nancy. These troops were to have the organisation of provisional corps, each battalion being still dependent on the regiment from which it was detached. Napoleon gave orders for attaching to each division a battery of foot artillery, for forming at Besançon and La Fère three other batteries of horse artillery, which would make the whole artillery of the corps

* The repeated perusal of his most secret correspondence has proved to me that, till the events at the Escorial, he thought of Portugal only, and that after those events he thought solely of Spain. The dates of his orders, compared with the dates of the news from Madrid, cannot leave a doubt concerning their correlation, and prove that the one were the certain consequence of the others.

10



MARSHAL VICTOR



amount to 36 pieces. General Mouton had orders to proceed to Metz, Nancy, and Sedan to superintend the execution of these measures. The four brigades of cavalry, of provisional formation also, assembled at Compiègne, Chartres, Orleans, and Tours, were distributed between the two corps of Generals Moncey and Dupont. The cuirassiers and the chasseurs were attached to that of General Dupont, the dragoons and the hussars to that of Marshal Moncey. The army of General Junot being sufficient for the occupation of Portugal, there would consequently be left to meet events in Spain the corps of General Dupont, entitled second of the Gironde, and the corps of Marshal Moncey, entitled corps of observation of the coasts of the ocean, forming between those two alone about 60,000 men. Lastly, the news from Madrid growing worse from day to day, Napoleon prescribed, as he had before done, the establishment of relays of carts from Metz, Nancy, and Sedan to Bordeaux, that his troops might travel post. To encourage them to endure fatigue, and also to conceal his object, he directed the soldiers to be told that they were going to the relief of their brethren in Portugal, threatened by the landing of an English army.

Napoleon made a retrograde movement of his veteran soldiers towards the Rhine coincide with this movement of his conscripts towards Spain. All the countries beyond the Vistula were evacuated. Marshal Davout, who, with the Poles, the Saxons, his third corps, and part of the dragoons, had remained in Poland beyond the Vistula, and formed the first command, fell back between the Vistula and the Oder, occupying Thorn, Warsaw, and Posen, his cavalry upon the Oder itself. Poland, strongly recommended to Napoleon by the King of Saxony, thus obtained a considerable relief. Marshal Soult, who formed the second command, received orders to evacuate Old Prussia, and to fall back upon Prussian and Swedish Pomerania, his cavalry alone continuing to live in the island of Nogat. On the right of the Vistula there were left only Oudinot's grenadiers at Dantzig. The first corps, transferred to Marshal Victor, continued to occupy Berlin, with the heavy cavalry in rear on the banks of the Elbe. Marshal Mortier, with the fifth and sixth corps, and two divisions of dragoons, was left in Upper and Lower Silesia. The Prince of Ponte Corvo, commanding alone the shores of the Baltic since the reduction of Stralsund and the dissolution of the corps of Marshal Brune, was to occupy Lübeck with Dupas' division, Lünenburg with Boudet's division, Hamburg with the Spaniards, Bremen with the Dutch. All the surplus cavalry not comprehended in these different commands was sent into Hanover. The Bavarians, the Wurtembergers, the Baden troops, the Hessians, and the Italians were authorised to return home. The heavy siege artillery, the stores of clothing,

shoes, arms, made at a high price in Poland and Germany, were despatched to Magdeburg. The imperial guard, to the number of 12,000 men, hastened to march towards Paris.

Napoleon, in prescribing these movements, had the twofold intention of relieving the north of Europe from its burden, and of bringing back a few regiments of old troops to France. Independently of the guard, which would soon arrive, he ordered the return of a certain portion of the foot artillery and many skeletons of dragoons. With his usual dexterity, he managed this business so that there should result from this change, instead of a dissolution, a better organisation of these *corps d'armée*.

The corps of Lannes, composed of Oudinot's grenadiers, had at first been left at Dantzic. There were grenadiers sufficient for Dantzic, both as a defence and as a burden. Napoleon pronounced the dissolution of Verdier's division, composed of four fine regiments of infantry. Two of these regiments, the 2nd and 12th light, forming part of the garrison of Paris, were recalled to that capital. The two others, the 72nd and the 3rd of the line, were attached to St. Hilaire's division, to compensate it for three regiments, the 43rd, 55th, and 14th of the line, which were taken from it because they had their *dépôt* at the camp of Boulogne and at Sedan. This division still comprised five regiments, a number which Napoleon would not exceed. Morand's division having six regiments, was diminished by the 51st. Dupas' division, which, with the Saxons and Poles, composed Mortier's corps at Friedland, now dissolved, formed only a temporary assemblage, and bore heavily on the city of Lübeck. Napoleon took from it the 4th light, which belonged to the garrison of Paris, and the 15th of the line, which belonged to Brest. Lastly, the 44th of the line, left in garrison at Dantzic to rest itself there after the disaster of Eylau, being no longer necessary in that city, was recalled. The 7th of the line having become disposable by the evacuation of Braunau, was likewise recalled. The artillery of Verdier's dissolved division joined the corps returning to France. In the north the arm of the dragoons was more numerous than it needed to be. The third squadrons of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 9th, 10th, 15th, 4th regiments, after turning over all their men to the first two squadrons, were likewise to return to France.

Thus without disorganising his corps, by restoring them to more uniform proportions, and breaking only temporary aggregations, Napoleon contrived to create means for bringing ten fine regiments of infantry, belonging almost all either to Paris or to the camps on the coasts; which was an additional congruity, for these regiments being those which had contributed most to the corps of Portugal and the Gironde, were thus brought near to their detachments. That profound art of disposing

troops is, perhaps, the loftiest part of the science of war. It is necessary for every government, even though pacific, by title of good administration. The grand army in the north was still about 300,000 French, exclusive of the Poles and Saxons left in Poland, and the Bavarians and Wurtembergers, the Badeners, the Hessians, and the Italians marching to their own countries, but not disbanded, and ready to return at the first call. Adding to the grand army the armies of Upper Italy, Dalmatia, Naples, the Ionian Islands, Spain, and the interior, Napoleon had then 800,000 French troops, and at least 150,000 allied troops,* a colossal, an alarming force, if we, moreover, consider that the greater part of it was composed of veteran soldiers, that the conscripts themselves were introduced into old skeletons, that all of them were commanded by the most experienced, the ablest officers that war has ever produced; and lastly, that these marched under the orders of the greatest of captains.

After he had withdrawn his old troops from the Rhine, and pushed his young soldiers towards the Pyrenees, Napoleon, full of an eager curiosity, waited impatiently for tidings from Madrid, which he conceived must follow in rapid succession, in consequence of so flagrant a step as the arrest of the presumptive heir to the crown. Having come to no fixed resolution, hoping for that event which should be most conformable to his wishes, not relying in the least on the intelligence of M. de Beauharnais, though he had full reliance on his integrity, he gave him no other instruction than to observe all that passed, and report it to Paris with all possible despatch.

It is by successive shocks that great revolutions develop themselves, and always with longer intervals between them

* We think it right to quote here a curious letter from Napoleon to Joseph, in which he shows him, and in great confidence, the immense extent of his forces, a letter which betrays, along with his pride at seeing them so great, his embarrassment at having to pay such a number.

Letter from the Emperor to the King of Naples.

“FONTAINEBLEAU, 21st of October 1807.

“The urgent necessity there is for me to establish good order in the state of my military force, to avoid producing derangement in all my affairs, requires that I should establish my army in Naples on a definitive footing, and that I should know that it is duly kept up.

“You will judge what attention I am obliged to pay to details when you know that I have more than 800,000 men on foot. I have still an army on the Passarge, near the Niemen; I have one at Warsaw; I have one in Silesia; I have one at Hamburg; I have one at Berlin; I have one at Boulogne; I have one on march for Portugal; I have a second, which I am assembling at Bayonne; I have one in Italy; I have one in Dalmatia, which I am at this moment reinforcing with 6000 men; I have one at Naples; I have garrisons on all my maritime frontiers. You may judge, therefore, when this tide flows back into the interior of my dominions, and I shall cease to find foreign alleviation, how necessary it will be that all my expenses should be rigidly calculated.

“You ought to have an inspector of reviews skilful enough to make out a statement of what a regiment ought to cost you according to our regulations.”

than human impatience would wish for. Such was the case at this time in Spain. Events did not follow one another so rapidly as had been at first expected.

The Prince of the Asturias, engaged in a scheme in which there was assuredly very little criminality, the object of which, after all, was only to open the eyes of a deceived father, and to prevent usurpation—the Prince of the Asturias, engaged in this scheme without prudence, without discretion, without courage, soon proved that he deserved the slavery from which he had aimed at releasing himself. Shut up alone in his apartments, terrified when he thought of the fate which the founder of the Escorial, Philip II., had inflicted on the Infant Don Carlos, full of exaggerated ideas of the cruelty of the favourite, credulous enough to admit that this favourite and his mother had caused his wife to be poisoned—he imagined that he was undone, and thought to save his life by the basest of means, by informing against his alleged accomplices. This son, worthy, as we see, of those against whose oppression he was struggling, formed the design of throwing himself at the feet of his mother and confessing everything to her—a confession which could scarcely satisfy her if he told her nothing but the truth; but which would become the most infamous perfidy if, to please her, he charged his accomplices with supposititious crimes. After the communication to the members of the councils, quoted above, the king had gone to seek in hunting that oblivion of the cares of government which he could not endure longer than a few moments. The queen was alone at the Escorial, still transported with anger. Emmanuel Godoy remaining ill at Madrid, where he pretended to be much worse than he really was, Ferdinand sent to beseech his mother to come to see him in his apartments, to receive his confession and the assurance of his repentance and submission. That princess, who had more understanding than her son, who had no desire for a reconciliation, the probable consequence of the interview solicited by the prince, sent to him M. de Caballero, minister of grace and justice, an extremely circumspect personage, capable of assuming all sorts of parts, but preferring to all others that one which should bring him nearest to the victorious party. Ferdinand deeply humbled himself before this minister of his father's, declared what had passed, confining his account to the truth, which was not very overwhelming; he maintained that he had designed only to forearm himself against any attacks upon his rights, and added, what was still unknown, that he had written to Napoleon to solicit from him the hand of a French princess. The most serious thing in his confession was his naming the Dukes de San Carlos and de l'Infantade, and above all, the Canon Escoiquiz, as the instigators who had led him astray.

The result of the declaration was the immediate apprehension, with unexampled brutality, and incarceration at the Escorial, of the personages whom he had denounced. The prisoners answered, with a dignity and firmness which did them honour, all the questions which were put to them, and reducing the accusation to so much of it as was true, declared that they had only designed to enlighten Charles IV., deceived by an unworthy favourite, to deliver the Prince of Asturias from an intolerable oppression, and to prevent, in case of the king's death, an act of usurpation foreseen and dreaded by all Spain. The firmness of these honest men, culpable, no doubt, for having engaged in irregular proceedings, but having an extraordinary situation for their excuse—their firmness, we say, threw dishonour on both the infamous court that would fain have sacrificed them to its vengeance, and on the pusillanimous prince who repaid their devoted attachment by the basest desertion.

The effect, however, of this audacious and foolish proceeding was immense throughout the whole Peninsula. There was but one cry of rage and indignation against the Prince of the Peace and against the queen, who were bent, it was said, on sacrificing a virtuous son, the only hope of the nation. People were not acquainted with the bottom of things, but they refused to believe that absurd imputation levelled against the Prince of Asturias, of harbouring a design to dethrone his father; and the popular good sense discerned that there was nothing more in the inculpatory acts than an effort to undeceive Charles IV., and some precautions to prevent the favourite from usurping the supreme authority. At length the application made by Ferdinand to Napoleon becoming known by degrees, the scandalous trial at the Escorial was attributed to the anger which the court must have felt on that point. The public mind conforming immediately to what the adored heir to the crown had done, approved of it without reserve. It was admitted that it was an excellent idea to apply to that great man, who had re-established order and religion in France, who could, if he pleased, regenerate Spain, without making her pass through a revolution: it was, above all, a wise idea to think of uniting the two houses by the ties of blood; for that union alone could put an end to the jealousies which still separated the Bourbons from the Bonapartes. Ferdinand was applauded for having had confidence in Napoleon; they felt indebted to Napoleon for having inspired him with it; and immediately, with the fickleness, the ardour of a warm-hearted nation, the whole population of Spain conceived but one wish, uttered but one cry—that was, to insist that the long columns of French troops proceeding towards Lisbon should turn aside for a moment to Madrid, to deliver a deceived father and a persecuted son from the monster who

oppressed them both. This sentiment was general, unanimous in all classes of the nation: singular contrast with the sentiments which were soon to burst forth in that same Spain, hostile to France and to her chief!

After having long despised Spain for having suffered all kinds of scandals before her face, the favourite began to be alarmed on hearing the cry of reprobation raised against him in all quarters. Leaving his bed, to which he affected to be confined by severe indisposition, he resolved to show himself at the Escorial as peacemaker and reconciler. The excited passions of the queen were more difficult to repress than his own; and he had some trouble to make her sensible that they must stop short in the course which they were pursuing, unless they meant to provoke a sort of popular insurrection. The signature of the treaty of Fontainebleau had just been communicated to him, though that treaty was not yet to receive the consecration of publicity. Emmanuel Godoy was rejoiced that he had obtained the quality of sovereign prince, with the guarantee of that new quality by France. He found in this a reason for taking courage, for avoiding any violent crisis, for seeking, in short, gentler means of attaining his end. To dishonour the Prince of the Asturias seemed to him safer than to inflict on him a condemnation which would revolt all Spain, and after which that prince would become the idol of the Spanish nation.* A first step had been already

* M. de Toreno has alleged, and other writers have repeated, that the motive which caused the proceedings commenced against the Prince of the Asturias to be suspended, was no other than an injunction addressed by Napoleon to the Prince of the Peace not to compromise in any way the agents of the French government, or that government itself. This is a mere supposition, contradicted by facts and dates. It would have been easy to continue these proceedings without introducing into them the French ambassador, the communications with whom were the smallest of the grievances, while the other papers, such as that revealing to Charles IV. the conduct of the favourite, the cipher, the eventual appointment of the Duke de l'Infantado, constituted the alleged crimes of the prince and his accomplices. What affords a still stronger proof of this is, that the proceedings against the accomplices of the prince were continued, and that the grievances remaining exactly the same, the difficulty, had there been any, would have been as great with them as with the prince. But this invention, I repeat, is peremptorily contradicted by the dates. The begging pardon, and the royal act which grants it, are of the 5th of November. Now, at this time the arrest of the prince was scarcely known at Paris; for the seizure of his papers was on the 27th of October, his arrest on the 28th, and the circulation of all these facts at Madrid on the 29th. No explicit account, then, could have left Madrid before the 29th of October. All the couriers at that time took seven or eight days for the journey. The news, therefore, could not have reached Paris before the 5th of November. Had it even left on the 27th, it could not have been there before the 3rd, and assuredly there would not have been time to order at Paris, on the 3rd, an act which was consummated at Madrid on the 5th, which had even been resolved on there on the 3rd or the 4th. The dates are consequently sufficient to contradict such a supposition. The Prince of the Peace was induced to act the part of conciliator, solely because the enterprise of obtaining the condemnation of the heir-presumptive, in order to deprive him of his rights to the throne, was beyond his audacity and the patience of the Spanish nation.

taken in this course by the anxiety of the prince to offer his confession, for which he was not asked, and to denounce accomplices who were not thought of. In consequence, Emmanuel Godoy persuaded the queen, but not without difficulty, to grant a pardon, which the prince should solicit with humility, and acknowledging his guilt. He went therefore to Ferdinand's apartment, which had been converted into a prison, and was received, not with the contempt which he ought to have met with from a prince endowed with any dignity, but with the satisfaction experienced by an accused person who feels that he is saved. Emmanuel Godoy then proposed to Ferdinand, or Ferdinand to him, to write a letter to his father and another to his mother, in which he should solicit the most humiliating pardon, and after that all should be forgotten. Those two letters were conceived in the following terms:—

"November 5, 1807.

"SIRE AND MY FATHER,—I have rendered myself culpable in offending against your majesty, I have offended against my father and my king. But I repent of it, and I promise your majesty the most humble obedience. I ought not to do anything without the consent of your majesty, but I was taken by surprise. I have denounced the guilty persons, and I beseech your majesty to forgive me, and to permit your grateful son to kiss your feet."

"MADAME AND MY MOTHER,—I deeply repent of the great fault which I have committed against the king and against you, my father and my mother. I therefore implore your pardon with the greatest submission, as well as for my obstinacy in denying the truth to you the other night. I therefore beseech your majesty from the bottom of my heart to deign to interpose your mediation with my father, that he will be pleased to permit me, his grateful son, to kiss his majesty's feet."

After these letters were signed, a new public act of Charles IV. pronounced the pardon of the accused prince, reserving, however, the continuation of the proceedings commenced against his accomplices, and forbidding the circulation of the first act, in which he had been denounced to the Spanish nation. But it was too late to smother so great a scandal. The deplorable scenes at the Escorial were inseparable from one another, and none could remain concealed. The first disgraced the king, the queen, the favourite; the last disgraced the Prince of the Asturias.

The effect on public opinion was not, however, what one would have supposed. Though all the actors in these scenes had deserved nearly equal censure, the father for his weakness, the mother and the favourite for their guilty passions, the son for his cowardly desertion of his friends, the Spanish people, nevertheless, resolved not to find any fault but with the favourite and the queen; neither would they regard the conduct of the prince

as anything more than a consequence of the oppression under which he groaned ; his confessions as declarations either supposititious or extorted ; and continued to love him with idolatry, to invest him with all imaginable virtues, to demand of Napoleon a movement of his mighty arm towards Spain. All at once Napoleon became the tutelary deity, invoked on every side and by every voice. It is the only moment, perhaps, in which the Spanish people has ever admired with transport a hero who was not a Spaniard, and appealed to a foreign influence.

At the same time that Napoleon was informed of the accusation preferred against the Prince of the Asturias, he also received intelligence of the pardon granted to that prince. He was as much surprised at the one as at the other ; but he clearly saw that the course of this drama, which would have been tragic in another age, but which was only disgusting in ours, was slackening, to be resumed by-and-by, and to end subsequently in its conclusion. Though the step taken by the Prince of the Asturias had disposed him favourably, he knew not whether it would be right to trust such a character ; he knew not whether, in his weakness and in his passions, there were not reasons for seeing in him an impotent ally or a perfidious enemy. To give him a princess of the house of Bonaparte, apparently the easiest solution, was not, therefore, a very safe course. Besides, history exhibited but few encouraging instances in regard to princesses charged to attach Spain to us by marriages. Neither did it seem that to allow Charles IV., the Prince of the Peace, and the queen to continue to reign would be a solution promising much duration, as well on account of the king's health as that of the indignation ready to burst forth. To change the dynasty appeared, therefore, the simplest course. But still, in this case there was the danger of revolting the opinion of the Spanish nation, and above all, the opinion of Europe, there being no pretext for dethroning princes who, divided among themselves, were united only in calling in Napoleon as a friend and master. Persevering in his doubts, as Spain in her agitations, Napoleon resolved to avail himself of that momentary respite to devote a few days to Italy, and to regulate several important affairs that demanded his presence. Besides, he was to meet in Italy his brother Lucien, to reconcile himself with him, to receive from his hand a daughter, who might be the princess destined for Spain if the less violent plan of uniting the two houses by a marriage should be definitively adopted. These resolutions taken, he gave counter-orders to his armies not to stop their march towards Spain, but to slacken the rapidity of that march. He directed that the troops of the corps of the coasts of the ocean, which were to have been conveyed post to Bordeaux, should perform that march on foot, and without any haste. He enjoined General

Dupont to make such arrangements that the second corps of the Gironde might enter Spain about the end of November, and he prescribed to him to go to Valladolid, without advancing further towards Portugal. He despatched from Paris his chamberlain, M. de Tournon, whose good sense he appreciated, with orders to go to Spain, to observe what was passing there, to ascertain thoroughly whether the Prince of the Asturias had many partisans, whether the old court still retained any, and with the further commission to carry an answer to the various communications of Charles IV. In this answer, full of civility and generosity, Napoleon recommended to Charles IV. mildness and indulgence towards his son, denied that he had received any application from him, and strove to avoid sowing fresh seeds of discord, though he had more interest in exciting dissensions than in pacifying Spain.

This done, Napoleon, expecting that he should soon have to turn his attention again to that quarter, left Fontainebleau on the 16th of November, accompanied by Murat, by the ministers of the marine and the interior, by Messrs. Sganzin and de Proni, directors of several important services, and proceeded towards Milan, to embrace his beloved son, Prince Eugène de Beauharnais. On leaving, he gave orders for the triumphal reception of the imperial guard, which would soon arrive in Paris.

He wished to be absent from this solemnity, and if possible, that nobody should even think of him. He wished that honour should be done to the army, to the army alone, by the festivities given to the guard, which was the élite of that army. Accordingly, writing to the minister of the interior to prescribe the details of the ceremony, he said: "In the emblems and inscriptions which shall be employed in this ceremony, my guard ought to be kept in view, not myself, and it ought to be shown that in honouring the guard, the whole grand army is honoured."

Accordingly, on the 25th of November the prefect of the Seine and the *maires* of Paris proceeded to the barrier of La Villette, followed by an immense concourse of people, to receive the heroes of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Friedland. Marshal Bessières was at their head. A triumphal arch had been erected at that spot. The ensigns stepped out of the ranks, lowered the standards, on which the magistrates of the capital placed crowns of gold, bearing the inscription, "The City of Paris to the Grand Army." Then the guard, numbering twelve thousand veteran soldiers, sunburnt, mutilated, some of them having already grey beards, filed off through Paris, with an enthusiastic crowd at their heels applauding their triumph. A plentiful repast, provided in the Champs Élysées, was offered to these twelve thousand soldiers by the city of Paris, which in this fraternal and national solemnity represented France, as well as the guard represented

the army. The weather was not favourable towards the conclusion of the day, which was frequently rendered unpleasant by the rain; for it seemed that this army, which had no other share in our greatness and our faults but its heroism, was not lucky. Of the thousand millions decreed by the Convention, was left nothing but a fête promised in 1806 to the whole army of Austerlitz; of that fête was left nothing but this entertainment to the guard, which was damped by the weather and deprived of the presence of Napoleon. But the glory of the French army might well dispense with such frivolous pomp. History will relate that everybody in France from 1789 to 1815, excepting the army, mingled faults with his services; for while innocent victims were slaughtered in 1793, it was defending the country; while Napoleon violated the rules of prudence in 1807 and 1808, it confined itself to fighting; and at all times, under all governments, it knew but how to devote itself and to die for the existence and the greatness of France.

BOOK XXIX.

WHILE Napoleon, resolved as to the end that he should pursue in Spain, uncertain as to the means, was travelling to Italy, full of confidence in the immensity of his power, the French armies were advancing into the Peninsula, and about to encounter for the first time the hardships which awaited them in that inhospitable country.

The army ordered to enter it first was that of General Junot : his commission, as we have seen, was to take possession of Portugal. It was composed of about 26,000 men ; 23,000 present under arms, and followed by a reinforcement of from 3000 to 4000 men drafted from the dépôts. It was distributed into three divisions, under Generals Laborde, Loison, and Travot. It had for the principal officer of the staff General Thiébault, and for commander-in-chief the brave Junot, the devoted aide-de-camp of Napoleon, for a moment ambassador in Portugal, an intelligent officer, bold to temerity, having no other defect than a natural ardour of disposition, destined to terminate one day in a mental malady. The army was composed of young soldiers of the conscription of 1807, levied in 1806, but embodied in the old skeletons, and sufficiently trained. They were very capable of behaving well under fire, but unluckily not seasoned to fatigue, which, nevertheless, was likely to be their principal trial. Napoleon, anxious that they should enter Lisbon speedily, in order to catch there, not the royal family, about which he cared very little, but the Portuguese fleet and the immense wealth belonging to English merchants, had given orders to General Junot to redouble his celerity, and not to spare his soldiers either fatigue or privations in order to arrive in time. Junot, with his ardour, was not the man to correct by a discreet discernment so much of that order as might prove dangerous in the country which they were about to traverse.

On the 17th of October the army entered Spain in several columns, in order to find subsistence the more easily. It marched upon Valladolid, by Tolosa, Vittoria, and Burgos. Notwithstanding the promises of the Prince of the Peace, scarcely anything had been provided upon the route, and at night it was necessary to collect in haste whatever could be found to feed

the troops, worn out with the fatigues of the day. The lodgings were detestable, full of vermin, and so filthy, that our soldiers chose rather to lie in the fields or in the streets than to accept the wretched shelter that was offered them. The population received them with the curiosity natural to a lively people fond of sights, and for which its inert government had procured scarcely any for a century past. The higher classes behaved well to our troops; but the lower showed towards them their sullen hatred of foreigners. On the route to Salamanca several of our stragglers were stabbed with knives, though they conducted themselves with the most cautious discretion.

The army, before reaching Salamanca, where it made a short halt, had already suffered much from fatigue, and left a certain number of men behind. General Junot, who had a provident chief of the staff, established at Valladolid, Salamanca, and in advance of Ciudad Rodrigo, dépôts consisting of a commandant, several managing clerks, and a detachment to collect the fatigued or sick, and to send them off by-and-by to the army in parties sufficiently numerous to defend themselves. The order to march without intermission having reached the army at Salamanca, it left that city on the 12th of November, formed into three divisions. On its route from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara, it had to cross the chain of mountains which separates the valley of the Douro from that of the Tagus, and which is a prolongation of the Guadarrama. From Salamanca to Alcantara it would have to travel fifty leagues through a poor, mountainous, woody country, inhabited by herdsmen only, who were accustomed to drive their flocks thither twice a year—in autumn, when they removed from Old Castille into Estramadura, and in spring, when they returned from Estramadura into Old Castille. Though the Spanish authorities had promised to prepare provisions, scarcely any were found at Sanmunos, an intermediate point half-way between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. The troops travelled nineteen leagues in two days, without anything to eat but a little goat's flesh, which they procured by seizing the flocks which they fell in with on their route. At Ciudad Rodrigo, a considerable town and a fortress of great importance, they found a governor very unfavourably disposed, who excused himself by alleging the ignorance in which he had been left of the passage of the French army, and who took no pains to procure the supplies that he had neglected to provide. Some provisions were, however, collected, sufficient to afford the soldiers half a ration; a new dépôt was organised for rallying the stragglers, whose number increased at every step, and the army advanced towards the mountains, for the purpose of passing out of the basin of the Douro into that of the Tagus. The weather had all at once become frightful, as is the case in

these southern countries, where Nature in extremes, like the inhabitants, passes with singular violence from the mildest to the most inclement temperature. Rain and snow succeeded each other without intermission. The tracks followed by the different columns were completely covered, and not discernible even under the feet of men and horses. Misled by half savage guides, who were themselves frequently mistaken from having never passed the bounds of their own village, several columns lost their way, and arrived at the village of Peña Parda, nearly on the crest of the chain, worn out with fatigue and hunger, having left part of their men behind them on the way. For food they were obliged to go, for the purpose of passing the night, to La Moraleja, on the back of the mountains. A tremendous tempest overtook them. In a moment all the torrents overflowed. What with the howling of the wind and the roaring of the water, our inexperienced soldiers, having had scarcely anything to eat for several days, having no hope of better quarters for the following days, were seized with one of those sudden demoralisations which surprise and depress young minds not much accustomed to the hardships of the military life. Night having come on, and the drums, relaxed by the rain, giving no sound, a sort of confusion took place in this march. The soldiers, ceasing to distinguish objects, having great difficulty to discern one another, and endeavouring to communicate by shouts, made the mountains ring with their wild hooping and hallooing. The officers were no longer heeded or heard; indiscipline had accompanied despair, and the scene had become terrific. A first column, however, had arrived at about eleven o'clock at night at La Moraleja; and having found a detachment which had already gone to bed, made known the state in which it had left the rest of the army. The men who were least fatigued were selected, and despatched to the aid of their comrades. Large fires were kindled, a light was placed on the top of the steeple, and the great bell was rung to draw the men who had lost their way towards this point. To add to their hardships, no more preparations had been made at La Moraleja than elsewhere. No provisions whatever were to be had. The soldiers, in the delirium of hunger, respecting nothing, fell to plundering and ravaging that unfortunate place, which thus became the victim of the neglect of the Spanish government to fulfil its promises. There was not at the moment of arrival one-fourth of the men around the colours. By degrees, during the night, all who had not sunk under fatigue, all who were not drowned in the torrents, or murdered by the herdsmen of Estramadura, reached the devastated quarters of La Moraleja. A few more goats sufficed, not to satisfy the hunger of the soldiers, but to prevent their dying of

inaction. It was impossible to stop in such a place, and next day the troops marched for Alcantara, where they at length reached the banks of the Tagus and the frontier of Portugal.

The general-in-chief, Junot, had preceded his army thither, in order to make amends by his attentions for the carelessness of the Spanish government. The town afforded rather more resources than the wild mountains of Estramadura. These resources, however, were not very considerable, and they had been partly absorbed by the Spanish troops of General Carafa, who with a division of nine or ten thousand men was to support the movement of the French troops, and to descend the left of the Tagus while General Junot should descend the right. A few bullocks and a few sheep were collected, and distributed among the regiments; bread sufficient to allow half a ration to each man was procured; and a bait was granted to the army, as well in order to rally it as to enable it to recover its exhausted strength. It had left behind or lost in the forests and the torrents a fifth of its effective, that is to say, from four to five thousand men. Half the cavalry was dismounted, many horses had died of hunger, or could not follow for want of shoeing. As for the artillery, the army had been compelled to employ oxen to draw it, and that means soon failing, they had not more than six pieces at Alcantara. In respect to ammunition, that they had been obliged to abandon by the way, together with the rest of the matériel.

The embarrassment of the unfortunate General Junot was extreme. On the one hand, he was stimulated by the orders of Napoleon, by the certainty that if he did not soon reach Lisbon, he should find either that the Portuguese fleet had sailed with the wealth of Portugal, or meet with an organised resistance, which he should have trouble to overcome; on the other hand, he saw before him the backs of the mountains of Beyra, sloping towards the Tagus, consisting of a multitude of abrupt spurs, separated from one another by frightful ravines, apparently cut out, as seems to be expressed by the name of *Tailladas* given to some of them, entirely destitute of inhabitants, destitute of every resource, and rendered still more dreary by the autumnal deluges of rain. Add to this that our soldiers, having left France in haste, and being unable to take their baggage along with them, were mostly without shoes, without cartridges, and not in a fit state to undergo a long march, or to conquer a serious resistance if they should meet with one, which was not impossible; for the Portuguese had still 25,000 tolerably good troops, well disposed to defend themselves, since the prospect of belonging to Spain did not incline them to give a favourable reception to the invaders of their country. Neither was the concurrence of the Spaniards to be depended upon; for instead of twenty battalions,

they had furnished us with only eight, and animated by sentiments so adverse to the French, that it had been found necessary to send them to their cantonments.

In the face of this alternative, either to allow events that might excite regret to be consummated at Lisbon, or to encounter fresh fatigues with exhausted troops in crossing a country more frightful than that which he had just traversed, General Junot did not hesitate, and preferred the course of obedience to that of prudence. He therefore took the resolution to continue this precipitate march by crossing the series of spurs detached from Beyra, which border the Tagus from Alcantara to Abrantes. He picked up some shoes and a few bullocks, availed himself of a depôt of powder existing on the spot, and of the paper upon which were written the voluminous records of the knights of Alcantara for making cartridges. He then divided his army into two parts, one composed of the infantry of the first and second divisions, the other of the infantry of the third division, of the cavalry, of the artillery, and of the stragglers. He pushed forward the first, and left the second at Alcantara, with orders to rejoin him as soon as it should be somewhat rallied, recruited, and provided with means of transport. He took with him only a few mountain guns, which from their calibre were lighter to draw.

He resolved to leave Alcantara on the 20th of November, and to cross the frontier of Portugal on the right of the Tagus, while General Carafa was to cross it on the left. It would, no doubt, have been much better to pass the Tagus, to penetrate further into Estramadura, to reach Badajoz, to take the high-road from Badajoz to Elvas, which the Spaniards generally follow, through Alentejo, a level province, and easy to travel through. But it would have been requisite to descend the Peninsula as far as Badajoz, then to make a long circuit to the right to reach Lisbon. Napoleon giving orders at Paris, from the mere inspection of the map, and preferring the road that led most speedily to Lisbon, had directed the right of the Tagus to be followed from Alcantara to Abrantes, while the Spaniards were to follow the left. In this manner one not only made sure of the advantage of celerity, but also of that of not having subsequently to effect a passage of the Tagus when approaching Lisbon. If, however, Napoleon could have known that the troops would meet with deluging rains in Portugal, that through the negligence of his allies the army would arrive at Alcantara exhausted with hunger and fatigue, he would have chosen rather to lose a few days than to prosecute a march which was soon to resemble a rout. But here began to be revealed those calamitous inconveniences of an extreme policy, which, resolved to act at once upon the Vistula and the Tagus, at Dantzic and at Lisbon, was obliged to issue orders from a

great distance, and to employ weak soldiers and inexperienced generals, when robust soldiers and able generals were employed elsewhere. There are lieutenants who act wrong from timidity, others from excess of zeal. The latter are the rarest, and in general the most useful, though frequently dangerous. The brave Junot was one of these latter. He hesitated not, then, to leave Alcantara on the 20th of November, sending away, as we have said, part of the Spanish troops which seemed far from steady, and assigning to the others the duty of following the left bank of the Tagus while he should pursue the right. Of an army which had at Bayonne an effective of 23,000 men present under arms out of 26,000, he had with him but 15,000 at most; not that the others were all dead or lost, but because they were incapable of continuing that hasty march. He advanced along the Tagus by paths formed on the side of the mountains, compelled incessantly to ascend or descend, sometimes rising to the very crests of the spurs which run out from Beyra, sometimes plunging into the deep ravines which separate them, having the summit of the mountains on his right, the river on his left. He directed his two divisions of infantry upon Castel-Branco by two different roads. The first took the Idanha-Nova road, the second that to Rosmaniñal. They were each accompanied by some Spanish light troops. The weather was still terrible, the rain incessant, the road scarcely passable. The first division, commanded by General Laborde, having to cross an overflowed torrent, wider and deeper than the others, that brave general alighted, walked into the water up to his waist, and remained in that position till all his soldiers had passed. At night they had nothing to eat but goats' flesh, acorns, and one ounce of bread per man. They arrived on the following day at Castel-Branco, where the two divisions joined in a state difficult to be described. The first that arrived, which had had fewer difficulties to surmount, went and bivouacked outside the town, that it might leave to the other, which was still more fatigued than itself, the advantage of lodging in it. Guards were posted at every oven to prevent pillage. Thanks to this precaution, two ounces of bread could be allotted to each man. They were without meat, but had rice, vegetables, and wine. The soldiers were pale, haggard, and almost all barefoot. To stop would have been to expose them to the danger of dying from hunger, to say nothing of the inconvenience of losing valuable time. They set off, therefore, in the hope of reaching Abrantes, a wealthy and populous town, situated beyond the regions of the mountains in an open and fertile country. The troops marched thither in two columns, one formed of the first division by Sobreira-Formosa, the other formed of the second division by Perdigao. The first had fourteen leagues to travel,

and four or five torrents to cross. They were so swollen by the rain, that they could not be passed without danger. The soldiers formed a chain with their muskets to defend themselves against the force of the water. Some, debilitated or worn out with fatigue, were occasionally hurried away by the current. The officers, full of zeal, with the intention of setting the stronger the example of assisting the weaker, took upon their shoulders the men who were incapable of passing, and thus helped them to cross the torrents. On the road they found but a single village, that of Sarcedas, and the soldiers, dying of hunger, plundered it, in spite of the efforts of the general-in-chief to prevent them. It was eleven at night before they reached Sobreira-Formosa, in a state of absolute despair. For the first hour not more than a sixth of the men had joined. They found some chestnuts and a few cattle, and these were the whole of their fare. The second division had, on its part, experienced cruel hardships in its march to Perdigao.

The rest of the route to Abrantes was not rendered so fatiguing by asperities of soil, but equally marked by sterility and destitution. At length, after unparalleled fatigues and privations, the troops arrived on the 24th at Abrantes to the number of four or five thousand men, wan, wasted, with bleeding feet, tattered clothes, unserviceable muskets, for the soldiers had used them for sticks to assist them in crossing the torrents and climbing the mountains. To arrive in this state in a very populous town would have been offering it a temptation to close its gates against such assailants, and to defend itself from them by merely leaving them to die of hunger. But fortunately the glorious victories gained in all parts of the world by the old soldiers of France protected our young troops wherever they might be. Such was the renown of the French army, that at its approach but one sentiment pervaded the population, that of satisfying it by supplying its wants as speedily as possible. If they had time to become acquainted with it, they soon ceased to detest it, without ceasing to fear it, and they offered it cheerfully that which on the first day they had offered under an impression of terror.

The general-in-chief had preceded his army to Abrantes, in order to prepare beforehand that relief which its deplorable state demanded. The inhabitants complied with all his requisitions. They collected cattle, bread in abundance ; and for the first time since their departure from Salamanca, for twelve days, the soldiers received complete rations. Excellent wine, shoes, clothing, and means of conveyance were procured for them. They were even enabled to send off vehicles to the rear to pick up the sick and the fatigued men. The weather had not yet become serene and dry ; but they were in a fine, level, warm country, covered with

orange trees, exhaling the delicious perfumes of the south, presenting a spectacle of comfort and wealth. The effect on those young soldiers, accessible to all sensations, was rapid, and they passed in two days from the most gloomy despair to a sort of joy and confidence. Many of them were still bewildered among the rocks of Beyra, and they came by degrees, in detached parties, to receive in their turn the delightful impression of a fine country, abounding in resources of every kind.

Junot had the arms repaired, and collecting the companies of élite, formed a column of 4000 men, capable of continuing the march for Lisbon. Having prevented by his celerity a resistance which, in the mountains of Beyra, might have become invincible, he had gained a first prize of his efforts. But he wanted to reach Lisbon, so as to seize on their passage all who should attempt to escape from that capital. This second success it was scarcely possible to obtain.

At this moment incredible confusion prevailed at Lisbon. The prince-regent, governing for his mother, who was afflicted with insanity, had wavered among a thousand contrary resolutions. In concord with the cabinet of London, he had endeavoured to prevail upon Napoleon to accept a middle term, which consisted in closing his ports against the English, without confiscating their property. Napoleon having refused this, the prince-regent had been again thrown into great perplexity. His ministers, divided respecting the course to be pursued, advised some of them that they should live as they had always lived, that is, continue attached to England, and with her aid to resist Napoleon; others, that they should forsake past errors, enter into the views of France, expel the English, and thus spare themselves a foreign invasion. Others again proposed a third course, to which we have already adverted, that of retiring to Brazil, leaving the unfortunate land of the Braganzas to the English and the French, who would soon be fighting for its wrecks. Amidst these painful hesitations, the prince-regent, as soon as he was apprised of the march of the French army upon Valladolid, had acceded to all the demands of Napoleon, declared war against Great Britain, decreed the seizure of all its property, giving time, however, to the English merchants to carry away or sell the most valuable of their effects. He had, lastly, despatched messengers to meet General Junot, and to stop the French army; but unluckily they sought him on routes which he had not taken. Lord Strangford, the English ambassador, had received his passports, and retired on board the English fleet, which had immediately commenced the blockade of the Tagus.

The unexpected appearance of the French army on the route from Alcantara to Abrantes, where none of the emissaries sent off could slacken its march, struck inexpressible terror into the

soul of the regent, a terror shared by all his relations and councillors. The idea of flight then became uppermost in all the others. Lord Strangford, knowing what was passing, lost no time in making his appearance again at Lisbon, bringing news from Paris forwarded from London, giving information of the resolution taken by Napoleon to dethrone the house of Braganza.* This intelligence and his presence decided definitively the departure of the royal family for Brazil. In the supposition that the government might be forced to close the Tagus against the English, all that was left of the Portuguese fleet, that is to say, one ship of 80 guns, seven of 74, three frigates, and three brigs, had been armed somehow or other. The arrival of Junot at Abrantes, which is only three days' march from Lisbon, being known in the capital on the 27th of November, the royal family and part of the aristocracy were conveyed on board, together with all the valuable effects that they could carry off. In terrible weather, amidst pelting rain, the princes, the princesses, the queen-mother, with wildly rolling eyes in consequence of her mental malady, almost all the persons composing the court, many of the great families, men, women, children, servants, to the number of seven or eight thousand, were seen confusedly

* Several historians, as well Portuguese as Spanish and French, have asserted that Lord Strangford decided the prince-regent, by producing a *Moniteur* of the 11th of November, which had come by way of London, containing an imperial decree, similar to that which had pronounced the forfeiture of the house of Naples, and declaring that *the house of Braganza had ceased to reign*. This assertion, if not totally inaccurate, is, nevertheless, erroneous. Neither the *Moniteur* of the 11th of November, nor of any anterior or posterior date, contains any decree declaring that the house of Braganza *had ceased to reign*. This form, used in 1806 against the house of Naples, after an unpardonable treachery, could not be employed against reigning families, which had not furnished Napoleon with any pretext for treating them in that manner. Neither does the depôt of the minutes at the Secretary of State's office, any more than the *Moniteur*, contain the alleged decree. But the *Moniteur* of the 12th of November contains, under the head Paris, and date of the 12th, an article relative to the various expeditions of the English against Copenhagen, Alexandria, Constantinople, and Buenos Ayres. In this article, evidently dictated by Napoleon, and tending to show the consequences to which all the governments that sacrificed themselves to the English policy were liable, we find the following passage :—

"After these four expeditions, which so clearly demonstrate the moral and military decline of England, we shall advert to the situation in which they now leave Portugal. The Prince-Regent of Portugal loses his throne; he loses it, influenced by the intrigues of the English; he loses it for refusing to seize the English merchandise at Lisbon. And what does England, that so mighty ally? She looks on with indifference at what is passing in Portugal. What will she do when Portugal is taken? Will she go and seize Brazil? No; if the English make such an attempt, the Catholics will expel them. The downfall of the house of Braganza will be a new proof that the ruin of all who attach themselves to England is inevitable."

This is probably what is meant by the decree declaring that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign; and this the *Moniteur*, which, published at Paris on the 13th, reaching London on the 15th or 16th, might through the Admiralty be received by the English fleet on the 23rd or 24th, and communicated to the Prince-Regent of Portugal.

embarking in the squadron and in about a score of large vessels employed in the Brazil trade. The furniture of the royal palaces and of the wealthy houses of Lisbon, the funds in the public chests, the money which the regent had for some time past taken care to amass, that which the fugitive families were able to procure, all lay on the quays of the Tagus, half-buried in mud, before the eyes of an astounded population, alternately melted by so grievous a spectacle, and irritated at so cowardly a flight, which left it without government and without means of defence. So great was the precipitation, that on board some of these vessels laden with wealth, the most indispensable articles of provision were forgotten to be brought. Everything was embarked by the 27th; and thirty-six ships of war, or merchantmen, ranged around the admiral's ship, in the middle of the Tagus, as broad before Lisbon as an arm of the sea, waited for a favourable wind, while a population of three hundred thousand souls, divided between grief, anger, curiosity, and terror, sorrowfully gazed at them. At the mouth of the Tagus the English fleet was cruising to receive the emigrants, and to protect them if necessary with its guns.

Thus passed the whole of the 27th, the wind not permitting the expedition to leave the Tagus; anxiety prevailed in the Portuguese fleet; for if a French detachment had arrived in time at Lisbon and hastened to the tower of Belem, the Tagus would have been closed.

Meanwhile General Junot, leading in haste his unfortunate soldiers, arrived breathless under the walls of Lisbon. He had been detained during the 26th and 27th before the Zezera, the waters of which had risen from twelve to fifteen feet in a few hours, and which falls into the Tagus near Punhette. He passed it with some thousand men in boats, brought by well-paid seamen, and amidst the greatest dangers; for these boats were carried away by the current with great violence into the Tagus, and were then obliged to work up the stream to get to the point for landing. On the 28th Junot marched for Santarem, across the inundations which covered to a distance the banks of the Tagus, and in which the soldiers sometimes travelled for a league together with the water up to their knees. On the 29th he reached Saccavem, and there received intelligence from Lisbon. He learned that the royal family had embarked with the whole court, and that it was taking away with it the Portuguese fleet laden with wealth. There was now no hope left of arriving in time; but it was necessary to prevent a rising, which it would have been impossible to quell with a few thousand exhausted men and not a single piece of cannon. General Junot resolutely pursued his course, and left Saccavem on the morning of the 30th with a column of not more than

1500 grenadiers and with an escort of some Portuguese horse, met with by the way, which he obliged to accompany him. He entered Lisbon at eight in the morning, was received by a commission of the government to which the prince-regent had consigned the kingdom, and by a French emigrant, M. de Novion, who was at the head of the police, and who performed that duty with equal intelligence and energy. General Junot found the capital quiet, mortified at the presence of foreigners, but submissive, and besides, so indignant at the flight of the court, as to feel little less embittered against it than against those who were come to take its throne. The Portuguese fleet having waited under sail the whole of the 27th and part of the 28th, had at length crossed in the evening the bar of the Tagus, thanks to a change of wind, and fugitive royalty had been greeted with salutes by the English fleet. Admiral Sidney Smith detached a strong squadron to accompany that royalty to America, where it was about to commence with Brazil the enfranchisement of all the Portuguese and Spanish colonies; for it was given to the French Revolution to change the face of the New World as well as that of the Old; and those thrones of the Peninsula, which it hurled into the ocean, were destined to produce by their fall a reflux that was felt on the other side of the Atlantic.

General Junot found, therefore, that part of the results which he was pursuing with such ardour had escaped him. But a few old ships, so crazy that those on board them were fearful they might not reach Brazil, some precious stones, some coined metals, and lastly, a family, the capture of which would have been a great embarrassment, were not equivalent to the advantage of becoming master of the most important positions of the coast of Europe without striking a blow, and of having prevented a resistance which could not have been conquered had ever so little energy been exerted. General Junot and his army had, therefore, won the prize of their perseverance. But it was requisite to establish himself at Lisbon, to rally the army, to give it rest, to provide it with necessaries, and to restore to it the imposing aspect which it had lost during that memorable march.

Towards the evening of the 30th, part of the first division arrived. Junot possessed himself of the forts and of the positions commanding Lisbon, which is situated on several hills on the shore of the expansive waters of the Tagus. The commission of the government, and particularly the commandant of the police force, M. de Novion, assisted him to keep order; in which they acted as good citizens, for disturbance would only have led to useless bloodshed, and perhaps to the sacking of Lisbon. Junot distributed the troops in the manner best suited

to their welfare and their safety amidst a hostile population of 300,000 souls. Having solidly established the first detachments that arrived, he turned his attention to rallying the others. Many of the soldiers had been drowned or murdered. These losses, however, though much to be regretted, were not so great as there was reason to fear from the small number of men who appeared in the ranks on the day that they entered Lisbon. The lists subsequently made proved that the dead and missing did not exceed 1700. There were left, therefore, 21,000 or 22,000 soldiers, well tried already by that campaign, and followed by 3000 or 4000 who, brought by a frequented route of stations (*étapes*), would arrive safe and sound at the goal which their predecessors had not reached without great difficulty and fatigue. Most of the men left behind had collected into parties, marching more slowly than the heads of columns, but defending themselves against the peasantry, and living upon what they could find in the woods. The flocks of goats and sheep which they fell in with by the way furnished their principal subsistence. When once at Abrantes, they embarked in boats, which carried them down the Tagus to Lisbon. The artillery, which arrived much later, was likewise put on board boats, and by this expeditious mode of conveyance carried to the general rallying point. The cavalry arrived without horses. But Portugal would soon supply the army with all that it wanted. There was at Lisbon a magnificent arsenal, appropriated alike to the land and the sea service, peopled with 3000 very skilful workmen, desiring nothing better than to continue to earn their livelihood, even by working for the French. Junot employed them in repairing or remaking all the matériel of the army, and in making gun-carriages for the numerous artillery existing in Lisbon, which was to be mounted in battery against the English. Near the capital was posted the Portuguese army, 25,000 strong, waiting for its fate to be pronounced. The Portuguese soldiers, in general, liked better to live in their villages than under their colours. Junot gave them furloughs, so that no more than 6000 were left in the ranks. He took all the horses of the cavalry, and remounted the French cavalry with them. He did the same by the artillery, and in a few days his army, rallied, armed, new-clothed, rested from its fatigues, exhibited the finest aspect. There were no funds in the chests for defraying these expenses. But till the payment of the taxes, commerce, encouraged by the language and the acts of General Junot, advanced him five millions in order to supply the most urgent wants, and thus he was enabled to pay for all that the army consumed. General Junot established his first division in Lisbon; the second, half in Lisbon, and half opposite to Abrantes; the third, on the back of the mountains at the foot

of which Lisbon is seated, from Peniche to Coimbra. He sent his cavalry, under General Kellermann, into the plain of the Alentejo, to enforce all over it the recognition of the French authority. He placed at Setuval General Carafa's Spaniards, who had accompanied him. He established a well-guarded and well-supplied route of stations (*étapes*) through Leiria, Coimbra, Almeida, Salamanca, and Bayonne. In the first moment, all appeared quiet and almost cheering. There was but one very embarrassing difficulty from the commencement, that was to provision in spite of the English a capital with 300,000 inhabitants, accustomed to receive by sea corn and cattle from the coast of Africa. General Junot treated with several merchants, and gave commissions on all sides for bringing supplies from the interior. He was ably seconded by Thiébault, chief of the staff, and by M. Hermann, whom Napoleon had sent to him to superintend the Portuguese finances. The latter was a man of the highest integrity, well acquainted with the country, having long performed the diplomatic functions both at Lisbon and at Madrid. Thanks to the combined exertions of these different agents, there was no want of anything for some time at least, and a beginning was even made to equip the remnant of the Portuguese fleet. At the same moment, the Spanish general Taranco occupied the province of Oporto with 7000 or 8000 men, and General Solano that of the Algarves with 3000 or 4000.

While a French army was penetrating into Portugal, Napoleon, who had prepared two others to enter the Peninsula, had ordered General Dupont, commanding the second corps of the Gironde, to take one of his divisions to Vittoria, upon pretext of assisting General Junot against the English. Shortly before the march of this division, a reinforcement of 3000 or 4000 men, destined to be incorporated into the three divisions of the army of Portugal, had already taken the road for Salamanca. Thus the French became accustomed to consider the Spanish boundary as an abolished demarcation, and Spain itself as an open road, which they made use of without even informing the sovereign of the country. General Dupont's first division, in fact, had reached Vittoria before M. de Beauharnais had given notice of that movement to the cabinet of Madrid. It was the Prince of the Peace who first spoke of it to M. de Beauharnais with a visible anxiety. At the same time, he had made many excuses for the want of preparations along the route followed by General Junot, and had attributed that neglect to important engagements resulting from the process at the Escorial.

Since that process, and notwithstanding the pardon granted to the Prince of the Asturias, the agitation, both in the court of Spain and in the country in general, had not ceased to increase.

The Prince of the Asturias, whose abject submission and whose cowardly betrayal of his friends ought to have disgraced him, was, on the contrary, adored by a nation which, finding in that degenerate family no other prince to love, was fain to excuse everything in him, and imputed whatever was equivocal in his conduct to his enemies, to their threats, and to their tyranny. The application for a French princess addressed by Ferdinand to Napoleon, an application now well known, had turned the eyes of the nation, as well as those of the prince, towards the high protector who ruled at this moment the destinies of the world. The French troops that had already entered the Spanish territory, those which were accumulating between Bordeaux and Bayonne, far exceeding the force necessary for the occupation of Portugal, accredited the opinion that this powerful protector designed to interfere in the affairs of Spain; and the whole nation rejoiced in the belief that it would be in the way which accorded with their wishes, that is to say, to overthrow the favourite, confine the queen in a convent, Charles IV. in a hunting-lodge, and give the crown to Ferdinand VII., united to a French princess. The attitude of M. de Beauharnais tended only to favour these illusions. This ambassador, filled with aversion for the favourite, led by his secret intercourse with the Prince of the Asturias to take an interest in his behalf, flattering himself that this prince would marry a French princess (*Mademoiselle de Tascher*), who was his relation, abounded in all the sentiments of the Spaniards themselves; and these concluding that the representative of France had orders to be what he appeared, conceived such an increasing enthusiasm for Napoleon, that our troops, instead of being a subject of alarm to the most mistrustful people in the world, had on the contrary become a subject of hope for it.

To no purpose did some more sagacious minds say to themselves that to overthrow a favourite abhorred by the Spanish nation so many soldiers were not required; that the nod of the omnipotent Emperor of the French would be sufficient to reduce him to nothing; that those troops which were collecting were, perhaps, the instruments long ago prepared of a more important resolution tending to exclude the Bourbons from all the thrones of Europe: to no purpose some clear-sighted minds made these remarks; they found no acceptance, because they were contrary to the passion that possessed all hearts.

Fear, infusing juster apprehensions into the queen and her favourite, opened their eyes to their own danger. The queen and the favourite were both sensible, and the queen more deeply than her paramour, what contempt they must excite in the great man who ruled Europe. They felt how far their weak incapacity was beneath his great designs; and the veil with which he

covered his intentions added to their presentiments the terror which arises from obscurity. Though Napoleon had signed the treaty of Fontainebleau, though by this treaty he had recognised Emmanuel Godoy sovereign prince of the Algarves, they were neither of them quite easy. In the first place, Junot had seized into his own hands the entire administration of Portugal, without excepting the provinces occupied by the Spanish troops. In the next, Napoleon had required that the treaty of Fontainebleau should continue to be kept secret. Wherefore this secrecy, when Portugal was in the power of the allied troops, when the house of Braganza was gone, and had in some measure left the throne vacant by its departure? To these questions were added the letters of Yzquierdo, the agent, who could not disguise from his patron the apprehensions with which he began to be filled. These apprehensions, it is true, were not grounded on any precise fact; for Napoleon had not communicated his determination respecting Spain to a single creature—indeed, he could not communicate it, for he was yet uncertain what he should do. But of that fatal propensity for everywhere superseding the Bourbon family by his own—a propensity which swayed his soul to such a degree as to make him unmindful of all prudence—some clear-sighted spirits had a presentiment, and without his saying a word, his intention was guessed by more than one observer. The silence which he kept, though engaged in very apparent preparations, had struck in particular the agent Yzquierdo, the cleverest of men at discovering what was intended to be concealed from him; and he was incessantly writing to the Prince of the Peace that though Napoleon had set out for Italy, yet around his ministers and his confidants there was not a word to be picked up; and yet that in all he saw there was a mystery which filled him with uneasiness.

Hence the Prince of the Peace and the queen were extremely agitated. The queen, often indisposed, disguising her trouble under an affected tranquillity, her age under the most elegant personal decorations, nevertheless gave way in spite of herself to frequent bursts of anger. She filled the palace with her storming, demanded the sacrifice of all those whom she considered as her enemies, foolishly insisted on the execution of the Canon Escoiquiz and the Duke de l'Infantado, and was enraged with Caballero, the obsequious minister of justice, who, trembling all over, merely opposed to her desires the difficulties arising from the ancient laws of the kingdom, inviolate and inviolable. She went so far as to declare that minister a traitor, sold to Ferdinand. The latter, on his part, dissatisfied with this same minister, called him a vile executor of the commands of his mother, and promised himself to take signal vengeance on him at a future time. The Prince of the Peace, believing it to be for his interest

even to pacify the queen, loaded her with attentions, and passed from an insulting indifference towards her to incessant demonstrations of kindness. Though he went in the evening to the demoiselles Tudo to rest his weary soul, weary with intrigue and alarm, he paid in the morning to that exasperated queen all the attendance of a faithful courtier; and these two paramours, whom from their numerous infidelities one would have supposed to be disgusted with each other, were brought back by mutual terrors and mutual antipathies into an intimacy wearing all the semblance of love. In public the queen manifested redoubled affection for the Prince of the Peace, and took delight in defying by such demonstrations the modesty of those who witnessed them and the aversion of her enemies. The court was deserted: all respectable persons had forsaken it. When the royal family appeared outside the gardens of the Escorial, the people remained silent, excepting for the Prince of the Asturias, whom they followed with their cheers to such a degree that the queen had obtained a police ordinance by which all acclamations were prohibited. To such a length did she carry the extravagance of her requisitions as to order a *Te Deum* to return thanks to Heaven for the miraculous preservation which it had vouchsafed to the king in thwarting the plots of the Prince of the Asturias. Of the members of the grandezza, all convoked, four only had attended, two Spaniards, two foreigners, confounded all four at their own baseness. At leaving the church the queen had shown a tenderness, a familiarity with Emmanuel Godoy, disgusting to the beholders; while poor Charles IV. perceived none of these infamous proceedings, though, having a confused feeling of the peril of his situation, he had unintentionally crowned the scandal by supporting himself on the arm of the favourite, as on the mighty arm from which he hoped for salvation. Deplorable, disgraceful spectacle, not only for the throne, but for humanity itself, the degradation of which, manifested in so exalted a situation, was the more striking.

Every evening the Prince of the Peace went, as we have said, to the demoiselles Tudo to pour forth the tribulations of his soul, which, notwithstanding its levity, was deeply afflicted. In that house, to which the curious resorted in quest of news, great joy had been conceived and expressed at the treaty of Fontainebleau; a joy soon embittered by the order received from Paris to keep that treaty secret, by the continual entry of French troops, and by the letters of Yzquierdo, the agent. As the public was delighted to learn whatever was unfavourable to the Prince of the Peace, his confidants endeavoured to oppose to the torrent of bad news a contrary torrent, referring with exaggeration to all the tokens of favour obtained from the Tuileries. Thus in spite of the order to keep secret the treaty of Fontainebleau, all its

particulars had been repeated, and with the greatest detail, at the residence of the demoiselles Tudo. It had been there related that the north of Portugal had been given to the Queen of Etruria, the south to the Prince of the Peace, constituted sovereign prince of the Algarves, and the middle reserved to be subsequently disposed of. In this manner the presence of the French armies was accounted for; and as for their number, far superior to that which the mere occupation of Portugal would have required, that was attributed to the great projects of Napoleon in regard to Gibraltar. To prevent the mischievous effects which the entry of the other corps speedily expected could not fail to produce, it was said that the French army would amount to at least 80,000 men, that the Prince of the Peace would command it in person, and that consequently people need not be alarmed on that subject. As for the proceedings against the accomplices of the Prince of Asturias, which excited universal indignation, and which, it was said, Napoleon would not suffer to go on, the friends of the Prince of the Peace alleged that the court had intelligence from Paris that Napoleon had declared the affair of the Escorial to be an affair foreign to France, and that he highly approved of the punishment of the intriguers who had designed to shake the throne.

Neither the Prince of the Peace, nor the women of such different rank who interested themselves in his fate, gave much credit to this intelligence. They were tormented by fear, which suggested to them precautions of the nature of those taken in the east against Fortune or against tyranny. Thus gold and precious stones were amassed at the palace of the Prince of the Peace. Superb dresses were stripped of their diamonds, which were carried to his residence, together with considerable sums in specie. Everybody might see at night laden mules setting out from his habitation; some taking the road for Cadiz, others that for Ferrol. The people, according to custom, exaggerated these circumstances, and exaggerated them most immoderately. They talked of five hundred millions in specie collected in his palace, and then sent off in several convoys for unknown destinations. These fabulous stories, concurrent with the flight of the house of Braganza, had led in all quarters to the conclusion that the Prince of the Peace purposed to carry away the royal family to Mexico, to prolong beyond sea a power which was expiring in Europe. Propagated with incredible rapidity, this supposition had excited the indignation of all the Spaniards. The idea of seeing the royal family of Spain betaking itself to a cowardly flight like the royal family of Portugal, carrying away an adored prince a prisoner, leaving a vacant kingdom to Napoleon, revolted them; and this fear had increased, if possible, the popular fury excited by the favourite. Every week the rumour

that the riches of the crown had been packed up to be secretly conveyed to Cadiz, and that the Prince of the Peace was about to conduct the royal family to Seville, was spread anew as a sinister report, exasperated all minds, let loose all tongues, then subsided for a moment when found not to be confirmed by facts, like the hollow murmurs that precede the tempest.

And false as are in general the rumours which circulate among an agitated people, these were not without foundation. Long before the flight of the house of Braganza the project of that flight had been communicated to the court of Madrid, submitted to its judgment, and so far discussed with it as to be mentioned to the French ambassador. Struck with this example, the Prince of the Peace, when he despaired of his situation, was fond of musing upon an asylum in America, to which he could go to seek repose, safety, and the continuance of his power. He had opened himself on this subject to the queen, who liked this scheme much; and in order to dispose the king to agree to it, he had begun to alarm him respecting the intentions of Napoleon. After telling him on this subject more than he knew, but not more than was really meditated, he had expatiated at great length on the plan of flight to America as the safest and even the most profitable course for Spain. To withstand the armies of Napoleon was, according to the Prince of the Peace, impossible. They might enter into a struggle, but it must end in their succumbing to him whom all Europe had in vain endeavoured to oppose; and in this contest they should lose not Spain alone, but the magnificent empire of the Indies, a hundred times more desirable than the European territory of the house of Bourbon. The provinces beyond sea, strongly agitated already by the insurrection of the English colonies, desiring nothing better than to declare themselves independent, warmly urged to that step by the British agents, would take advantage of the war that must absorb all the forces of the mother-country to shake off her yoke; and thus they should see not only the Spains, but Mexico, Peru, Colombia, La Plata, the Philippines wrested from them. On the contrary, by removing to the colonies they should preserve them by the presence of the reigning family, whom they would be happy to have at their head to form an independent empire; and if Napoleon, becoming more odious to Europe in proportion as he became more powerful, should ultimately fall, they might return to the old continent, more assured of the fidelity of the provinces of America, which they should have bound to themselves by stronger ties, and having meanwhile escaped by a mere voyage the general convulsion of all the States. If, on the contrary, the tyrant of the Old World should die on his usurped throne, and leave his consolidated dynasty upon it, they should find in the New World a regenerated empire, affording where-

withal to make them forget everything that they had left behind in Europe.

These ideas, the only forcible and sensible ideas that the favourite had ever conceived, for if they renounced all intention of disputing the possession of Spain by an heroic resistance, the best thing to be done was to preserve to the nation the two Indies, and to the reigning family a throne, how distant soever it might be—these ideas were of a nature to confound Charles IV. To defend himself by arms he most assuredly had no thoughts of. To go from the Escorial to Cadiz, to embark, to cross the sea, to deprive himself for ever of the diversions of the chase in the Pardo, appalled him almost as much as a battle. He preferred banishing far from him these sinister forebodings, and to throw himself, he said, into the arms of his *magnanimous friend, Napoleon*. It must be added, to the honour of this good and unfortunate prince, that notwithstanding his intellectual mediocrity, he appreciated whatever was great in Napoleon, that he admired his exploits; and that if he had been capable of any efforts, he would have assisted him to beat England, for the interest of both countries, which he comprehended whenever he chanced to think about it. Accordingly, he replied to those who talked to him of a distant retreat, that they must endeavour to divine the intentions of Napoleon and conform to them, for at bottom they could not be bad; that the Prince of the Asturias had, after all, not been so very ill-advised in applying for a princess of the Bonaparte family for a wife; that it was a means of strengthening the alliance of the two countries, and putting an end to the animosity of the two races; that it was not possible for Napoleon, after giving Ferdinand one of his adopted daughters, to harbour an intention of dethroning him. He was too great, too magnanimous a hero to commit such a breach of faith. It was, perhaps, the first time in his life that this unfortunate king, whose mind, roused under the stimulus of circumstances, conceived an idea of his own, and appeared to adhere to it. He had already thought of this marriage of the heir to the crown with a niece of Napoleon, and he had not to do violence to himself to adopt such a project. He desired, therefore, that the application made by Ferdinand in an irregular manner should be repeated regularly in the name of the crown of Spain, with suitable solemnity and the powers necessary for treating. If Napoleon assented, he was bound towards the house of Bourbon; if he refused, they should know what to infer respecting his intentions, and it would then be time to think of retiring.

Nothing could be more disagreeable to the queen and the favourite than such a marriage; for Ferdinand, husband of a French princess, protected by Napoleon, protector in his turn

of the house of Spain, would become all-powerful. The fall of the favourite and the destruction of the queen's influence must ensue. But not to renew Ferdinand's proposal in the name of the crown was declaring that he had acted wrong, not only in regard to the form, but in regard to the main point; it was showing Napoleon that they desired not his alliance; it was depriving themselves of a sure means of sounding his intentions; and above all, depriving themselves of arguments indispensable with Charles IV. for inducing him to approve of the project of flight to America. Such were the reasons which reconciled the queen and the favourite to the idea of applying for a princess, that is to say, of renewing Ferdinand's clandestine proposal in the name of the crown. This was perhaps the only occasion when there was any necessity for debating a resolution with Charles IV., the only occasion assuredly on which a resolution of his became that of the government.

In consequence, a most affectionate letter was prepared for Charles IV. to write, soliciting Napoleon to unite the heir to the crown of Spain with a princess of the house of Bonaparte. But this was not the only demand. In a second letter, annexed to the first, the king sued to Napoleon for the immediate execution of the treaty of Fontainebleau, the publication of that treaty, the entry into possession of the sharers in the Portuguese provinces of the portion allotted to each. This suit was suggested by the Prince of the Peace, who had those points much at heart, for he was impatient to be proclaimed a sovereign prince: they were, moreover, for the well-judged interest of the house of Spain, since by this treaty Charles IV. had received the guarantee of his dominions and the title of King of the Spains and Emperor of the Americas. The publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau would have been at the moment a powerful preservative against the projects, real or supposed, of invasion.

While awaiting this publication, there were persons who, as we have said, had not hesitated to commit all kinds of faults and to divulge the whole treaty. People talked publicly in the streets of Madrid, exaggerating even the assertions of Tado House, that the Prince of the Peace would soon be declared King of Portugal, and Charles IV. Emperor of the Indies; that, in short, the favour of Napoleon to Emmanuel Godoy was about to be shown in a signal manner. In the very brief moments in which people gave credit to these rumours, they half-opened their eyes; they said that, no doubt, Napoleon was preparing to dethrone the last of the Bourbons, as he had dethroned all the others, that he had concerted with Godoy to get them delivered up to him, and that he was giving him Portugal that Godoy in return might give him Spain. In this they calum-

niated that personage, whom it was so difficult to calumniate ; for if it was true that he had enslaved, degraded, ruined his masters, it was not true that he had betrayed them in favour of Napoleon. Fortunately for the popularity of Napoleon in Spain, these reports gained not long credit. M. de Beauharnais, who was left by his court in complete ignorance, affirmed that he had no knowledge of that treaty, and with such sincerity that nobody doubted his word. The assertions of the favourite's friends were, therefore, taken for one of their accustomed boastings, and people again began to believe what pleased them, that is to say, that Ferdinand was about to become first the husband of an adopted daughter of Napoleon, then king, and that the odious faction which oppressed and disgraced the Escorial would thus be swept away. And what is a singular fact in this gloomy and melancholy history of the fall of the Spanish Bourbons, while the Prince of the Peace was soliciting at Paris the authorisation to publish the treaty of Fontainebleau, M. de Beauharnais, on his part, was applying for the authorisation to contradict it.

The letters of Charles IV. and the despatches of M. de Beauharnais had to make a long journey to reach Napoleon, then in Italy, and travelling from town to town with his usual rapidity. In the state of the communications at that period, it took not less than seven days to go from Madrid to Paris, not less than five days to go from Paris to Milan ; and if Napoleon was at that moment on a journey either to Venice or to Palma-Nova, it was sometimes fourteen or fifteen days after the departure of despatches from Spain that they were received by him. The transmission of answers required the same time ; and these delays suited Napoleon, who would fain have slackened the pace of Time, so loth was he to take any resolutions relative to Spain, divided as he was between the desire of dethroning the Bourbons everywhere, and apprehension on account of the violent and odious means which he should be obliged to employ for its accomplishment.

Having left Paris on the 16th of November, Napoleon had arrived at Milan on the 21st, having previously visited several interesting points. He had even taken by surprise his son Eugène Beauharnais, who had not had time to hasten off to meet him. Appearing on the morning of his arrival at the cathedral of Milan to hear *Te Deum*, in the afternoon at the palace of Monza to visit the vice-queen, his daughter, in the evening at the theatre of La Scala to show himself to the Italians, he had conversed in the intervals with the functionaries charged with the most important offices. He spent the 23rd, the 24th, and the 25th in the despatch of a great deal of business and in giving a multitude of orders. Struck while traversing the

new road over Mont Cenis, which was his work, with the absolute deficiency of accommodation for travellers, for want of population on those snow-covered heights, he gave orders for the creation of a commune, divided into three hamlets, one at the foot of the ascent, one at the summit, and one on the descent. The hamlet situated on the summit was to be the chief place of the commune. He prescribed the erection of a church, an inn, an hospital, and a barrack. He granted exemption from taxes for all the peasants who should settle in the new commune, and commenced the population by the establishment of a certain number of soldiers in cantonments, charged to keep the road in repair on ordinary occasions, and in case of accident to assemble at the points where their assistance might be necessary. Having fixed the budget of the kingdom of Italy, paid serious attention to the Italian army, convoked the three colleges of the Possidenti, Dotti, and Commercianti for the moment of his return to Milan, that is to say, for the 10th of December, he set off for Venice, taking the road to Brescia, Verona, and Padua, greeted on his passage by the acclamations of an enthusiastic people. Ever usefully employed, even amidst festivities, he had rectified in passing the drawing of the fortifications of Peschiera, reserving his decision upon those of Mantua till his return. On the road he had fallen in with a party of relations—the King and Queen of Bavaria, whose daughter Eugène had married; his sister Elisa, Princess of Lucca, and soon to be *gouvernante* of Tuscany; and lastly, his brother Joseph, whom he had not seen since he nominated him King of Naples, and whom he fondly loved notwithstanding numerous reproaches on account of his lax mode of governing. At Fusina, a small port on the lagoons, where travellers bound for Venice embark, the authorities and the population awaited him in gondolas, decorated with rich hangings, to conduct him to the seat of the ancient queen of the seas. The people of Venice, who consoled themselves for no longer forming an independent republic with the satisfaction of having escaped from tyrannical laws, with the hope of soon belonging to an extensive kingdom, comprising all Italy; lastly, with the promise of vast works destined to render its waters navigable, had displayed for the reception of Napoleon all the luxury of which they were wont to make a parade when their doge wedded the sea. Innumerable gondolas, bedecked with a thousand colours, ringing with the sound of instruments, escorted the barges, bringing along with the master of the world the Viceroy and the Vice-Queen of Italy, the King and Queen of Bavaria, the Princess of Lucca, the King of Naples, the Grand Duke of Berg, the Prince of Neufchatel, and most of the generals of the old army of Italy. After allowing the necessary time for receptions,

Napoleon passed the following days in visiting the public establishments, the dockyards, the arsenal, the canals, accompanied everywhere by Messrs. Decrès, Proni, and Sganzin. Having finished the examination of these places, he issued a decree, containing twelve heads, which embraced all the wants of regenerated Venice. He began, in virtue of this decree, with re-establishing a number of taxes, abolished since the fall of the republic, but justified by long experience, little burdensome in themselves, and indispensable for defraying the expenses of a wholly artificial existence; for Venice, like Holland, is a work of art rather than of Nature. The means being ensured, he thought of their application. In the first place, he organised an administration for keeping the canals in good condition and for deepening the lagoons; he next decreed a grand canal, for conveying vessels from the arsenal to the passage of Malamocco, a basin for 74-gun ships, hydraulic works, both on the Brenta, which brings its waters into the lagoons, and at the different outlets by which they discharge themselves into the Adriatic. He instituted, moreover, a free port, into which commerce might bring merchandise before the payment of the duties of customs. He provided for the public health, by transferring burials from churches to an island destined for that purpose. He attended to the pleasures of the people in ordering the Place of St. Mark, the everlasting object of the pride and the historical recollections of the Venetians, to be repaired and lighted. Lastly, he ensured a subsistence to seamen by the re-establishment of all the old charitable institutions. After dispensing these benefits, and receiving in return a thousand acclamations, Napoleon set off to visit the Friule, to inspect the fortifications of Palma-Nova and Osopo, which he had continued to direct from a distance, and which he considered, with Mantua and Alessandria, as pledges of the possession of Italy. Osopo and Palma-Nova on the Isonzo, Peschiera and Mantua on the Mincio, Alessandria on the Tanaro, were, in his estimation, the stages of an almost invincible resistance against the Germans if the Italians exerted any energy in defending themselves. He had come by Porto Legnago to Mantua, where he was to meet his brother Lucien to try to bring about a reconciliation, for which he was anxiously desirous, but which he would grant only on certain conditions. M. de Meneval went in the night to an hotel to fetch Lucien, and conducted him to the palace occupied by Napoleon. Lucien, instead of throwing himself into the arms of his brother, accosted him with a very excusable loftiness (as he was the only one of the five brothers who had no power), but carried perhaps beyond what a well-understood dignity would have required. The interview was, therefore, unpleasant and stormy, but not without useful result. Among the number of the combinations possible

in Spain, Napoleon still included the union of a French princess with Ferdinand. In fact, he had that moment received the letter of Charles IV. renewing the proposal for a marriage, and though he inclined to a more radical resolution, still he did not exclude from his plans that kind of middle term. He therefore desired Lucien to give him a daughter, the offspring of a first marriage, to be brought up about the empress-mother, to initiate her thoroughly into his views, and then send her to Spain to regenerate the race of the Bourbons. If he should not decide to entrust her with this part, there would not fail to be other thrones more or less exalted on which he could place her by means of an alliance. As for Lucien himself, he was disposed to confer on him the quality of French prince, even to make him King of Portugal, which would have placed him near his daughter, on condition that he would annul his second marriage, compensating his wife so repudiated by a title and a handsome annuity. These arrangements were possible, but they were required with authority, refused with irritation, and the brothers parted, agitated, angered, but not at variance, since part of what Napoleon desired was complied with, by Lucien Bonaparte a few days afterwards sending his daughter to Paris. On the very next day Napoleon set off on his return to Milan, where he arrived on the 15th of December.

Despatches from Spain and from all parts of the empire were waiting there for him, and he had more than one resolution to take. The letters of his agents relative to the Peninsula, the letters of Charles IV. applying for a French princess and for the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau, had been delivered to him while on his journey. To resolve such important questions was impossible in the state of mind in which he found himself. He would not yet involve himself in any engagement, for he had not definitively decided on any point, though he inclined, as we have said, to the resolution for dethroning the Bourbons. In consequence, he ordered M. de Champagny to write to Madrid that he had received the letters of King Charles IV., that he appreciated their importance, but that exclusively absorbed by the affairs of Italy, where he had but a few days to stay, he could not devote to those of Spain that attention to which they were entitled; and that on his return to Paris he should give such answers as the king's letters deserved. He insisted anew that the treaty of Fontainebleau should remain secret for some time longer; and as for M. de Beauharnais, taking no heed of his advice and opinions, he addressed to him insignificant answers, but formal on one point, namely, the prohibition to show any preference for the parties into which the court of Spain was divided, or to afford any cause for inferring to which side the French cabinet leaned.

It was not true, however, that, wholly engrossed by the affairs of Italy, Napoleon could not think of those of Spain. He had, on the contrary, issued fresh military orders tending to increase his forces by degrees, both on this and on the other side of the Pyrenees; so that whatever course he should adopt, he might have but one resolution to express when he should have decided upon it. All that he learned of the state of Spain contributed to persuade him that the moment of a crisis was at hand; for it seemed no longer possible to place the favourite on a throne, to instil patience into Ferdinand, and to repress the indignation of the Spanish people. He determined, therefore, to be ready to avail himself of an occasion, and to this end to have considerable forces in the Peninsula, without diminishing either the grand army or the army of Italy, both which served to keep Europe in alliance with him or in subjection. Besides the army of General Junot, necessary for Portugal, he had prepared, as we have seen, two other corps, that of General Dupont and that of Marshal Moncey, and these he deemed insufficient. He considered that those two corps, proceeding along the road to Burgos and Valladolid upon pretext of Portugal, enabled by a movement to the left to march upon Madrid, would keep in awe the capital and the two Castilles. But Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, provinces so important of themselves, and likewise for their spirit, their position, and the fortresses which they contained, ought, he conceived, to be occupied, if not by forces to be marched thither immediately, at least by forces which should be quite ready to enter them. He resolved, therefore, to have two divisions prepared; one which, placed near St. Jean Pied de Port, might upon any pretext whatever fall upon Pampeluna; the other, which, assembled at Perpignan, might in like manner enter Barcelona, and take possession of that city, and also of the forts which command it. Master of Pampeluna and of the forts of Barcelona, Napoleon would have two solid bases for the armies that were to advance upon Madrid. At any rate, though the crisis at the Escorial seemed imminent to him, he determined neither to hasten it nor to assume too ostensibly the part of invader, by marching troops elsewhere than on the Burgos, Valladolid, and Salamanca road, which was the road to Portugal. The probable assemblage of English troops on the coasts of the Peninsula could not fail to furnish subsequently specious motives for introducing fresh troops into the interior of Spain. Meanwhile it was sufficient for him to keep them assembled on the frontier. General Junot's army, composed of the old camps in Bretagne, had left some dépôt battalions, of which might be formed a division of three or four thousand men, quite sufficient to occupy Pampeluna and to awe Navarre. These battalions, five in number, belonged to the

15th, 47th, 70th, and 86th of the line. One Swiss battalion, cantoned in the vicinity, afforded the means of raising them to six. Napoleon gave orders for their immediate assemblage at St. Jean Pied de Port under the command of General Mouton, and for adding to them a company of foot-artillery. As for the Perpignan division, he sought the elements for that in Italy itself. He there had Lombard and Neapolitan regiments fit to be employed in the climate of Spain, but needing to be instructed in war by the French. The return of the auxiliary troops to their country admitted of the immediate disposal of part of the Italian regiments stationed nearest to France. Napoleon, therefore, directed four Italian battalions, three resident at Turin, and one at Genoa, to march for Avignon. A fine Neapolitan regiment, which his brother Joseph had already sent him to gain experience in war, was near Grenoble. The same order was sent to it for Avignon. Four Lombard and Neapolitan squadrons, six or seven hundred strong, with several companies of artillery, were directed to the same point. The French regiment, which had left the fortress of Braunau, restored to the Austrians, was crossing the Alps to return to Italy. Its route was prescribed with a view to its being sent to the south of France. Lastly, the five regiments of chasseurs and the four regiments of cuirassiers, transferred in the preceding winter from Italy to Poland, had their dépôts in Piedmont, and these dépôts well supplied with men and horses, like all those of the army. Napoleon drafted from them two more fine brigades of cavalry, which formed a division of 1200 horse under General Bessières. By joining to these troops some French or Swiss battalions residing in Provence, it would be possible to form a corps of from ten to twelve thousand men for Catalonia.

These dispositions being prescribed to the troops which were not yet to cross the Pyrenees, Napoleon gave orders for a new movement to those which had already passed them. He enjoined General Dupont, whose first division had arrived as far as Vittoria, to set in motion the other two, so as to have all three united in the first days of January, with the appearance of being on march for Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, that is to say, for Lisbon, but with the precaution to observe the bridge over the Douro on the Madrid road, and to be ready to occupy it on the first occasion. He ordered Marshal Moncey, with the corps of the coasts of the ocean, to occupy the positions left vacant by General Dupont, and to march one of his divisions towards Vittoria. These movements could not much increase the jealousy of the court of Spain, because they would take place on the route for Lisbon. To render them still more natural, Napoleon instructed M. de Beauharnais to communicate to the Spanish ministry the most alarming intelligence of an assemblage of English forces at Gibraltar—an assemblage

real enough, by-the-by, and no fiction ; for he had just learned that the British government had caused Sicily to be almost entirely evacuated, and that it was preparing to send the troops which had returned from Copenhagen to Portugal. He warmly urged the Spanish cabinet to provide for the safety of Ceuta, Cadiz, the camp of St. Roch, the Balearic Islands ; and while giving it useful intelligence, he threw an air of greater probability over the pretexts alleged for the introduction of fresh French troops into Spain.

Napoleon had made haste to despatch the affairs of Italy that he might return to Paris, where he could attend so much more closely to the object that incessantly engaged his thoughts. There was, nevertheless, one question which he would have been more capable of resolving at Paris than at Milan, because he would there have had around him superior intelligence, and for which, nevertheless, he would not defer his decision for a single day. That question related to the recent orders in council issued by the British government respecting the navigation of neutrals. By these ordinances England was about to plunge deeper than ever into the system of violence ; and Napoleon, as it may easily be conceived, was determined not to be left behind. To a hard blow he made a point of replying immediately by one still harder. The reader is acquainted with the steps which had been previously taken in this fatal track. To the pretension of seizing enemy's property, even under a neutral flag, and of applying the right of blockade to vast extents of coast which it was physically impossible to blockade, Napoleon had at first replied by the prohibition of English commerce on all the coasts of the empire and of the countries under his influence ; then his irritation increasing in proportion to the violence of the Admiralty, he had by the famous Berlin decree declared the British islands in a state of blockade, forbidden the traffic in English goods in all countries under his sway, ordered their seizure and confiscation everywhere, and given notice that every ship which should have touched at any place in the three kingdoms, or at any of the English colonies, should be excluded from the ports belonging to France, or dependent on her will. Various supplementary decrees had imposed upon vessels laden with colonial commodities the obligation to provide themselves with certificates of origin delivered by French agents. In default of these certificates all goods were liable to confiscation. The alliance concluded with Russia and with Denmark, the adhesion promised by Austria, the ensured adhesion of the two governments of the Peninsula, were about to extend these formidable dispositions to the entire continent.

England had at length perceived that the system of interdiction, carried to extremity, was more prejudicial to her than to

France, for she had more need to sell than the continent to buy, that the colonial productions, the almost general monopoly of which she had secured, for her ships detained, under various pretexts, even the vessels of the United States themselves, remained unsold in the warehouses; that she should suffer in point of importation as much as in point of exportation, for she would not be able to obtain certain raw materials which were indispensable for her, such as the wools of Spain and the naval stores of the north; that in this state of trade France would have much less reason to complain, for she would furnish the continent with the stuffs which the English manufacturers would cease to supply; that as for colonial produce, there would reach her, either by privateers or by vessels escaping the cruisers, a certain quantity, for which she would be obliged to pay a high price, but which would suffice for her wants; and that, after all, the dearness of sugar and coffee would not be productive of such great inconveniences to France as the suppression of all exchanges would entail on England. The British cabinet had, therefore, relinquished its system of exclusion, and devised means for facilitating general commerce, but by obliging it to pass wholly through Great Britain, and making it, moreover, her tributary. In consequence, it had decided by three orders in council, dated the 11th of November 1807, that every vessel belonging to a nation not at declared war with Great Britain, though more or less dependent on France, might freely enter the ports of the United Kingdom or its colonies, then go whithersoever it pleased, provided that it had touched in England either to carry thither or to receive goods, and had there paid duties of customs equivalent on an average to 25 per cent. Every vessel, on the contrary, which should not have touched in the ports of Great Britain and have among her papers certificates of origin delivered by French agents, was to be seized and declared lawful prize. Accordingly merchantmen, in as far, at least, as violent laws can be carried into execution over the immense extent of the seas, were compelled to touch in England to pay the customs, or to go thither to supply themselves with English commodities and merchandise. All commerce, therefore, was to be carried on through the English ports; all merchandise was to come from them or to pay duty there. Thanks to these regulations, the English had a sure means of sending us their colonial productions, which did not carry with them, like cotton stuffs, for instance, the proof of their origin. They called, in fact, neutral vessels into the Thames, loaded them with sugar and coffee, then convoyed them to within sight of our coasts in order to spare their being searched, and thus introduced them into our ports or those of Holland, furnished with false papers, which enabled them to pass for neutrals coming direct from America.

Napoleon, on receiving at Milan, where he then was, the orders of the 11th of November, wrote first to Paris to the minister of the finances and the director of the customs requiring a report on these orders. But not having patience to wait for their answers, he issued on the 17th of December a decree, known by the appellation of the Milan decree, still more severe than the preceding. In the Berlin decree he had done no more than exclude from the ports of the empire every vessel which should have touched in England; this time he went much further, and declared every vessel which should have touched in England or in her colonies, and submitted to an obligation to pay a duty there, denationalised, therefore lawful prize. By further regulations he fixed heavy penalties for captains and seamen who should make false declarations. While Napoleon was issuing this decree, Messrs. Gaudin, Cretet, Defermon, and Collin de Sussy, in answer to his questions, proposed a measure tending to nearly the same end, but still more severe: it was to forbid all commercial intercourse with the French empire to such nations as should not themselves have ceased all commerce with England. The Milan decree, such as it was, served to cut off more strictly than ever the communications which England had purposed to reopen for her advantage. But this advantage was purchased at the expense of a redoubled violence, which was soon destined to weary France and her allies as much as England herself.

Excepting this short diversion, Napoleon bestowed all the time that he had left to the administration of the kingdom of Italy.

The three colleges of the Possidenti, Commercianti, and Dotti met, agreeably to the convocation which they had received, at Milan, towards the end of December, to listen to the communication of several essential acts. By the first of these acts, Napoleon officially adopted Prince Eugène Beauharnais as his son. By the second, he fixed the consequence of this adoption, by ensuring to Prince Eugène the succession to the crown of Italy and by restricting his right of inheritance to that crown alone, which precluded the possibility of his succeeding some day to that of France. After he had established his brothers and his sisters, it was natural that he should satisfy perhaps the warmest of his affections, that excited in him by the children of the Empress Josephine, and particularly Eugène de Beauharnais, who had served him with modesty, prudence, and zeal in Italy. This prince was highly esteemed by the Italians, who had never lived under so mild and so enlightened a government, and who for two years past had been resting in the quiet of peace from the horrors of war.

The crown of Italy continuing for the present united to that

of France, and Eugène de Beauharnais being still only heir-presumptive to it, with the title of viceroy, Napoleon resolved that he should be called Prince of Venice, and that this should thenceforward be the title borne by every heir-presumptive to the crown of Italy. He created the title of Princess of Bologna for the infant daughter recently produced by his marriage with the Princess Augusta of Bavaria. Lastly, desirous of bestowing a new mark of favour on the Duke de Melzi, formerly vice-president of the Italian republic, he created him Duke of Lodi, a title borrowed from one of the splendid achievements of our early campaigns. He then turned his attention towards modifying in some points the constitution of Italy—a constitution of little importance in itself, the will of Napoleon doing everything in Italy, a circumstance not to be regretted for the moment, for with the exception of the exigencies arising from the general war, that will neither purposed nor accomplished anything but what was beneficial there. The college of the Possidenti, the wealthiest of the three, voted the erection at its expense of a monument to perpetuate the memory of the benefits with which Napoleon had loaded Italy.

These operations finished, Napoleon set out for Piedmont, inspected the great fortress of Alessandria, complimented on the spot itself General Chasseloup, entrusted with the construction of that fortress, then proceeded to Turin, where he granted further advantages to those provinces which had become French. With a view to connect Liguria with Piedmont, he decreed a canal which, discharging itself into the sea at Savona, and crossing the Apennines in their lowest part to reach the Bormida at Carcara, was intended to join the Po and the Mediterranean. He gave orders for the improvement of the navigation from Alessandria to the Po, so that it should be rendered passable for craft in all seasons. He caused some points on the highroad from Alessandria to Savona to be rectified, and determined that it should be put into communication with the Turin road by a branch from Carcara to Ceva. He decided upon the opening of the highroad of Mont Genève, through Briançon, Fenestrelle, and Pignerol, which, joined to that of Mont Cenis, was to complete the communications of France with Piedmont by the Cottian Alps. He decreed also the construction of several bridges: one of stone over the Po at Turin; another of stone over the Doira; one of wood over the Sesia at Verceil; one of wood over the Bormida, between Alessandria and Tortona; lastly, three of less importance, likewise of wood, over three streams that run between Turin and Verceil. He took care at the same time to ensure financial means sufficient for these extensive works; for he was not one of those who give orders for new creations, without considering how the

consequent expenses are to be defrayed. A balance owing by the purchasers of national domains, the produce of the mortgaged domains, an advance raised upon the salt monopoly, were to provide for these useful expenses.

Napoleon left Turin, accompanied by the acclamations of the grateful population, and arrived at Paris on the 1st of January 1808, late in the day, but in time to receive the homage of the court, the public authorities, and the Parisians. His return to the capital of the empire was to be the signal for the most important determinations of his reign. It behoved him, in fact, to adopt some resolution in regard to Spain, for he could no longer defer answering Charles IV. He was obliged also to decide respecting the court of Rome, the relations with which became every day more difficult. Napoleon was thus about to run against the two oldest, the two most formidable vestiges of the ancient system, the Bourbons of Spain and the Papacy.

Swayed incessantly, ever since the continent was pacified, by the systematic idea of placing Bonapartes on all thrones instead of Bourbons, drawn towards this object by family feeling and also by his reforming genius, which was averse to leaving at his side degenerate royalties, either useless or prejudicial to the common cause—Napoleon, as we have seen, was agitated by the most diverse ideas in regard to Spain. Three courses presented themselves to his mind: the first, to attach Spain to himself by the marriage of a French princess with the Prince of the Asturias, and by the overthrow of the favourite, without requiring of the Spaniards anything that could wound their pride or their ambition; secondly, to grant all that we have just mentioned, marriage, overthrow of the favourite, but to make Spain pay for it by sacrifices of territory, which should secure to us the banks of the Ebro, the coasts of Catalonia, and the joint possession of the Spanish colonies; thirdly and lastly, to resort to extreme means, that is to say, to dethrone the Bourbons, to impose a new dynasty upon the Spaniards, without demanding of them any sacrifice of territory, any commercial advantage, and contenting himself with having, as the sole result, closely bound the destinies of Spain to those of France.

Of these three courses not one was good (we shall presently explain why), but they were far from being equally bad.

To grant Ferdinand a French princess, to add to this boon the overthrow of the favourite, without requiring any sacrifice for this double satisfaction, would have transported the Spanish nation with joy, would have gained him for some time an absolute devotedness on its part, and would have secured him its energetic support against any minister who had not kept steadily in the track of French policy. But gratitude in nations, as in individuals, is of brief duration: Spanish jealousy would

soon have roused again when the memory of Napoleon's benefits was effaced, and Ferdinand, who had all the defects of the Spanish character without any of its good qualities, would have become in a short time as inimical to France as Emmanuel Godoy. His incapacity, his indolence, would have rendered the counsels of Napoleon as annoying to him as they were at this moment to the favourite; after a few days' warm gratitude, things would have resumed their old course; ignorance, carelessness, aversion to all improvement, jealousy of foreign superiority would have been, as in times past, the character of the Spanish government in a new reign. A French princess, it is true, would have been placed near the throne, to repeat there the good advice proceeding from Paris; but it would have required a very rare superiority to withstand such contrary tendencies, and this very superiority would perhaps have rendered her odious. The past was not cheering for a French princess bringing noble and attractive qualities into Spain. Besides, one cannot create at pleasure princesses enriched with all the gifts of Nature, and those whom Napoleon had then at his disposal gave no indications of the brilliant faculties which the situation would have rendered as necessary for their part as dangerous for themselves.

The second plan, that of requiring, in consideration of the marriage, of the overthrow of the favourite, and of the cession of Portugal, large sacrifices, such as the surrender of the provinces of the Ebro and the opening of the Spanish colonies to the French, was merely the first plan greatly aggravated. The provinces of the Ebro offered an advantage more apparent than real; for those provinces, on account of their vicinity, disliked the French more than any. They would not, even in time, have contracted a fondness for the French, any more than the Milanese have contracted a fondness for Austria. The Pyrenees would always have reminded them that they were Spanish and not French; and so far from giving us a soldier or a piastre, it would have cost us a great many men and a great deal of money to keep them. The alleged sway which they would have secured to us over Spain would be, under Napoleon at least, quite illusory. To start from Pampeluna or Saragossa, instead of Bayonne, for the purpose of marching to Madrid, was not so great a difference as to induce a belief that Spain would thus pass, in regard to us, from a state of independence to a state of submission; on the contrary, we should have exasperated the Spaniards by this dismemberment of their territory; we should have so embittered their joy at seeing Ferdinand married to a French princess and the favourite overthrown, that we should have caused ingratitude to spring up on the very first day. Lisbon itself would have had no charms in their eyes, had they

been obliged to give Saragossa and Barcelona for it. As for the opening of the Spanish colonies to the French, this was a serious advantage, sufficiently serious to be desired, but easy to be obtained without exciting resentment had it been the only price exacted for Portugal, the marriage, and the overthrow of the favourite. This second plan, therefore, had not the merit of attaching Spain to us for a single day; and for the sake of some territorial cessions which it would be impossible to retain, it would expose us to the everlasting hatred of the Spaniards.

The third course towards which Napoleon appeared to be urged in an irresistible manner, consisted in dethroning the Bourbons, in the definitive approximation of France and Spain by the establishment of one and the same dynasty in both countries, in regenerating the latter in order to render it useful either to itself or to the common cause, in taking nothing from it; on the contrary, in giving it everything, Portugal, the overthrow of the favourite, internal reforms, in renewing, in short, the policy of Louis XIV., which involved nothing too great for a man who had surpassed all known greatness. Not only had this policy of Louis XIV. nothing too great for Napoleon, but it was, it must be acknowledged, the natural policy of France. To unite in one and the same spirit, in one and the same interest, the whole of the west, that is to say, France and the two peninsulas, Italian and Spanish, to oppose their continental power to the coalition of the courts of the north, their maritime power to the pretensions of England, was assuredly the true, the legitimate ambition which one could have wished for Napoleon, that which would have been justified by the rules of sound policy had it not succeeded. But the punishment of the prodigal who has incurred foolish expenses consists in being no longer able to defray necessary expenses. Napoleon, for having undertaken in the north an immense, an exorbitant task, out of the real interests of France, such as to constitute a French Germany to the great displeasure of the German populations, to undertake the restoration of Poland in spite of Austria and Prussia, was about to feel the want of those forces which the execution of the most profoundly political designs would have required. He was, in fact, obliged at that very moment to keep three hundred thousand men between the Oder and the Vistula to ensure the submission of Germany and the alliance of Russia, one hundred and twenty thousand men in Italy to deter Austria from all idea of recrossing the Alps. If he required one or two hundred thousand more men to coerce Spain, to prevent the entrance of the English, who were likely to find a convenient and firm footing there, for they had merely the Bay of Biscay to cross in order to reach that

country—if he must keep these different armies in Germany, in Italy, in Spain, it would be a mass of eight or nine hundred thousand men that became necessary, and there must thence result an extension of cares, of efforts, of command, to which in the end France and even his genius would prove inadequate.

What was then passing afforded already a striking proof of this, since in order to procure troops without weakening the grand army, without stripping Germany and Italy, Napoleon was obliged to set his wits to work in a thousand ways, and had not hitherto contrived to find anything but conscripts, commanded by officers picked up in the dépôts or dragged from retirement. It was a first and strong indication of the situation which Napoleon had created by the immoderate multiplication of his enterprises. Another circumstance served greatly to aggravate this insufficiency of resources. The submission of the court of Spain, though mingled with many secret perfidies, though rendered barren by the incapacity of the Spanish administration, had all the appearance of the most absolute devotedness. Napoleon had, therefore, no specious grievance to allege against the court of the Escorial; and the dictatorial act of dethroning Charles IV., for reasons highly politic, it is true, but contrary to simple equity, difficult to make the multitude comprehend, and needing, besides, definitive success to be admitted, was liable to excite insurrection in a proud, jealous nation, filled with ardent hatred against foreigners. One ran the risk, therefore, of revolting its moral feeling, and to repress it there would have needed forces very different from those which Napoleon was then able to collect. It was not young conscripts, brave, no doubt, but not imposing in appearance, that would have been wanted; it was veteran soldiers, capable of striking terror by their number and their aspect, and who, seizing unawares on all points at once of the affrighted Peninsula, would prevent any outbreak of the public feeling, overawe the half-savage populace of Spain, lastly, afford the middle classes, wishing for a new order of things, inclined to hope for it from France, time to confirm themselves in their sentiments, and to diffuse them around them. On these conditions, the extraordinary act to which Napoleon was reduced would have had a chance of succeeding; and the first movement of revolt being thus prevented, the Spanish nation would have learned by degrees to acknowledge the benefits which France was bringing it. But attempted with inferior resources, the plan of which Napoleon cherished the idea was liable to prove the commencement of a series of disasters.

There was one more condition necessary for the success of this enterprise, that was to keep up in all its intimacy the new alliance which Napoleon had concluded at Tilsit; for if he

were forced to recommence either the campaign of Austerlitz or that of Friedland while engaged in Spain, besides the difficulty of conquering at these two extremities of the European world, it would be imposing not only a double task upon himself, but rendering the second a hundred times more difficult; for the Spaniards must receive extreme encouragement from any war that might break out in the north. He would then be obliged, whatever condescendence he might show for the ambition of Alexander, to take his own course, and to prevent the inconvenience of the dispersion of the French forces, by purchasing at any price the concurrence of the great empire of the north; to pay, in short, with Moldavia and Wallachia for the possibility of dethroning the Bourbons of Spain with impunity.

Lastly, when all these conditions were attained there would still be a serious danger, serious both for Spain and France—the possible, nay, probable loss of the rich Spanish colonies. These colonies, in fact, had been already secretly worked up by the spirit of revolt. The example of the United States had strongly developed in them the disposition for independence, and the shameful neglect of the mother-country, which left them without defence, disposed them to it still more. There was reason, therefore, to apprehend that a new dynasty, and that imposed upon the nation, would furnish the colonies with the pretext which they were seeking to rise, and that the English protection would furnish them, moreover, with the means of doing so. In this case, but too easy to be foreseen, Spain, while waiting till she had opened for herself other sources of prosperity, would be ruined, and France would have done nothing more than enrich English commerce with all the advantages which the traffic of the vast Spanish colonies must afford it.

Such were the three plans between which Napoleon had to choose. They presented, each of them, their inconveniences; for the first, which would have fulfilled all the wishes of the Spaniards at once by ridding them of the favourite, by assuring them of the protection of Napoleon through a French marriage, by giving them Lisbon without territorial compensation, would perhaps have been but a cheat. The second, which would have required all these advantages to be paid for by a cruel sacrifice of territory, would have revolted them. The third and last, which solved the question in a decisive manner, which definitively established friendship between France and Spain, which regenerated the latter without demanding any other sacrifice from her than that of a debased dynasty, might, nevertheless, provoke the nation to insurrection, and would then require such a disposable force as Napoleon had not reserved for himself, and as a last inconvenience would bring the Spanish colonies into great danger

Everything considered, Napoleon could not have done better than to adopt the first plan ; that is to say, to deliver Spain from the favourite, to grant her the hand of a French princess, to cede Portugal to her without requiring the provinces of the Ebro in return, which would have raised the popular joy to intoxication, and to demand at most the opening of the colonies, perhaps the cession of the Balearic Islands or of the Philippines, from which Spain derived no benefit ; serious and the only desirable advantages which she would have relinquished to us without regret, and without any change whatever in her sentiments towards us. Her gratitude might not have been of long duration, but it might have lasted long enough for bringing the maritime war to a conclusion, for obtaining during the latter period of that war the sincere concurrence of the Spaniards against the English, for acquiring, even in their own estimation, the right to demand it, and if not obtained, the right to punish their ingratitude.

But this plan, the only prudent one because it was the only one which added no new enterprises to those with which the empire was already overburdened, won no approbation, either from Napoleon, with whose secret desires it disagreed, or from M. de Talleyrand, who had not the courage to support it, though he began from that time to be alarmed at the consequences that might arise from the policy which he had complaisantly flattered. He had been seen, with a view to regain the imperial favour, obsequiously entering into all Napoleon's ideas, making himself his secret confidant, his patient interlocutor ; and now prudence counterbalancing in him the desire to please, he hesitated and sought in the second scheme a middle term, in which the courtier and the statesman concurred. He seemed to think that they ought not to enter too deeply into the affairs of the Peninsula ; that it would be well to get all they could from Spain, then leave her to herself, and for this purpose, without pretending to the honour of regenerating her, give her a French princess since she desired one, rid her of the favourite since she was tired of him, and lastly, give her the reserved portion of Portugal too distant from France to be kept by us, but make her pay for it with Aragon, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, the opening of the Spanish colonies, and having thus obtained compensation for what we should have given, let her alone, but watch her from the top of the walls of Barcelona, Saragossa, and Pampeluna.*

* This may serve to explain how it happens that M. de Talleyrand, after flattering more than any other the disposition of Napoleon to interfere in the affairs of Spain, could since maintain that he had dissented from what was done at this period. He had alone encouraged Napoleon to change the state of things in the Peninsula, which rendered the dethronement of the Bourbons almost inevitable. This fact is proved by authentic documents ; but, in truth, the despatches in which M. de Talleyrand gives an account of his negotiations with M. Yzquierdo, prove that he preferred a marriage with Ferdinand and the

Such was the way in which M. de Talleyrand strove to bring back Napoleon from the fatal track into which he had urged him.

But the latter, who judged soundly of this plan because he disliked it, perceived as much danger in defying as in adopting the last; because it was as difficult in his estimation to take Saragossa, Barcelona, and Pampeluna from the Spaniards, as to take from them a degraded dynasty. He therefore always turned away from it, and reverted irresistibly to the idea of expelling the Bourbons from the last throne that was left them in Europe, and said to himself that he must take advantage of the moment when he was all-powerful on the continent, when England had just authorised everything by her conduct at Copenhagen, when he was young, victorious, obeyed, served by fortune, to complete his system by a signal blow struck at the Spanish dynasty, after which he, the army, France, the west, would rest themselves, dazzled with his glory, satisfied with the order which he should have established, with the wise reforms which he should have effected. He said to himself that, after all, the difficulty could not be much greater than that which had been encountered in the kingdom of Naples; that supposing the Spaniards to be as energetic as the banditti of the Calabrias, it would be sufficient to triple or quadruple the extent of the Calabrias, and instead of 25,000 Frenchmen to imagine 100,000, in order to form an idea of the obstacles to be overcome; that his young soldiers, who had everywhere proved themselves the best troops in Europe, would certainly be capable of conquering degenerate Spaniards, and that by sending to the dépôts one more conscription, he should have the hundred thousand conscripts and more necessary for this new enterprise; that the grand army should remain intact between the Oder and the Vistula to overawe Europe; that, moreover, Finland, given up to Russia, Moldavia and Wallachia promised, would ensure him the concurrence of the Emperor Alexander in the accomplishment of his designs; that, in short, what he purposed to do in Spain was the last consequence to be drawn from his victories, the definitive establishment of his family, the complete consummation of his destinies.

However, in January 1808, on his return from Italy, even after the proceedings at the Escorial, Napoleon's resolution was not irrevocably taken, and he sometimes recurred to the idea of stopping short at a marriage which would bind the two houses

acquisition of the provinces of the Ebro to the decisive measure of overthrowing the Bourbons. It is by supporting himself on this equivocation that M. de Talleyrand asserted that he had not approved of the enterprise against Spain. He had, nevertheless, pushed on Napoleon to this enterprise, when men the most worthy of confidence, such as the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, would have withdrawn him from it; and after he had so pushed him, the preference given to the very worst of the three possible solutions is not a valid manner of redeeming his responsibility.

together, when a family incident gave rise to a sort of material impossibility in regard to this combination. Napoleon had, as we have already related, called to Paris Lucien's daughter by a first marriage, who had been sent to him that she might not be made a victim to the quarrels of her relations. But unfortunately, this girl, brought up in exile, often hearing bitter complaints against the omnipotent family which shared among themselves all the thrones of Europe regardless of a distant and forgotten brother—this girl had not brought with her to Paris such sentiments as it was desirable that she should have done. Placed about her grandmother, the empress-mother, she nevertheless met with a severity from her, with a neglect from her aunts, which could not produce more favourable impressions of those whom she had been taught to fear more than to love. Accordingly, in her correspondence with her relations in Italy, she expressed the disappointment that she felt. Napoleon, in the supposition that he should send her to share the throne of Spain, desirous of ascertaining whether she had brought with her such dispositions as accorded with his policy, directed that she should be closely watched, and gave orders that her correspondence should be read at the post-office. Scarcely had she arrived in Paris before letters were seized, in which she made reports concerning her grandmother, her aunts, her uncle Napoleon, far from favourable to the imperial family. When these letters were delivered to Napoleon he smiled maliciously, and immediately summoned his mother, his brothers, and his sisters to the Tuileries, and caused the letters which had been intercepted to be read in family meeting. He was highly diverted at the anger excited in those present at this scene, all of whom were treated harshly enough in this correspondence; then passing from an ironical mirth to a cold severity, he insisted that his young niece should be sent back within twenty-four hours, and accordingly on the following day she was on the road for Italy. There was then no princess of the Bonaparte family left to be given to Spain; for Mademoiselle de Tascher, recently admitted into the imperial family, did not belong to that house.* Napoleon had recently adopted this young person, niece of the Empress Josephine, and had sent her to Germany, to be there

* The Duchess of Abrantes, in her Memoirs, which bespeak a clever but not well-informed person, says that Prince Lucien's daughter had not come to Paris, and that the refusal of her father to send her thither had thus become the cause of important events; for Napoleon, obliged to renounce the idea of a union with the Bourbons of Spain, had from that time resolved to dethrone them. This assertion is inaccurate. Prince Lucien's daughter did come to Paris, but did not stay there on account of the incident which I have just related. The particulars here given were derived from a member of the imperial family, an eyewitness of the scene described, and from a personage who is a member of one of our assemblies, and was appointed to conduct the princess to Italy, a commission which he declined.

married to the heir of the princely house of Aremberg. In mixing his blood with that of the Bourbons, he wished it to be his own blood, and not that of his wife, strong as was the affection which he felt for her.

Even without this incident, Napoleon would probably have preferred the more decisive measure, that is to say, the dethronement of the Bourbons. At any rate, he had no longer any choice. To overthrow them and to substitute for them a member of his family was the only solution that was left him. But the pretext to be alleged for dethroning them, without deeply wounding the public feeling in Spain, in France, in Europe, was still the point that most embarrassed him. Unable to find it in the abject submission of the Spanish government to his will, he looked to events for it. The dissensions of the court, the scandalous passions of the queen and the favourite, the hatred which they felt for the heir to the crown and that which they excited in him, the impatience of the nation, ready to break forth—all these passions, which kept increasing from hour to hour, might produce a sudden explosion, and give rise to the desired pretext. It was easy, moreover, to perceive that the successive introduction of French troops into Spain contributed greatly to increase the impatience of all minds by the hopes excited in some, the fears excited in others, the expectations awakened in all, and that it might perhaps end in provoking a catastrophe. Besides, there might arise from all these causes a result highly agreeable to Napoleon, namely, the flight of the royal family of Spain, in imitation of the royal family of Portugal, going, like that, to seek an asylum in America. Such a flight would have set Napoleon quite at ease by giving up to him a vacant throne, which the Spanish nation, in its indignation against the fugitives, might perhaps itself award to him. This new emigration of a European dynasty to America became from that moment the solution to which he adhered, as the least odious, the least revolting for the civilised public. A sure way to bring about this result was to increase the number of the French troops in Spain, while enveloping his intentions in more profound mystery than ever. This he failed not to do. Being obliged to answer the letters of Charles IV., which solicited of him the hand of a French princess for Ferdinand and the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau, he replied to the first that, highly honoured for his house by the desire expressed by the royal family of Spain, he must nevertheless beg to be informed, before entering into any explanations, if the Prince of the Asturias, recently prosecuted as a state criminal, had been again taken into favour by his august parents; for nobody, he said, would *ally himself with a dishonoured son*. To the second, he answered that affairs were not yet sufficiently advanced in

Portugal to permit the administration to be parcelled out, and above all, the military command to be divided, in presence of the English, ready to land; that he must also beware of agitating the minds of the people by premature disclosure of the lot which awaited them; that from all these motives, the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau must be deferred for some time longer. It was M. de Vandeuil, an employé of the French legation, who had to deliver these two so ambiguous letters without adding any explanation tending to diminish the obscurity. To this redoubled mysteriousness Napoleon added a further augmentation of his forces.

We have seen what pains he had taken to organise the corps destined for Spain without weakening his armies in Germany and Italy. He had, in fact, composed the army of Portugal with the late camps in Normandy and Bretagne, the army of General Dupont, called corps of the Gironde, with the three first battalions of the five legions of reserve and some Swiss and Parisian battalions; the army of Marshal Moncey, called corps of observation of the coasts of the ocean, with twelve provisional regiments taken from the dépôts of the grand army; the division of the Western Pyrenees, destined for Pampeluna, with some battalions left in the camps in Bretagne and Normandy; lastly, the division of the Eastern Pyrenees, with the Italian and Neapolitan regiments which had not served in Germany, and which the return of the army of Italy rendered disposable. These last two divisions he resolved to reinforce, and to form, moreover, a general reserve for all these corps.

He augmented the division of the Western Pyrenees by adding to it the fourth battalions of the five legions of reserve, the organisation of which was just completed. These amounted to 3000 men, who, added to those already marching by St. Jean Pied de Port for Pampeluna, would form a division of six or seven thousand, sufficient to occupy that fortress and to observe Aragon. It was placed under the command of General Merle, and General Mouton, who had been at first appointed to that command, was commissioned to go and inspect the other *corps d'armée*. Napoleon augmented the division of the Eastern Pyrenees, composed of Italians, by adding to it the provisional battalions drawn from the French dépôts situated between Alessandria and Turin, swarming with conscripts already trained. This new French division was to consist of 5000 men, and added to the Italian division of 6000 or 7000 commanded by General Lechi, to form under General Duhesme a corps quite sufficient for Catalonia.

As for the general reserve, Napoleon organised it at Orleans for the infantry, at Poitiers for the cavalry. He had recourse to the same process which he had employed for composing Marshal

Moncey's corps, and he assembled at Orleans fresh provisional battalions, drawn from the dépôts which had not yet furnished detachments for Spain. General Verdier was to command these six new provisional regiments of infantry, designated by the numbers 13 to 18. Napoleon assembled at Poitiers four new provisional regiments of cavalry, likewise drawn from the dépôts, consisting of 3000 horse of all arms, cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars, and chasseurs, under a general of cavalry of distinguished merit, General Lasalle. He restored to the camp of Boulogne, to the garrison of Paris, and to the camps in Bretagne the ten old regiments brought back from the grand army; which prepared for him, in case of need, new reserves of a superior quality. Lastly, he despatched secretly for Bordeaux some detachments of the imperial guard, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, expecting that he should be obliged to go himself to Spain to bring about the *dénoûment* which he desired. Computing General Dupont's corps at 25,000 men, Marshal Moncey's at 32,000, the division of the Western Pyrenees at 6000 or 7000, the corps of the Eastern Pyrenees at 11,000 or 12,000, the two reserves of Orleans and Poitiers at 10,000, the troops of the guard at 2000 or 3000, the whole force destined for Spain may be set down at 80 and some odd thousand men, exclusive of the army of Portugal, forming a total amount of more than 100,000 new soldiers destined for the Peninsula. But they were so young, so little inured to fatigue, that there was reason to expect a great difference between the number of men entered on the muster-roll and the number of the men present under arms. However, one-fourth of this effective was still on march in the course of January 1808. Napoleon, with a view to advance the *dénoûment*, prescribed to his troops a decided movement upon Madrid. The highroad leading to that capital divaricates opposite to Burgos. One branch passes through the kingdom of Leon by Valladolid and Segovia, crosses the Guadarrama towards St. Ildefonso, and descends by the Escorial upon Madrid. The other traverses Old Castille, passing through Aranda, crosses the Guadarrama at Somosierra, a name famous in our military annals, and descends by Buitrago and Chamartin upon Madrid. The two corps of Dupont and Moncey being, the first at Valladolid (in the route to Salamanca), the second between Vittoria and Burgos, before the divarication, had not yet taken a single step which could betray the intention of marching upon Madrid. Napoleon ordered General Dupont to direct one of his divisions upon Segovia, and Marshal Moncey one of his upon Aranda, upon pretext of extending himself for the sake of subsistence. From that moment the direction upon Madrid would be unmasked. But the entry of the French troops into Catalonia and Navarre, which it was at length necessary to prescribe in

order to occupy Barcelona, told still more plainly that the real object of these movements was a very different one from Lisbon. For the purpose of furnishing an explanation that would be but half credible, Napoleon, while ordering General Duhesme to penetrate into Catalonia, General Merle to enter Navarre, instructed M. de Beauharnais to announce the intention of a double movement of troops upon Cadiz, one through Catalonia, the other through Estramadura and Andalusia. The French fleet lying at Cadiz might be the motive of this expedition. If, however, this alleged object was in some degree doubted, either at court or in the country, nothing further could result from it than an increased agitation, which Napoleon would not be sorry for, since he wished to bring about, if not immediately, at least speedily, the flight of the royal family.

Napoleon found too great advantage in keeping his dépôts continually full, by means of conscripts called out beforehand, and trained for twelve or fifteen months before they were employed, not to persevere in this system of anticipated conscription, especially at a moment when he purposed to form numerous camps along the whole coast of Europe by the side of his fleets. In consequence, after demanding the conscription of 1808 in the spring of 1807, he resolved to demand the conscription of 1809 in the winter of 1808. This demand furnished him, besides, with occasion for a communication to the Senate, and for a specious explanation of the immense assemblage of troops collecting at the foot of the Pyrenees. The Senate was therefore called together on the 21st of January to hear a report on the negotiations with Portugal, and on the resolution taken, nay, already executed, of seizing the patrimony of the house of Braganza. This was made a text for developing the system of occupation of all the coasts of the continent, in order to reply to the maritime blockade by the continental blockade. The conscription of 1808, said M. Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, author of the report presented to the Senate, had been the signal and the means of the continental peace signed at Tilsit; the conscription of 1809 would be the signal for the maritime peace. The latter, unfortunately, was still to be signed in a place that no man knew or could tell. The promise to employ in the dépôts alone the young conscripts called out a year beforehand, was renewed on this occasion to weaken the moral effect of these anticipated calls. Another report declared the incorporation with the empire, in consequence of anterior treaties, of Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, and Flushing; Kehl and Cassel as indispensable annexions to the fortresses of Strasburg and Mayence; Wesel as a point of great importance on the lower course of the Rhine; lastly, Flushing as the port of a maritime establishment, to which Antwerp was the dockyard. This last

communication led to an imperial profession of faith respecting the disinterestedness of France, which having had in her hands Austria, Germany, Prussia, Poland, had kept nothing for herself, and was content with such insignificant acquisitions as Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, or Flushing. Napoleon meant the new kingdom of Westphalia, for instance, to be considered not as an extension of territory, since it was given to an independent prince, but as a mere extension of the federative system of the French empire.

Good or bad, these argumentations, submitted in brilliant and magniloquent language, for which Napoleon furnished the ideas and M. Regnault the style, were received as usual with a respectful inclination of the head by the senators, and followed by the vote of the conscription of 1809.

This new contingent of 80,000 men would raise the mass of the French troops spread over the banks of the Vistula and the Oder, the shores of the Baltic, the Alps, the Po, the Adige, the Isonzo, the coasts of Illyria and of the Calabrias, lastly, on the Ebro and on the Tagus, to nearly 900,000 men. Adding to these 100,000 allies at least, here were more than a million of men, three-fourths of whom were veteran soldiers, equal at least to the soldiers of Cæsar, and led by a man who, in point of military genius, was superior to the Roman captain. What was there impossible with such colossal forces, the greatest that mortal ever had at his disposal, if political prudence had but stepped in to repress the intoxication of victory? Napoleon, when enumerating them, felt a dangerous satisfaction: he was puzzled only how to pay them, but reckoned upon the continuation of the war to enable them to live in foreign countries, or upon a peace to permit him to reduce their effective without diminishing their skeletons. Supported by this prodigious military power, he dared to will anything, to attempt anything, considering himself at that height as above all the rules of ordinary morality, empowered to give and take away thrones like another Providence, always justified like it by the vastness of his designs and of the results.

From this period dates the origin of an idea with which Napoleon was ever afterwards prepossessed on the subject of military organisation, which was not absolutely good in itself, but which for him alone might have had advantages: this was to convert the French regiments into legions, nearly resembling the Roman legions. The battalion, composed of seven or eight hundred men, and having for its measure the physical power of man, who cannot command directly a greater number; the regiment, composed of three or four battalions, and having for its measure the solicitude of the colonel, who cannot extend paternal care to a greater number of individuals, have been, in modern times, the basis of the military organisation. With several

regiments has been formed the brigade, with several brigades the division, with several divisions the army. In general, there has been left on the frontiers a battalion, called the *depôt* battalion, in which it has been customary to collect all the weakly men, convalescents, untrained recruits, with the officers least capable of active service, to serve at once as a place of rest and instruction, and to furnish the war battalions with a constant recruit. It was by managing this organisation with profound skill that Napoleon had contrived to create those armies which, starting from the Rhine, sometimes from the Adige or the Volturno, went to fight and to conquer on the Vistula or the Niemen. The constant attention bestowed on the *depôts* had been the secret cause of his successes as much as his genius for war. Now his art was about to become complicated, his solicitude extended, in proportion as these *depôts*, placed on the Po and on the Rhine, having already sent detachments to the armies in Prussia and Poland, were required to send more to the armies in Spain, Portugal, and Illyria. To follow with the eye 116 French regiments of infantry, 80 of cavalry, from which had been drawn a considerable number of provisional corps, besides the imperial guard, the Swiss, the Poles, the Italians, the Irish, and the German and Spanish auxiliaries—to follow with the eye the regiment and its detachments in every country, to direct its formation, training, location, so as to be assured of the best employment of each, and to prevent the disorganisation which might arise from the dislocation of parts—for a regiment whose *depôt* was on the Rhine had sometimes battalions in Poland, Germany, Spain, Portugal—all this required a laborious and singularly wearisome attention, even for the most indefatigable of all geniuses. Napoleon, therefore, conceived the idea of sixty legions instead of a hundred and twenty regiments, each composed of eight war battalions, commanded by a *maréchal-de-camp*, several colonels and lieutenant-colonels, capable of furnishing war battalions in Poland, in Italy, and in Spain, and having a single *depôt* to which all the detachments drawn from it should be sent back. This was a departure from the principle of the regiment, a juster basis, as we have observed, since it has for its measure the physical force of the *chef-de-bataillon*, and the moral force of the colonel, and substituting in its stead a new and completely arbitrary composition, for the convenience of a unique position, unique as the genius and the fortune of Napoleon; for who, excepting him, could ever have battalions of one and the same regiment to send to Poland, to Italy, to Spain? This conception he had so much at heart, that he never afterwards ceased to think of it during his reign, and even in exile. However, upon the objections of Messrs. Lacuée and Clarke he contented himself with a middle plan, which instead of abandoning the principle of the

regiment, augmented its composition, so as to diminish the total number of the corps. He decided by a decree, which was not definitively signed till the 18th of February, that all the infantry regiments should be composed of five battalions, four for war, one at the *depôt*; each battalion of six companies, one of *grenadiers*, one of *voltigeurs*, and four of *fusiliers*. The *depôt* battalion was fixed at four companies only, as the companies of the *élite* were not to be formed unless in war. Agreeably to this decree, each company consisted of 140 men, and the whole regiment of 3970, 108 of whom were officers, and 3862 sub-alterns and privates. The colonel and four *chefs-de-bataillon* commanded the war battalions, and the major remained at the *depôt*. In this formation, which already exceeded the natural proportions of the regiment, and which was induced by the situation of Napoleon and of France, a regiment having its *depôt* on the Rhine, for example, could have two war battalions with the grand army, one on the coast of Normandy and one in Spain. A regiment having its *depôt* in Piedmont might have two of its war battalions in Dalmatia, one in Lombardy and one in Catalonia. In this manner all the corps had a share in all the species of warfare at once; and when hostilities ceased in the north, care was taken to allow all those who had just served in Poland to rest themselves, and to send off for Spain all who had not been in the late campaigns, or all which had either strength or the desire to make several successively. But this composition of the regiments, which had perhaps some advantages for Napoleon and for the empire, such as it had become, is a singular proof of the influence which an extreme policy exercised already on the military organisation. While the extension of his enterprises was about to weaken the armies of Napoleon by dispersing them, it was about to weaken also the regiment itself by extending it beyond measure, by diminishing the energy of family spirit in brethren-in-arms, too distant from one another. A military corps is a whole, which has its natural proportions, its architecture, if one may be allowed the expression, which we are liable to distort by any attempt to extend it too much.

For the rest, several dispositions of this decree revealed the noble and manly sentiments of the great man who had conceived it. The eagle of the regiment, an object of the respect, the love, the devotedness of the soldiers, for it is their honour, was always to be where the greatest number of battalions were, and to be consigned to the care of the eagle-bearer, who was to have the rank and pay of lieutenant, who should have served ten years, or have distinguished himself in the campaigns of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland. Beside him were to be placed, with the title of second and third eagle-bearer, with the rank of sergeant and the pay of sergeant-major, two old soldiers, who had been

in the great battles, but who had not been able to obtain promotion as illiterate men. It was a worthy mode of employing and rewarding brave fellows, whose intelligence was not equal to their courage. Everything in the State received, as we see, the influence of the immoderate genius of Napoleon, and the impress of his great soul.

Elevated by the sense of his power, conceiving that he had a right to do whatever he pleased since England dared do everything, considering the continental war as finished, and the prolongation of the maritime war as a useless delay of the completion of his plans, Napoleon resolved to demolish all the obstacles that counteracted his will. While he was giving the orders that we have just stated, for the purpose of bringing the Peninsula into the system of his empire, he issued nearly similar orders for bringing the Italian Peninsula into the same system, and for putting an end, on the one hand, to the sovereignty of the Pope, who annoyed him in the centre of Italy, on the other, to that of the Bourbons of Naples, who defied him from the centre of the island of Sicily.

We have seen how the refusal to restore the Legations to the Holy See after the coronation, then the conquest of the kingdom of Naples, which had completely reduced the Roman States to a mere enclosure of the French empire, had successively galled Pius VII. and converted his habitual mildness into a continual and sometimes violent irritation against Napoleon, to whom he was nevertheless attached. The privation of the principalities of Benevento and Ponte Corvo, granted to M. de Talleyrand and to Marshal Bernadotte, the occupation of Ancona, the continual passages of French troops, had raised the displeasure and the exasperation of his Holiness to the utmost. Accordingly, he refused to comply with any of the applications of France, and rejected them all, some for specious reasons, others for reasons which were not specious, and which he took no pains to render so. He had, in the first place, refused to annul the first marriage of Prince Jerome, consummated without any formality; and could not be induced to do anything more than wink at the dissolution pronounced by the French ecclesiastical authority. He had refused to acknowledge Joseph as King of Naples, received at Rome the refractory Neapolitan cardinals, and given asylum in the suburbs of that capital to all the banditti who murdered the French soldiers. He had kept with him the consul of the dethroned King of Naples, alleging that this king, who had retired to Sicily, was at least sovereign of that island, and consequently had a right to keep a representative at Rome. He had not consented to exclude the English from the Roman States, saying that he was an independent sovereign, and that as such he could be at peace

or war with whomsoever he pleased ; adding that, in his quality of head of the Christian Church, his duty forbade him to go to war with any of the Christian powers, even though not Catholic. He delayed the canonical institution of the bishops, insisted on a journey to Rome in the case of the Italian bishops, contested the extension of the French Concordat to the Italian provinces which had become French, such as Liguria and Piedmont, and the extension of the Italian Concordat to the Venetian provinces, annexed the last to the kingdom of Italy. Lastly, he would not assent to any of the arrangements proposed for the new German Church ; and on every subject, be it what it might, he objected the natural difficulties arising out of it, and gladly created such as did not exist. Napoleon thus reaped the reward of his neglect to satisfy the court of Rome, which he could have kept in the best dispositions by means of a few sacrifices of territory that would have been easy to him ; for without touching the kingdoms of Lombardy and Naples, he had Parma, Piacenza, Tuscany for rounding the dominions of the Holy See. It is true that his imperious determination to subject all Italy to his system of warfare against the English would have proved, in any case, a serious difficulty. But assuredly it would have been possible to obtain from the satisfied Pope, under the form of a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, his adhesion to all the conditions of war which he meant to impose upon Italy.

Taking no account of the motives which had alienated his Holiness from him, Napoleon ordered him to be told, " You are sovereign of Rome, it is true, but comprised in the French empire ; you are Pope, I am emperor, such as were the German emperors, such as Charlemagne was still more anciently ; and I am Charlemagne for you by more than one title, by title of power, by title of benefaction. You will, therefore, obey the laws of the federative system of the empire, and close your territory against my enemies." The manner of this pretension offended Pius VII. still more than the matter. His eyes, usually so mild, flashed with all the fire of indignation, and he declared to Cardinal Fesch that he recognised no sovereign above him upon earth ; that if it were intended to renew the tyranny of the German emperors of the Middle Ages, he would renew the resistance of Gregory VII. ; and that though it was alleged that the spiritual arms had lost their force, he would show that they could still be powerful against a sovereign of recent origin, whom he had consecrated with his own hands, and who owed part of his moral authority to that consecration. To this Napoleon replied, that in the nineteenth century he feared the spiritual arms but little ; that, however, he would not afford any legitimate pretext for their employment, by abstaining

from touching religious matters; that he should do no more than strike the temporal sovereign; that he should leave at the Vatican the respected Bishop of Rome, the chief of the bishops of Christendom, and as for the temporal prince whose spiritual sovereignty should have received no injury, not a creature either in France or Spain would interest himself about him.

Cardinal Fesch, whose haughty and meddling disposition and inferior capacity were liable to embroil the easiest negotiations, having been superseded by M. Alquier, accustomed successively, at the courts of Madrid and Naples, to treat with the old royal-ties, and disposed to humour them, the situation had nevertheless remained the same, and the relations between the two governments had retained all their acrimony. The pontifical court, however, resolved to send a cardinal to Paris, to put an end by a compromise to the differences which divided Rome and the empire, and made choice of Cardinal Litta. Napoleon rejected him as one of the cardinals animated with the worst spirit. It then selected the French cardinal de Bayanne, an enlightened and discreet member of the Sacred College. At the same time, the Pope, to prove that Cardinal Consalvi was not the instigator of his resistance, as Napoleon supposed, took from this friend the secretaryship of State, and gave it to an aged prelate, without talent and without energy—Cardinal Casoni. They shall see, he exclaimed, with a pride which, notwithstanding his mildness, would break forth all at once when he was irritated—they shall see that it is with me, with me alone, they have to deal: it is I who must be crushed, trampled under foot by French soldiers, if they are resolved to do violence to my authority.

Napoleon, ceasing to impose upon himself any restraint, as we have said, caused the provinces of Urbino, Ancona, and Macerata, which formed the coast of the Adriatic, to be militarily occupied by General Lemarois; and then the Holy See, Pope and cardinals, fearing that these provinces would ultimately share the fate of the Legations, thought for a moment of compounding, and an accommodation took place, the conditions of which were the following:—

The Pope, independent sovereign of his dominions, proclaimed such, guaranteed such by France, would nevertheless contract an alliance with her, and whenever she may be at war would exclude her enemies from the territory of the Roman States;

The French troops should occupy Ancona, Civita Vecchia, and Ostia, but be subsisted at the expense of the French government;

The Pope would engage to clear and put into good condition the muddy harbour of Ancona;

He would recognise King Joseph, send away King Ferdinand's consul, the murderers of the French, and the Neapolitan cardi-

nals refusing the oath, and renounce his ancient right of investiture over the crown of Naples ;

He would consent to extend the Concordat of Italy and the Concordat of France to all the provinces of Italy converted into French provinces ;

He would nominate without delay the French and Italian bishops, and not require the latter to travel to Rome ;

He would appoint plenipotentiaries charged to conclude a Germanic Concordat ;

Lastly, to satisfy Napoleon respecting the spirit of the Sacred College, and to proportion the influence of France to the extension of her territory, he would increase the number of the French cardinals to one-third of the total number of the cardinals.

This arrangement was nearly completed when the Pope, impelled by unlucky suggestions, and in particular offended by two clauses, that which obliged the Holy See to close its territory against the enemies of France, and that which increased the number of the French cardinals—clauses, the first of which was inevitable in the situation of the Roman States, and the second adapted to pacify for the future—the Pope peremptorily refused his assent.

Then without listening further to a single observation, without listening to the offer of withdrawing a first refusal, Napoleon ordered passports to be sent to the Cardinal de Bayanne, and despatched the necessary orders for the invasion of the Roman States. At bottom, he was decided there, as in Spain, to come to a definitive solution, that is to say, to leave the Pope at the Vatican, with an ample revenue, with a purely spiritual authority, and to deprive him of the temporal sovereignty of Central Italy. But expecting to have to do with the Spaniards in two or three months, that is, towards Easter, he had no wish that religious causes should be added to political causes to irritate a fanatical people. He formed, therefore, the design of occupying for the moment Rome and the provinces bordering the Mediterranean, as he had already caused those which border the Adriatic to be occupied. Accordingly, he ordered the general commanding in Tuscany to assemble 2500 men at Perugia, General Lemarois to march as many upon Foligno, General Miollis to put himself at the head of these two brigades, to advance upon Rome, to pick up by the way a column of 3000 men ordered by Joseph to start from Terracina, and with these 8000 soldiers to take possession of the capital of the Christian world. General Miollis was to enter, by fair means or by force, the Castle of St. Angelo, to take the command of the Papal troops, to leave the Pope at the Vatican with a guard of honour, to interfere in no respect in the government, to say that he came to occupy Rome for a longer or shorter time in a purely military interest, and to keep

off the enemies of France from the Roman States. He was to make himself master of the police alone, to expel all the banditti who made Rome their retreat, to send off the Neapolitan cardinals to Naples, and to have recourse to the public chests for what was necessary for the maintenance of the French troops.

The illustrious Miollis, an old soldier of the Republic, combining with an inflexible character a most cultivated mind, the purest probity, and much experience in treating with Italian princes, was better qualified than any other for performing this rigorous commission, and paying at the same time the respect due to the head of Christendom. Napoleon allowed him a considerable salary, with orders to live in high style at Rome, and to accustom the Romans to regard the French general established at the Castle of St. Angelo as the real head of the government, much more than the pontiff left at the Vatican.

The invasion of Portugal had drawn towards Gibraltar the troops which the English had in Sicily, and those which they had brought back beaten from Alexandria. Not more than seven or eight thousand men were left in Sicily to preserve that wreck of her crown for their unfortunate victim, Queen Caroline. This was the time for preparing an expedition against that island, and to take advantage of the junction of the French fleets in the Mediterranean to convey that expedition. Napoleon had ordered Admiral Rosily, commanding the French fleet at Cadiz, and Admiral Allemand, commanding the fine Rochefort division, to weigh anchor on the first favourable occasion, and to form a junction with the Toulon division. At his instigation the same order had been given to the Spanish division at Carthagena, commanded by Admiral Valdes, an order executed with tolerable punctuality since the Spanish government showed itself so submissive, and he expected to have twenty and odd sail at Toulon under Admiral Ganteaume if all these junctions were successfully effected. With one only of these junctions, that of the Rochefort squadron, one of the most probable on account of the point of starting, and the most desirable on account of the quality of the crews and of the commander, there would be ships sufficient to transport an army to Sicily and to revictual Corfu, the second and not the least important object of the expedition. He therefore ordered Admiral Ganteaume to collect at Toulon, and to take on board the division already assembled in that port, a considerable mass of stores of all kinds, such as corn, biscuit, powder, projectiles, gun-carriages, tools, and to land this cargo at Corfu, whatever might be the success of the operation against Sicily. He directed Joseph to assemble at Baïæ eight or nine thousand men, completely equipped, and at Scylla, opposite to the lighthouse, seven or eight thousand more, with a great quantity of feluccas and craft capable of crossing the small arm

of the sea which separates Sicily from Calabria. He desired that everything should be ready, so that Admiral Ganteaume, having left Toulon and arrived off Baiæ, might embark the eight or nine thousand men concentrated at that point, convey them in twenty-four hours to the north of the lighthouse, where the other seven or eight thousand assembled at Scylla, and embarked in the small vessels that should have been procured, would have arrived on their part. With these fifteen or sixteen thousand men the lighthouse was to be taken, and armed as well as the fort of Scylla, and these two points which closed the strait being gained by the French, they would make themselves masters for ever of the passage. This result obtained, not an English soldier would dare to remain in Sicily.

But this bold enterprise presupposed that the orders repeated by Napoleon relative to the two points which the English still possessed on the coast of Calabria, Scylla and Reggio, would have been carried into execution. Napoleon had several times been angry with Joseph, because with an army of more than 40,000 men he suffered the English still to possess a foot of the continent of Italy. "It is a shame," he wrote to him, "that the English can still resist us upon land. I beg you not to write to me till this disgrace is retrieved; and if it is not soon, I will send one of my generals to supersede you in the command of my army in Naples." Joseph, smarting under these reproaches, had charged General Regnier to attack the two fortified points of Scylla and Reggio, which so grievously offended the eyes of Napoleon. They were on the point of being taken—but they were not taken. Napoleon was extremely angry. However, his irritation against his brother's want of energy made no change in the state of things; it was agreed that the plan of the expedition should be modified, for it was impossible to be master of the strait while the coast of the Calabrias, which ought naturally to have belonged to the French, was not yet in their possession. In consequence, Admiral Ganteaume was to proceed first to Corfu, to land the vast mass of warlike stores on board the fleet, then to return to the strait, touch at Reggio, which would probably be taken at the presumed time of his appearance in these seas, embark a dozen thousand men there, and convey them by the interior of the strait to the south of the lighthouse. The season was an additional motive with Admiral Ganteaume for thus acting; for in operating by the interior of the strait, and to the south of the lighthouse, he should be screened from the violent winds which in winter blow from the north-west and render the approach to the north coast of Sicily dangerous.

These dispositions being adopted, Admiral Ganteaume held himself in readiness to embark on the first appearance of one of the naval divisions expected every moment from Carthagera,

Cadiz, or Rochefort. The reader will recollect, no doubt, that on the very judicious observations of Admiral Decrès, it had been agreed that the Brest and Lorient divisions should remain at sea, and that those of Rochefort and Cadiz should alone receive orders to penetrate into the Mediterranean. Admiral Rosily was extremely anxious to leave Cadiz, where he had been detained upwards of two years. But it was more difficult for him to get out than any other, on account of the Strait of Gibraltar. It is to the immensity of the seas that the facility of escape is owing; but in the narrow channel of a strait, within reach of such a post as Gibraltar, it is impossible to elude an enemy and to give him the slip. The sea between the coast of Spain and that of Africa was covered with small vessels mounting guard for the English fleet, which kept in the offing in order to entice Admiral Rosily to venture out. But no sooner was he under weigh than the whole naval force of the enemy was seen bearing down upon him. Rosily's division was completely armed, thanks to the resources of the port of Cadiz, abundant for the French government, which paid well, null for the Spanish government, which never paid. It was manned, moreover, by excellent crews, which had been at sea and sustained the greatest sea-fight of the age, that of Trafalgar. Admiral Rosily, an old seaman, as experienced as he was brave, would not have shrunk from fighting an English division, even superior in force to his own; but with six sail of the line and two or three frigates, he could not defy twelve or fifteen sail of the line and a multitude of frigates without running the risk of a fresh disaster. Thus though he had received the order to leave Cadiz in September 1807, he had not succeeded in getting out in February 1808.

Rear-Admiral Allemand, the boldest naval officer that France then had, especially as a navigator, found himself also closely blockaded in Rochefort, and the disasters experienced by Captain Soleil's frigates furnished a proof of this. But once out of the Pertuis by a daring venture, the ocean expanded before him, and with excellent crews, good ships, and his boldness at sea he had many chances of escaping the English. Several times he weighed anchor and several times he beheld the enemy bearing down in such number that it would have been impossible to escape. One day, however, the 17th of January 1808, favoured by thick weather, he set sail, got out unperceived, dashed into the Bay of Biscay, and doubled Cape Ortegal without accident, ran along the whole of Spain, arrived within sight of the projecting coasts of Europe and Africa, and in a dark night, and with a tremendous west wind, he threw himself boldly into the strait, so well guarded that Admiral Rosily could not have appeared in it had he not covered himself with English colours. It has long been proverbially said that Fortune favours the brave; on this occa-

sion, at any rate, she certainly did, for in a few hours Admiral Allemand found himself with his whole division in the open Mediterranean, having passed Gibraltar and Ceuta without being perceived. On the 3rd of February he appeared in sight of Toulon, and made a signal to Admiral Ganteaume to come out, that they might proceed together to the goal marked for them by the emperor. The joy of this brave seaman was extreme at having performed so successfully such a dangerous trip.

The Spanish division at Carthage, much less closely watched than that of Admiral Rosily, because it was more than a hundred leagues from the strait, and at that time the people ceased to do the Spanish navy so much honour as to believe it to be enterprising—the division at Carthage had few difficulties to conquer in order to get out. It had therefore been able to weigh anchor and to sail for Toulon, agreeably to the orders of Napoleon. It was commanded by Admiral Valdes, and composed of one very fine three-decker, one ship of 80, and four of 74 guns. After lying immovably in the harbour for three years their bottoms were foul; they were but moderately manned, and had not on board provisions for three months. Whether the admiral had received secret orders not to execute his commission, or the timidity of the Spanish sailors had become extreme, the squadron had sailed round the Balearic Islands to find an asylum there in case of need, and on the first appearance of an English sail had taken refuge there, informing its government, which lost no time in transmitting the intelligence to Paris, that it was blocked up and knew not when it would be possible to put to sea again. Whether treachery or faintheartedness, the result was absolutely the same for the plans of Napoleon, and exhibited in the strongest light the manner in which Spain was accustomed to perform her duty as an ally.

For the rest, Admiral Ganteaume had orders to sail on the first junction that should happen to increase his force. The five ships at Toulon having, in fact, been joined by the five from Rochefort, he had nothing to fear in the Mediterranean. The ships equipped at Toulon were far less efficient than those which had arrived from Rochefort; and the crews of those in particular that were equipped in the port of Genoa consisted of boys picked up on the quays of that great city, the Genoese sailors themselves having fled into the Apennine mountains. Nevertheless, as an excellent spirit prevailed in the Toulon squadron, a spirit which was traditional in that port, and which Rear-Admiral Cosmao strove to strengthen by his example, good-will made amends for inexperience, and the Toulon division was likely to behave honourably. Admiral Ganteaume, with two excellent lieutenants, Rear-Admirals Allemand and Cosmao, had two three-deckers, one 80-gun ship, seven seventy-fours, two frigates, two corvettes,

two large flutes, in all sixteen sail. After taking time to divide among the whole fleet the immense stores which he was ordered to carry to Corfu, he weighed anchor on the 10th of February 1808, steering for the Ionian Islands, whence he was to return to the strait of Sicily to convey a French army to Catanea, when he should have accomplished the first part of his mission. He sailed on the 10th of February, and was out of sight before any enemy's ship made her appearance. With the composition of his fleet, and in the state of the enemy's forces in the Mediterranean, everything bespoke a successful result. In case of separation the rendezvous was the point of Italy opposite to the coast of Epire, having for refuge the Gulf of Taranto, the mouths of the Cattaro, and Corfu itself, the primary object of the expedition.

While this voyage, which was long and lasted two months, was commencing, events in Spain were following their deplorable course. The letters of Napoleon in answer to the proposal of marriage and the request to publish the treaty of Fontainebleau, written on the 10th of January and despatched on the 20th, did not reach Madrid till the 27th or 28th, and were not delivered before the 1st of February. These were not of a nature to cheer the court of Spain. To add to its unhappiness, the process at the Escorial was just then finished with extraordinary éclat, and to the confusion of those by whom it was set on foot.

Notwithstanding all the efforts made to get the friends of the Prince of the Asturias declared accomplices in a crime which had no existence, their innocence, supported by the public opinion, had saved them. The Marquis d'Ayerbo, the Count d'Orgas, the Dukes de San Carlos and de l'Infantado, had conducted themselves with perfect dignity. But the Canon Escoiquiz, in particular, had displayed an almost provoking firmness, excited as he was by the danger, by the ambition to sustain his part, by the affection of his royal pupil, by the indignation of an honest man. In spite of the unbecoming threats of the director of this process, Simon de Viegas, one of the vilest agents of the court, Escoiquiz, without disavowing the papers on which the accusation was founded, had persisted in maintaining and demonstrating his innocence, saying that, in fact, he had endeavoured in those papers to unveil the turpitudes and the crimes of the favourite; that in so doing he was serving the king, not betraying him; that the blank order, signed beforehand, to confer military powers on the Duke de l'Infantado was a legitimate precaution against a plan of usurpation which everybody was acquainted with, and proof of which he engaged to furnish if he were placed in presence of Godoy, and permitted to call witnesses who were all ready to reveal fearful truths. The courage of this poor, unarmed priest, having no other

support against an all-powerful court than public opinion, had disconcerted the accusers, and excited general interest; for though the proceedings were secret, the details of them were known from day to day, and transmitted from mouth to mouth with a rapidity which nothing but the warmest passion can account for in a country without newspapers, and almost without roads. The judges beginning to waver, there had been added to them a reinforcement of magistrates supposed to be devoted, for the purpose of rendering the condemnation more certain. The fiscal, Don Simon de Viegas, had conformed to the order which he had received, to require the punishment of death against the accused. The court, working in all possible ways on the judges upon whom it conceived that it could rely, made application to them to pronounce the condemnation required by the fiscal, not for the purpose of carrying it into execution, but to afford the king occasion to exercise his clemency. It had, it was alleged, but one object in view; this was to render the royal authority more respectable by punishing with a sentence of death the mere thought of failing in duty to the king, and to endear him still more to the people by furnishing occasion for a signal act of clemency towards the accused to emanate from him. It was, in fact, the design of the court to obtain a sentence of death in order to prevent its execution. But nobody had sufficient confidence in it to trust it with the lives of the most honoured members of the Spanish grandezza; and besides, public opinion, ready to break loose against the double-dealing judges who should sacrifice innocence, was more imposing than the court. One of the judges, related to the minister of grace and justice, Don Eugenio Caballero, seized with a mortal disease, would not leave the world without expressing an opinion worthy of a great magistrate. He requested his colleagues composing the extraordinary tribunal to come to his house to deliberate beside his death-bed. When they were assembled, Don Eugenio maintained that it was impossible to try the accomplices in a crime, real or false, without the principal author—that is to say, without the Prince of the Asturias; and that, according to the laws of the kingdom, that prince could be summoned and heard only before the assembled Cortes; that, moreover, the crime was imaginary; that the proofs furnished were null or destitute of legal character, for they were copies, and not the originals, which they had before them; that the unknown person who had denounced these facts ought, according to the Spanish laws, to come forward and depose upon the faith of an oath; that in the state of the proceedings, without the accused principal, without proofs, without witnesses, with all that was otherwise known concerning the alleged offence imputed to a prince, the object of the love of the nation, and to

great personages objects of its respect, upright judges ought to declare themselves incapable of pronouncing, and to beseech the king to annul so scandalous a process.

No sooner had this courageous citizen of an absolute monarchy, in which, absolute as it was, there were laws and magistrates imbued with their spirit—no sooner had he given his opinion, than his colleagues adopted that opinion, and joined in it with a sort of patriotic enthusiasm. They all embraced one another after this decision, like men about to die. People believed, in fact, not Charles IV., but the court, to be capable of everything against judges who had disappointed its calculations, and exaggerated its cruelty though they could not exaggerate its baseness.

When this decision was known, it transported the public with joy, and filled the court with despondence. Poor Charles IV. was persuaded that he ought to display his own justice in default of that of the magistrates, and a royal decree was wrung from him, in virtue of which the Dukes de San Carlos and de l'Infantado, the Marquis d'Ayerbo, and the Count d'Orgas were exiled to the distance of sixty leagues from the capital, and stripped of all their dignities and decorations. The Canon Escoïquiz, the most hated of all, was treated still more severely. He was deprived of his ecclesiastical benefices, and doomed to end his days in the monastery of Tardon. The Cardinal de Bourbon, Archbishop of Toledo, brother of the princess of the blood married to Emmanuel Godoy, was, moreover, required to make the chapter of Toledo pronounce the degradation of the Canon Escoïquiz, a member of that chapter. The cardinal obstinately refused to comply. On this occasion he ventured to reveal to Charles IV. the scandals of the monarchy, and the melancholy situation of the princess, his sister, united to the favourite, who had added to all his other crimes that of bigamy. He went so far, it is said, as to insist that his sister should be given up to him, and be permitted to shut herself up in a religious retreat, there to deplore a union which brought upon her disgrace and misery. The only answer received by the cardinal was an order to retire to his diocese.

The courageous magistrate who had so nobly done his duty, Don Eugenio Caballero, being dead, his funeral became a sort of triumph. All the religious congregations disputed the honour of burying him gratuitously, and all the most respectable people in Madrid accompanied the magistrate who had so worthily finished his career to his last home. As for the accused, the public rejoiced to see their lives saved, especially after the exaggerated apprehensions occasioned by their trial. No fears were entertained for the consequences of this trial to their reputation, for they were surrounded by universal esteem, even

beyond their merit; neither was any uneasiness felt about their exile, for nobody imagined that it would last long. All the world, in fact, expected a speedy catastrophe, whether it were to proceed from the public indignation, excited to the highest degree, or to be the work of the French troops, silently advancing towards the capital, without telling what they came to do there. People still flattered themselves that they would do what was generally wished, namely, hurl the favourite from that throne, half of which he had usurped, and unite the Prince of the Asturias with a French princess amid the thunder of their guns.

While the sympathies of an excited nation surrounded those who declared themselves against the court, that court was filled both with rage and terror. It was an immemorial custom for the royal family to leave, in January, the cold and bleak residence of the Escorial to enjoy the climate of Aranjuez, a magnificent domain, crossed by the Tagus, and where spring, as is the case in southern latitudes, begins to be felt in the month of March, sometimes even so early as the end of February. It was customary, too, Madrid lying in the way, for the court to pass a few days there, to receive the homage of the capital. Expecting this year to be greeted with demonstrations of aversion alone, the court passed the gates of Madrid without stopping, and went on to hide its shame, mortification, and alarm at Aranjuez.

It had, in fact, not a single support to hope for in any quarter. The Spanish people manifested an implacable hatred for it, and scarcely made any difference in favour of the king by despising instead of hating him. As for the terrible Emperor of the French, whom that court had alternately flattered and betrayed, whose favour since Jena it hoped to have regained by a year of meannesses, he covered himself all at once with an impenetrable veil, and maintained an alarming silence respecting his designs. The French armies, directed at first upon Portugal, were now executing a movement upon Madrid, upon pretext of marching towards Cadiz or Gibraltar. But it was an unheard of proceeding to invade in that manner, and without further explanation, the territory of a great power. The answer which Napoleon had returned to the proposal of marriage could not be regarded as serious; for he wished to know, he said, before he gave a French princess to Ferdinand, whether that prince was readmitted into the good graces of his parents, and this question he asked Charles IV., who had formally acquainted him with the arrest of the Prince of the Asturias and the pardon which followed it. The refusal to publish the treaty of Fontainebleau, which contained the concession of a sovereignty to Emmanuel Godoy, and the formal guarantee of the dominions belonging to the crown of Spain, could have none but a sinister signification.

From all these considerations despondence prevailed at Aranjuez in the interior of royalty, and at Buen Retiro in the residence of the Countess de Castel Fiel, the favourite of the favourite. Both here and there they began to open their eyes, and to discover that by dint of meannesses they had inspired Napoleon with the audacity to overthrow a degraded dynasty, despised by all the Spaniards. Every day the idea of imitating the house of Braganza and retiring to America recurred more and more frequently to the minds of the leaders of the court, and gave occasion to more and more frequent rumours. Emmanuel Godoy and the queen had almost definitively decided upon this resolution, and they secretly made their preparations; for the loads of valuable effects sent off for the ports were more numerous and more noticed than usual. But it was first necessary to gain the sanction of the king, whose weakness dreaded a change of place almost as much as the horrors of a war; it was also necessary to decide the princes of the blood, Don Antonio, brother of Charles IV., Ferdinand, his son and heir, as well as the younger Infants. The commission of one indiscretion would be sufficient to cause the whole nation to rise against such a design. The Prince of the Peace, in order to cover the preparations which were perceived at Ferrol and Cadiz, circulated a report that he was going in person, in his quality of grand-admiral, to inspect the ports, and that he was to begin with those of the south.

But before undertaking this flight, which even for the queen and Godoy was but an extreme course, it would be proper to endeavour by all means to draw from Napoleon the secret of his intentions, and to bend, if possible, his formidable will. There was nothing, in fact, that ought to have been attempted before they had themselves decided on leaving Spain, and before they had extorted the compliance of Charles IV. In consequence, in reply to the last answer of Napoleon, Charles IV. was prevailed upon to write another letter, dated the 5th of February, eight or ten days before the conclusion of the process at the Escorial, with a view to force him to an explanation, to touch his heart, if it were possible, to appeal even to his honour, deeply interested in keeping the promises that he had given. In this letter Charles IV. confessed the alarm which began to be felt at the approach of the French troops, reminded Napoleon of all that he had done to gratify him, all the proofs of attachment that he had given him, the sacrifice of his navy, the sending of his armies to distant countries, and solicited of him, in return for so faithful an alliance, a frank and honest declaration of his intentions; as he could not suppose that they were any other than what Spain had deserved. The poor king knew not, when writing in this manner, that this faithful alliance had been intermingled with a thousand secret treacheries, that the sacrifice of

his navy had served only to cause the destruction of the two fleets at Trafalgar, that the sending of a division to Hamburg had been of no other service than that of a demonstration, and that Spain had been an auxiliary useless to herself and to her allies, sometimes even the occasion of great uneasiness to them. Ignorant of these things, as of all others, he addressed these questions to Napoleon in perfect sincerity, under the dictation of those who knew, thought, and willed for him. This unfortunate prince could not believe that, at the close of his life, having never sought to do an injury, he could be reduced to the necessity either of fighting or of running away, convinced as he was that to reign honourably and safely it was sufficient to have never wilfully done harm; of which he was very sure, for he had never done anything but hunt and look after his horses and his fowling-pieces.

This letter, destined for Napoleon, was followed by most pressing letters to M. Yzquierdo. He was implored to procure at any price, no matter what it cost, precise intelligence of the intentions of France; to endeavour to change them by means of sacrifices, if they were hostile; or, if they were not to be changed, to communicate them at least, that one might be able to combat them or to avoid their consequences. All the necessary credits were opened for him, in case there should be any means of succeeding in such a commission.

The despatches in question arrived in Paris in the middle of February. Napoleon had evaded the application for a French princess for Ferdinand by feigning ignorance whether that prince had been restored to favour by his parents. Unable to allege any further doubt on this subject, and directly questioned concerning his intentions, he was sensible that the time for the *dénouement* had arrived, and that, after taking a fixed resolution to dethrone the Bourbons, he must at length fix upon the means of accomplishing it without revolting too violently the public feeling of Spain, France, and Europe. This was the only point upon which he had really hesitated; for if he had for a moment admitted the plan of allying the two dynasties by a marriage as practicable, and the plan of appropriating to himself a large portion of the Spanish territory as worth discussing, at bottom, he had always preferred, as the safest, the most decisive, nay, the most honest course, to take nothing from Spain but her dynasty and her barbarism, and suffering her to keep her territory, her colonies, and her independence. But the means of rendering enduring this act of a conqueror, even in times when not only the crowns of kings, but their heads had fallen—the means were difficult to find. The family of Braganza had itself, by its flight, suggested a medium to him, to which he had finally adhered, as we have seen: this was to induce the court of

Spain to embark at Cadiz for the New World. Nothing would then be more simple than to present himself to a deserted nation, to declare to it that, instead of a degenerate dynasty, cowardly enough to abandon its throne and its people, he would give it a new, glorious, peaceably reforming dynasty, bringing to Spain the benefits of the French Revolution without its calamities, a participation in the greatness of France without the horrible wars which France had had to sustain. This solution was natural, less liable to censure than the other, and furnished by the very cowardice of the adulterated families which reigned over the south of Europe. It became, moreover, more probable from day to day, since at each new fit of terror that should seize the court of Spain, the report of a retreat to America, echo of the internal agitations of the palace, was circulated in the capital. It would be sufficient to push this terror to the utmost, to make the French troops advance definitively towards Madrid, continuing to observe a threatening silence respecting their destination. In consequence, Napoleon made all arrangements for bringing about the catastrophe in March; for if it should be necessary to act in Spain, spring would be the most favourable season for introducing his young soldiers into that arid and parched country, which, physically as well as morally, is the commencement of Africa. It was now the middle of February. Napoleon had a month to the middle of March to make his last preparations. He began them, therefore, immediately after he had received the interrogatory letter of King Charles IV., dated the 5th of February, in which that unfortunate prince besought him to explain his intentions in regard to Spain.

But before provoking at Madrid the *dénouement* which he desired, he was obliged to decide upon the course to be pursued on a question not less important than that of Spain—on the question of the east; for at the moment one was linked to the other. If anything, in fact, could add to the imprudence of undertaking new enterprises when he had already such momentous ones on his hands, it would be that of engaging in the affairs of Spain with Russia discontented. Accustomed as Europe was to new spectacles, prepared as it was for the approaching end of the Bourbons of Spain, its foresight was far behind the reality; and the overthrow of one of the most ancient thrones in the world was destined to excite a deep emotion, to transfer from the head of England to that of France the reprobation called forth by the crime of Copenhagen. Though Prussia was crushed, Austria alternately irritated and trembling, it would have been supremely imprudent not to secure, on the eve of an act of the greatest audacity, the certain adhesion of Russia. It was, in fact, one of the most serious inconveniences of the enterprise against Spain, that it inevitably entailed sacrifices in the east; and it

was, as we shall see hereafter, one of the most lamentable faults of the emperor, in these circumstances, not to have known how to make those sacrifices frankly. It would have been otherwise if, having undertaken less in the north, if, having given up Germany to satisfy Prussia, he had not had to leave on the Vistula 300,000 veteran soldiers, who composed the real force of the French army. Confining himself then to the occupation of Italy and Spain, having his armies concentrated behind the Rhine, and nobody to fear or to support beyond that frontier, he might have dispensed with purchasing by sacrifices the concurrence of Russia. And if she had resolved to take advantage of the occasion to fall upon the east, Austria herself, though inconsolable for the loss of Italy, would have become the ally of France for the purpose of defending the Lower Danube. But Napoleon, having destroyed Prussia, created ephemeral royalities in Germany, and sowed the seeds of hatred and ingratitude from the Rhine to the Vistula, required an ally in the north, even though dearly purchased.

General Savary had been succeeded at St. Petersburg by M. de Caulaincourt, and nearly at the same time M. de Tolstoy, ambassador of Russia, had arrived at Paris. The latter was, as we have said, a soldier, brother of the grand-marshal of the palace, imbued with the opinions of the Russian aristocracy in regard to France, but member of a family which enjoyed the imperial favour, which placed that favour above its prejudices, and which discovered in the conquest of Finland and of the Danubian provinces a sufficient excuse for the deserters who had gone over from the English policy to the French policy. "My brother has devoted himself," said the Grand-Marshal Tolstoy to M. de Caulaincourt; "he has accepted the embassy to Paris, but if he does not obtain for Russia something of consequence he is ruined and all of us along with him."* These words prove in what spirit the new ambassador came to France. Alexander had related to him what had passed at Tilsit, in the way in which he was fond of calling it to mind and understanding it, and according to this communication, much altered from the conversations of Napoleon. M. de Tolstoy had conceived that all had been told, that the sacrifice of the Empire of the East was made, that he had come to Paris merely to sign the partition of Turkey, and the acquisition, if not of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, at least of the plains of the Danube as far as the Balkans. Besides, he had visited by the way the unfortunate sovereigns of Prussia, despoiled of part of their dominions, and deprived of nearly the whole of their revenues by the prolonged occupation of the provinces that were left them. M. de Tolstoy,

* These words are literally extracted from the secret correspondence so frequently quoted by us.

thinking that if the conquest of the provinces of the east interested the glory of Russia, the evacuation of the Prussian provinces interested her honour, came to Paris prepossessed with the twofold notion of obtaining a share of the Turkish empire and the evacuation of Prussia. Add to all this, that he was techy, irritable, suspicious, and excessively proud of the glory of the Russian armies.

Napoleon had promised to give him a favourable reception, to make him fond of residing at Paris, that he might contribute by his reports to the maintenance of the alliance. But he found him so fiery and so intractable on the double affair of the evacuation of Prussia and the acquisition of the provinces of the Danube, that he was annoyed at it. He felt so strong, and was himself so far from patient, that he could not long endure the persistence of M. de Tolstoy. Napoleon, only half disguising the vexation that he felt, told the new ambassador that if, after evacuating the whole of Old Prussia and part of Pomerania, he continued to occupy Brandenburg and Silesia, it was because Prussia had refused to pay the war contributions; that he desired nothing more than to withdraw his troops as soon as they should be paid; that, for the rest, if he tarried in Prussia beyond the intended time, the Russians, on their part, were tarrying without any avowable motive in the provinces of the Danube; and that Moldavia and Wallachia were assuredly equivalent to Silesia. Without precisely saying so, Napoleon appeared, in the eyes of a prejudiced person like M. de Tolstoy, to make the evacuation of Silesia dependent on that of Moldavia and Wallachia, and almost to link the acquisition of the latter by the Russians to the acquisition of the former by the French. The temper of M. de Tolstoy ought to have given way to the elevation of Napoleon, but the Russian minister felt grievously mortified; and as we always seek the society that sympathise most with our own sentiments, he kept company, in preference with the infatuated persons of the old French nobility, a fastidious class, who revenged themselves by their animadversions for not being yet admitted into the imperial court. He held a language that was not friendly, and had well nigh quarrelled with Marshal Ney, who was not of a passive disposition, about the merit of the Russian and the French armies, and behaved more like the representative of an unfriendly court than of one which wished to be, and which really was, at least for the moment, a close ally. M. de Talleyrand, with his disdainful *sang-froid*, was instructed to curb, to calm, to repress, if needful, the troublesome temper of M. de Tolstoy.

Things went on more smoothly at St. Petersburg between M. de Caulaincourt and the Emperor Alexander; but the latter dissembled no more than his ambassador the mortification which

he experienced. M. de Caulaincourt was a grave man, whose face was stamped with the integrity that dwelt in his soul, having but one weakness—the incapability of consoling himself for the part which he had acted in the affair of the Duke d'Enghien; which rendered him sensible, beyond measure, to the esteem that was manifested for him, and which furnished the Emperor Alexander with the means of swaying him. M. de Caulaincourt found the emperor full of courtesy and kindness towards him, but wounded to the heart to see that the promises made to him were not immediately realised. At Tilsit, Napoleon had said to the Emperor Alexander, that if the war continued, and if Russia took part in it, she might find towards the Baltic an increase of security, towards the Black Sea an increase of greatness; and he had talked eventually of the distribution to be made of the provinces of the Turkish empire, without, however, stipulating anything positive. But if, on the one hand, in the excitement of these communications, he had perhaps said more than he meant to grant, the Emperor Alexander had understood more than he had really said to him; and on his return to St. Petersburg, in a discontented company, in order to pacify it, he had made in confidence many indiscreet and exaggerated communications. By degrees a notion became current in the drawing-rooms of St. Petersburg, that Russia, though vanquished at Friedland, had brought back from Tilsit the gift of Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia. Those who were well disposed towards the Emperor Alexander, or, at least, who were not pre-determined to censure the government, considered that this was a very fine price for several unsuccessful campaigns; that if Russia owed such extensive conquests to the friendship of France, she did right to cultivate and to preserve that friendship. Those, on the contrary, who still cherished in their hearts all the sentiments excited by the late war, or who were angry with the emperor for his inconstancy, such as Messrs. de Czartoryski, Novosilzoff, Strogonoff, and Kotschoubey, representing the forsaken policy—these alleged that the conquest of Finland, to which Russia was urged, was of no value; that it was a country of lakes and marshes, totally destitute of inhabitants; that, moreover, this conquest was immoral, since it was gained from a relation and an ally, the King of Sweden; that, for the rest, it would be the only one that Napoleon would allow the Emperor Alexander to make; that he would never put Moldavia and Wallachia into his hands, of which people would very soon be convinced; that the French alliance was therefore at once a desertion, an inconsistency, and a cheat.

This language, repeated to the Emperor Alexander, deeply vexed him, and seeing by the reports of M. de Tolstoy that it was likely to be some day verified, he expressed to M. de

Caulaincourt his extreme mortification on the subject. He received him with great cordiality, manifested for him an esteem for which, as he perceived, that ambassador was eager, and then, coming to what concerned the Russian interests, he launched out into bitter complaints. He had never meant, he said, to link the fate of Silesia with that of Moldavia and Wallachia. He had stipulated and obtained from the friendship of the Emperor Napoleon the restitution of part of the Prussian dominions—a restitution necessary, indispensable, to the honour of Russia. He should have been content with that restitution, and have retired to his own empire, satisfied with having spared his unfortunate allies some of the consequences of the war, if the Emperor Napoleon, desirous to engage him in his system, had not afforded him a glimpse of aggrandisements both to the north and to the south of the empire, and had not been the first to speak to him about Moldavia and Wallachia. Urged to enter this track, he had done all that Napoleon desired; he had declared war against England, in spite of the interests of Russian commerce; he had resolved upon war with Sweden, in spite of the ties of relationship; and when he and everybody in the empire expected to receive the price of all this compliance with a foreign policy, there comes all at once intelligence from Paris that he must renounce the most legitimate hopes. The czar could not recover from his surprise, or get the better of his vexation. To pretend to make the fate of Silesia dependent on that of Moldavia and Wallachia, and to keep back the one from the Prussians in order to give the two others to the Russians, was a proceeding which rendered it a duty of honour to refuse everything. He could not pay with the spoils of an unfortunate friend, whom he was accused of having too much sacrificed already, for acquisitions that he might be permitted to make on the Danube. "*Those unfortunate Prussians,*" said Alexander to M. de Caulaincourt, "*have nothing to eat.* Relieve me from their importunities, and I shall have nothing else to trouble me in my relations with France. Besides, what would Napoleon do with Silesia? Would he keep it himself? But in that case he would be my neighbour, and neighbours, as he has himself told me, are never friends. Of what advantage to him would be a province so distant from his empire? Let him take what he pleases around him, near to him, I shall think it natural and regular. He has taken Etruria; he is going, it is said, to take the Roman States; and contemplates one knows not what against Spain—be it so! Let him do what suits him in the south, but leave us to do, in like manner, what suits us in the north, and not approach too near our frontiers. If he does not want Silesia for himself, could he give it to any one else equally serviceable to him with me? Assuredly not; and in restoring

it to the Prussians, which is the simplest of solutions, he must not in retaliation refuse me what he has promised. He would then disappoint, not only my expectations, but those of the Russian nation, which would esteem Finland to be not worth the war which it will cost us with England and Sweden; which would say, 'that I have been duped by the great man with whom I have conversed at Tilsit; that one cannot meet him without danger, either on the field of battle or in a negotiation; and that it would have been better, without continuing an impolitic and dangerous war, to separate in peace, but with indifference and the coldness which distance justifies.'"

Such had been, and such was, every day the language of the Emperor Alexander to M. de Caulaincourt. He did not add that if he had been taught to hope for the provinces of the Danube, it was without their being promised to him, and that if, out of a mere hope, the Russian nation, misled by the rumours of the court, had made a formal engagement, the fault was his, owing to his indiscretion, nay, his weakness, since he had not been able to control those around him but by promising more than he could perform. Alexander did not add this; but it was evident that if one were not to come to his relief by granting what he had imprudently suffered the nation to hope for, he would be cruelly hurt, and his minister Romanzoff also, and that if the sudden change of policy effected at Tilsit was too recent for one to venture upon another equally sudden, there would still be left at the bottom of the heart a deep wound constantly bleeding, and from which fresh wars would be likely soon to ensue.

M. de Caulaincourt, affirming with his persuasive honesty the good faith of Napoleon, protesting that everything would be cleared up, attributing to a misunderstanding, to the jealous susceptibility of M. de Tolstoy, the sinister reports which had come from Paris, succeeded in restoring some composure to the mind of the Emperor Alexander. The latter, at length, began to find fault with M. de Tolstoy himself, with his awkwardness, with his ill-temper, and declared before M. de Caulaincourt that he would not fail, if he again found M. de Tolstoy, as he did formerly M. de Markoff, bent on embroiling the two courts, to make a signal example of those who should study to thwart, instead of endeavouring to serve him. The Emperor Alexander had appeared highly gratified by the magnificent presents of Sèvres porcelain sent to St. Petersburg, by the cession of fifty thousand muskets, and by the reception of the Russian cadets into the French navy. But nothing touched that heart, full of a single passion, excepting the object of that passion. The provinces of the Danube or nothing; that was impressed upon his countenance as in his soul, deeply smitten with ambition and renown.

For the rest, M. de Caulaincourt, in order to ascertain pre-

cisely whether the nation shared the sentiments of its sovereign, sent one of the employés of the embassy to Moscow, to pick up what was said there. This employé, transported into the circles of the old Russian aristocracy, whose language was more natural and more true than at St. Petersburg, heard it repeated that the young czar had very rapidly passed from hatred to friendship in espousing the policy of France at Tilsit; that he had very lightly compromised the interests of Russian commerce by declaring war against Great Britain; that Finland was a very slender compensation for such sacrifices; that Wallachia and Moldavia at least would be required to make suitable payment for them; but that those fine provinces would never be obtained from Napoleon; and that their young emperor would this time have to pay the penalty of a new inconsistency by a new disappointment.

M. de Caulaincourt lost no time in transmitting these various particulars to Napoleon, and declared that without doubt the court of Russia, though deeply mortified, would not go to war; but that it was not to be relied upon if that were not granted to it which, with or without reason, it had flattered itself that it should obtain.

General Savary, returning from St. Petersburg, corroborated by his testimony the reports of M. de Caulaincourt, supported them by the recital of a multitude of particulars which he had himself collected, and confirmed Napoleon in the idea that it depended on himself to attach the Emperor Alexander entirely, to chain him to all his projects, whatever they might be, by means of a concession in the east. Decided ever since the middle of February to extinguish the Bourbons of Spain, Napoleon hesitated no longer and resolved to pay on the banks of the Danube for the new power which he thought himself on the point of acquiring on the banks of the Ebro and the Tagus.

It was assuredly the best measure that he could adopt; for though it was very grievous to have to lead the Russians by the hand himself to Constantinople, or, at least, to bring them nearer to that object of their everlasting ambition, still it was necessary to be consistent, and to submit to the condition of the enterprise in which he was about to engage. He was obliged to grant one or two provinces on the Danube, in order to acquire the right of dethroning in Spain one of the oldest dynasties in Europe, and to renew the policy of Louis XIV. beyond the Pyrenees. For the rest, if Napoleon had done no more than give Moldavia and Wallachia without Bulgaria to the Russians, that is to say, lead them to the banks of the Danube, taking care to stop them there; if, at the same time, he had procured Bosnia, Servia, and Bulgaria for the Austrians, for the purpose of opposing them to the Russians, by placing them upon the road to Constantinople, the mischief would not have been by far so great. Albania and the

Morea would have been a fine compensation for France, and she would not have bought too dearly the concession which she was obliged to make in order to ensure the Russian alliance. The daily language of the Emperor Alexander and of M. de Romanzoff left no doubt of their acquiescence in these conditions. Here then it was requisite to stop: to pay for the Russian alliance, since we had made it a necessity, but not to push the dismemberment of old Europe any further, not to contribute more to the growth of the young colossus, sprung from the ices of the pole, and enlarging for a century past in a manner to appal the world.

Napoleon, however, whether he designed to occupy the imagination of Alexander, or whether, reduced to the necessity of a sacrifice, he sought to envelop it in an immense recomposition, or, lastly, whether he thought to derive from circumstances, besides the overthrow of the dynasty of the Bourbons, the entire acquisition of the coasts of the Mediterranean—Napoleon conceived that he ought not to stop at the mere concession of Moldavia and Wallachia, which would have settled everything, and assented to the raising of the immense question of the complete partition of the Ottoman empire. At the moment, the Turks, secretly excited by Austria, publicly by England, both asserting that France was about to sacrifice them to Russian ambition—the Turks conducted themselves in the most odious manner towards the French. Not daring to strike off their heads, they struck off those of their partisans, and behaved, in short, like furious barbarians intoxicated with blood and pillage. Napoleon, exasperated against them, at length determined to write a letter to the Emperor Alexander, in which he announced his intention of discussing the question of the Empire of the East, of considering it under all its aspects, of solving it definitively; in which he also expressed a desire to admit Austria as a sharer, and specified as an essential condition of this partition, whatever it might be, partial or total, more advantageous for these or for those, a gigantic expedition to India, across the continent of Asia, executed by a French, Austrian, and Russian army. It was M. de Caulaincourt who delivered Napoleon's letter to the Emperor Alexander. The czar was already apprised by a despatch from M. de Tolstoy of the favourable change which had taken place at Paris, and he received the ambassador of France with transports of joy. He insisted on reading Napoleon's letter immediately, and in his presence. He read it with an emotion which he was unable to repress. "Ah, the great man!" he exclaimed every moment—"the great man! There! he has come back to the ideas of Tilsit! Tell him," he frequently repeated to M. de Caulaincourt, "that I am devoted to him for life; that my empire, my armies, and all are at his disposal. When I ask him to grant something to satisfy

the pride of the Russian nation, it is not out of ambition that I speak: it is for the purpose of giving him that nation whole and entire, and as devoted to his great projects as I am myself. Your master," he added, "purposes to interest Austria in the dismemberment of the Turkish empire: he is in the right. It is a wise conception: I cordially join in it. He designs an expedition to India: I consent to that too. I have already made him acquainted, in our long conversations at Tilsit, with the difficulties attending it. He is accustomed to take no account of obstacles; nevertheless, the climate and distances here present such as surpass all that he can imagine. But let him be easy; the preparations on my part shall be proportioned to the difficulties. Now we must come to an understanding about the distribution of the territories which we are going to wrest from Turkish barbarism. Discuss this subject thoroughly with M. de Romanzoff. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that all this cannot be usefully, definitively discussed, but in an interview between me and Napoleon. As soon as our ideas have arrived at a commencement of maturity, I shall leave St. Petersburg, and go to meet your emperor at whatever distance he pleases. I should like to go as far as Paris, but I cannot; besides, it is a meeting upon business that we want, not a meeting for parade and pleasure. We might choose Weimar, where we should be among our own family; but even there we should be annoyed by a thousand things. At Erfurt we should be more free, more to ourselves. Propose that place to your sovereign; when his answer arrives I will set out immediately, and I shall travel like a courier."

As he said these things and a thousand others, which it were useless to repeat, the emperor, overflowing with a joy which he could not repress, acknowledged that M. de Caulaincourt was right some time before, when endeavouring to tranquillise him respecting the intentions of Napoleon, in imputing the momentary disagreement to mere misunderstandings. He again repeated that he was sure it was M. de Tolstoy, who had been awkward, warm, perhaps even indocile, to the new policy of the Russian cabinet; that he would change him and send another who should be entirely to the liking of Napoleon, but he knew not where to find such a one; that he everywhere met with refractory spirits; but he was determined to quell them, whatever severity he was obliged to use, and *make them pursue the grand system of Tilsit.*

M. de Caulaincourt found old M. de Romanzoff not less warm, less young, in the expression of his joy. "Here we are then come back again to the ideas of Tilsit," he repeated to M. de Caulaincourt. "Those we comprehend, we enter into them; they are worthy of the great man who is an honour to the age

and to human nature." After incredible demonstrations of satisfaction and of devotedness to France, M. de Romanzoff ventured upon that difficult question of partition. There commenced embarrassment, nay, even, we must say, confusion. To lay daring hands on the extensive countries which are of such importance to the equilibrium of the world, and which belong not only to the stupid possessors, who keep them in barbarism and sterility, but far more to Europe itself, so deeply interested in their independence—to lay hands on these countries, even in idea, embarrassed the greedy Russian minister, who devoured them in his longings, and the French minister, who gave them up from necessity to the Muscovite monster of ambition. Though both were furnished with their instructions, and knew what to think, what to say, on the subject which brought them together, neither was willing to speak the first word. The most hungry was, of course, the first to speak, and he did speak. He spoke, in that interview and in several others, with entire freedom, and with an unparalleled boldness of ambition.

Two plans presented themselves: in the first place, a partial partition, which should leave to the Turks that portion of their European territory extending from the Balkans to the Bosphorus, consequently the two straits and the city of Constantinople, and all their Asiatic provinces; in the second place, a complete partition, which should leave to the Turks none of their European territory, and take from them all their Asiatic provinces washed by the Mediterranean.

The first plan was that which seemed to have occupied the two emperors at Tilsit. It presented but few difficulties. France was to have all the maritime provinces, Albania, which adjoins Dalmatia, the Morea, and Candia. Russia was to obtain Moldavia and Wallachia, which form the left of the Danube, Bulgaria, which forms the right, and thus stop at the Balkans. Austria, to console herself for seeing Russia established at the mouths of the Danube, was to take Bosnia in full property, and Servia as an appanage for one of the archdukes. In this system the Turks would retain the most essential part of their European provinces, those which geography and the nature of the population have hitherto amply ensured to them, that is to say, the part to the south of the Balkans, the two straits, Constantinople, and the whole of the Asiatic empire. There would thus be taken from them such provinces only as they could no longer govern, Moldavia, Wallachia, to which they had already been obliged to concede a sort of independence; Servia, which was at that moment striving to emancipate itself by arms; Epire, which belonged to Ali, pacha of Janina, more than to the Porte; lastly, Greece, which already appeared disposed to defy the sw
ant conquerors rather than to endure their

yoke. The division of these provinces among the co-partners was made agreeably to geography. France gained, it is true, superb maritime positions. Still, besides the inconvenience of herself bringing the Russians near to Constantinople, there was another not less serious, namely, that of giving to Russia and Austria that which, from the contiguity of territory, must continue theirs, and taking for France such as could not remain hers unless in the hypothesis of a greatness impossible to be long maintained. Had we kept the most essential part of that greatness, the Rhine and the Alps, and even the back of the Alps, that is to say, Piedmont, Greece was still too far from us to be preserved. All this was, therefore, in reality, but a sorry concession towards the east for the triumph in the west of great designs, no doubt, but unseasonable, extravagant, which must add new burdens to those which already oppressed the empire.

The second plan was a sort of convulsion of the civilised world. The Turkish empire was to be swept away completely both from Europe and from Asia. The Russians, according to this new plan, were to pass the Balkans and to occupy the southern slope, namely, ancient Thrace as far as the straits, to obtain the object of their desires, Constantinople, and a portion of the shore of Asia, to ensure to them the possession of the straits. Austria, acquiring also a better share, and employed in keeping France and Russia apart, would obtain, besides Bosnia and Servia, both in full property, Macedonia itself as far as the sea, with the exception of Salonichi. France, retaining her former allotment, Albania, Thessaly as far as Salonichi, the Morea, Candia, would have further all the islands of the Archipelago, Cyprus, Syria, and Egypt. The Turks, flung back to the extremity of Asia Minor, and upon the Euphrates, would be at liberty to adhere there to that religion of the Koran which had caused them to lose their empire in Europe and three-fourths of that in Asia.

In this chimerical division of the world, destined perhaps to become some day a reality, with the exception of what was then reserved for France, there was one point, however, on which it was impossible to agree, and which was as strongly contested as if all these plans were to be carried into speedy execution. Constantinople interested both the pride and the ambition of the Russians, and among nations one is not more eager than another. The Russians coveted the city of Constantinople itself, as a symbol of the Empire of the East: they coveted the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, as the keys of the seas. M. de Caulaincourt participated in the sentiments of Napoleon, who recoiled with pride and horror when he was asked to give up Constantinople to the rulers of the north, peremptorily

refused, and proposed to make Constantinople and the two straits a sort of neutral State—a kind of Hanseatic town, like Hamburg or Bremen. At length, when the Russian minister persisted in the demand of the city of Constantinople in particular, as though it had been for St. Sophia alone, M. de Caulaincourt acceded, saving the pleasure of his master, but reserving the Dardanelles for France, as being the route by land for Syria and Egypt, which would have made the French battalions travel the same road as the ancient crusaders. The Russians, having St. Sophia, would not relinquish to the French the Strait of the Dardanelles, which they were importunate to leave in the hands of the Turks, weak as they were. They refused Constantinople on those terms, and declared, what was indeed true, that they should prefer the first partial partition, which left the south of the Balkans and Constantinople to the Turks. Satisfied, in this case, with having the extensive plains of the Danube as far as the Balkans, they consented to postpone the rest of their conquest, and chose rather to see the keys of the seas in the hands of the Turks than to put them into those of the French.

It was to no purpose to continue the discussion on this important subject; the parties could not come to an understanding, and the interminable quarrel which arose—daring and silly anticipation of ages—revealed the true interest of Europe against Russia in the question concerning Constantinople. The French empire having become, at this time, extensive as Europe itself, was alive to all its interests, and would not give up the strait from which the Russians will some day threaten the independence of the European continent. It was quite enough to concede Finland to them, to afford them the means of taking a step towards the Sound, another strait, from which, at some future time, they will be not less threatening. When, indeed, the Russian colossus shall have one foot on the Dardanelles and the other on the Sound, the Old World will be enslaved, freedom will have fled to America; chimerical at this moment to narrow minds, these forebodings will some day be realised; for Europe, unwisely divided, like the cities of Greece before the kings of Macedonia, will probably experience the like fate.

After long discussion, the Russian minister and the French ambassador had done no more than ripen their ideas, as they said. There was nothing but a meeting of the two sovereigns that could settle these mighty differences. It was therefore agreed that an exposition of the two plans should be addressed to Napoleon, with a request to send his opinions, and an offer of an interview for the purpose of reconciling them with those of the Emperor Alexander. For this interview there was to be selected a place very near to France, such as Erfurt for instance.

But to write such things was repugnant even to those who had dared to utter them. M. de Caulaincourt, apprised sometimes by his good sense of their chimerical and alarming nature, preferred leaving to M. de Romanzoff the task of committing them to writing. The latter accepted it, and presented a note, written entirely with his own hand, which M. de Caulaincourt was to despatch immediately to Napoleon. If, however, he ventured to write, he dared not to sign it. He delivered it himself, in his own handwriting, but not signed; and to give it full authenticity, the Emperor Alexander declared orally to M. de Caulaincourt that this note had his full approbation, and was to be received, though without signature, as the authentic expression of the ideas of the Russian cabinet.*

* We think it right to quote this paper itself, perhaps the most curious monument of those extraordinary times, copied literally from the Minute in the handwriting of M. de Romanzoff, sent to Napoleon, and now preserved in the depot of the Louvre. We have had before us the original document, and we affirm the strict accuracy of the following copy:—

“Since his majesty, the Emperor of the French and the King of Italy, &c., has recently judged that, in order to attain a general peace and to secure the tranquillity of Europe, it would be expedient to weaken the Ottoman empire by the dismemberment of its provinces, the Emperor Alexander, faithful to his engagements and to his friendship, is ready to concur in it.

“The first idea which could not fail to present itself to the Emperor of all the Russias, who is fond of calling to mind the occurrences at Tilsit, when this overture was made to him, was that the emperor, his ally, purposed to proceed immediately to the execution of what the two monarchs had agreed upon in the treaty of alliance relative to the Turks, and that he added to it the proposal of an expedition to India.

“It had been settled at Tilsit that the Ottoman power was to be driven back into Asia, retaining in Europe nothing but the city of Constantinople and Roumelia.

“There was drawn at the same time this consequence, that the Emperor of the French should acquire Albania, the Morea, and the island of Candia.

“Wallachia and Moldavia were next allotted to Russia, giving that empire the Danube for its boundary, comprehending Bessarabia, which is in fact a strip of sea-coast, and which is commonly considered as forming part of Moldavia; if to this portion be added Bulgaria, the emperor is ready to concur in the expedition to India, of which there had then been no question, provided that this expedition to India, as the Emperor Napoleon himself has just traced its route, shall proceed through Asia Minor.

“The Emperor Alexander applauded himself for the idea of gaining the concurrence of a corps of Austrian troops in the expedition to India; and as the emperor, his ally, seemed to wish that it should not be numerous, he conceives that this concurrence would be adequately compensated by awarding to Austria, Turkish Croatia and Bosnia, unless the Emperor of the French should find it convenient to retain a portion of them. There might, moreover, be offered to Austria a less direct but very considerable interest, by settling the future condition of Servia, incontestably one of the fine provinces of the Ottoman empire, in the following manner:—

“The Servians are a warlike people, and that quality, which always commands esteem, must excite a wish to regulate their lot judiciously.

“The Servians, fraught with a feeling of just vengeance against the Turks, have boldly shaken off the yoke of their oppressors, and are, it is said, resolved never to wear it again. In order to consolidate peace, it seems necessary, therefore, to take care to make them independent of the Turks.

“The peace of Tilsit determines nothing in regard to them. Their own wish,

However, it was not enough to discuss eventually plans of partition of the Turkish empire. Napoleon conceived that something more positive was needed to satisfy the Russians, something which, while imposing a less sacrifice on him, would touch them deeply, when from words they should proceed to

expressed strongly and more than once, has led them to implore the Emperor Alexander to admit them into the number of his subjects; this attachment to his person makes him desirous that they should live happy and content, without insisting upon extending his sway; his majesty seeks no acquisitions that could obstruct peace; he makes with pleasure this sacrifice, and all those which can contribute to render it speedy and solid. He proposes, in consequence, to erect Serbia into an independent kingdom, to give its crown to one of the arch-dukes who is not the head of any sovereign branch, and who is sufficiently remote from the succession to the throne of Austria; and in this case it should be stipulated that this kingdom should never be incorporated with the mass of the dominions of that house.

"This whole supposition of the dismemberment of the Turkish provinces, as explained above, being founded upon the engagements at Tilsit, has not appeared to offer any difficulty to the two persons commissioned by the two emperors to discuss together the means of attaining the ends proposed by their imperial majesties.

"The Emperor of Russia is ready to take part in a treaty between the three emperors, which should fix the conditions above expressed; but, on the other hand, having conceived that the letter which he recently received from the Emperor of the French seemed to indicate the resolution of a much more extensive dismemberment of the Ottoman empire than that which had been projected between them at Tilsit, that monarch, in order to meet the interests of the three imperial courts, and particularly in order to give the emperor, his ally, all the proofs of friendship and deference that are in his power, has declared that, without wanting a further diminution of the strength of the Ottoman Porte, he would cheerfully concur in it.

"He has laid down as the principle of his interest in this greater partition that his share of the increased acquisition should be moderate in extent or magnitude, and that he would consent that the share of his ally in particular should be marked out of much larger proportion. His majesty has added that beside this principle of moderation he placed one of wisdom, which consisted in not finding himself by this new plan of partition worse placed than he is at present in regard to boundaries and commercial relations.

"Setting out with these two principles, the Emperor Alexander would see, not only without jealousy but with pleasure, the Emperor Napoleon acquire and incorporate with his dominions, in addition to what has been mentioned above, all the islands of the Archipelago, Cyprus, Rhodes, and even whatever is left of the seaports of the Levant, Syria, and Egypt.

"In case of this more extensive partition, the Emperor Alexander would change his preceding opinion respecting the state of Serbia; studying to form an honourable and highly advantageous share for the house of Austria, he should wish that Serbia should be incorporated with the mass of the Austrian dominions, and that there should be added to it Macedonia, with the exception of that part of Macedonia which France might desire in order to fortify her Albanian frontier, so as that France might obtain Salonichi. This line of the Austrian frontier might be drawn from Scopia to Orphane, and would make the power of the house of Austria extend to the sea.

"Croatia might belong to France or to Austria, as the Emperor Napoleon pleases.

"The Emperor Alexander cannot disguise from his ally that, finding a particular satisfaction in all that has been said at Tilsit, he places, according to the advice of the emperor, his friend, those possessions of the house of Austria between theirs, in order to avoid the point of contact, always so liable to cool friendship.

"The share of Russia in this new and extensive partition would have added

deeds—this was the conquest of Finland. He had ordered M. de Caulaincourt to urge warmly the expedition against Sweden, from the motive that we have just mentioned, and also because he was desirous to compromise Russia irrevocably in his system. Once engaged against the Swedes, she could not fail to be so against the English, and to proceed, in regard to them, from a mere declaration of hostilities to hostilities them-

to that which was awarded to her in the preceding plan, the possession of the city of Constantinople, with a radius of a few leagues in Asia, and in Europe part of Roumelia, so as that the frontier of Russia, on the side of the new possessions of Austria, setting out from Bulgaria, should follow the frontier of Servia to a little beyond Solismick and the chain of mountains which runs from Solismick to Trayanopol inclusive, and then the river Moriza to the sea.

"In the conversation that has taken place respecting this second plan of partition, there has been this difference of opinion, that one of the two persons conceived that, if Russia were to possess Constantinople, France ought to possess the Dardanelles, or, at least, to appropriate to herself that which was on the Asiatic side: this assertion was contested, on the other part, upon the ground of the immense disproportion proposed to be made in the shares of this new and greater partition, and that even the occupation of the fort would utterly destroy the principle of the Emperor of Russia not to be worse placed than he now is in regard to his geographical and commercial relations.

"The Emperor Alexander, moved by the feeling of his extreme friendship for the Emperor Napoleon, has declared, with a view to remove the difficulty; 1stly, that he would agree to a military road for France, running through the new possessions of Austria and Russia, opening to her a military route to the ports of Syria; 2ndly, that if the Emperor Napoleon wished to possess Smyrna, or any other point on the coast of Natolia, from the point of that coast which is opposite to Mitylene to that which is situated opposite to Rhodes, and should send troops thither to conquer them, the Emperor Alexander is ready to assist in this enterprise, by joining, for this purpose, a corps of his troops to the French troops; 3rdly, that if Smyrna, or any other possession on the coast of Natolia, such as has just been pointed out, having come under the dominion of France, should afterwards be attacked not only by the Turks, but even by the English, in hatred of that treaty, his majesty the Emperor of Russia will in that case proceed to the aid of his ally whenever he shall be required to do so.

"4thly. His majesty thinks that the house of Austria might, on the same footing, assist France in taking possession of Salonichi, and proceed to the aid of that port whenever it shall be required of her.

"5thly. The Emperor of Russia declares that he has no wish to acquire the south coast of the Black Sea which is in Asia, though, in the discussion, it was thought that it might be desirable for him.

"6thly. The Emperor of Russia has declared that, whatever might be the success of his troops in India, he should not desire to possess anything there, and that he would cheerfully consent that France should make for herself all the territorial acquisitions in India which she might think fit; and that it should be likewise at her option to cede any portion of the conquests which she might make there to her allies.

"If the two allies agree together in a precise manner that they adopt one or the other of these two plans of partition, his majesty the Emperor Alexander will have extreme pleasure in repairing to the personal interview which has been proposed to him, and which could perhaps take place at Erfurt. He conceives that it would be advantageous if the basis of the engagements that are to be made there were previously fixed with a sort of precision, that the two emperors may have nothing to add to the extreme satisfaction of seeing one another but that of being enabled to sign without delay the fate of this part of the globe, and thereby, as they propose to themselves, to force England to desire that peace from which she now keeps aloof wilfully and with such boasting."

selves. But singularly enough, the Russians were reluctant to undertake the conquest of Finland, the most useful one, nevertheless, of all those which they were meditating, and it seemed to be sufficient to have obtained the authorisation for it, without being in haste to carry it into execution. It was with regret that they diverted part of their forces either from the east or from the Polish provinces, greatly agitated at that moment. Nevertheless, continually urged by M. de Caulaincourt, they did at length invade Finland in the course of February, at the very time when the plan of partition, of which we have been treating, was under discussion.

Notwithstanding all his efforts, the Emperor Alexander could not assemble more than 25,000 men on the frontier of Finland. He had entrusted the command of them to General Buxhövdén, the same who had displayed his incapacity at Austerlitz, and who displayed it still more in the war with Sweden. Excellent troops had been given him, with good lieutenants, especially the heroic and indefatigable Bagration, who when one war was finished longed to begin another. Napoleon had strongly urged them to act during the frosts, that they might be able to cross without difficulty the waters which cover Finland, a country studded with lakes, forests, granitic rocks, dropped upon this earth like *aérolites*. A brave Swedish officer, General Klingspor, with 15,000 regular troops, steady as Swedish troops always are, and 4000 or 5000 militia, defended the country. If the Swedish government, less regardless of all the warnings which it had received, had taken its precautions, and directed all its forces upon that point, instead of threatening the Danes with ridiculous attempts, it might have advantageously disputed the possession of that valuable province. But it had left there too few troops, and those too untrained, to oppose any efficacious resistance. The Russians, on their part, attacked upon a very ill-conceived plan, which attested the profound incapacity of their commander-in-chief. Finland, from Wiborg to Abo, from Abo to Uleaborg, forms a triangle, two sides of which are washed by the gulfs of Finland and Bothnia, while the third is bordered by the Russian frontier. Common sense intimated that it was requisite to operate on the side of the triangle bordering the Russian frontier, that is to say, by the Savolax, because it was the shortest and the least defended line. The Swedes, in fact, occupied the two sides which form the coasts of the gulfs of Finland and Bothnia; they were spread through the seaports, peopled in general by Swedes, the ancient colonists of Finland. If, instead of traversing the two maritime sides of the triangle, for the purpose of disputing these with them, the Russians had followed with a column of 15,000 men the side which borders their frontier from Wiborg to Uleaborg, sending along the coast

only a column of 10,000 men to occupy as fast as the Swedes evacuated it, and also to blockade the fortresses, they would have arrived before the Swedes at Uleaborg, and taken not only Finland, but General Klingspor and the little army charged with the defence of the country. They did nothing of the kind, but advanced along the coast in three columns, commanded by Generals Gortschakoff, Touthkoff, and Bagration, driving before them the Swedes, who defended themselves as vigorously as they were attacked in a series of partial actions. The left column having arrived at Sweaborg while the other two were marching upon Tavastehuus, undertook the blockade of that great maritime fortress, which consisted of several fortified islands, and which was defended by old Admiral Cronstedt with 7000 men. The columns of the centre and the right advanced from Tavastehuus to Abo, after traversing the side of the Finland triangle which borders the gulf of Finland. General Bagration was left at Abo, and General Touthkoff was afterwards sent along the side that borders the gulf of Bothnia running direct north to Uleaborg. A weak column had been directed upon the essential line, that from Wiborg to Uleaborg. Thus the Russians did nothing more than push the enemy before them, merely taking from them a few prisoners, and bringing about themselves a concentration of the Swedes, who, had they thrown themselves in mass upon the true line of operation, from Uleaborg to Wiborg by the Savolax, might have made them atone for so vicious a manner of operating. There were, nevertheless, brilliant petty actions, which proved the bravery of the troops of the two nations, and the experience acquired by the Russian officers in their wars against us, but the ignorance of their staff in all that concerned the general conduct of the operations. It was not thus that French generals, educated in the school of Napoleon, would have acted upon such a theatre of war. The Russians, having invaded but not conquered the country, undertook the siege of the fortresses on the coast, among others that of Sweaborg, which the frost could not but singularly facilitate.

A month or thereabout had sufficed for this military march, which was only the commencement of the war in Finland—a month employed by the Russian cabinet in the discussion of the partition of the east. The King of Sweden, on learning the invasion of his dominions, to revenge himself apparently for the surprise sustained from a brother-in-law, ventured upon an act which is hardly customary any longer even in Turkey; he caused the Russian ambassador, M. d'Alopeus, to be seized, instead of merely sending him away; which excited general indignation in the whole diplomatic body residing at Stockholm. Alexander replied with suitable dignity to this strange conduct;

he dismissed with infinite marks of attention M. de Stedingk, ambassador from Sweden at St. Petersburg, an old man universally respected ; but he revenged himself in a different and more skilful manner. He took advantage of the occasion to pronounce the union of Finland with the Russian empire. This conquest was the sole result of the mighty plans projected at Tilsit ; but though the only one, it was sufficient to justify the policy followed at that moment by the Emperor Alexander, and it is a proof that Russia cannot conquer but with the concurrence of France.

Notwithstanding the disdain which the Russians had affected for the conquest of Finland, the fact itself, which seemed to be consummated, though a great deal of blood was yet to be spilt—the fact deeply affected the mind of the public at St. Petersburg. It was remarked that having met with nothing but defeats in the service of England, Russia had, after only a few months' friendship with France, acquired an important province, but little cultivated and thinly peopled, it is true, in which respects it was very much like the rest of the empire, but admirably situated as a land and sea frontier ; and people began to hope that the policy of the French alliance might prove as fertile as the government flattered itself that it would. The emperor and his minister were radiant with joy. Their usual critics, Messrs. de Czartoryski and Novosiltzoff, were less disdainful and less bitter in their animadversions. The society in St. Petersburg itself manifested its content with M. de Caulaincourt in quite new attentions, addressed not only to his person, which was surrounded by the public esteem, but also to his government, with which it began to be satisfied.

The emperor and M. de Romanzoff, who had just received intelligence of the invasion of Etruria and Portugal, of the movements of troops towards Rome and Madrid, and who could not doubt that those movements had a very serious motive, never spoke of them but with singular levity, without any appearance of pre-occupation, and as men who gave up the weak in order that they might be allowed to oppress in their turn. But though they felt a real satisfaction, they were very urgent with M. de Caulaincourt for a speedy answer to the various proposals for partition and the appointment of a place for an interview to be held very shortly, in order to settle matters definitively. Spring was near at hand, for it was almost the end of February, and they wanted, they said, against the opening of the navigation, something striking, that should make people forget the disasters of the preceding year. The opening of the navigation in the northern seas is a period of rejoicing ; for light makes its appearance again, warmth returns, commerce brings its treasures. The productions of the north are exchanged for those of civilised

Europe or for specie. But this year the English flag, the usual instrument of these exchanges, was not to appear, or if it did, it must float from the mastheads of men-of-war. The English shipping, instead of bringing treasures, was not to show anything but the muzzles of its guns. There was wanted to oppose to this sad spectacle some great national joy, excited by interests of a different kind, the interests of Russian ambition.

M. de Caulaincourt, who accurately reported to his master the ideas of this ambitious court, had communicated everything to Napoleon with his usual veracity. But in explaining the wishes of Russia, he represented as certain that for the present she was fully satisfied, and that for the rest she could be fed for some time with hopes.

Napoleon, successively informed of this situation at the end of February and in the beginning of March, had clearly foreseen all the emotions, all the plans more or less chimerical, all the hopes more or less exaggerated, that his letter would produce at St. Petersburg; but he had said to himself that, in the immediate invasion of Finland, and in the acceptance of a discussion opened for the partition of the Turkish empire, there was food enough for several months for the imagination of the Russian nation and of its sovereign; and that during this interval he could prosecute his plans respecting the west. It is not true, as one would be disposed to believe from what precedes, that he entirely deceived Russia, and that, in reality, he never intended to grant her at any price a concession in the east. He knew that by relinquishing Moldavia and Wallachia, and even Moldavia alone, he should satisfy the czar, and pay his debt to Russian ambition, whatever French ambition might presume to do in the west. He had, therefore, this resource, in all cases, for realising the hopes which he had led the Emperor Alexander to conceive. But if he went further, and was not sorry to employ in this manner the lively imagination of his new ally, it was because, on his part, his own imagination plunged deeper into this futurity than that of his contemporaries. The Turks, since the fall of Selim, appeared to have reached the term of their existence. Napoleon asked himself if he must not put an end to this ever-threatening ruin; and excited by his maritime struggle with the English, he again asked himself if the time had not arrived for making himself master of all the coasts of the Mediterranean, and for availing himself of the momentary attachment with which he had inspired Russia to direct an army upon India across the partitioned continent of Asia. Though chimerical in the eyes of a generation reduced, like ours, to very moderate proportions, these projects must not be judged of from our present point of view. It must be recollected that the man who conceived such daring schemes could at pleasure

make and unmake kings, pronounce by a word the doom of the greatest monarchies in Europe; and though, in our opinion, he deceived himself, we must not believe that we accurately measure the extent of his error in measuring it according to our present ideas; for by judging thus our littleness would deceive itself as much as his greatness did. Having attained the summit of omnipotence, subject to a continual fermentation of ideas, he conceived that all these questions ought to be investigated; and though he dreaded the solution as much as his ally desired it, he did not deceive him by bringing them under discussion; for in the immensity of his views, he was sometimes quite disposed to resolve them.

Be this as it may, Napoleon, having pushed the Emperor Alexander upon Finland, having given him the partition of the Turkish empire to discuss, said to himself that he had several months before him, and he decided to carry at length into execution the plan which he had fixed upon relative to Spain.


We have already seen what this plan was. It consisted in progressively increasing the terror of the court of Spain till he should induce it to flee, as the house of Braganza had done. For this purpose, he had recourse to the most crafty means; and on this occasion he employed his genius in a way that cannot be too deeply regretted. All the troops were ready. General Dupont, with 25,000 men, was on the Valladolid road, one division upon Segovia, taking the direction of Madrid. Marshal Moncey, with 30,000, was between Burgos and Aranda, the direct road for Madrid. General Duhesme, with 7000 or 8000 men, almost all Italians, was marching upon Barcelona; 5000 French from Piedmont and Provence were on march to join him. One division of 3000 men was proceeding by St. Jean Pied de Port for Pampeluna. A second, composed of the fourth battalions of the five legions of reserve, was gone to reinforce the first. A reserve of infantry was organising at Orleans, one of cavalry at Poitiers. These made about 80,000 men, all young soldiers, who had never seen fire, but well officered, and full of the military spirit which at that period animated our armies.

It was necessary to give a commander to these forces. Napoleon chose a very indiscreet one for a political mission of such importance, but he placed him in such a situation as to preclude the possibility of any indiscretion. This commander was Murat, still discontented at being only grand duke, impatient to become king, no matter where, having taken part in the wars in Italy, Austria, Prussia, Poland, and contributed to erect thrones at Naples, Florence, Milan, the Hague, Cassel, Warsaw, without gaining one of those thrones for himself; inconsolable above all for not having obtained that of Poland, and eager for

any war which might offer fresh chances of reigning. The Peninsula, where at this moment the throne of Portugal was vacant, where that of Spain tottered, was for him the land of dreams, as Mexico or Peru formerly was for the Spanish adventurers. Good-natured and generous as Murat was, if he was required to hasten the downfall of Charles IV. by means not the most creditable or avowable, in his ardour for reigning he was the man to undertake the commission. There was nothing to be feared on his part but too much zeal. However, more intelligent, more shrewd than he has in general been deemed (the circumstances which are about to follow will furnish proof of this), he was capable, in an important interest of ambition, of being even discreet and reserved. He had at all events, as we have seen above, formed particular relations with Emmanuel Godoy, relations cultivated by the latter with equal eagerness, each believing that the other would assist him in the attainment of the object of his wishes, and both deceiving themselves, for Godoy was no more in a condition to give a king to the Spaniards than Murat an idea to Napoleon. To send Murat to Spain was, therefore, inviting him to a feast. But Napoleon, desiring to frighten the reigning house by the despatch of numerous troops combined with absolute silence respecting his intentions, made use of his brother-in-law conformably to the plan which he had adopted. He had had him by his side both in Italy and Paris without uttering a single word concerning his plans relative to Spain, at the very moment when he was thinking of them the most. On the 20th of February, having seen him in the course of the day without saying a word to him about the mission which he destined for him, he directed the minister of war to make him set out in the night for Bayonne, in order to assume the command of the troops entering Spain. Murat was to be there on the 26th, and to find there his instructions. Those instructions were to this effect: to take the general command of the corps of the Gironde and of the ocean, of the division of the Eastern Pyrenees, of the division of the Western Pyrenees, and of all the troops which were penetrating further into Spain; to repair in the first days of March to Burgos, whither the detachments of the imperial guard were to proceed; to place his headquarters at the centre of the corps of Marshal Moncey, that is to say, at Burgos itself; to advance with this corps upon the Madrid road by Aranda and Somosierra; to direct that of General Dupont thither by Segovia and the Escorial; to be master by about the 15th of March of the two passes of the Guadarrama; to collect 600,000 rations of biscuit already made at Bayonne, so that the troops should be supplied for a fortnight in case of a forced march; to await orders from Paris for any ulterior

movement; to occupy immediately the citadel of Pampeluna, the forts of Barcelona, the fortress of St. Sebastian; to give the Spanish commandants, as a reason for this occupation, the ordinary rule of war to secure one's rear when marching forward even in a friendly country; to keep all the troops well together, as one is accustomed to do on approaching the enemy; taking care that the pay should never be in arrear, so that the soldiers, having money, might not be tempted to consume without paying, and as there was reason to distrust the Neapolitans who were entering Catalonia, to order the first Italian who should plunder to be shot; not to seek, not to accept of communication with the court of Spain without having a formal order; not to answer any letter from the Prince of the Peace; to say, in case of being questioned in such a manner as not to be able to keep silence, that the French troops were entering Spain for a purpose known to Napoleon alone, a purpose certainly advantageous to the cause of Spain and of France; to pronounce vaguely the words Cadiz, Gibraltar, without saying anything positive; to intimate particularly to the Biscayan provinces, that whatever might happen, their privileges would be respected; to publish, on reaching Burgos, an order of the day, recommending to the troops the strictest discipline and the most fraternal relations with the generous Spanish people, the friend and ally of the French people; never to mix up with all these protestations of friendship any other name than that of the Spanish people, and never to mention King Charles IV. or his government under any form whatever.

Such is the substance of the instructions addressed to Murat on the 20th of February, confirmed and developed in the following days in posterior orders. General Belliard was placed about him as chief of the staff, General Grouchy as commander of his cavalry, General Lariboisière was charged with the direction of the artillery of the army. The latter was to despatch for Bayonne, from all the dépôts of artillery situated in the west and the south, considerable stores, particularly tools and fireworks capable of blowing up the gate of a town or of a strong castle. The mode of carriage in Spain being on the back of mules, orders were immediately sent off to Bayonne to purchase five hundred of the best and handsomest of those animals. M. Mollien, minister of the public treasury, was desired to send several millions in specie, two of them in gold, to Bayonne, to defray all the expenses of the army, and to pay them in ready money. He was, moreover, to prepare an equitable tariff, showing the comparative value of the French and Spanish coins, which was to be published in every town in Spain through which the troops should pass, in order to prevent quarrels between the soldiers and the inhabitants.



To these instructions, given for the army entering Spain, were added others for the army in Portugal. Napoleon designed that Spain should not be put to any expense in an enterprise which was about to cost her the reigning dynasty. But he was not equally scrupulous in regard to Portugal, which he was authorised to treat as a conquered country, and the ally of England. Calculating the wealth of that kingdom rather by that of the colonies than by that of the mother-country, he directed Junot to impose upon it a contribution of one hundred millions. He recommended the most extreme severity for any attempt at insurrection, reminding him, as an example to be followed, of the terrible manner in which he had repressed Cairo in Egypt, Pavia and Verona in Italy. He ordered him to dissolve the Portuguese army, and to send to France all that could not be disbanded. He expressly enjoined him to have an eye on the Spanish divisions which had concurred in the invasion of Portugal, to move them as far as he could from the frontiers of Spain, to keep the bulk of his forces at Lisbon, and two small French divisions of four or five thousand men each, the one at Almeida to awe the Spanish troops of General Taranco, who occupied Oporto, the other at Badajoz, to march, if needful, for Andalusia; to keep this order absolutely secret, and if he heard that any collision had taken place between the Spaniards and the French, to circulate among the Portuguese that the cause of this collision was no other than Portugal itself, the possession of which was demanded by the Spaniards, but refused them.

Napoleon, lastly, gave orders to the guard, for he foresaw that he should be obliged to go himself to Spain, either to direct the war, if war should break out there, or to direct the political affairs, if his policy should bring about a like termination of the events in Spain to those in Portugal, by the flight of the royal family. He had successively despatched for Bayonne the Mamelukes, the Poles, the seamen of the guard, several detachments of chasseurs and horse grenadiers, and a regiment of fusiliers, that is to say, about 3000 men. He sent the brave Lepic to command them, with orders to be in the first days of March at Burgos, the infantry in Burgos itself, the cavalry on the road from Bayonne to Burgos.

These military dispositions were not sufficient to fulfil completely the object which Napoleon proposed to himself. While his troops were to advance mysteriously upon Madrid, having no cheering words but for the Spanish people, and none whatever for the reigning family, he set his diplomacy to work in the same spirit. M. de Beauharnais applied incessantly at Paris for instructions against a catastrophe which appeared imminent. He solicited, in particular, permission to confer some demonstrations of interest on Ferdinand, still convinced that the favourite

must be overthrown for the benefit of that prince, and the fusion of the two dynasties be effected by a marriage. Napoleon, who was now far from entertaining such a plan, and who frequently laughed at the credulity of M. de Beauharnais, his awkwardness, his avarice, the importance which he was fond of assuming, and who left him where he was, because an honest man without talent suited him better than another to perform the ridiculous part of an ambassador who was left ignorant of everything, directed that he should be enjoined to observe the strictest neutrality between the factions which divided Spain, to show no demonstrations of interest for any of them, to answer merely, when asked concerning the dispositions of the Emperor of the French, that he was displeased, extremely displeased, without saying at what; to add, if anything was said to him concerning the march of the French armies, that Gibraltar, Cadiz, probably required a concentration of troops, for the English were bringing large forces towards that point; but that the Spanish cabinet was so indiscreet that it could not be trusted with the secret of a single military operation.

These instructions were sufficient for the part which M. de Beauharnais had to act. But Napoleon employed more certain means for striking terror into the unhappy court of Spain. M. Yzquierdo was still in Paris, hovering about the Tuileries, sometimes at the Grand-Marshal Duroc's, with whom he had negotiated the treaty of Fontainebleau, sometimes at M. de Talleyrand's, the principal go-between in the whole Spanish business. Seeing that it was impossible for him to obtain the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau, he had thence concluded that other measures were contemplated in Paris; that this partition of Portugal had been but a provisional arrangement for obtaining the immediate cession of Tuscany; and that, no doubt, the overthrow of the dynasty itself was meditated. With his usual perspicacity, he had completely detected, not the means, but the end at which Napoleon was aiming. He had endeavoured, by artfully sounding M. de Talleyrand, to discover whether large concessions of territory or of commerce might not, accompanied by a marriage, appease the wrath, real or feigned, of the conqueror.

M. de Talleyrand, who was inclined to an intermediate plan, had listened to M. Yzquierdo, and perhaps as much proposed as adopted the ideas of which this agent of Emmanuel Godoy's desired to make essay. These ideas agreed precisely with the second plan, which we have already detailed. It purported, in fact, to marry Ferdinand to a French princess, to take for France the provinces of the Ebro in exchange for the part of Portugal left disposable, to open the Spanish colonies to the French, to ~~him~~ ^{join} ~~him~~ ^{them} together not only by a marriage, but by a

treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, which should render either war or peace common to both, and lastly, to give to Charles IV. the title of Emperor of the Americas. Such were the ideas which M. Yzquierdo put forward, as much to sound the court of the Tuileries as to arrive at a conclusion. All at once Napoleon ordered him to be treated with extreme harshness, to be sent away, as if one was weary of his tergiversations, as if one would have nothing more to do with a court so weak, so incapable, so insincere; in short, to impel him to set out for Madrid, that he might carry thither the terror with which he had been filled. The Grand-Marshal Duroc had orders to write to M. Yzquierdo that he would do well to return immediately to Madrid,* to disperse the thick clouds which had arisen between the two courts. It was not said what clouds; but M. Yzquierdo took the hint, and it would be sufficient to make him set out to excite in the court of Spain an agitation which would not let it rest anywhere, and which must lead to a definitive resolution. M. Yzquierdo left Paris the same day.

It was requisite, at the same time, to answer the letter of the 5th of February, in which the terrified Charles IV. had besought Napoleon to satisfy him respecting his intentions, and respecting the march of the French troops, which at that moment were advancing towards Madrid. In this letter Charles IV. had abstained from alluding to the marriage of his son with a niece of Napoleon's, seeing that the latter affected to think no more of that proposal. Like one who is striving to pick a quarrel, Napoleon, instead of endeavouring in his answer to dispel the alarm of Charles IV., seemed to complain that, on the subject of the marriage, there should be observed a silence of which he had himself set the example. This answer, dated the 25th of February, was very short and very dry. He therein mentioned that, on the 18th of November, King Charles had asked him for a French princess, that he answered on the 10th of January by a conditional consent; that on the 5th of February, King Charles, writing again to him, made no further mention of the marriage; and he added that this last silence left him in doubts which it was necessary to remove in order to decide upon objects of great importance.

This new letter, which was but a refusal to relieve the uneasiness of the unfortunate Charles IV., and which, combined with other circumstances of the moment, must have filled him with terror, was brought by M. de Tournon, chamberlain of the emperor, who had been previously sent to Madrid on a similar mission, and who to great devotedness united much good sense and love of truth. He had instructions to observe attentively the progress and conduct of the French troops, the dispositions

* The letter is in the Louvre, and bears date the 24th of February.

of the Spanish people in regard to them, to take particular notice also of what was passing at the Escorial, then to return to Burgos about the 15th of March, and there await the arrival of Napoleon. The latter had, in fact, calculated that his orders, given between the 20th and the 25th of February, would have their consequences in Spain in the middle of March, and that at this period he ought to be in person at Burgos to derive from events, always fertile in unforeseen cases, the result which he desired.

There was, therefore, every reason to believe that the court of Spain, already strongly tempted to follow the example of the house of Braganza when it should see the French army advancing upon Madrid, M. de Beauharnais saying nothing because he knew nothing, and M. Yzquierdo saying much because he feared much, would no longer hesitate to set out for Cadiz. If, however, in spite of recommendations given to the French troops to treat the Spanish people as friends, an unforeseen collision should take place, there would then be a solution again. He might consider himself as betrayed by allies among whom he had come amicably for an important expedition interesting the alliance, and he should revenge himself by deposing the Bourbons of Spain, as he had deposed those of Naples for a treachery real or supposed. Napoleon, acting thus as a conqueror who cares little about the means provided that he attains his end, reckoning upon great results, such as the regeneration of Spain, the re-establishment of the natural alliances of France, to excuse himself in the eyes of posterity for the dark machination which he was employing towards a friendly court—Napoleon conceived that he had at length discovered the true way of overturning the Bourbons without resorting to atrocious violences, which in less humane ages than ours conquerors have never hesitated to commit. He thought that on giving a slight shake to the throne of Spain, without violently hurling Charles IV. from it, he might induce that weak prince, his guilty wife, and his cowardly favourite to forsake it in order to seek another in America. But this plan, devised to avoid shocking Europe and France too much, gave rise to an objection which had caused Napoleon to hesitate long about adopting it. By driving the reigning house to retreat, like that of Portugal, to the New World, he should inevitably bring upon Spain the loss of her colonies, as had been the case with Portugal. The Braganzas in Brazil, the Bourbons in Mexico, in Peru, on the banks of the La Plata, would found empires, enemies of their usurped mother-countries, friends of England, who would find for a long time in the supply of these colonies wherewithal to indemnify herself for the closing of the continent. No doubt on penetrating into a distant futurity one might

discover in these colonies new nations, offering to their old mother-countries more means of exchange, more occasions for profit, as was already exemplified in the case of England and the United States. But Spain, Portugal, were not industrious England; the Americans of the south were not the Americans of the north; and all that could be foreseen for a long series of years was the loss of the Spanish colonies, and the working of them for the benefit of British commerce. To the flight, therefore, of Charles IV. to America were attached, together with a great convenience for the usurpation of the throne, great and serious inconveniences in respect to the future lot of the Spanish colonies. This must be a subject of grievous affliction to the Spaniards themselves, hence discontent and revolt, and an injury to our commerce proportionate to the advantage that would be derived by the commerce of the enemy.

Napoleon, extremely well informed respecting these complicated interests, devised a new combination much more artful than any of those to which we have adverted, and having for its object to correct the only inconvenience of the plan which he had definitively adopted. There was at Cadiz a fine French squadron capable of commanding the harbour and the road. He resolved to employ it in detaining the Bourbons at the moment when they should attempt to embark, and after driving them by fear from Aranjuez to Cadiz, stop them by force at Cadiz itself, before they should have sailed under the escort of England for Vera Cruz. In consequence, he sent off to Admiral Rosily a despatch in cipher, dated the 21st of February, containing an express order to take such a position in the road of Cadiz as to prevent the departure of any vessel, and to stop the fugitive royal family if it should imitate the folly, so said the despatch, of the court of Lisbon.*

Assuredly, if one were to judge of these acts according to ordinary morality, which renders sacred the property of another, we must brand them for ever, as we brand those of the criminal who has made free with what does not belong to him; and even if we judge of them upon different principles, we cannot avoid inflicting severe censure upon them. But thrones are a different thing from private property. They are taken away or given by war or policy, and sometimes to the great advantage of the nations which are thus arbitrarily disposed of. But whoever aims at playing the part of Providence should beware of failing, of being either odious or unfortunate in attempting to be great, of not obtaining the results that ought to serve for excuse. He ought, in short, to be shy of any enterprise which he dare

* At the end of this book will be found a note explaining how I came to discover the secret of all the machinations which have hitherto been totally unknown.

not avow, and for which he is necessitated to have recourse to knavery and lying. Napoleon reasoned upon what he was about to do as ambitious policy always reasons. That Spanish nation, he said to himself, so proud, so generous, deserved a better fate than to be subjected to an incapable and degraded court; it deserved to be regenerated; when regenerated it would be capable of rendering great services to France and to itself, of assisting to overthrow the maritime tyranny of England, of contributing to the emancipation of the commerce of Europe, of being called, in short, to brilliant and mighty destinies. To interdict himself from all this for the sake of an imbecile king, of a lewd queen, of an abject favourite, was more than could be expected of an impetuous spirit which darts upon its object like the eagle upon his prey, the moment he descries it from the elevation where he dwells. The result was destined to prove to what danger he exposes himself who attempts to perform one of those parts so far above humanity, who chooses to hold himself dispensed from regarding the lives, the welfare of men, upon pretext of the aim towards which he is advancing.

Murat had executed with perfect submission the orders of Napoleon, transmitted by the minister of war. Setting out immediately for Bayonne, he had arrived in that town on the 26th, as his instructions enjoined him to do. His departure was so sudden, that he had with him neither staff nor horses for his personal service. He was accompanied only by the aides-de-camp who ought to attend an officer of his rank, marshal, grand duke, and imperial prince all in one. He had despatched them in all directions to ascertain the position and state of the corps, to put himself into communication with them, to assume the direction of affairs. The mystery which Napoleon had observed in his instructions hurt his vanity, but so clearly did he perceive their drift, and so well did it please him, that he asked for nothing more, and fell to work in order to execute punctually the commands of his master.

Bayonne exhibited a spectacle of confusion, for there was not at this point the immense military display which a war of fifteen years had accumulated on the frontier of the Rhine or of the Alps, and everything there had to be created at once. Moreover, the troops which arrived, composed of conscripts recently organised, were in want of necessaries, and of the experience which might make amends for it. People were busy baking the biscuit, making shoes and greatcoats, creating the means of transport, of which they were totally destitute; for it had been impossible to procure the 500 mules which Napoleon had ordered to be bought, as those valuable animals were not to be found anywhere but in ^{the} money itself was behindhand for want of ^{the} artillery of

the various corps had scarcely joined, and the retarded matériel of Junot's army, crossing that arriving for the armies in Spain, increased the disorder. Notwithstanding the clearness, the precision, the vigour which Napoleon infused on this occasion as formerly into the despatch of his orders, their execution was affected by the distance, by the precipitation, by the inexperience of the administrators, the most capable being employed in other parts of Europe.

Murat, who possessed intelligence, whom Napoleon, by his grand lessons and continual remonstrances, had trained to command, passed several days at Bayonne to introduce some order there, to inform himself of what had been executed and what delayed, that he might apprise Napoleon, and that the latter might apply the remedy. He then set out for Vittoria. He crossed the frontier on the 10th of March, and proceeded the same day to Tolosa. If ever there was an officer who, by his good looks, his martial air, his open and quite southern manners, suited the Spaniards, it was assuredly Murat. He was formed at once to please and to awe them, and among the French princes destined to reign, he would have been incontestably the best that could be chosen for ascending the throne of Spain. We shall see hereafter how grievous a fault it was to prefer another to him. The population of the Biscayan provinces received him with great demonstrations of joy. These excellent people, the handsomest, the most sprightly, the bravest, and the most laborious of those that inhabit the Peninsula, had not the same passions as the rest of the Spaniards. They had neither the same antipathy to foreigners, nor the same national prejudices. Situated between the plains of Gascony and those of Castille, in a mountainous region, speaking a distinct language, living by the illicit traffic which they carried on with France and Spain, enjoying extensive privileges, of which they availed themselves for continuing that traffic, privileges for which they were indebted to the difficulty of conquering their mountains and their courage, theirs was a kind of neutral country, a Switzerland, as it were, between France and Spain. They were, therefore, but loosely attached to the Spanish rule, and would not have been sorry to belong to a great empire, which would have enabled them to extend to a distance their industrious activity. They welcomed Murat with boisterous acclamations, and indicated in a thousand ways a wish to belong to France. The French troops were cordially received; they observed strict discipline, paid for all they had, and by consuming the produce of the country, were an advantage to it rather than a burden.

Murat was not less favourably received at Vittoria, the capital of Alava, the third of the Biscayan provinces, in which the

Spanish spirit begins to express itself more strongly. He entered it on the 11th, in the carriage of the bishop, who with all the authorities of the country had hastened to meet him. The population thronged to the gates of the towns, and gave the most brilliant reception to the general who had become a prince, and was destined to be soon a king. The French soldiers, though very numerous in Spain, more numerous than was consistent with the war with Portugal, had not yet afforded the slightest cause for complaint. If people ascribed any political intention to their coming, it was against the court, a court equally execrated and despised. There was no reason, therefore, for checking either the curiosity which they excited or the hopes which they raised. The authorities, to which orders had been sent from Madrid to prepare provisions, in order to prevent all dissatisfaction, had collected them in tolerable abundance. Murat, having given notice that the consumption of the army would be paid for by France, the authorities answered, with Castilian pride, that they received the French as allies, as friends, and that Spanish hospitality was never paid for.

Thus at this first moment things went on in the best manner. The illusions were reciprocal. While these half-Spaniards were giving such a favourable reception to our troops and their illustrious chief, the latter fancied that everything would be easy in Spain, that the French were wished for there, that a king of their nation would be accepted with joy, and with still more joy if that king were himself. Struck by the deep and universal hatred excited by the favourite, he soon discovered that the support of Emmanuel Godoy was but a feeble stay to secure for himself in Spain, and that to obtain the popular favour there he must, on the contrary, let it be understood that he had come to overthrow him.

From Vittoria Murat proceeded to Burgos, which was to be the seat of his headquarters. When you leave Vittoria and pass the Ebro at Miranda, the boundary at which the Spanish officers of the customs were then stationed, and where they continued not long since to be placed, you quit the mountainous, diversified, smiling, ever-verdant country of the Pyrenean Switzerland, and enter real Spain. The Ebro, which at Miranda is but a large rivulet, running among flints—the Ebro being crossed, you pass the defiles of Pancorbo, a kind of fissure in a line of rocks, which form the last ledge of the Pyrenees, and enter Castille. There commence prodigious plains, extensive views, stern and dreary scenes. On the vast plateau of the Castilles the sun is serene and scorching in summer, the air foggy and chilly in winter, and at all times raw. Dwellings are rare; the cultivation is uniform, and presents to the eye, excepting when the crops have grown up and are ripening,

nothing but vast fields of stubble, upon which subsist the flocks, absolute masters of the soil of Spain, over which they travel twice a year from north to south and from south to north, like birds of passage. With this new aspect of physical nature is united on entering the Castilles a different aspect of moral nature. The inhabitant, handsome, particularly in the country—handsome, but less sprightly and less alert than the Biscayan mountaineer, tall, well-made, grave, always armed with a gun or a dagger, ready to employ it against a countryman, still more ready against a foreigner, displays in an exaggerated form all the features, good or bad, of the Spanish character. He is at once more ignorant, more savage, more cruel, more brave than the inhabitants of the towns. The latter, with their imperfect instruction, like half-civilised Turks, have lost with their ferocity part of their energy. The mass of the people in Spain, which by its vices and its virtues preserved the national independence, exhibits a peculiar trait which distinguishes it from the other nations of Europe. Along with ardent passions, there is to be found in it a sort of public spirit, owing to its mode of life, to its aggregation in large villages, where it lives all the time that it does not devote to the land, on which it bestows but little, confining itself to a single ploughing, then sowing, and harvest, and doing nothing afterwards. While the French, Belgian, English, and Lombard peasantry, dispersed over the soil, engaged in various and incessant agricultural occupations, are not induced either by proximity or leisure to attend to anything but their labour, you find the Spanish peasant, covered with a cloak, supported by a stick, along with a party of his fellows in the public place of the village, talking about the king, the queen, the events of the time, with an astonishing curiosity, or joining in games, dances, songs, running to bull-fights, a sanguinary amusement of which no class of the nation can deprive itself, scarcely eying the passing foreigner, or eying him with contemptuous pride, which on the slightest civility suddenly changes to unaffected ease and freedom. The Spaniard, at this period, was more than ever disposed to turn his attention with redoubled zeal to public affairs. Thrust to the extremity of the continent, it was more than a century since he had been seriously involved in the affairs of Europe. A few sea-fights, some operations in Italy, a momentary war in the Pyrenees in 1793, had not been sufficient to exhaust or even to satisfy his energetic passions. Looking on with the impatience of a spectator who would fain act a part in the great events of the age, nobody could be better prepared to take an immoderate part in all things.

Such was the country, such the people, amidst which we arrived in March 1808, on crossing the Ebro. Murat was again

well received at Burgos, the capital of Old Castille, that is to say, with curiosity and hope. Meanwhile the lower class, less concerned than the citizens about what the French were come to do in Spain, seemed more displeased at seeing foreigners overrun their country; and between the petulant hastiness of our young soldiers and the proud gravity of the lowest class of the Spanish people, there were collisions here and there, and some stabs with the knife, instantaneously revenged by sword-cuts. In this first meeting of the two nations there was one unlucky circumstance. There should have been set before these proud Spaniards, so inclined to despise all who were not their countrymen, some of the soldiers of the grand army, who would have made an impression upon them by their superannuated age, their wounds, their grey moustaches. But our legions, composed of conscripts of 1807 and 1808, who had never seen fire, commanded, as we have said, by officers taken out of the dépôts or drawn from retirement (this was the case in particular with the officers of the five legions of reserve), had nothing whereby to gain respect but the immense renown of our armies. Marched in haste from the dépôts before they were completely clothed, shod, or armed, they had not even the showiness of equipment to compensate for their youthful looks. They had, therefore, the twofold disadvantage of not being sufficiently imposing, and of exhibiting the appearance of a greedy poverty, which had come to eat up the country that it was invading. Among our soldiers there were many sick, some from having suffered fatigues for which they were not sufficiently prepared, others having caught the itch from Spanish beggars. One-fifth of the army was infected with this loathsome disease. It had been found necessary, in order to secure the troops of the imperial guard from it, to make them bivouac in the open air. The Spaniards, conceiving that these were the soldiers who had conquered Europe, said to themselves that it could not be difficult to gain victories, since such troops had sufficed, not yet knowing, though they soon learned to their cost and our own, that, such as they were, these young soldiers were capable of conquering them and stronger than they, thanks to the spirit which animated them, and to the military skill which superabounded in all parts of the French army. It was only the cuirassiers, whose large stature and imposing armour disguised youth, and the guard, incomparable troops, that inspired the populace of the Spanish towns with the respect which they ought to have inspired from the very first instant. For the rest, at this moment there was not yet a thought of resistance; nothing but good was expected from the French; and with the exception of some accidental collisions between men of the lowest class and our conscripts, overtaken by the wine of Spain or excited by the beauty of the women, cordiality

prevailed. Certain reflecting Spaniards, indeed, said to themselves that this extraordinary accumulation of troops must forebode something else than the overthrow of the Prince of the Peace; for in the then state of minds it would have required but a word from Napoleon to hurl him from power. But people would not believe or hope for anything but the fall of the favourite; they would not think of any object but that. Another rumour, moreover, that of an expedition against Gibraltar, artfully circulated, completed the general illusion.

No sooner had Murat entered Spain than two letters from his friend the Prince of the Peace came, one after another, to congratulate and at the same time to question him. The desire to answer him, which, under any other circumstance, would have been vehement in the impetuous Murat, was easily surmounted by the fear of renewing his relations with so unpopular a personage, and by the still greater fear of displeasing Napoleon. The two letters were left unanswered. For the rest, the questions of the Prince of the Peace were not the only ones to which Murat was exposed. The civil, military, and ecclesiastical authorities, which hastened around him to see and to entertain him, provoked his natural indiscretion in a thousand indirect ways. But he curbed himself, in the first place, because he was not acquainted with Napoleon's designs; and secondly, because the general object of which he had a glimpse was so important, that less intelligence and less tact than he possessed would have been sufficient to impose silence on him. Still, his vexation at finding himself in the midst of this tumult without any but military instructions was extreme. Accordingly, as soon as he had arrived in Spain, he did not fail to write to Napoleon a detailed report on the state of the troops, on their destitution, on their diseases, on their favourable reception by the Spaniards, on the unpopularity of the Prince of the Peace, on the enthusiasm of the Spaniards for Napoleon, on the facility of doing what one would in Spain, but also on the necessity of deciding what one purposed to do, and on the embarrassment of being left without instructions to meet the events that were preparing. "I conceived, sire," he wrote to Napoleon—"I conceived, after so many years' service and attachment, that I had deserved your confidence, and invested, above all, with the command of your troops, that I ought to know to what ends they are about to be employed. I beseech you," he added, "to give me instructions. Be they what they may, they shall be executed. Do you intend to overthrow Godoy, to place Ferdinand on the throne? Nothing is easier. One word from your lips will suffice. Would you change the dynasty of the Bourbons, regenerate Spain by giving her one of the princes of your house? Again nothing is easier. Your will shall be received as that of Pro-

vidence." Brave but weak observer, he durst not add a last assertion, more true than any of those with which he filled his reports, that he should have been the best received of the foreign princes who could have been substituted for the reigning dynasty.

Napoleon, whose intention was to terrify the court by his silence, and at the same time to cheer the population by a friendly attitude, in order to reach Madrid without striking a blow, and to take pacific possession of a vacant throne—Napoleon felt a movement of impatience on reading Murat's letters, full of home questions. "When I prescribed to you," said he, "to march militarily, to keep your divisions well together, and at a distance from fighting, to supply them abundantly that they might not commit any disorder, to avoid all collision, to take no part in the divisions of the court of Spain, and to send me the questions that might be addressed to you, were not these instructions? The rest does not concern you; and if I say nothing to you, it is because you ought to know nothing."

To this reprimand he added such orders as circumstances required. He prescribed by a decree that the battalions detached from their regiments should be furnished immediately with funds, to be placed to the account of the administration of the corps; to take from his guard young sub-officers, sufficiently lettered, having served in the campaigns of 1806 and 1807, to be appointed officers, and thus to supply the regiments which were deficient of them; to subject immediately all those who had the itch to proper treatment; to encamp the troops as soon as the cold season, which could not last much longer in Spain, was over; to despatch the brigade composed of the fourth battalions of the legions of reserve to join that of General Darmagnac, already ordered to occupy Pampeluna, to arm it, to leave 1000 men there, then to take the entire division of the Eastern Pyrenees between Vittoria and Burgos, in order to cover the rear of the army; to collect at the same point all the regiments on march composed of reinforcements destined for the provisional regiments; to send thither besides, and without delay, Verdier's division (called above the Orleans reserve), to form in this manner a considerable corps under the command of Marshal Bessières, which with the guard could not amount to less than from 12,000 to 15,000 men, and which in case of collision would secure the line of retreat of the army against the Spanish troops directed to occupy the north of Portugal. Napoleon then settled about the march upon Madrid. He ordered Murat to make both Marshal Moncey's corps and General Dupont's pass the Guadarrama, the one by the Somosierra road, the other by that of Segovia, on the 19th or 20th of March, to be on the 22nd or 23rd under the walls of Madrid,

to ask leave to rest himself there before he continued his march for Cadiz; to break open the gates of Madrid if they should be closed against him, but not till he had done all that was possible to prevent a collision. To all these directions was added, and that repeatedly, the recommendation to be silent on the subject of political affairs, to supply all the wants of the troops that they might not take anything, and even to delay the movement for a day or two if the means of subsistence and transport should not be sufficient.

Murat was therefore obliged to be content to learn nothing more, and set about punctually obeying the emperor's orders, certain that, after all, this mystery could conceal nothing but what he desired, that is to say, the overthrow of the Bourbons of Spain, and the vacating of one of the finest thrones in the world.

The occupation of the fortresses, repeatedly ordered by the emperor, was executed. Generals Duhesme and Darmagnac, the one at Barcelona, the other at Pampeluna, had at first occupied the towns only, and not the fortresses commanding those towns. A secret order, emanating from Madrid, prescribed to the Spanish generals to receive the French amicably, to open the towns to them, but as far as possible to refuse them admission into the citadels. General Duhesme, arriving at Barcelona at the head of about 7000 men, mostly Italians, had been received with affected politeness by the authorities, with kindness and curiosity by the townspeople, with distrust by the populace. The incontinence of the Italians had drawn upon them more than one infliction of the knife. The seriousness of the circumstances having occasioned the closing of the manufactories, there was a great number of unemployed workmen ready to take part in any kind of disturbance. General Duhesme, placed with 7000 men amidst a city of 150,000 souls, though followed at a little distance by 5000 French, was in a critical position, especially as he was not master of the citadel of Barcelona and of the fort of Mont Jouy, which entirely commands the city. In consequence, he agreed with General Lechi, commanding the Italians, upon a plan for carrying the fortresses, when a repeated order to possess himself of them came and put an end to all his hesitations. One morning, getting his troops under arms, he directed one part of them upon the citadel, another upon Mont Jouy. At the principal gate of the citadel a French post mounted guard as well as a Spanish post. Advantage was taken of this circumstance to penetrate into the interior. Owing to the negligence of the Spanish officers, half of the garrison was dispersed in the city. The French, therefore, found themselves in far superior force within the citadel, and made themselves masters of it without striking a blow. At Fort Mont Jouy the result was different. Admission was

refused by the officer commanding there, Brigadier Alvarez, who afterwards energetically defended Girona. Though part of his troops were absent and dispersed, as had been the case at the citadel, he assumed an attitude of defence. General Duhesme, who had directed the bulk of his force towards this point, declared, on his part, that he should instantly commence the attack. The captain-general of Catalonia, Count Ezpeleta, fearing a collision which he had been recommended to avoid, came to the determination to yield and to give up Mont Jouy to the French. They established themselves there immediately. Masters of these two fortresses which command Barcelona, they had nothing more to fear; but they did not enter them without exciting in the population of Catalonia a painful, and under the circumstances, a very injurious emotion.

At Pampeluna, General Darmagnac, a brave man, full of energy and honour, who would more willingly have scaled by main force than stealthily surprised a fortress which he was ordered to occupy, made use of a clever expedient to get into the citadel. He was lodged in a house at a little distance from the principal gate. He had a hundred well-armed grenadiers concealed there. His troops were accustomed to go in the morning into the citadel itself to fetch their provisions. He sent about fifty picked men, who repaired without arms to the gate of the citadel just before the distribution, and who, pretending to be waiting, approached the post guarding the gate, fell upon it and disarmed it, while the hundred grenadiers, in ambush in General Darmagnac's house, running up in all haste, completed the capture. The French troops, secretly assembled, came up at the same moment, and the citadel was conquered, but to the great displeasure of General Darmagnac, who, reporting what he had done to the minister of war, observed, "These are disgraceful commissions." At Pampeluna, as at Barcelona, the emotion was vehement and general.

The troops had less trouble at St. Sebastian. A Duke de Crillon, of French extraction, commanded there. Murat summoned him to surrender the place. He flatly refused to comply. Murat replied that he had orders to occupy it, not with hostile views, but with mere views of military prudence, to secure the rear of the army; and that if any resistance were made, he should open his fire immediately. The Duke de Crillon, forewarned, like all the other commandants of fortresses, that a collision was to be avoided, surrendered St. Sebastian on condition that Murat should restore it if his compliance was not approved at Madrid. Murat assented to this puerile reserve, and sent a battalion of French troops into St. Sebastian.

This sudden occupation of the fortresses, effected in the last days of February and the first days of March, produced a most

baneful impression in Spain. Those persons of foresight who had remarked that to take possession of Portugal, already conquered besides, that to overthrow a favourite detested by the nation there was no need for so many troops, began to find their remarks justified, and to meet with more assent. In the countries, in particular, which had witnessed these surprises, accompanied with more or less violence, the people had well-nigh come to blows with the troops. The middle class, which, less hostile to foreigners than the populace, less excited by the clergy, more disposed to changes, had taken pleasure in hoping from us for the fall of the favourite and the regeneration of Spain, was sorely grieved. The populace manifested a first movement of rage, which the firm attitude of our soldiers and our officers soon succeeded in repressing. Two circumstances contributed further to aggravate these feelings of disappointment among the middle class, and jealous anger among the populace: the first, and the most grievous was the contribution of one hundred millions imposed upon the Portuguese; the second, not so generally known to the public, was the marriage of Mademoiselle de Tascher to the Prince of AreMBERG. They began to complain in all quarters that the French treated very ill those from whom they were receiving hospitality, and they asked one another what would be the burden of Spain if she had to pay a proportionate contribution to that laid upon Portugal. As for the marriage of Mademoiselle de Tascher, it greatly affected the enlightened class, to which it was more particularly known. They had persuaded themselves, in fact, that it was not a daughter of Lucien's, a person unknown in Spain, but a niece of the empress's, recently adopted, and related to the Ambassador Beaumharnais, that Napoleon destined for the Prince of the Asturias. The marriage of that young lady with the Prince of AreMBERG blighted the hopes of all those who reckoned upon the speedy union of a French princess with Ferdinand. The dethronement of the Bourbons became thenceforward the only intention that they could attribute to the emperor. The middle class, and above all the nobility, might perhaps have accommodated themselves to a change of dynasty, which should have ensured to them the regeneration of Spain without making her pass through the cruel ordeal of the French Revolution; but the clergy, and particularly the monks, who regarded the French as dangerous foes to their existence, repelled such an idea with indignation, and had no difficulty to act upon a still fanatical people, eager for movement and tumult. The clergy, corresponding from one end of Spain to the other by the dioceses and by the convents, had a powerful means of communicating to all parts, with incredible speed, the impressions which they had an interest in propagating. These first impressions, however, were but a fore-

running sign of the hatred that was to break forth against us. For a moment a different object engrossed the minds of the Spaniards: this was the court—the court in which an unnatural mother and an execrated favourite, governing a weak king, kept a young and adored prince under oppression. It was towards Madrid, towards Aranjuez, that all eyes were turned, and to which the French were called to consummate there a revolution universally desired. Certain acts tended, it is true, to excite doubts respecting their intentions; but these acts, some of them explained as mere military precautions, the others as measures solely applicable to Portugal, quickly passed out of the memory of a nation occupied with a single object; and people soon began again to think of the court, to wish for its downfall, and to demand it of the French.

The moment of the catastrophe was actually approaching. Napoleon had made M. Yzquierdo leave Paris about the 25th of February to carry terror to the hearts of the sovereigns of Spain, and M. de Tournon to deliver a new letter, alarming from its very insignificance; for when he had been asked for a princess for Ferdinand, he had evaded the application by inquiring if that prince was restored to favour; and now, when marriage was no longer mentioned, he complained that nothing was said about it. These contradictions, with the sinister explanations furnished by M. Yzquierdo's reports, by the march of the French troops, by the silence of Murat, were soon to bring about the long expected crisis at Madrid.

M. Yzquierdo, arriving at Madrid on the 3rd or 4th of March, was presented on the 5th at Aranjuez to the whole royal family. His reports were of the most alarming nature, and filled with terror not only the royal family, but the intimate circle of the Prince of the Peace, his mother, his sisters, and his mistress, Mademoiselle Tudo. M. Yzquierdo, after explaining the state of the negotiation commenced with M. de Talleyrand on the subject of ceding to the French the provinces of the Ebro and the opening of the Spanish colonies—M. Yzquierdo declared that this negotiation, afflicting as it might appear, was itself but a blind; that Napoleon evidently wanted something else, that is to say, the throne of Spain for one of his brothers.

M. Yzquierdo easily succeeded in convincing the court of Aranjuez, already terror-stricken, and in persuading it that, unless it adopted a decisive course, it was undone. The arrival of M. de Tournon, and the delivery of the letter of which he was the bearer, were not likely to dispel the alarms excited by M. Yzquierdo. Charles IV., ill, suffering from rheumatism in the arm, received M. de Tournon with a politeness, through which might be perceived profound affliction. The queen and the favourite received him with affection, but ill

concealed their furious hatred. Charles IV. told him, in a tone penetrated with grief, that he should soon write to his ally the Emperor Napoleon, and hastened to put an end to a useless and painful interview. From that moment the resolution to leave the country was taken. It was a cruel sacrifice for Charles IV. to quit the three or four palaces situated around Madrid, among which he was accustomed to divide his life, going from one to another at every change of season, like those animals which change climates in following the sun. It was to him a severe privation to renounce the chase in the Parde, to wait instead for Napoleon, and to place the fate of the house of Spain at the disposal of his omnipotence. The good King Charles IV. had too honest a heart, and too limited an understanding, to surmise a single one of Napoleon's combinations, and he was inclined to think that by waiting for him, and placing confidence in him, all would be arranged for the best. It is certain that his simple self-surrender of weakness must have strangely embarrassed Napoleon, and perhaps produced different results. But the Prince of the Peace and the queen, well aware that they had no favour to hope for, that the interference of Napoleon, whatever it might be, would at least act against them, left no option to Charles IV., and induced him to retire to Andalusia. It is probable that they placed before his view nothing more than this first removal, relying upon events for deciding the definitive retreat to America. Their resolution on this head was so firm, that the Prince of the Peace, hurried away by his usual intemperance of language, declared that he would carry off the king rather than consent to his awaiting the arrival of the French at Aranjuez.

However, that he might not deprive himself of every resource on the part of France, M. Yzquierdo was obliged to return immediately to Paris, to have recourse to supplications with Napoleon, to go with his agents, in order to avert the stroke which threatened the house of Spain, and to sign all the treaties which might be required, how disgraceful soever they might be. He set out again in haste on the morning of the 11th of March, to reach Paris before a fatal order was given. His distress was such, that those who met him, and there were many going and coming on the road, were forcibly struck by it.

The resolution to retire to Andalusia being taken, it was necessary to reconcile to it many minds both at Aranjuez and Madrid. The Prince of the Asturias, judging of Napoleon's intentions by the demonstrations of interest which he received from M. de Beauharnais, regarded the French as deliverers, and would not submit to be dragged far away from them, a prisoner to the queen and the Prince of the Peace. He declared this loudly, since they had talked of the journey to Andalusia, and

they talked of it, in fact, at the moment as a determined resolution. He had won to his opinion his uncle Don Antonio, who felt as much aversion as himself for the queen and the favourite, and likewise all the members of the royal family, excepting the Queen of Etruria, who had recently arrived from Tuscany to take possession of the north of Portugal. This princess, dear to the queen, was for that reason odious to Ferdinand, but nobody cared much about her opinion. All who had any weight in the royal family were decidedly adverse to the plan of flight, and in favour of waiting for the French. The queen and the favourite, giving themselves no concern about these oppositions, were determined to conquer them, and by fair means or force to take the whole royal family to Seville. But there were still other more formidable oppositions to overcome. The council of Castille, secretly consulted, had rejected the idea of a disgraceful retreat, and replied that the French ought not to have been admitted into Spain, but after having so easily admitted them, it was necessary either to take the sudden resolution to resist them, by raising the whole nation against them, or to receive them with open arms, appealing to the good faith of these allies, welcomed in Spain as friends and brothers. Another opposition, more unlooked-for than all the rest, suddenly burst forth. The minister of justice, M. de Caballero, who had appeared more attached than he was to the fortune of the Prince of the Peace, called by his functions as minister of justice to attend frequently during the proceedings at the Escorial, had thereby gained all the odium of them, though without deserving it; for he had maintained, before both the king and the queen, that neither in the papers which had been found nor in the facts collected was there sufficient evidence for instituting criminal prosecutions. He had even on this account incurred the anger of the queen, who had called him a traitor sold to the Prince of the Asturias. The public, nevertheless, believed him to be much more culpable than he really was. As for the journey to Andalusia, he would not hear of it, saying that it would be a cowardly desertion of the nation, that the French ought not to have been introduced into Spain, but that now it was expedient to wait for them, that it was for those who distrusted them to retire, but that probably Charles IV., whose conduct had always been honourable towards them, would perhaps have no reason to repent having waited for them. Another minister, M. de Cevallos, who subsequently would fain have passed himself off for an antagonist of the Prince of the Peace, though he was servilely submissive to him, and all whose patriotism consisted in a stupid hatred of the French—M. de Cevallos, minister of foreign affairs, remained a quiet spectator of this conflict, and left M.

de Caballero to withstand singly the plan of flight. The Prince of the Peace, regardless of his opposition, gave all the orders for the intended journey to Andalusia. Seeking to conceal the object of this journey, he talked vaguely of a personal project for inspecting the ports, the superintendence of which, since he was grand admiral, belonged specially to him.

The convoys of money and movables already remarked, the preparations of the court, and particularly of the Tудо family, soon left no doubt. It would be difficult to form an idea of the indignation of the Spaniards on learning that they were about to be abandoned by the house of Bourbon, as the Portuguese had been by the house of Braganza. Concerning themselves but little about the advantages which such a resolution might afterwards have for the preservation of the colonies, they said to themselves that if the French had such evil intentions, the government was either silly in not having foreseen them, or criminal in having favoured them; that at all events they must be resisted to the last extremity; that all the Spaniards, having the king and the princes at their head, ought to cover the capital with their bodies, and perish rather than suffer it to be entered; but to run away cowardly was an indignity, a treason; that for the rest, there was in this flight something besides a precaution of prudence for the benefit of the royal family, merely a calculation for prolonging the usurped power of the favourite; for if the intention was to escape the French, it was because they were known to be adverse to Emmanuel Godoy and favourable to the Prince of the Asturias. This last idea becoming general, had restored their popularity to the French, and people said that instead of running away or fighting them, they ought to go to meet and welcome them, since the Prince of the Peace had such a strong distrust of their intentions. The exasperation of all classes against the court was at its height. The nobility, the middle class, the common people, and the army, all spoke one and the same language at Madrid; and this language was as open, as bold, as immoderate, as it is possible to be on the eve of great events in the most free countries. In the army, in particular, a body of men very ill-treated by the Prince of the Peace, who had overturned its organisation, the life-guards, manifested the greatest irritation, and resolved to oppose the king's departure even by force. Among the officers of this corps there were several absolutely devoted to the Prince of the Asturias, and in frequent communication with him, receiving, it is alleged, suggestions and orders from him.

This boisterous opposition had not shaken either the Prince of the Peace or the queen in their projects, and merely excited in them a desire to withdraw themselves the sooner from such

hatred and such dangers, by retiring first to Andalusia, afterwards, if they must, to America. The Prince of the Peace had given orders accordingly. He had made the troops destined to occupy Portugal fall back; for on the eve of losing Spain there was something else to think of than the Algarves and North Lusitania. General Taranco had been obliged to leave Oporto to march into Galicia, and from Galicia into the kingdom of Leon. General Carafa had had to ascend the Tagus, and to advance as far as Talavera; General Solano, Marquis del Socorro, to return from Elvas towards Badajoz, and proceed for Seville. Assuredly the Prince of the Peace had no idea of entering with these forces, consisting of six or seven thousand men each, into a contest with the French army. He probably destined them much more to cover the retreat of the royal family than to organise a desperate defence in the south of Spain. Several frigates were eventually prepared in the port of Cadiz.*

The Prince of the Peace, according to his custom of passing a week alternately at Madrid and with their majesties, had returned on Sunday, the 13th of March, to Aranjuez, a magnificent royal residence seated on the bank of the Tagus, decorated in the Italian style, with superb gardens, somewhat reminding you of the Arabic taste. This residence, as you come from Madrid, is on the right of a highroad, as wide as the avenue of the Champs Elysées. Opposite to the palace this road expands into a spacious place. On the left are several fine mansions belonging to ministers and to grandees of the court, and one of which in particular was occupied by the Prince of the Peace. A multitude of small houses, inhabited by shopkeepers and tradesmen whom the court and its numerous establishment draw after them, form what may be called the town of Aranjuez.

No sooner had he arrived than the Prince of the Peace gave definitive orders for the departure, which was fixed for Tuesday or Wednesday, the 15th or 16th of March. The major-domo of the court had already caused the royal carriages to be got ready; and relays of horses were stationed on the Ocaña road, which leads to Seville. Directions had been given at Madrid to the Walloon and Spanish guards and to the life-guards who

* The domestic resolutions of the Spanish government are in general known from hearsay only, for there is nothing in writing on this subject by any well-informed man. The Marquis de Caballero, however, when subsequently questioned by Murat, delivered to him three very instructive memoirs concerning the events which preceded the disturbance at Aranjuez, and the manuscripts exist in the Secretary of State's office. M. de Caballero, relating the discussions which he had with the Prince of the Peace respecting the projected departure, details all that passed on this occasion, and furnishes a great many facts that are extremely curious. In particular, he heard the Prince of the Peace assert that he had just caused five frigates to be got ready at Cadiz for conveying the royal family beyond sea.

were not on duty, to hold themselves in readiness to set out for Aranjuez.

But although no account had been made of the opposition of certain ministers, it became at length necessary to inform them of the definitive resolution of the court, and to apply to them for the signature of various orders. The Prince of the Peace, as soon as he arrived at Aranjuez, had summoned several of them to the royal residence, in particular the Marquis de Caballero, who had kept him waiting. The Prince of the Peace, somewhat nettled, received him very ungraciously. The minister, persisting in his opposition, refused to concur either by his consent or by his signature in the departure, which was no longer merely projected but resolved upon. I order you to sign, said the prince to him, in a movement of anger. I take no orders but from the king, replied M. de Caballero. Such an opposition from a man not distinguished by boldness of character must have proved to what a degree the authority of the favourite was already shaken. The other ministers having come in, a sharp altercation took place among them. M. de Caballero, urged to the highest pitch of irritation, reproached M. de Cevallos for his base complaisance towards the Prince of the Peace, and had no supporter but the minister of the marine. They separated without coming to any conclusion, and on leaving the palace these councillors of the crown, retaining in their countenances and in their language the agitation which they were full of, dropped words which apprised the public of the matter in hand, and of the danger with which it was threatened.

The Prince of the Asturias, on his part, and his uncle, Don Antonio, had communicated to their confidants what they knew, and had in some measure applied for aid against the violence that was preparing for them. The attached officers whom the prince numbered in the life-guards had spoken to their men, who were disposed to infringe all the rules of subordination at the first word that should be said to them. The household, who knew from the very preparations which had been made how near at hand the journey was, and were sorry to leave the old abode in which they were accustomed to dwell, had forewarned the inhabitants of Aranjuez. The latter, grieved to be deprived of the presence of the court, had resolved to prevent its departure; and they had, by reporting the design of flight in the surrounding country, drawn together the formidable peasants of La Mancha, grievously vexed also to see the court leaving them, and taking from them the advantage of its supply. The affluence to Aranjuez became extreme, and faces the most sinister and the most strange began already to make their appearance. A singular personage, the Count de Montijo,

persecuted by the court, having, together with the birth and fortune of a grandee, the art and a disposition for exciting the popular masses, was in the midst of this concourse, ready to give it the signal for insurrection. In consequence, there were seen tradesmen of Aranjuez, peasants of La Mancha, brought together by anxiety, interest, passion, keeping continual watch about the palace.

Monday, the 14th, the day after the altercation between M. Caballero and the Prince of the Peace, was extremely stormy. On Tuesday, the 15th, the sight of the last preparations of the court, the language of the dissident ministers, certain words attributed to the Prince of the Asturias, who, it was said, asked for aid against the violence of those who purposed to carry him off to Andalusia, produced such an emotion, that a popular insurrection was expected every moment to break out. There was already the aspect, the shouts of one; nothing was wanting but acts of violence.

On the morning of the next day, Wednesday, the 16th, the authors of the project of a journey, seeing that the departure would be rendered impossible unless a moment's tranquillity could be restored to that agitated population, proposed to publish a proclamation, by which Charles IV. should promise not to leave Aranjuez. Accordingly this proclamation was immediately drawn up, read, and posted in all the principal streets of Aranjuez, and sent in the utmost haste to Madrid. "My dear subjects," such was the substance of it, "be not alarmed, either at the arrival of the troops of my magnanimous ally, the Emperor of the French, which have entered Spain to repel a landing of the enemy on our coasts, or at my alleged intention of departure. No; it is not true that I want to leave my beloved people. I will stay with you, live among you, relying on your attachment if I should need it against any enemy whatsoever. Spaniards, be easy, then—your king will not leave you."

This proclamation infused into men's minds a degree of security, and calmed them for a moment. The multitude, collected in front of the royal residence, called for its sovereigns, who appeared at the windows of the palace, cheering with all its might, shouting "Long live the king!" "Death to the Prince of the Peace!" "Death to the favourite who dishonours and betrays his master!" Thus ended the 16th, amidst a satisfaction which unfortunately was to be but transient.

On the following day, the 17th, in spite of the royal promises, the journey seemed still to be resolved upon. The carriages remained loaded in the courts of the palace. The horses were waiting at the relays. The troops forming the garrison of Madrid, composed of the Walloon and Spanish guards and of

the company of life-guards not on duty, set out for Aranjuez. Part of the populace of the capital and a multitude of curious persons followed and performed the trip, a distance of seven or eight leagues, along with them. By the way this train set up shouts against the queen and against the Prince of the Peace, and asked the officers and soldiers if they would let their sovereigns be carried off by an unworthy usurper, who meant to take them away with him to tyrannise over them the more safely. The troops, thus accompanied, reached Aranjuez towards the close of the day, and were quartered upon the inhabitants, which was not the way to recall them to military subordination. A last circumstance completely convinced the multitude that the royal promises were but a deception; this was, that the demoiselles Tudo themselves had arrived at Aranjuez, and were to set off that evening, it was said, for Andalusia.

The concourse about the king's palace and that of the Prince of the Peace was more considerable than on the preceding days, for with the terrified inhabitants of Aranjuez, with the peasants of La Mancha, were mingled soldiers without arms, who, having once arrived at their lodgings, came out again to join the mob and the curious persons who had left Madrid in great number. The life-guards, at least those not on duty, evidently excited by the friends of the Prince of the Asturias, divided into bands, forming volunteer patrols, sometimes towards the king's stables, sometimes towards the residence of the Prince of the Peace.

Towards midnight a singular incident, which occurred in front of the palace of the Prince of the Peace, became the spark that produced the explosion. A lady coming out of this palace, under the arm of an officer, escorted by a few hussars, of whom the prince composed his guard, was perceived by a band of the life-guards and of inquisitive persons. They recognised, or thought they recognised, Mademoiselle Josepha Tudo, who, according to them, was going to get into a carriage. The crowd pressed around her. The prince's hussars having attempted to open a passage, a gun was fired, it is not known by whom. A frightful tumult instantly arose. The life-guards ran to their quarters, saddled their horses, and brandishing their swords, rushed upon the prince's hussars whom they met. The Walloon and Spanish guards also took to their arms, rather for the purpose of joining the mob than of enforcing respect for the royal authority. The people no longer containing themselves, assembled beneath the windows of the palace, called for the king with loud shouts, insisted on seeing him that they might let him hear the expression of their good wishes, by furiously shouting "Long live the king!" "Death to the Prince of the Peace!" After terrifying him by greeting him with such acclamations, they proceeded to the other side

of Aranjuez, towards the residence of the Prince of the Peace, which they surrounded on all sides. To force the doors and to rush in appeared at first to this mob, which set out in the career of revolutions, an outrage beyond its daring. They paused for a moment hesitating, but full of impatience, and devouring their prey with their eyes before they seized it. All at once a person, a messenger, it was said, from the palace, appeared at the gate of the prince to obtain admittance. It was refused him. He insisted. The guards of the house conceiving that they were attacked, thought of defending themselves. Amidst this agitation a shot was fired. Hesitation was then at an end. The enraged crowd dashed against the gates, broke them in, penetrated into the magnificent abode of the favourite, ravaged it, flung out of the windows pictures, hangings, sumptuous furniture, destroyed without pillaging, more furious than greedy, as is the case in the movements of every mob excited but not debased. They ran from apartment to apartment in quest of the object of the public hatred, but found only the unfortunate wife of the Prince of the Peace. The populace in Spain, even the very lowest of it, had at length become acquainted with the whole life of Emmanuel Godoy. They knew how many women he had, which he loved, which he did not love. They knew the wretchedness of that august Princess de Bourbon, unhappily united to a soldier in the guards, to throw on that soldier the royal lustre which he had not. The multitude, on perceiving her, fell at her feet, conducted her respectfully out of the stormed house, placed her in a carriage, and drew her in triumph to the palace of the sovereign. Having set her down in the abode of kings, which she ought never to have been obliged to leave, the mob, thinking that they had not done with the palace of the Prince of the Peace, returned thither, searched for the owner himself in every corner of his mansion, and not finding him, revenged themselves by a frightful devastation. The whole night was spent in searching, ravaging, and when daylight came, the favourite not being discovered, it was supposed that he had sought an asylum elsewhere.

It may be conceived what must have been at this moment the terror of Charles IV. and the despair of the queen. The remembrance of the French Revolution had always filled them with horror. That revolution, which they had so dreaded, they beheld at last at their own door, raising the same cries, committing the same acts, though excited by different sentiments. They were dismayed, appalled, resigned to whatever should befall them. That queen, justly odious, felt nevertheless a true sentiment, which, without rendering her interesting, might, at least to a certain degree, excuse her scandalous life. She

thought not in her terror either of her family or of herself, but of the ruler of her soul, the despicable Godoy. She inquired of everybody what had become of him; she despatched trusty servants to learn tidings of him. "Where is Emmanuel?" she exclaimed; "where can he be?" and she hid not the tears wrung from her by such uneasiness. The king himself, when his fear subsided, also inquired what they had done with poor Emmanuel, who, he said, was so attached to him. As for the Prince of the Asturias, seeing his enemy pulled down, the crown ready to drop from the head of his father upon his own, and not knowing that he should soon fall to the ground and be picked up at the point of the sword, he manifested a mean and perfidious joy, which was perceived by his mother, and drew from her the most violent reproaches.

The ministers and several nobles devoted to the king having hurried to the palace, tumultuously advised his majesty to take from the Prince of the Peace all his dignities and employments, as the only means of restoring tranquillity and saving the life of the prince himself. The king, because he was ready for anything, the queen, because she was more anxious to preserve the life than the power of her paramour, immediately assented; and a decree appeared on the morning of the 18th of March, declaring that the king withdrew from Don Emmanuel Godoy his appointments of grand admiral and generalissimo, and authorised him to proceed to what place soever he should be pleased to choose for his retreat.

Such was the end of this deplorable favourite, whose strange destiny was, in our times, a last vestige of the vices of the old courts, in contrast with the manners of the age; for even in dissolute courts they had come to respect public opinion—deplorable favourite on other accounts than those of scandal; for with the exception of bloodshed, he had drawn upon Spain all evils at once, shame, disorganisation, ruin, and in the last instance popular insurrection. On learning the degradation of Emmanuel Godoy, the people with whom Aranjuez was thronged, and who were composed of several populations, not only of Aranjuez, but of Madrid, of Toledo, of the country of La Mancha, gave themselves up to a furious joy, as though on the morrow they should be the happiest people on earth. In all quarters there were singing, dancing, bonfires; they embraced in the streets, congratulating one another on this downfall, which gratified a still stronger feeling than that of interest—hatred for an insolent fortune which had offended all Spain. The news, carried in two or three hours to Madrid, produced there an absolute delirium.

As soon as this popular movement was known, the ambassador of France, destitute of talents but not of courage, hastened to

the king, to cover him with his body if he had been in danger. The disturbance being ended by the fall of the favourite, whose enemy he had become in consequence of the interest that he felt in behalf of the Prince of the Asturias, he appeared almost triumphant with the latter. He told Charles IV. that the French troops, whose arrival was near at hand (they were at that moment passing the Guadarrama, to descend upon Madrid), would be at his command against all enemies at home and abroad, and he believed that, in giving this assurance, he was fulfilling the instructions of his august master, who would never suffer his friendship to be invoked in vain. Charles IV. thanked M. de Beauharnais, and declared that in future he should be happy to treat of business with the ambassador of France, and without any intermediary. Unfortunate king! Fate had not reserved for him so heavy a burden.

The 18th was tranquil; but the multitude, once agitated, had need of new emotions. It wanted something else than a palace to destroy. It would have rejoiced to have the body of Emmanuel Godoy to tear in pieces. Search was everywhere made for him, and the queen trembled lest she should hear every moment of the discovery of his asylum and his death. All the ministers passed the night at the palace near the two sovereigns, whose eyes were not closed for an instant by sleep.

On the morning of the 19th, the popular agitation, calmed a first time by the proclamation of the 16th, and a second time by the deposition of the favourite, which had been decreed on the 18th, had increased, like a wave which alternately rises and sinks. At the palace, the officers of the guards finding all authority over their troops slipping out of their hands, had declared that it was not in their power to enforce respect for the royal authority if it should be attacked. The king and the queen, in deep consternation, had sent for their son Ferdinand, to desire him to shield them by his popularity, and he had promised his good offices, with the secret joy of a conqueror, and the ease of a conspirator, sure of all the springs that he is to set at work; when, all at once, a fresh and violent rumour proved that there was reason to feel apprehensions for the day that was commencing.

The Prince of the Peace, so assiduously sought for, had, nevertheless, not quitted his residence. At the moment when the doors of his palace were forced, he had taken a handful of gold and a pair of pistols, and hid himself in the loft under the roof, by rolling himself in a mat, a sort of rush carpet used in Spain. Continuing in this deplorable situation during the whole of the 18th, and during the night between the 18th and 19th, he could not stay any longer than till the morning of the 19th, when, after several hours' suffering, overcome by thirst, he

had quitted his asylum, and found himself face to face with a soldier of the Walloon guards who was on duty as sentry. Offering this man money, and not daring to add to his offer the threat of using his pistols, all he gained was to get himself denounced, and he was instantly delivered up. Fortunately for him, the mass of the populace was not then near his palace. Some of the life-guards, coming up opportunely, placed him between their horses, and proceeded as fast as they could towards the quarters that served them for barracks. They were obliged to pass through all Aranjuez, and the populace, apprised of the circumstance, ran up in the twinkling of an eye. The prince was on foot, between two of the guards on horseback, leaning upon the pommels of their saddles, and defended by them against the attacks of the mob. The other guards in front and rear did their best to protect him, but could not prevent the furious rabble from aiming at him dangerous blows with stakes, forks, and all sorts of weapons snatched up in haste. With his feet trampled by the horses, with a large wound in his thigh, with one eye almost out of his head, he arrived at the barracks of the guards, where he was thrown, covered with blood, upon the straw in the stables—melancholy example of the favour of kings when the popular fury comes to revenge itself in one day for twenty years' unmerited omnipotence! There is nothing in history more lamentable than the spectacle presented at that moment by this life-guardsman returning, after sharing the royal bed and almost the throne, to the barracks and to the straw on which he had lain in his youth.

The king and the queen, on hearing of this fresh tumult, sent again for Ferdinand, and besought him to forget his injuries, and to go and rescue the unfortunate Godoy. He promised to save him, and accordingly hastened to the quarters of the life-guards, which an unruly populace threatened to storm, dispersed it by the assurance that the culprit should be tried by the Council of Castille, and that justice should be done upon him for all his crimes. At the desire of the heir to the crown the mob dispersed, Ferdinand went to Godoy, whom he found bathed in blood, and told him, with a feigned generosity, that he forgave and pardoned all the injuries which he had received from him. The sight of an abhorred enemy restored to the Prince of the Peace that presence of mind which he had not possessed for a moment since the beginning of the catastrophe. "Art thou king already," said he to Ferdinand, "to grant pardon?" "No," replied the prince, "I am not; but I shall be soon."

The prince returned to the palace to tranquillise his parents, who were left in a state of tribulation difficult to be described, and ready, in order to save themselves and their dear Emmanuel, to make every possible sacrifice, even that of the throne. "What

would they have of us," they exclaimed, "to induce them to spare our unfortunate friend? His dismissal? We have pronounced it. His being put upon his trial? We are going to pronounce it. Would they have the crown? We will lay that down too." A sort of aberration of mind had seized the king and the queen: they knew not what they said, and addressed themselves to every one, soliciting either support or advice. With a view to make them easy about the life of the Prince of the Peace, it was proposed to send him under a proper escort to Grenada, using for the purpose the relays with which that road was provided. A carriage drawn by six mules was immediately brought in front of the barracks of the life-guards, that he might be put into it and removed from so dangerous a place of abode as Aranjuez. But no sooner were these preparations perceived, than the populace, surmising for what object they were destined, fell upon the carriage, broke it in pieces, and manifested a determination to prevent any departure.

This new incident completely deranged the heads of the unfortunate Charles IV. and his wife. They both believed that it was the French Revolution recommencing its course in Spain; that it was not to the Prince of the Peace alone, but to them also, that ill-will was borne; that to place the sceptre in the hands of Ferdinand would perhaps be the best means of dispelling this rising storm, and of saving their lives and that of their unhappy friend. This they said to all those who were around them, to M. de Caballero and M. de Cevallos, to the Duke de Castel Franco, commander of the troops assembled in the royal residence, in short, to different persons of the court; and when they made this proposal, all present signified by a sorrowful and approving silence that this would certainly be the simplest, the safest, the most applauded solution—the solution most capable of stifling in its birth a revolution as appalling as the commencement of that which brought the head of Louis XVI. to the block. After a few moments of these vague parleys, of this consultation of distracted persons, Charles IV. said that he would abdicate; his ambitious wife replied that he was right; and without a single voice being raised in contradiction, his ministers offered to draw up the act of abdication.

This act was instantly prepared, and published immediately, amidst a joy which had no parallel. Charles IV. therein declared that, weary of the fatigues of the throne, bowed by the weight of years and infirmities, he resigned to his son Ferdinand the crown which he had worn for twenty years.

The news of this abdication produced a sort of intoxication at Aranjuez. The people thronged to salute the young king, who had so long been the object of their wishes, and loaded him with a thousand benedictions. The court, outstripping the

people, had forsaken the old sovereigns as it forsakes their bodies when they are dead. They were left by themselves, somewhat less uneasy, but deeply dejected at their fall; and those who left them hastened around Ferdinand to assure this new master that it was he—he alone—whom they had had in their hearts for years past when bowing their heads before his mother and the favourite. Ferdinand, whom Nature had formed for dissimulation, and whom the unhappiness of his youth had further perfected in that odious art, appeared pleased with everybody, and was pleased enough with Fortune to seem so with men. He retained provisionally his father's ministers, whom he could not change immediately, and instantly ordered them, for their first commission, to send for the Duke de l'Infantado, exiled to the distance of sixty leagues from Madrid, and the Canon Escoiquiz, shut up in the convent of Tardon. He immediately appointed the Duke de l'Infantado captain of his guards and president of the Council of Castille. Thus, one favour extorted, another favour begot; but this latter was destined to last for a few days only. The formidable Napoleon approached. His troops were at that moment descending from the heights of Somosierra upon Buitrago, and were but one good march from Madrid. Ferdinand's temporary ministers advised him to commence his reign by advances towards the Emperor of the French. The Duke del Parque was sent to Murat, to arrange with that prince respecting the entry of the French into Madrid. The Dukes de Medina Celi and de Frias, and Count Fernand Nuñez, were sent to Napoleon, who was supposed to be on the way to Spain, to swear friendship to him, and to renew the application for a French princess. This done at the close of this very first day, Ferdinand fell asleep, believing himself to be a king. He was destined to become such, but not till after long years of captivity and a terrible war.

Thus fell the last Bourbons, to reappear well or ill, gloriously or scurvily, a few years later: they fell at Paris, as at Aranjuez, as at Naples, beneath the French Revolution, which drove them before it like the vengeful Furies pursuing guilty spirits. At Paris this Revolution had struck off the head of one Bourbon. At Naples it had thrown another into the sea, and obliged him to take refuge in Sicily. At Aranjuez it forced the last to abdicate, in order to save the life of an ignoble favourite, and made use not of a people smitten with liberty, but of a people smitten with royalty, differing therefore in its modes of acting, like the places into which it penetrated, but always terrible and regenerating, though fortunately less cruel, for it now dethroned without killing kings.

NOTE TO PAGE 268.

I should very much astonish both the public and contemporary historians (who are usually very prompt in making up their minds on doubtful questions), were I to describe the various perplexities I experienced before I could come to any satisfactory conclusion respecting Napoleon's real designs on Spain. As he ended by invading the country and giving the sovereignty to his brother Joseph, it has been inferred that he had all along projected the scheme which he ultimately executed. In like manner, there are persons who firmly believe that, because he made himself Emperor of France, he had entertained that project from the time when he commanded the army of Italy. The collectors of recollections have even gone so far as to look for the first traces of his projects in the School of Brienne. Moreau betrayed France in 1813: this is an unquestionable fact. But there are persons who, not content with dating his civic delinquencies from the conspiracy of Georges, and his misunderstanding with the First Consul, trace them back to the conspiracies of Pichegru; and following up the spirit of investigation, they go so far as to affirm that he conceived the first idea of betraying the French armies to the Austrians whilst he was engaged in studying the law at the School of Rennes. This is a most absurd mode of judging mankind. It is founded on a misunderstanding, not only of the individuals themselves, but of the progress of the human mind, which is slow and successive, and much less frequently determines events than is determined by them. In 1808 Napoleon dethroned the Spanish Bourbons. When did he determine on this step, and by what means did he propose to effect it? These are questions the solution of which presents the utmost difficulty even to those who have the historical documents within their reach. I am the only historian who has possessed all the documents relating to those facts—thanks to the facilities afforded by my political position; and yet I was for a considerable time involved in great uncertainty. My doubts were only removed by discoveries which have been in part due to persevering investigation, and in part the result of mere good fortune. I will here subjoin an account of these discoveries for the information of the public, and for the satisfaction of men who regard conscientious inquiry on such points in the light of a duty.

First, I have a few observations to offer respecting the documents themselves. Of all the many writers who have treated of the events here in question, not one has had access to the real historical documents referring to them. All have merely written books from other books. This is evident, on a perusal of their works, to any one acquainted with facts. Even Count de Toreno, whose work on the Spanish Revolution is remarkable for talent, and what is better still, for sound political judgment, had not the means of consulting the necessary documents. He based his work on the authority of Spanish and French publications and existing traditions collected in his own country; and by these means his narrative was rendered in many respects highly valuable. Among French writers, one only, M. Armand Lefevre, has had the advantage of being initiated into foreign affairs, and obtaining access to a few authentic documents. But could he, through this initiation, come to the knowledge of truth? A single remark will suffice to answer this question. The correspondence of the foreign office in relation to this Spanish business consists of a very few despatches from M. de Champagny, and in a very considerable number of despatches from M. de Beauharnais, the French ambassador at Madrid!

Now, it happened that M. de Champagny, who was a very honourable

man, and sincerely devoted to the emperor, knew nothing whatever of the affairs of Spain. M. de Beauharnais, also a man of strict integrity, but very incapable, was singled out as a fit personage to play the ridiculous part of an ambassador who was deceived, in order that he, in his turn, might the better deceive the court to which he was accredited. "Say nothing to Beauharnais," "I have said nothing to Beauharnais," are phrases of continual recurrence in the correspondence between Bonaparte and his agents in Spain. Finally, at the moment of the catastrophe, Napoleon despatched M. de la Forêt to second Murat, regarding M. de Beauharnais as a person utterly useless; and he dismissed the latter in disgrace, without even hearing his defence, which was a flagrant act of injustice. The correspondence of the department of foreign affairs, even when one enjoys the advantage of consulting it, comprises only a few very unimportant documents in relation to the affairs of Spain. Where, then, it will be asked, are the documents to be found? In the correspondence between Napoleon and the agents he employed at the time. The agents in Paris were MM. Talleyrand and Duroc—in Madrid, first Murat, and afterwards General Savary, Marshal Bessières, General Count de Lobau, M. de Tournon, General Grouchy, M. de Monthyon (whose reports were subsequently published in a manner different from that in which he wrote them), and Admiral Decrès, who was much engaged in this affair in reference to the Spanish colonies. These were Napoleon's real agents; the only persons who possessed any knowledge of the affair; and they were only partially informed, for each individual knew only that which concerned himself, and conjectured the rest as well as his intelligence enabled him. The correspondence of all these persons with Napoleon, and of Napoleon with them, exists. It is an extensive and curious correspondence, preserved in the Louvre, and I am the only person who has read it. But though these documents seemed calculated to clear up all obscurity, they did not satisfy my doubt until after I had examined them with that sort of laborious attention which it is necessary to bestow on certain passages in the writings of the historians of antiquity, in order to elucidate historical facts.

In general, whenever I have perused the correspondence of Napoleon with his agents, I have found it so clear and precise that I never could be in doubt respecting facts and events; but after reading this correspondence relative to Spain, I remained for a length of time in the most embarrassing perplexity. At first, Napoleon must have wavered long amidst a variety of projects; and when at length his determination was fixed, he did not make known his designs. Possibly he might have disclosed them to Savary at the last moment, and in reference to one point—the compulsory journey of Ferdinand to Bayonne. On the 20th of February he had seen Murat, without mentioning the matter to him, and he transmitted to him, through the minister of the war department, the order to depart for Bayonne. He traced to him the march of the army on Madrid, adding not a single word relative to politics, and forbidding any question to be asked. Count Lobau and M. de Tournon, who were sent as observers, were not put in possession of any secret. At length, when the Revolution of Aranjuez was accomplished, and Spain was without a king (Charles IV. having abdicated, and Ferdinand VII. not having been recognised), Napoleon despatched General Savary, and confided to him a part of the plan—that which consisted in bringing the father and son to Bayonne, either with their own free-will or by force. On that same day M. de Tournon left Paris with instructions of a totally different nature. These instructions, which were subsequently published at St. Helena, are not apocryphal, but perfectly authentic: they countermanded all that Murat and General Savary had been ordered to do and what they actually did. It may be readily imagined how great was the difficulty of elucidating historical truth from amidst this mass of well-concocted dissimulation; and if this task was difficult, even

with the help of genuine documents, it must be pronounced impossible without them.

I will now explain by what means I succeeded in arriving at the truth. By comparing one with another all the orders given, not only to confidential agents, but to agents who were mere instruments; by comparing the political with the military orders, and not only with the military, but even with the financial orders; by comparing those which were given with those which were executed, and with some little hints thrown out at the critical moment when Napoleon found it necessary to make a partial disclosure of his designs, in order to exact obedience; by these means, and the help of much patience, I succeeded in unravelling the truth, but not till after years of reflection. I may say years, for there is one point on which I did not satisfy myself until after three years of attentive examination and reflection.

Having thus shown the difficulty of my task, I will now state the conclusions at which I have arrived, and how I arrived at them.

That Napoleon had long and systematically entertained the idea of hurling the Bourbons from every throne in Europe, admits of no doubt. But this idea did not take birth in his mind until 1806, after the treachery of the court of Naples, and after the dethronement of the king, which was announced on the day succeeding the battle of Austerlitz. Subsequently, the incapacity and meanness of the court of Spain, its secret treachery, which were perceptible, though not distinctly manifest; finally, the famous proclamation by which the Prince of the Peace, on the very eve of the battle of Jena, summoned the whole Spanish nation to arms; all these circumstances confirmed Napoleon in the idea that it was necessary to pursue towards the Spanish Bourbons the same course he had adopted towards the Bourbons of Naples. But at what time was this general and vague idea matured into a fixed scheme? This is the first question. And after the idea had ripened into a fixed scheme, by what means was that scheme to be executed? For the court of Spain had not the courage to make that demonstration of hostile spirit by which the Neapolitan court had furnished a just ground of offence. By what means, then, the scheme being fairly determined on, was it to be carried out? This is the second question, and the most difficult of solution.

It has been said that immediately after the proclamation of the Prince of the Peace, Napoleon, then in Berlin, formed the project of deposing the King of Spain. Napoleon's correspondence, which almost in every line reveals his inmost feelings, bears evidence to the contrary. After the battle of Jena, he was wholly engrossed by thoughts of a great war in the north of Europe. The general idea of ultimately getting rid of the Bourbons might have become confirmed in his mind; but the project for its execution was not yet even in embryo. It has been alleged that Napoleon was induced to sign peace at Tilsit by M. Talleyrand, who represented the necessity of bringing matters to a close in the north, that he might be enabled to direct his whole attention to the south, that is to say, to Spain; and it has also been stated that the question of dethroning the Spanish Bourbons was even discussed with the Emperor Alexander, who consented to that step, on condition of sacrifices being made to himself in the east. All this is untrue. Napoleon was induced to treat for peace at Tilsit only by a consciousness of the difficulties of his position, which in 1807 was in no way dissimilar to what it was in 1812; the good fortune of the former year being wholly attributable to the excellence of the army at that period. Spain was entirely out of the question. The private correspondence of M. de Caulaincourt bears evidence that Alexander received his first intelligence on the subject when he learned the events that had taken place in Madrid. It is therefore a calumny on the memory of that prince to allege that he was cognisant of the design of dethroning the King of Spain. Napoleon

was desirous of concluding the continental peace at Tilsit, because he found that the Niemen was very far distant from the Rhine; and he had one grand object at heart, which was to constrain England to conclude a maritime peace by the union of all the powers of the continent against her.

On his return to Paris in July 1807, Napoleon immediately directed attention to two objects: first, the internal administration of the empire, which had been neglected for the space of a year; and secondly, to turn to the best account the results of the policy he had pursued at Tilsit. Thus, whilst the cabinet of St. Petersburg, charged with the task of mediation, was addressing England, saying, "Choose between peace and war—peace with us, or war with us!" Napoleon disposed matters so as to force the States still remaining neutral to declare themselves against England, in the event of her determination to continue hostilities. These neutral States were Denmark, Austria, and Portugal; and he prepared an army to constrain in the latter power to obedience. But his correspondence and the nature of his orders prove that, as far as concerns Portugal, he was merely desirous of breaking up her neutrality. When in August and September 1807 the only answer returned by England to the question urgently pressed by Russia was the burning of Copenhagen, a general war-cry was raised against her; and then Napoleon determined to take advantage of two things—the prolongation of the war, and the universal indignation excited against Great Britain—this indignation enabled Napoleon to pursue, in reference to England, a course which he never would have ventured upon under other circumstances.

His first attempt was made on Portugal; but the secret understanding of that power with England soon becoming manifest, he resolved to reduce her under his own dominion. Not being able to do this in a direct way, he determined to divide the usurped power between himself and Spain, in consideration of the cession of Tuscany. At this time (October 1807) the question respecting the whole Peninsula was visibly raised in his mind by the question respecting Portugal. Words inadvertently dropped—first, orders hurriedly issued, show the latent thought that had its origin in the events of Copenhagen. It was also at the period here alluded to that the disgraceful scenes enacted in the Escorial gave birth to the extravagant idea of bringing the Prince of the Asturias to trial, with the view of declaring the forfeiture of his claims to the crown, and transferring the claims to some one else, probably to the Prince of the Peace, under the title of regent. It would, moreover, appear from the orders of Napoleon that the vile conduct pursued at the court of Spain served as a stimulant to his ambition, for calculating the journeys of couriers according to the rate of expedition usual at the period, we find that, on receipt of the intelligence of what was passing in the Escorial, the military movements commenced; for at first he had determined to send forward the troops by forced marches, though he suspended that order on receiving in Paris intimation of the royal pardon accorded to the Prince of the Asturias.

Led by the catastrophe at Copenhagen, and the necessity of continuing the war, to the thought of making himself master of Portugal, Napoleon's attention was next directed to the general affairs of the Peninsula, and the proceedings at the Escorial very much disposed him to take part in those affairs by force. A delay in carrying this wish into effect was the consequence of the pardon granted to Ferdinand, and he departed for Italy in November 1807.

From what passed at Mantua between Lucien Bonaparte and Napoleon, it is evident that the latter thought of arranging the marriage of one of his nieces with Ferdinand, and that he was not quite determined about the dethronement of the Bourbons. Yet in Italy he issued orders for the march of the troops, and such orders as prove that those troops were not mere reinforcements to the army of Portugal (as has been conjectured by

those who imagine that he cherished no hostile design prior to the Revolution of Aranjuez), but troops destined to decide the fate of Spain, for, when in Italy, he organised the Duhesme division, which was despatched to invade Calabria.

On his return to Paris in January 1808, his orders were multiplied, and their rapid succession shows that his plan was becoming matured, and that he was determined to make an end of the Spanish Bourbons.

There were two, or, it may be said, three ways by which this object might be accomplished.

1st. To give a French princess in marriage to Ferdinand without requiring any sacrifice on the part of Spain.

2nd. To give a French princess in marriage to Ferdinand, and to demand the surrender of the provinces of the Ebro, and the opening of the ports of the Spanish colonies.

3rd. To dethrone the Bourbons.

As to the first plan, and in my opinion the wisest of the three, Napoleon seems not to have dwelt upon it long, for he speedily sent his niece back to Italy. This fact admits of no doubt, for it is attested by witnesses under whose observation it occurred. One of the emperor's brothers is among these witnesses.

With regard to the second plan, it certainly was entertained, or at least thought of; for a despatch from M. Yzquierdo, received in Madrid by Ferdinand at the time of his father's abdication, and published by the Spaniards, bears evidence that the plan was discussed between MM. Yzquierdo and Talleyrand. Moreover, there exists in the archives of the Louvre a letter from M. de Talleyrand, in which he expounds this same plan to Napoleon, whilst M. Yzquierdo, on his side, explained it to the court of Spain, and at the same date. Of the existence of the project there can consequently be no doubt. But was it seriously entertained? To a certain extent I believe it was, for M. de Talleyrand in his despatch to the emperor thus expresses himself: "My opinion is that, if your majesty thinks fit, M. Yzquierdo might, though with some little difficulty, be induced to sign, but only on condition of the troops being removed to some distance from the king's place of residence." The scheme either of marriage or no marriage, but with the surrender of the Ebro provinces and the opening of the colonial ports, had a certain degree of reality in the mind of M. de Talleyrand, who was here the intimate confidant of the emperor. But was the plan entertained in perfect seriousness and with entire earnestness of purpose, or was it merely an eventuality which Napoleon held in reserve while really tending to a different object? I believe his latter supposition to be the correct one. In the course of February and March 1808, Napoleon discussed the plan of settling the pending affairs of Spain, on condition of the surrender of her Ebro provinces and the opening of her colonial ports, with or without a marriage; but at the same time, and more seriously, his views were directed to the dethronement.

The following are the reasons which determined my conviction on this subject:—

1st. The expressions employed by M. de Talleyrand prove that the project was only in part seriously entertained; for if Napoleon had had no other object in view, and had earnestly designed to carry out the scheme, Talleyrand would not have made use of the expression, "*If your majesty thinks fit.*" When Napoleon had a determined object in view, his own language, and also that of his agents, was imbued with the spirit of his resolution: it assumed an emphatic and positive tone, and never the tone of doubt.

2nd. Had Napoleon desired only to appropriate to himself the provinces of the Ebro, to open the colonial ports, and to conclude a marriage, he would not have deemed it necessary to overrun Spain with troops. He

would have had no need to issue mysterious orders for marching on Madrid by all the routes at once. He had only to express his desire, and the court of Spain, after perhaps resisting for a while, would infallibly have yielded. He would, besides, have distinctly told Murat what he desired, instead of leaving him involved in doubt respecting the object for which the French army was destined.

3rd. Finally, Napoleon, who did not resolve until the last extremity to make to Russia the sacrifice of discussing the partition of the Turkish empire (which was one step towards the partition itself), would not, about the middle of February, the period of his definitive orders, have sent to Russia a dangerous lure, by proposing that she should explain her ideas on so grave a subject. Nothing short of an object so paramount as the dethronement of the Bourbons could have determined him to purchase, at such a sacrifice, the concurrence or the silence of Russia.

Thus, in February and March 1808, everything tends to prove that the first and second projects—of marrying Ferdinand to a French princess, and exacting or not exacting territorial and commercial sacrifices—were no longer seriously entertained, if they had ever been so. The language of M. de Talleyrand would not have been so dubitory, nor would Napoleon have invaded Spain with so much mystery, or have made such great concessions to Russia for an object of secondary and even of minor importance in comparison with the gigantic projects of the time.

It is clear that in February and March he had determined on dethroning the Bourbons, notwithstanding all the contrary affirmations of those who maintain that he had not determined on the step until he saw both the father and the son at Bayonne, and witnessed their intellectual incapacity and moral degradation.

But having ascertained the end he had in view, it is no easy matter to discover the means he wished to employ for its attainment. This is a point on which I was long doubtful, and my doubts were not cleared up until after several years of inquiry and reflection.

Prior to the Revolution of Aranjuez, that is to say, before the dethronement of the father by the son, Napoleon did not disclose his intention to any person whatever. Not one of his ministers was aware of it, and Murat, as has been seen, was totally ignorant of the matter.

The idea has occurred to me, though it is not supported by any positive proof, that Napoleon wished to force the Spanish royal family to depart by filling them with alarm, in the same manner as the Braganza family had been frightened away. This idea was the first that occurred to me in the course of my investigation, and after much doubt and perplexity I have come back to it.

Whilst reading over five or six times the correspondence of Napoleon, especially that which he maintained with Murat, I alternately arrived at and abandoned this conviction. In the first place, I was forcibly struck with one remark. Napoleon repeatedly says to Murat, "Maintain the most perfect order, conciliate the populace, avoid any sort of collision," which was equivalent to saying that he wished the dethronement should be effected without violence, in order to avoid war with the Spanish nation; but he added, "*Seek to remove the apprehensions of the royal family of Spain: address them in courteous terms.*"

On the 14th of March he thus wrote to Murat: "I have ordered that on the 17th a passage shall be demanded, by way of Madrid, for 50,000 men, destined to proceed to Cadiz. Your conduct must be framed according to the nature of the answer that may be given. *But endeavour to be as encouraging as possible.*" On the 16th of March he writes: "Continue to maintain friendly terms. Banish apprehension from the minds of the king, the Prince of the Peace, the Prince of the Asturias, and the queen."

On the 19th he wrote thus: "I suppose you will receive this letter in

Madrid, where I am very anxious to learn that our troops entered peacefully and with the consent of the king; in short, that all is proceeding tranquilly. I am momentarily looking for the arrival of Tournon and Yzquierdo, so that I may know what to do for the arrangement of affairs. Announce in Madrid that I have arrived here. Maintain rigorous discipline among the troops. Take care that they receive their pay, so that they may be enabled to scatter money."

On the 25th he wrote as follows: "I have received your letter of the 15th of March. I regret to learn that the weather has been so bad; here, we have the finest weather imaginable. I presume you have been in Madrid since the day before yesterday. I have already intimated that the most important points to which you must direct attention are to provision your troops and let them rest; to maintain the best understanding with the king and the court, should they remain at Aranjuez; to give out that the Swedish expedition and the affairs of the north detain me here for some days, but that I shall speedily arrive. In short, set my house in order for me. Declare publicly that your orders are to rest and refresh your troops in Madrid, and to await the emperor's arrival; and that you are certain not to quit Madrid until such time as his majesty shall arrive.

"Do not take part with any of the different factions which divide the country. Behave well to every one, and do nothing that may operate prejudicially on the course which I am about to take. Be careful always to keep up good supplies of provisions in the magazines of Buitrago and Aranda."

At first sight there appears nothing in these orders which betrays the design of alarming the court of Spain; and having once read them, I relinquished the idea that Napoleon's intention was to frighten the royal family away. But a re-perusal of them convinced me that he wished to lull apprehension only till he could effect his entrance into Madrid, and to avoid a collision before his entrance. For example, in the letter of the 14th of March, which I first quoted, I remarked these words: "Whatever may be the intentions of the court of Spain, I wish to impress upon you the paramount importance of arriving in Madrid without hostilities—of encamping the corps by divisions, to make them appear more numerous, and to provision and rest my troops. Meanwhile, my differences with the court of Spain will be adjusted. I hope the war will not take place; that is a point I have greatly at heart. If I take all these precautions, it is because I am in the habit of not leaving anything to chance. If war had broken out, your position would be a good one, for you would have in your rear a force more than sufficient to protect you, and on your left flank Duhesme's division, comprising 14,000 men."

In his letter of the 16th, after the words already quoted, viz., "Continue to maintain friendly terms. Banish apprehension from the minds of the king, the Prince of the Peace, the Prince of the Asturias, and the queen," he proceeds to say, "the principal object is to accomplish the arrival in Madrid, there to let the troops rest, and procure fresh supplies of provisions. Say that I am coming for the purpose of conciliating and arranging affairs.

"Above all things avoid any act of hostility, unless you be positively forced to it. I hope that all may be arranged. It would be dangerous to irritate those people."

The intention was evident. Napoleon was desirous of entering Madrid without a collision, and he wished to inspire just such an amount of confidence as was requisite for averting a rupture. But by carefully comparing one with another the various passages in his letters, and looking into the whole of his arrangements, I have come back to the idea, that though he wished to avoid a collision with the populace, he nevertheless wished the royal family to depart.

Accordingly, everything denoted the intended departure of the court, and Napoleon daily received intimation of the expected movement from Madrid. M. Yzquierdo, in conversation with M. de Talleyrand, had avowed the plan of departure. In this state of things, Napoleon was fully aware that it was only requisite to let matters take their natural course, and the flight would take place. Nay, more, the slightest interposition of his authority would have sufficed to prevent it; for on the 19th the French troops had arrived on the Guadarrama. A movement of cavalry on Aranjuez might in the space of a few hours have surrounded the court and intercepted its flight. And there was another course still more easy, which was to despatch a force in the direction least calculated to excite alarm—that of Talavera; this force, which might have passed for a reinforcement to Junot, might have surrounded Aranjuez, and have prevented all possibility of escape. But there is one passage in Napoleon's correspondence more decisive than all the rest, and it leaves scarcely a shade of doubt on the subject. I will here quote it. Murat, not knowing how to act, when the news of the intended flight of the court was everywhere spread about, addressed to Napoleon the following question, "If the court should wish to depart for Seville, am I to allow it?" On the 23rd of March Napoleon replied as follows:—

"I may suppose that you have arrived in Madrid to-day, or that you will arrive there to-morrow. You must maintain strict discipline. Should the court be at Aranjuez, you will let it remain quietly there, and you will manifest friendly sentiments to the royal family. Should the court be at Seville, you will also leave it there undisturbed. You will send aides-de-camp to the Prince of the Peace to inform him that he has done wrong in avoiding the French troops, that he must not make any hostile movement, and that the King of Spain has nothing to fear from our troops."

Now, when it is recollected that Napoleon caused M. Yzquierdo to depart from Paris (there is extant a letter from Duroc containing the invitation to depart forthwith); that he made him depart full of alarm; and that whilst he ordered 80,000 men to advance on Madrid, he refused to give any explanation—it is evident that everything was calculated to urge on the departure which accordingly took place, as far at least as depended on the court of Spain.

It may be said, it is true, that Napoleon intended to surround and capture them, and then to proclaim the abdication. In the first place, he might have surrounded them, and he did not; in the next place, to have done so would have been an overt and unjustifiable act of violence. The flight to Andalusia answered his purpose better, for it left the throne vacant, and thus the whole difficulty was solved.

Having arrived at this point in my investigation, I should have been convinced that Napoleon's plan was to force the court of Spain to fly, but for one serious consideration, and that one so weighty that it caused me to hesitate several times, and to abandon the opinion I had conceived. It is that the departure or flight of the Bourbons would have entailed the loss of the colonies. Now, Spain without her colonies would have been, as every one must allow, a most onerous burden. All the commercial interest of the south was exclaiming at Bayonne, "Spare us at least from the consequences which have visited Portugal!"

Now, to send the Bourbons to America was exactly the way to bring about those consequences; for the Bourbons would have raised the colonies in rebellion against the royalty of Joseph, and at the same time would have opened them to the English, a circumstance which it was most desirable to prevent.

This consideration very much staggered me, and for a considerable time I ceased to believe that Napoleon wished to cause the flight of the Spanish royal family. However, the facility for flight which was afforded them—the order to allow them to fly, combined with the alarm spread from

Paris by the departure of M. Yzquierdo, were also facts too conclusive to be disregarded. Amidst this perplexity, one fact riveted my attention, viz., that there was in Cadiz a French fleet in possession of the road, and that possibly it might have been Napoleon's intention to make use of it to arrest the fugitive Bourbons, whose flight would have morally ruined them in the eyes of the Spanish nation. After having, on the one hand, induced them to abandon the throne to enable him to take possession of it, he would, on the other hand, have arrested them when on the point of embarking for America. This reflection came across my mind like a ray of light, for it explained and resolved every obscurity. Still it was but a mere conjecture. I once more read over the correspondence of M. Decrès, and in it I discovered the following fact—that an order in cipher sent to Admiral Rosily could not have been read, because the key to the cipher of the consulate was lost; and that the admiral had sent to Paris a confidential and intelligent officer to receive the communications, which had remained unknown, owing to the loss of the cipher. This circumstance appeared to me to be a remarkable confirmation of my first conjecture. What could be the purport of this despatch in cipher? Could it be an order for the fleet to quit Cadiz and proceed to Toulon? That order had been given three or four times in plain characters, that is to say, without employing the precaution of cipher. The despatch must therefore have related to something else—something still more secret. I felt quite convinced that it must be the order for the arrest of the fugitive family. I renewed my search among the papers of the department for foreign affairs; but the despatch was not to be found there. I could scarcely entertain a hope of finding it in the department of the marine, where the archives, though arranged in admirable order, contain scarcely any documents of importance. Nevertheless, I resolved to make the search, and contrary to my expectation, I found in the historical section the despatch in cipher, and fortunately accompanied by the key. It was written by M. Decrès, and in the following terms:—

"I do not seek to discover the object of the entrance of the French troops into Spain. The only point that concerns me is, that you and I have to answer to his majesty for his squadron. I recommend you, therefore, to take a position as distant as possible from the strong batteries, and which, at the same time, will defend the road against any attack either from within or without. You have provisions which will serve you in case of need whilst you are lying at anchor. Be cautious not to betray any inquietude; but stand on your guard against any event, and that without show, but merely as if it were the natural consequence of the orders you have received for holding yourself in readiness to depart. Place the Spanish vessels in the centre of, and under the guns of, the French ships.

"*Should the court of Spain, whether impelled by the force of events, or by an infatuation, which it is impossible to foresee, renew the scene that has been enacted at Lisbon, you must oppose its departure.* Leave events to take their natural course as far as you possibly can; but should a crisis arise, do not hold any parley with the English, and seem as though you had not previously entertained any distrust; but silently adopt precautions for the safety of the squadron, and do all that is expected of your sagacity and personal merit in the service of his majesty. Feb. 21, 1808."

I naturally experienced very great satisfaction in having thus elucidated the truth; whilst, at the same time, I felt sincere regret to find the truth so mortifying; but it was the consequence of the plan of dethroning the Bourbons.

From that moment Napoleon's design was evident to me. First, it is important to note the date (the 21st), which corresponds with the dates of incidents which comprise the whole plan, viz., the departure of Murat and the instructions given to him, the composition of the whole army, the

departure of M. Yzquierdo, the departure of M. de Tournon, the orders to Junot. Secondly, on comparing the despatch of Decrès with the order given to Murat to allow the royal family to depart if they wished so to do, it will be found that the one does not contradict the other, but that both perfectly coincide. Napoleon wished the court to depart from Madrid, that the throne might be left vacant ; but he did not wish the royal family to quit Cadiz, lest the colonies should be excited to insurrection.

The great difficulty of arriving at the truth, even with the help of the most authentic documents, may be easily conceived ; and I venture to affirm that posterity will never know more than I have here elucidated. Napoleon made no disclosure on this subject ; Murat has left behind him nothing but his correspondence ; General Savary has left inaccurate memoirs, containing statements repeatedly controverted by his own correspondence ; M. de la Forêt himself wrote to me the assurance that he knew nothing of the affair ; Prince Cambacérès, in his memoirs, declares that he has no information to give ; Counts de Tournon and Lobau have left only their correspondence, which I have perused ; and M. de Yzquierdo has left only a few letters, which are deposited in the Louvre, and which I have read. I therefore conclude that no further information on the subject can ever come to light, and that the truth may be summed up as follows :—

The idea of the invasion of Spain was not matured into a settled plan in the mind of Napoleon till after the treaty of Tilsit, and not before.

After the treaty of Tilsit, and before the burning of Copenhagen, he thought only of closing the ports of Portugal against Great Britain.

After the events at Copenhagen, the war being obstinately protracted, he wished to profit by its prolongation to effect a complete settlement of affairs throughout the south of Europe.

His first design was to share Portugal with Spain ; but the events at the Escorial suddenly stimulated him with the determination of an armed interference in the affairs of Spain.

The pardon of the Prince of the Asturias caused him for a time to postpone the execution of his designs.

In Italy and in Paris he alternately entertained a variety of plans, viz., a marriage, a territorial dismemberment, with a partition of the colonies, and a dethronement.

He gradually determined, about the months of January and February, in favour of the last-named project—the dethronement.

That such was the fact, is evident from the mystery of his orders, the extraordinary accumulation of troops, the concession to Russia of the partition of the Ottoman empire—all these were things useless and needless for the accomplishment of any secondary project, such as the marriage, or the appropriation of one or two provinces.

Finally, having once determined on the dethronement, he wished to bring about, without collision, the flight to Andalusia, and to prevent, by the arrest of the royal family in the Bay of Cadiz, the consequences which their flight might entail on the colonies.

Such are, in my opinion, the real facts, collected with rigorous impartiality from historical documents, and the only facts which posterity can hope to obtain.

There remains only one doubt, which may be created by a letter (first sent forth to the world from St. Helena), bearing date the 29th of March, addressed to Murat, and censuring his whole conduct. This letter I will discuss and explain in the note on p. 387.

BOOK XXX.

THE fall of the Prince of the Peace had already produced a sort of ferocious joy among the people of Madrid. The news of the abdication of Charles IV., and of the accession of Ferdinand VII., crowned it. In the eyes of the multitude no joy is complete without a riot. It was known that the Prince of the Peace had stopped at Aranjuez: an assault was made upon his family and upon the persons who enjoyed his confidence. Their houses were ravaged, and their persons pursued; but thanks to the courage of M. de Beauharnais, not one of them fell into the hands of the mob. Immediately on the abdication of Charles IV., the latter returned to Madrid in time to offer an asylum to the family of Godoy. His mother, the brother of Emmanuel, and his sisters, married to some of the highest nobility in Spain, passed a frightful night under the roofs of their palaces. M. de Beauharnais offered them an asylum in the hotel of the embassy, where they would be protected by the fear inspired by the French arms—for Murat was then only on his march to Madrid. The plundering and burning were continued during the whole of the 20th, which was Sunday, and the mob was not obstructed by any public force. There were two Swiss regiments at Madrid (those of de Preux and Reding); but these foreign soldiers, still worse circumstanced than others in a case of popular agitation, did not dare to show themselves, and took no means of stopping the disorder. A kind of fatigue, the assembling of a few citizens who had taken up arms of their own accord, and a proclamation of Ferdinand's—who did not wish to dishonour his new reign by any gross excesses—put an end to their abominable conduct. Madrid was full of joy at seeing the end of a hateful reign, and the commencement of a new one so ardently desired. In their satisfied minds scarcely did there remain room for disquiet on learning that the French were approaching the capital. After having hoped that they would overthrow the favourite, the Spanish people now flattered themselves that they were about to recognise Ferdinand VII.; and **whatever** might be the case, the people, elated at what they **ve**, and proud of having themselves conquered the **write**, assumed an immense confidence in them-

selves, and seemed no longer to fear any one. In the simplicity of their joy they believed only what pleased themselves, and in their eyes the French were nothing more than auxiliaries come to inaugurate the reign of Ferdinand VII. With such a disposition of mind our troops were sure of being well received.

A great part of the troops had already passed the Guadarrama. On the 20th the two first divisions of Marshal Moncey's corps were between Cavanillas and Buitrago, and the third at Somosierra. On the same day the first division of General Dupont was at Guadarrama, ready to descend upon the Escorial; the second of the same corps was at Segovia; the third at Valladolid. Thus Murat was in a condition to enter Madrid in twenty-four hours with two divisions of Marshal Moncey, one of General Dupont, the whole of the cavalry and the guards; that is, with 30,000 men. But there only remained in that capital two Swiss regiments completely discouraged, and a people without arms. Murat had consequently no resistance to fear.

He was deeply troubled by the disorders in the capital, and was afraid that in Europe the French would be accused of having desired to throw Spain into utter confusion in order to seize upon it more easily. He was also wholly ignorant whether this unforeseen situation was that which Napoleon most desired, and that, especially, which would lead most surely to a vacancy on the throne of Spain. Humanity, obedience, and ambition caused a most painful conflict in his mind. In this state of mind he wrote to Napoleon to make him acquainted with what he had just learned, to complain anew of not having been admitted into his secrets, to express the pain which the events in Madrid had caused him, and to announce to him that he was just about to enter that capital, in order, at all costs, to repress the excesses of a barbarous populace. At the same time he put his columns in motion, and advanced to lead Marshal Moncey's troops to San Agostino, and those of General Dupont to the Escorial.

On the next day, the 21st, being in person at El Molar, he received a courier in disguise, who was the bearer of a letter from the Queen of Etruria. That princess, whom he had known in Italy, and to whom he was bound by friendship, appealed to his heart in the name of an august and deeply unfortunate family. She informed him that her aged parents were threatened with the greatest danger, to guard against which they had recourse to his generous protection. She entreated him to come himself, and secretly, to Aranjuez, to witness their deplorable situation, and to devise some means to extricate them from it.

This deeply afflicted young woman, but little versed in the knowledge of business, although she had more talent than her deceased husband, supposed that a commander-in-chief repre-

senting Napoleon, and at the head of a French army at the gates of one of the largest capitals in Europe, could secretly withdraw for a day or two from headquarters, as he may have done perhaps at Florence in a time of peace, and when he was more occupied with pleasure than with war or negotiations. Murat replied, with great courtesy, "that he was fully sensible of the misfortunes of the royal family of Spain, but that it was impossible for him to leave his headquarters, where he was detained by imperative duties; but that he would send in his stead M. de Monthyon, one of his officers, a man thoroughly to be relied on, to whom she might say freely all that she would have confided to him."*

M. de Monthyon set out from El Molar on the 21st, reached Aranjuez on the 22nd, and found the family of the aged sovereigns in the greatest distress. In a fit of fear, Charles IV. and his queen had been led to divest themselves of the supreme authority. The queen, who was the principal author of all the determinations of the court, had been led to this abdication by her desire to save the life of the Prince of the Peace, and to release herself and her husband from dangers which she had greatly exaggerated. But when the first moment was past, the silence and solitude succeeding popular tumult, new dangers threatening the Prince of the Peace, whose trial had been ordered by Ferdinand VII., she was seized with a double vexation at seeing herself fallen, and of not knowing the object of her criminal affections to be in safety. And as the emotions of her mind were reproduced immediately in the mind of her feeble husband, she had filled him with the same regret and the same vexation. To increase the misfortune, it was just notified to them in the name of Ferdinand VII. that it was necessary for them to go to Badajoz, at the extremity of Estramadura, far from the protection of the French, in order to live there in seclusion, misery perhaps, whilst a hated son reigned, avenged himself, and probably would sacrifice the unfortunate Godoy! With such a prospect in view their fall had become more cruel, and the young Queen of Etruria, whom this exile afflicted in proportion to her age, added to all the vexations of the royal family her own despair. Connected with Murat, deriving succour from her relation with him, she had been employed to invoke the protection of the French army.

Such was the situation in which M. de Monthyon found this unfortunate family: he was surrounded, assailed with prayers

* I make no supposition here. I write after the originals deposited in the Louvre, a small number of which, with very considerable alterations, were published in the *Moniteur*. Murat's correspondence with Napoleon, the most important of all which relates to the affairs of Spain, has never been published. Some fragments of that of M. de Monthyon were inserted in the *Moniteur*, but greatly altered. My narrative follows the autograph originals.

and the most earnest entreaties by the aged king, the aged queen, and the young Queen of Etruria; they related to him the sufferings of the days just past, the violence to which they had been subjected, and that to which, perhaps, they were about to be subjected again, the injunction that had been received to set out for Badajoz, and above all, the dangers that threatened Emmanuel Godoy. They spoke of the latter still more than of the royal family itself; they earnestly begged for him the protection of France, offering to refer all that had happened to the decision of Murat, to make him the arbiter of the destinies of Spain, and finally, to submit to everything which he should order.

M. de Monthyon immediately set out again to rejoin Murat, who during the 22nd had drawn nearer to Madrid, in order to enter the city on the 23rd, the day almost indicated beforehand in the instructions of Napoleon. He communicated to him what he had seen and heard in his interview with the aged sovereigns, their bitter regret, and their desire to submit the late events in Spain to Napoleon. Murat, on hearing this recital, was seized with a kind of sudden illumination. He was not in the secrets of the policy of which he was the instrument; but he had sometimes supposed that Napoleon wished, by frightening Charles IV., to induce him to flee, and to procure for himself the crown of Spain as well as that of Portugal by the desertion of their possessors. This plan being defeated by the Revolution of Aranjuez, Murat thought it was necessary to make a completely new one, to spring from the circumstances themselves. In consequence, he formed the idea of changing the regret which the old sovereigns exhibited at their fall into a formal protest against the abdication of the 19th; and after having obtained their signature to such a protest, and having it confided to his hands, to refuse the recognition of Ferdinand VII. This he was very naturally able to do, for it was impossible to recognise Ferdinand VII., who had come to the throne in such a manner, without first having referred to the authority of Napoleon. The result of this combination would be to leave Spain without a sovereign; for the old king, fallen in fact, would not resume the throne by protesting, and thanks to this protest, the royal authority of Ferdinand VII. would remain in suspense. Between a king who was no longer king, who could no longer be so, and a king who was not so yet, who could never be so if it was not wished that he should, Spain was about to be without any other master than the general commanding the French army. Fortune thus restored the means which she had taken away by preventing the departure of Charles IV.

Murat's mind, sharpened by ambition, had just found out all that the genius of Napoleon, in the exercise of its deepest cunning, devised some days later on the news of the recent events.

Without losing a moment, and with all the vivacity of his desires, he caused M. de Monthyon to set out again for Aranjuez, giving him orders immediately to revisit the royal family, and since they declared that they had been constrained, to propose to them to protest against the abdication of the 19th, to protest secretly if they dared not do it publicly, and to enclose this protest in a letter to the emperor, who would not fail to arrive in a few days in Spain, and who would thus be constituted arbiter of the hateful usurpation committed by the son to the injury of the father. Murat promised to gain Napoleon's favour for the cause of the old sovereigns, and in the meantime to protect not only them, but the unfortunate Godoy, who had become the prisoner of Ferdinand VII.

M. de Monthyon set out again for Aranjuez, and Murat hastened to write to the emperor, in order to inform him of what had taken place, and to submit to him the combination which he had devised. Having arrived on the evening of the 22nd at Chamartin, on the very heights which command Madrid, he prepared to make his entry on the next day. He had just received the Duke del Parque, the envoy of Ferdinand VII., commissioned to compliment him in the name of the new King of Spain, to offer him entrance into Madrid, provisions and quarters for the army, and an assurance of the friendly intentions of the young court towards France. Murat gave the Duke del Parque a very gracious reception, through which, however, appeared something of that presumption which was natural to him; and while accepting the assurances of which he was commissioned to be the bearer, expressed to him with sufficient clearness that the emperor alone could recognise Ferdinand VII., and legalise, in the name of the rights of nations, the Revolutions of Aranjuez. He declared to him, that whilst awaiting the imperial decision, he could only look upon the new government as a government *de facto*, and give to Ferdinand no other title except that of Prince of the Asturias. This kind of relation was accepted, since Napoleon's lieutenant would admit of none other, and everything was arranged for the entry of the French into Madrid on the next day, the 23rd of March 1808.

The leaders of the new court, though not very wise, nevertheless perceived the necessity of preventing any collision with the French; for their assumption of royalty—the offspring of a mere revolution in the palace—might have been put an end to by a regiment of cavalry. In consequence, they issued orders to the people of Madrid to give a good reception to the French, and posted up a proclamation on the corners of all the streets, in which Ferdinand VII. appealed to those feelings of good-will which ought to influence one towards another

nations so long and closely allied. The Spaniards comprehending this policy as well as their young king, and drawn, moreover, by curiosity, were then perfectly well disposed to run forth to meet Murat, and to lavish their acclamations upon him.

On the morning of the 23rd, Murat waited on the heights situated behind Madrid, which are merely the last declivities of the Guadarrama, with a part of his army, which consisted at this moment of the first two divisions of Marshal Moncey, the cavalry of the whole corps, and those detachments of the imperial guard which had been sent from Paris to form Napoleon's escort. He made his entry in the middle of the day, at the head of a brilliant staff, and delighted all the Spaniards by his noble mien and his trusting and gracious smile. The imperial guard made a singular impression upon the Spaniards; and the cuirassiers, by their great size, their accoutrements, and their discipline, were no less imposing. The infantry of Marshal Moncey, however, consisting for the most part of boys badly clothed and worn out with fatigue, excited more pity than fear, which was unlucky amongst a people whose senses it was more necessary to affect than their reason. Nevertheless, the whole of this military spectacle produced a certain effect on the imagination of the Spaniards; and they highly applauded both the French and their chiefs.

By a piece of involuntary negligence, rather than any want of respect, which no one intended to show, the arrangement of a proper lodging for the commander-in-chief of the French army had been omitted. At the gates of Madrid, Murat alighted at the abandoned palace of Buen Retiro, and occupied the apartments which had been inhabited by the demoiselles Tado before their departure. He was offended by this want of attention. But he was immediately offered the former dwelling of the Prince of the Peace, situated near the magnificent palace of the royal family of Spain. The authorities, civil and military, the clergy, and the diplomatic body came to visit him. He received them with grace and dignity, almost like a sovereign, although he had no other title than that of commander-in-chief of the French army.

Whilst he was entering Madrid, he was informed that the people were about to bring thither, as a prisoner, loaded with chains, and under the safe conduct of the life-guards, the unfortunate Godoy, whose trial they were eager to have the pleasure of seeing immediately commenced. Murat, both from generosity and calculation, in order to spare the feelings of the former court, now called to become the instrument of new combinations, was resolved not to tolerate any act of cruelty towards the fallen favourite. Fearing lest the presence

of Godoy, who was an object of such hatred to the multitude, might provoke a popular tumult, and especially at the moment of the entrance of the French troops, he sent one of his officers with a clear and simple order to put off the removal of the prisoner, and to detain him in a village close to Madrid. This order found and fixed the Prince of the Peace in the village of Pinto, where he was detained some days. Murat immediately ordered a detachment of cavalry to proceed to Aranjuez, in order to protect the old sovereigns, to oppose their being removed to Badajoz, and to give them courage to follow his counsels by giving them security. At the same time he announced that neither he nor his master would allow the severities which were in preparation against Emmanuel Godoy.

M. de Monthyon had found the family of the old sovereigns still more afflicted than on his first visit, still more alarmed for the fate of the Prince of the Peace, still more pained by the solitude in which they were left, still more irritated at the triumph of Ferdinand VII., and consequently, still more disposed to throw themselves into the arms of France. The idea of a protest, calculated to lead to the recovery of their power, or to enable them to avenge themselves, and at the same time quite in conformity with facts, could not be otherwise than received with delight. It was so, and immediately thereupon Charles IV. showed himself ready to sign it. The wording, however, which Murat proposed was not that which seemed quite suitable to the old sovereigns, although they were not difficult to please, and bad judges, in fact, of the suitable phraseology. They were afraid that such a step, if it was known, might place their own lives and that of the favourite in jeopardy. They therefore asked a few hours, in order to consider the form which might appear to be the best, engaging, however, to do as might be desired, and to date the protest from the day which would most properly correspond with the entire freedom of their appeal to the justice of Napoleon. M. de Monthyon was sent back to Murat with all these assurances, and a new appeal to the protection of the French army.

Murat, certain of being able to dispose of the old sovereigns according to his wishes, for the success of plans of which he was the author, resolved to act equally upon Ferdinand VII., in order to induce him not yet to take the crown, not to perform any act of sovereignty to the latest time he could, and especially not to make his solemn entry into Madrid. Murat thought, as long as Ferdinand VII. should not be king, and Charles IV. not being really so, things would go better in the sense of his own hopes. He desired to obtain another determination from Ferdinand VII. which appeared

to him urgent. When the notion of a journey to Andalusia was in contemplation, the Prince of the Peace had given orders to the Spanish troops to repossess the frontiers of Portugal, Taranco's division to go to Old Castille, and Solano's to Estramadura. The latter, having already reached Talavera, was approaching Madrid, and might occasion a collision, which was contrary to Murat's views, who understood very well that the affairs of Spain were to be managed by address, and not by force. In order, however, to make the Spanish troops retrace their steps, it was necessary to procure an order from Ferdinand himself.

For this purpose Murat sent for M. de Beauharnais, whom he very much distrusted, because he knew that the latter was attached to Ferdinand VII., and to whom he imputed a greater degree of finesse than this honourable though unskilful ambassador was capable of employing in any political plot. He persuaded him to go immediately to Aranjuez, and by using his influence over Ferdinand VII., to obtain from him the decision which the circumstances required. Murat began by frightening him with respect to the manner in which he had so completely misunderstood the intentions of Napoleon, by contributing to prevent the journey to Andalusia (right or wrong, this was, in fact, imputed to M. de Beauharnais). In order to disquiet him still more, Murat affirmed to him what he really did not know, that Napoleon would have wished a renewal of the scenes of Lisbon. He then suggested to him, as a certain means of repairing his fault, the idea of betaking himself immediately to Aranjuez, in order to obtain a command from Ferdinand VII. to make the Spanish troops retrace their steps, and not come to Madrid; and, moreover, that he should leave the question of his sovereignty in suspense till Napoleon's decision. M. de Beauharnais, yielding to his advice, set out the same hour for Aranjuez, in order to accomplish, if not the whole, at least a part of what Murat desired.

Having reached the presence of Ferdinand, he first asked, with his usual positiveness, for an order for sending back the Spanish troops into their former positions. Ferdinand had not yet by his side his two chief advisers, the Canon Escoiquiz and the Duc de l'Infantado, who had been in exile too far from Madrid to have had time to return. He had retained some of his father's ministers, especially MM. de Cevallos and de Caballero, and after having consulted them, he caused orders to be sent to General Taranco, and to the Marquis of Solano in particular, to return by Toledo and Talavera to Badajoz. M. de Beauharnais, having discharged the first part of his commission, whether he did not understand Murat's intentions with regard to the second, or did not wish to conform to them, applied him-

self to persuading Ferdinand that it was necessary for him at all costs to secure the good-will of Napoleon, and for that purpose to hasten to meet him, and to throw himself into his arms, asking for his friendship, his protection, and a wife; that the sooner he took such a step, the sooner he would be certain of reigning; that the best thing would be to set out immediately from Aranjuez on such a journey; that he would not have to proceed very far, for he would find Napoleon on the way; and finally, that he ought only to come to Madrid in order to pass through it as quickly as possible, to proceed to Burgos or to Vittoria.

All this was done in good faith on the part of M. de Beauharnais, who entertained no doubt that he should contribute on his part, as Murat on his, to the invention of an intrigue to which Ferdinand would speedily succumb. Ferdinand VII. did not reject the advice, but he deferred his decision till the arrival of his two confidential advisers, without whom he did not wish to undertake anything so serious. He adopted as much of the advice of M. de Beauharnais as suited his present convenience, that was, immediately to quit Aranjuez and to go to Madrid; and he announced his solemn entry into the capital for the 24th, the next day.

M. de Beauharnais, having returned to Madrid, ingenuously related to Murat all he had said and done. The latter thought he perceived in his conduct a perfidious calculation, in order to lead Ferdinand to enter Madrid immediately, and to take possession of his crown a little earlier than he would otherwise have done. Without loss of time he denounced him to the emperor as a secret accomplice of Ferdinand VII., as an active agent in the revolution which had hurled the old king from his throne, and as a dangerous ambassador, who favoured the cause of the new sovereignty, the only one which there was any reason to fear. These accusations, dictated by the jealous ambition of Murat, were, however, unfounded, or at least greatly exaggerated. M. de Beauharnais had been from the first warmly attached to Ferdinand, because he appeared to him the only person in the court deserving the least interest; this attachment had perhaps become warmer since the time in which the question had been raised of his marrying a lady of the Beauharnais family, but he sincerely believed that a close union with Ferdinand VII. was the very best solution of the difficulty for France; and by urging this prince to take the road to France, he was desirous of leading him not to Madrid, but to the feet of Napoleon, in order to ensure that result which he thought the best. And, moreover, he was neither sufficiently active nor sufficiently able to have taken any part whatever in the late revolution, which he had only appeased by bringing to the old

sovereign at the moment of danger the assistance of his unskilfulness and of his courage.

Those who directed the affairs of the new sovereignty had everything arranged for the entry of Ferdinand VII. into Madrid. Although they were ignorant of the designs of Napoleon, they said to themselves that Ferdinand's sovereignty, being the youngest and most vigorous, ought to be the least agreeable to the French, if they had any evil intentions with regard to the crown of Spain. For this reason, they considered it as a pressing matter, that he should enter Madrid and receive from the people of the capital their acclamations, which would be a kind of national consecration. Murat having entered on the 23rd, it was in their opinion too much to be behind even a day. Accordingly, it was announced that the new court would remove from Aranjuez to Madrid on the 24th, without any other pageantry except a few guards and the popular enthusiasm.

Accordingly, on the 24th, Ferdinand, having set out early from Aranjuez, alighted from his carriage at one of the gates of the city, that of Atocha, mounted his horse, and surrounded by the officers of his court, traversed the beautiful promenade of the Prado, and entered the interior of Madrid by the wide street of Alcala, in the midst of an immense multitude, who, after having long yearned for the termination of the old reign and the commencement of the new, at length saw their hopes realised, and sought in some measure by the vigour of their shouts to drive away the thoughts of the dangers which threatened Spain. The whole population, intoxicated with joy, were at the windows or in the streets. The women scattered flowers from the tops of the houses. The men threw themselves down before the young king and spread their cloaks under his horse's feet. Others, brandishing their poniards, swore to die for his cause, for the danger made itself confusedly felt in their ardent minds. That crafty and malicious prince, so little worthy of being loved, was at that moment surrounded by as much love as was shown for Titus by the Romans, or by the French for Henry IV. He constituted the delight of Spain, who had no idea what was to befall him—no doubt at all of his future—him or herself!

Ferdinand VII., having reached the palace, there received the public authorities. During the day the diplomatic body came to pay their respects to him, as if he were an undisputed king, although not recognised by all the men of Spain. M. de Beauharnais, kept back by Murat, did not appear; his absence greatly alarmed the new court, and embarrassed the members of the diplomatic body itself, who had given way to their secret feelings by signifying so quickly their adherence to the sove-

reignty of the Bourbons. The ministers of weak and dependent courts excused themselves. The representative of Russia also sent his excuse, but less humbly; he alleged diplomatic usages, which are invariable, and by virtue of which addresses of ceremony are presented to every new king, without at all prejudging the question of his definitive recognition.

Murat received these explanations of a course of conduct which displeased him with ill-concealed dissatisfaction, because he already looked upon Ferdinand as a rival for the crown of Spain; and when it was proposed to him to go and pay a visit to him, he refused, absolutely declaring that in his eyes Charles IV. was still King of Spain, and Ferdinand Prince of the Asturias, till Napoleon had pronounced his decision on this melancholy conflict. On the evening of the 21st, as we have said, he had written from El Molar an account of all that had taken place to Napoleon; he had communicated to him his own plan, which consisted in making Charles IV. protest, and in not recognising Ferdinand VII., in order that Spain might find herself in the condition of being between a king who was no longer so, and a prince who had not yet become one. On the 22nd and 23rd, occupied with his march and his entry into Madrid, he was not able to write. On the 24th he wrote an account of what had taken place in the two days preceding, and continuing to be inspired by the events, he added a new idea to his plan—an idea with which M. de Beauharnais had innocently furnished him, and of which he was about to make a treacherous use, that of sending Ferdinand to meet Napoleon, in order that the latter might make himself master of his person, and then do with him what he pleased. There would then be no other person to deal with except Charles IV., from whom it would be easy to snatch the sceptre, incapable as he was of holding it in his weak hands, and Spain herself not being disposed to leave it there.

Whilst these events were occurring in Spain, Napoleon had been successively apprised of them five or six days after their occurrence—for such was the time then necessary for a communication between Madrid and Paris. From the 24th till the 27th he was made acquainted with the rising at Aranjuez, then with the overthrow of the favourite, and finally, with the forced abdication of Charles IV. This solution, the most unexpected of all, although not the least natural, surprised without disconcerting him. The desired departure of the reigning family, which would have rendered the crown of Spain vacant, not having been effected, the first plan proved nothing more than an abortive combination. Napoleon, however, saw in these very events a new means of arriving at his end, and that means — in complete accordance with what the circumstances had

suggested to Murat. Long before the letters in which the latter put forward his ideas had arrived in Paris, Napoleon had thought of not recognising Ferdinand VII., whose young sovereignty, eagerly desired by the Spaniards, it would be difficult to destroy, and to consider Charles IV. still as king, whose old sovereignty, worn out and hateful to the Spaniards, it would be easy to overturn. Besides, under the form of arbitration between the father and the son, it would be easy to give an advantage to the cause of the father, who would not fail soon after to cede the crown of Spain to Napoleon under the influence of the queen's advice and that of the Prince of the Peace, who would wish, above all things, to be avenged on Ferdinand VII. If, moreover, under pretext of this arbitration, Ferdinand VII. could be brought to go and meet Napoleon, it would then be easy to become master of his person, and the difficulty would be greatly simplified, for he would have nothing more before him than the old dethroned sovereigns, convenient instruments in hands which could secure that repose which in their old age they required, and the vengeance for which their malicious hearts were greedy. The sceptre might be left for some time in their hands, and then they could be prevailed upon to surrender it in return for a quiet and opulent retirement; or even, perhaps, to carry them off at the same time by taking advantage of the fear with which a nascent revolution inspired them, and of the aversion felt for them by a people disgusted with their vices.

It was thus Napoleon, by being drawn on into this way of conquering a foreign throne without employing war, proceeding from one act of cunning to another, became daily more guilty. Some have laid all this to the account of his natural perfidiousness, and others to the imprudence of Murat, who had involved him in it against his own will. The truth, however, is as we have stated it here. Both, inspired by ambition and guided by circumstances, concurred according to their position in this dark work; and as to the project of not recognising the son and of using the instrumentality of the angry father against the rebellious son, it sprung up at the same time, both in Paris and Madrid, in the heads of Napoleon and Murat on the consideration of the events themselves; for the conditions being such as they have been related, did not admit of any other mode of action.*

Napoleon instantly summoned the attendance of General Savary, already employed in missions of the greatest magnitude, and who at that time had just returned from St. Petersburg, where, as has been seen, he had given abundant proofs of

* What is here stated is proved by the letters of both Murat and Napoleon, by their contents and their dates.

suppleness as well as of firmness. Napoleon opened to him the whole of his thoughts respecting Spain, his desire of regenerating the country and of binding it to France by a change of dynasty; the difficulties which surrounded the enterprise, alternately opposed or promoted by events; the new phase presented by the Revolution of Aranjuez; and finally, the possibility of conducting it to the desired end by making use of Charles IV. against Ferdinand VII. Napoleon expressed to General Savary his intention of not recognising the son—of affecting a religious regard for the authority of the father—of maintaining this authority as long as might be necessary to secure the crown, and of making him yield it up immediately, or at a later period, according to circumstances—to draw Ferdinand VII. away from Madrid, to lead him to Burgos or Bayonne—finally, to make sure of his person, and to obtain from him the cession of his rights by means of an indemnity in Italy, such as Etruria for example. Napoleon enjoined Savary to act with discretion, to allure Ferdinand to Bayonne, with the hope of seeing the dispute decided in his favour; but if he should prove obstinate, boldly to publish the protest of Charles IV., to declare that he alone was King of Spain, and to treat Ferdinand VII. as a son, and as a subject, like a rebel. The least violent means were always to be preferred.* Napoleon wished General Savary immediately to proceed to Madrid, to go

* It has been denied that General Savary ever received, or Napoleon ever gave, this commission. It has been attempted to show that the deplorable events of Bayonne sprang by chance from the concurrence of events; that the royal family of Spain—father, mother, son, brother, and uncles—had all been drawn by a sort of involuntary allurements to throw themselves into the hands of Napoleon, who, when he found them all united, was not able to resist the temptation of seizing upon them. I do not know that Napoleon would be more excusable even on this hypothesis. But however that may be, the proofs exist, and leave no room for doubt. For myself, who have no desire to tarnish the glory of Napoleon, I will speak the truth here, as I have done in the case of the Duc d'Enghien, under the responsibility which always rests upon an historian, of stating facts precisely as they took place. I have given before the thoughts of Napoleon with respect to the invasion of Spain; here I relate with accuracy, on the authority of unquestionable documents—the autograph letters contained in the Louvre—the succession of his ideas with respect to the meeting at Bayonne. On the authority of this correspondence, there cannot be a doubt that General Savary received the commission which I have attributed to him. As soon, in fact, as he arrives, he writes to the emperor, "*I have stated your intentions to Prince Murat.*" Prince Murat replies to the emperor, "*Now that I know your views, everything shall be done according to your desire.*" Then Murat from day to day gives an account of everything which is done by him to induce the son to go to Bayonne; then the father, the brothers, and all the princes, referring always to the plans of Napoleon, transmitted by General Savary, and other agents sent afterwards. Napoleon's letters, besides, contain his approval of all these acts, at first in covert phrases, then in plain language—so plain as to direct Marshal Bessières to arrest Ferdinand VII. if the latter should refuse to proceed to Bayonne. Thus the determination of Napoleon to cause the Spanish princes to be allured to Bayonne cannot be denied, any more than that the commission of conducting them thither was given to General Savary.

and tell Murat a secret which had been concealed from him till that moment, which he had indeed obtained a glimpse of, but which it was necessary to communicate to him by a confidential man who should be capable of guiding him in this tortuous course, in which the slightest false step might prove fatal. General Savary immediately set out, in order to execute completely and without reserve the wishes of Napoleon.

There took place, however, in the mind of Napoleon one of those sudden changes which astonish those who are unacquainted with the nature of the human mind, and which men hasten to call inconsistencies when met with in the conduct of men of less acknowledged superiority than those on whose history I am now engaged. Although a sort of fatal inclination drew him towards the usurpation of the crown of Spain, he never concealed from himself any of the inconveniences attached to this deplorable undertaking. He anticipated the blame that would be thrown upon him by public opinion, the indignation of the Spaniards, their obstinate resistance, and the advantage which might be taken of that resistance by England; he foresaw all these inconveniences with astonishing clearness; and yet, blinded not by the difficulties, but with regard to his immense power to conquer them, drawn by the passion of founding a new order in Europe, he proceeded towards his object, troubled, however, from time to time, by the sudden though fleeting apparition of the most sinister images. An incident, ill understood even at this day, caused one of those accidental changes to spring up in his mind, and led him to give orders the very reverse of those he had despatched before—orders which certain badly informed historians have brought forward as a proof that in the affairs of Spain he had no wish to do what was done, and that he had been more guilty and further involved than he wished by the imprudent ambition of Murat.

Among the agents of Napoleon travelling in Spain there was one in whom he had a well-placed confidence: this was de Tournon, his chamberlain, a man of cool mind, little inclined to illusions, and sufficiently devoted to his master to tell him the truth. He was one of those persons whom Napoleon was well pleased to send on any mission apparently indifferent, such as that of delivering a letter of congratulation or condolence; because, as he travelled, he observed much, observed well, and reported faithfully what he had observed. M. de Tournon during the last six months had taken several journeys to Spain as the bearer of letters from Napoleon to Charles IV. He had formed his opinion of the Peninsula, and of what was going on there, with a sagacity which events too well justified for example, he had clearly seen that the old court, the term of its dominion; that a new court was

already adored by the Spaniards; that it was necessary to try to attach it to France, by the need which it had of French protection; to be very careful of taking away the crown of Spain either by force or stratagem, inasmuch as a fanatical people would make a desperate resistance, and the advantages which might be gathered from such a conquest would not be worth the efforts necessary to effect it. M. de Tournon had very clearly seen all this, and was not afraid to say so in his numerous journeys in the presence both of Murat and his officers, all eager for bold enterprises, entertaining a profound contempt for the Spaniards, and not believing for a moment that they could resist our arms, before which the best soldiers in Europe had given way. M. de Tournon, during his sojourn in Madrid, having seen the preludes to the Revolution of Aranjuez, and the popular enthusiasm in favour of the young king, still remained convinced that it would be folly to seize upon Spain, either by circuitous means or open force, and that it would be a hundred times better to make an ally of Ferdinand VII., who would be still more submissive than Charles IV., because the Prince of the Peace and the old queen would no longer be at his side to subject his submissiveness to the fluctuation of their caprices or resentments. Napoleon had given orders to M. de Tournon to be at Burgos on the 15th of March, proposing to arrive there himself at the same time, and being anxious to collect from the mouth of a man in whom he could confide the details of all that might have taken place. M. de Tournon, on his way to Burgos, being obliged to pass through the headquarters of Murat, neither concealed from him nor his officers the fear with which the enterprise in which they were engaged inspired him, exposed himself to all their raillery (Murat in particular found fault with him), and went to Burgos on the 15th, as he had been ordered. From Burgos he wrote to Napoleon, in order humbly to entreat him, but with the earnestness of an honest man, not to take any further definite part before having seen Spain with his own eyes, above all not to found his determination on the information forwarded to him by brave but heedless soldiers who thought of nothing but battles and crowns; that it would be found they had made cruel miscalculations respecting Spain, and disregarded what perhaps might turn out dreadful evils. He waited at Burgos till the 24th, and not finding Napoleon arrive, he set out for Paris, which, with the greatest expedition, he could not reach till the 29th, in consequence of the state of the roads and of the relays of horses, both worn out by the excessive use at that time made of them.

—~~at~~ occupied as he had been with his entrance into Madrid, despatches on the 22nd and 23rd, and Napoleon was ~~as~~ on the 28th and 29th. He was very uneasy as to

what might have happened in Spain ; and in this state of extreme anxiety he was led for a moment to look at things in a less favourable point of view. The unexpected arrival of an eyewitness who was wise and well-informed, and with a full conviction and entire disinterestedness contradicted the interested accounts given by military men—the arrival of such a witness produced in Napoleon's mind a sudden, and unhappily too short a change of resolutions, for it lasted scarcely twenty-four hours. Napoleon shared all the anxieties of M. de Tournon at the idea of the French entering Madrid at the very moment of a political revolution, mixing with their natural forwardness in the strife of the factions which divided Spain, coming into collision with the Spaniards and involving him in immense difficulties, perhaps in a war of extermination with a fierce people passionately attached to their independence. He immediately wrote to Murat that M. de Tournon was just about to set out and to bring him new orders ; that he was proceeding too quickly, and was in too great a hurry to appear under the walls of Madrid (yet Murat was rather behind than in advance of the period determined upon by Napoleon for his entrance into the capital) ; that he was not only proceeding too quickly in directing his *corps d'armée* upon Madrid, but that he directed General Dupont too soon to go beyond the Guadarrama ; that as soon as he had been informed of the return of the Spanish troops under General Taranco towards Old Castille, he ought not to have weakened the garrisons of Segovia and Valladolid ; that it was necessary to beware of mixing himself up with the Spaniards, of taking any part in their divisions, and especially of coming into collision with them, for every war of this description was ruinous ; that it was a mistake to suppose the Spaniards to be little to be feared because they were disarmed ; that independently of their natural fierceness, they would have all the energy of a *new people whom political passions had not exhausted* ; that the army, though scarcely amounting to 100,000 men, and incapable of resisting the weakest French force, would separate, in order to go into every province, and to serve as the *kernel for continual insurrection* ; that the priests, monks, and nobles, knowing well that they could only come to reform the old social condition of Spain, would use all their influence to stir up a fanatical people against them ; that England would not fail to take advantage of the circumstances to involve us in immense difficulties, and create for us new embarrassments ; that it was therefore necessary to do nothing hastily, and to maintain the greatest possible reserve between the father and the son ; that with regard to the father, it was impossible to suffer him to reign longer, because the government of the queen and the favourite had become intolerable to the Spaniards ; that with respect to the son, he was in

reality an enemy of France, for he shared in the highest degree in all the Spanish prejudices, and that the aversion which he was supposed to entertain for his father's policy—a policy of concessions towards France—constituted some part of the popularity which he enjoyed; that experience had proved how little influence marriages exercised in changing the policy of princes; that Ferdinand would then before long be the declared enemy of the French; that, nevertheless, it was necessary not to break with him, for, mean as he was, *our opposition would make him a hero*; that between the impossibility of allowing the father to reign and of putting confidence in the son, it was necessary not to be hasty in choosing; above all, to give no one reason to divine the course we were likely to adopt, which was the more easily done, as he (Napoleon) *did not yet know it himself*; that it was necessary to give hopes of the possibility of a kind and disinterested arbitration, and that as to an interview with Ferdinand VII., that should not be thought of, except in case France should be decidedly obliged to acknowledge him; that, in a word, prudence advised to do nothing hastily—nothing precipitately; that Prince Murat should especially guard against the suggestions of his personal interests; that Napoleon would think for him, provided he did not think for himself; that the crown of Portugal would always be at his disposal to reward the services of the most faithful of his lieutenants—of him who, to all his own merits, added the advantage of being his sister's husband.

Such was the wise counsel which Napoleon, under the influence and by the instrumentality of M. de Tournon, was about to address to his lieutenant, when, after having been two days without news, he received Murat's letters of the 24th, in which the latter informed him of his peaceable entrance into Madrid, the excellent reception which had been given him, the inclination of the old sovereigns to throw themselves into his arms, their eagerness to protest against the abdication of the 19th—the facility, in fine, of rendering the throne vacant by refusing to recognise Ferdinand VII., and thus placing Spain between a king who had abdicated and one who was not acknowledged. Napoleon then finding all the means again in his hands in which he had ceased to believe for a moment, returned to the plan suggested to Murat and himself by the Revolution of Aranjuez, and confirmed the orders which had just been confided to General Savary before the arrival of M. de Tournon. In consequence of this, Napoleon, in a fresh letter, dated on the 30th, wrote to Murat that he approved of the whole of his conduct, and that he had done well by entering Madrid; that it was, however, necessary to continue to avoid every kind of collision, especially to guard against any mischief being done to the Prince of the Peace, even to send him to Bayonne if he could; carefully to

protect the old sovereigns, to bring them from Aranjuez to the Escorial, where they would be in the midst of the French army; to beware of acknowledging Ferdinand VII., and finally, to wait for the arrival of the French court at Bayonne, whither it was about immediately to proceed. Napoleon caused M. de Tournon to set out immediately without putting into his hands the cautious letter of which we have just given an analysis,* but without having been able to conceal either the slight disapprobation which he had felt regarding the conduct of Murat, or the apprehension which the possible consequences of this Spanish affair excited in his mind. He sent him back without the letter, with the mission to continue to observe everything, and to prepare apartments for him at Madrid. Napoleon himself took his departure on the 2nd of April for Bordeaux, where he wished to remain some days, in order to receive further letters from Murat, and to give to all those who were to be conducted to Bayonne, compulsorily or voluntarily, time to be brought or to repair thither. He left M. de Talleyrand at Paris to engage the attention and satisfy the demands of the representatives of European diplomacy, who would require to be reassured or satisfied on the arrival of every courier who should arrive from Madrid. M. de Tolstoy claimed this care and attention more than any of the rest. Napoleon took with him the docile and faithful M. de Champagny, from whom he had no great objections to fear, and even preceded his household, so eager was he to get nearer to the theatre of events. Expecting to remain for a considerable time on the frontiers of Spain, and to receive there many princes and princesses, he gave directions for the empress to come and join him there in a few days. He arrived at Bordeaux on the 4th of April, very impatient to receive news of Murat.

The events at Madrid, which had stagnated for a moment whilst Murat was waiting for orders from Paris, and Ferdinand VII. was expecting his two principal confidential advisers, Canon Escoiquiz and the Duke de l'Infantado, soon resumed their course. Murat, even while yielding to the impulse of his usual boldness, could not avoid feeling occasional anxiety with regard to his conduct, and asking himself whether he had well or ill comprehended the emperor's intentions. He was therefore delighted on receiving the letter of the 30th, and in spite of the momen-

* The letter of which the analysis is here given will be found given word for word, and its authenticity discussed, in a special note placed at the end of this book, in order not to interrupt the course of the narrative. In this note I have been desirous of discussing the principal points of the Spanish affairs, and of establishing the foundations on which my historical assertions rest. The letter in question called for special attention in consequence of its importance, and I think I have succeeded in proving and explaining its existence, which I was at first disposed to doubt.

tary blame, the secret of which M. de Tournon had divulged in Madrid, he only persevered with the greater zeal and cunning in the plan, so little worthy of his honour, which he had invented as quickly as his master. General Savary had just arrived as the bearer of the emperor's secret wishes, which were in such sad harmony with those of Murat, and he had no more hesitation as to the course to be pursued. The plan indicated by events appeared to Murat to be, not to acknowledge Ferdinand VII., to induce him, if possible, to meet the emperor, if he resisted to avail himself of the protest of Charles IV., in order to declare the latter the only King of Spain, and Ferdinand VII. a rebellious son and usurper; to rescue the Prince of the Peace from the hands of his executioners, both from humanity and politic calculation, for he was about to become in existing circumstances a very useful instrument; this plan, too, was agreeable to the commands of Napoleon, who was on his way to Bayonne. Murat and General Savary came to an understanding as to the manner in which this difficult plot was to be brought to a successful issue. They had a very convenient auxiliary in M. de Beauharnais; and the more convenient, as he was convinced in his blind confidence that Ferdinand VII. could do nothing better than hasten to meet Napoleon, and to throw himself into his arms or at his feet in order to obtain the recognition of his new title, the confirmation of all that had taken place at Aranjuez, and the hand of a French princess. M. de Beauharnais daily advised Ferdinand to adopt this course, as the latter, who was most eager to receive permission from Napoleon to reign, but dared not yet take any steps in the absence of his favourites, promised to follow the advice of the French ambassador as soon as he should have collected around him in Madrid those in whom he placed his confidence. He had already removed from his ministry those who were regarded as being the most devoted to the Prince of the Peace, or towards whom he felt no inclination. The administration of the war department had been committed to M. O'Farrill, an officer of distinction, who had formerly commanded the Spanish troops in Tuscany; the finances to M. d'Azanza, a highly respected former minister; the department of justice to Don Sebastian Pinuela, who had obtained great reputation in the administration of the laws. He had removed M. de Caballero, who alone in late times had made any opposition to the Prince of the Peace, but who was accused of playing no very respectable character in the prosecution of the suit of the Escorial; and he had retained in the office of foreign affairs M. de Cevallos, the humble servant on all occasions of the Prince of the Peace, and especially in the great question of the journey to Andalusia. Cevallos pretended at this time to be ~~the~~ most faithful friend of the new court, which had in its eyes

protect the old sovereigns, to bring them from Aranjuez to the Escorial, where they would be in the midst of the French army; to beware of acknowledging Ferdinand VII., and finally, to wait for the arrival of the French court at Bayonne, whither it was about immediately to proceed. Napoleon caused M. de Tournon to set out immediately without putting into his hands the cautious letter of which we have just given an analysis,* but without having been able to conceal either the slight disapprobation which he had felt regarding the conduct of Murat, or the apprehension which the possible consequences of this Spanish affair excited in his mind. He sent him back without the letter, with the mission to continue to observe everything, and to prepare apartments for him at Madrid. Napoleon himself took his departure on the 2nd of April for Bordeaux, where he wished to remain some days, in order to receive further letters from Murat, and to give to all those who were to be conducted to Bayonne, compulsorily or voluntarily, time to be brought or to repair thither. He left M. de Talleyrand at Paris to engage the attention and satisfy the demands of the representatives of European diplomacy, who would require to be reassured or satisfied on the arrival of every courier who should arrive from Madrid. M. de Tolstoy claimed this care and attention more than any of the rest. Napoleon took with him the docile and faithful M. de Champagny, from whom he had no great objections to fear, and even preceded his household, so eager was he to get nearer to the theatre of events. Expecting to remain for a considerable time on the frontiers of Spain, and to receive there many princes and princesses, he gave directions for the empress to come and join him there in a few days. He arrived at Bordeaux on the 4th of April, very impatient to receive news of Murat.

The events at Madrid, which had stagnated for a moment whilst Murat was waiting for orders from Paris, and Ferdinand VII. was expecting his two principal confidential advisers, Canon Escoiquiz and the Duke de l'Infantado, soon resumed their course. Murat, even while yielding to the impulse of his usual boldness, could not avoid feeling occasional anxiety with regard to his conduct, and asking himself whether he had well or ill comprehended the emperor's intentions. He was therefore delighted on receiving the letter of the 30th, and in spite of the momen-

* The letter of which the analysis is here given will be found given word for word, and its authenticity discussed, in a special note placed at the end of this book, in order not to interrupt the course of the narrative. In this note I have been desirous of discussing the principal points of the Spanish affairs, and of establishing the foundations on which my historical assertions rest. The letter in question called for special attention in consequence of its importance, and I think I have succeeded in proving and explaining its existence, which I was at first disposed to doubt.

tary blame, the secret of which M. de Tournon had divulged in Madrid, he only persevered with the greater zeal and cunning in the plan, so little worthy of his honour, which he had invented as quickly as his master. General Savary had just arrived as the bearer of the emperor's secret wishes, which were in such sad harmony with those of Murat, and he had no more hesitation as to the course to be pursued. The plan indicated by events appeared to Murat to be, not to acknowledge Ferdinand VII., to induce him, if possible, to meet the emperor, if he resisted to avail himself of the protest of Charles IV., in order to declare the latter the only King of Spain, and Ferdinand VII. a rebellious son and usurper; to rescue the Prince of the Peace from the hands of his executioners, both from humanity and politic calculation, for he was about to become in existing circumstances a very useful instrument; this plan, too, was agreeable to the commands of Napoleon, who was on his way to Bayonne. Murat and General Savary came to an understanding as to the manner in which this difficult plot was to be brought to a successful issue. They had a very convenient auxiliary in M. de Beauharnais; and the more convenient, as he was convinced in his blind confidence that Ferdinand VII. could do nothing better than hasten to meet Napoleon, and to throw himself into his arms or at his feet in order to obtain the recognition of his new title, the confirmation of all that had taken place at Aranjuez, and the hand of a French princess. M. de Beauharnais daily advised Ferdinand to adopt this course, as the latter, who was most eager to receive permission from Napoleon to reign, but dared not yet take any steps in the absence of his favourites, promised to follow the advice of the French ambassador as soon as he should have collected around him in Madrid those in whom he placed his confidence. He had already removed from his ministry those who were regarded as being the most devoted to the Prince of the Peace, or towards whom he felt no inclination. The administration of the war department had been committed to M. O'Farrill, an officer of distinction, who had formerly commanded the Spanish troops in Tuscany; the finances to M. d'Azanza, a highly respected former minister; the department of justice to Don Sebastian Pinuela, who had obtained great reputation in the administration of the laws. He had removed M. de Caballero, who alone in late times had made any opposition to the Prince of the Peace, but who was accused of playing no very respectable character in the prosecution of the suit of the *Escorial*; and he had retained in the office of foreign affairs M. de Cevallos, the humble servant on all occasions of the Prince of the Peace, and especially in the great question of the journey to Andalusia. Cevallos pretended at this time to be the most faithful friend of the new court, which had in its eyes

a most excellent title—his detestation of the French, whom, however, he was ready to serve as soon as their arms were triumphant.

The Duke de l'Infantado having at length arrived, Ferdinand VII., as we have said, appointed him governor of the Council of Castille and commandant of his military house. He had also the satisfaction of again seeing and embracing his preceptor, whom he had most unworthily given up in the suit of the Escorial, but whom he loved from habit, and to whom he was accustomed to open his heart, which he did to very few. He wished to load him with dignities and to make him grand inquisitor, which Canon Escoiquiz with a feigned disinterestedness declined, imitating in this respect the conduct of Cardinal de Fleury, and desiring nothing more than to be the preceptor of his royal pupil, but in reality under this title aspiring to be governor of Spain and the Indies. He only accepted the title of councillor of State and the cordon of Charles III. just as if to afford his king the pleasure of giving him something. It was with the help of these different persons, and by forming a more secret council with the Duke de l'Infantado and Canon Escoiquiz, in which the most important decisions were to be made, and those grand questions to be solved on which his own fate and that of his monarchy depended.

The questions which Ferdinand had to resolve may all be comprised in a single one—should he go to meet Napoleon in order to obtain his good-will, an acknowledgment of his new title, and the hand of a French princess? or should he rather proudly await in Madrid, surrounded by the fidelity and enthusiasm of the nation, what the French would dare to attempt against the dynasty? Even before resolving this grave question, various acts of obsequiousness towards Napoleon had been performed. After having sent three grandees of the court—Count Fernand Nuñez, the Duke of Medina Celi, and the Duke of Frias—the Infant Don Carlos was despatched to meet him—to go as far as Burgos, Vittoria, Irun, and if necessary, even to Bayonne. This first mark of respect being shown to Napoleon, it remained to know what concessions must be made to ensure his favour in case he should assume the duty of acting as arbiter between father and son. Several days were occupied in deliberating on this difficult subject.

First of all, it would have been necessary to know what were Napoleon's intentions with regard to Spain, when he had added to the 30,000 men sent to Lisbon another army estimated at not less than 80,000, whose march by Bayonne and Perpignan, by Castille and Catalonia, clearly indicated some very different object from Portugal. But Ferdinand's councillors, both those whom he had recently introduced into the ministry and those

who had formed a part of it in the time of the Prince of the Peace, were absolutely ignorant of the diplomatic relations with France. M. de Cevallos, the minister of foreign affairs, had never been initiated into any of the negotiations carried on in Paris by M. Yzquierdo. The Prince of the Peace and the queen alone were acquainted with them, and Charles IV. knew nothing more than they thought fit to tell him. Besides, these negotiations themselves, as M. Yzquierdo sagaciously asserted, were perhaps nothing more than a lure to conceal under a feigned dispute the secret designs of Napoleon.

Thus Ferdinand's councillors, new as well as old, knew nothing of what the Prince of the Peace was acquainted with, and he himself only knew what M. Yzquierdo had rather guessed than ascertained. Whilst these deliberations were being carried on, a despatch from Yzquierdo arrived in Madrid, addressed to the Prince of the Peace, and written from Paris on the 24th, before anything was known of the Revolution of Aranjuez. In this despatch Yzquierdo gave the details of the pretended negotiation going on between the cabinets of Madrid and Paris. It appeared, according to the language of this negotiation, that Napoleon required a perpetual treaty of alliance between the two countries, the opening of the Spanish colonies to the French, and finally, in order to avoid difficulties, the free passage of the troops destined for the protection of Portugal, and the exchange of that kingdom for the provinces on the Ebro situated at the foot of the Pyrenees, such as Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia. On these conditions, Yzquierdo informed the prince, the Emperor Napoleon would grant the King of Spain the title of Emperor of the Americas, would acknowledge Ferdinand VII. as heir-presumptive to the crown of Spain, and give him a French princess in marriage. He had, as he said, earnestly contended against these conditions, and especially against that which related to the cession of the provinces on the Ebro, but without success. He did not add, because he had already stated it personally in his short journey to Madrid, that Napoleon had a very different object in view, and aimed at taking away the crown itself. In other respects the contents of this despatch were perfectly correct, for M. de Talleyrand, on his part, had made a similar report to the emperor, offering, if he desired, to come to a conclusion with the court of Spain on these conditions.

When Ferdinand's councillors received M. Yzquierdo's despatch, which was not intended for them, in their ignorance of men and business they thought themselves thoroughly masters of the secret of Napoleon's policy. They thought that in reality there were no other questions between the governments

of France and Spain than those mentioned in the despatch of Yzquierdo, and that Napoleon had no idea whatever of seizing upon the crown of Spain. They reasoned as follows: first, that Napoleon would not dare to brave the power of Spain by making an attempt upon the crown; as true Spaniards they could not entertain this idea. That he had any desire to do so, they thought still less admissible. Had he not, after the battles of Austerlitz and Jena, left their thrones to the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia? He had up till this time dethroned only the Bourbons of Naples, who had drawn down this severe treatment upon themselves by unpardonable treachery. But the court of Spain had done nothing to deserve a similar fate, since it had, on the contrary, lavished all its resources in the service of France. The only questions to be decided, therefore, according to Ferdinand's councillors, were, whether they should exchange a few provinces for the kingdom of Portugal, consent to open the Spanish Indies to the French, and agree to an alliance which already existed in justice and in fact, and which, after all, was for the true interests of both countries. The only nice point was the sacrifice of the provinces on the Ebro, a sacrifice which the nation would most unwillingly make, and which might prove very injurious to the popularity of the young king. On this point, however, the language of Yzquierdo conveyed nothing absolute. It was, so to speak, in exchange for a military road to Portugal that the French cabinet appeared desirous of obtaining the provinces on the Ebro. But if they preferred supporting the bondage of this military road, then they might dispense with the cession of the provinces asked, and escape with the inconvenient but temporary passage of the French troops; for as soon as Napoleon should have a new war in the north (which could not fail to happen) he would be forced to evacuate Portugal, and Spain would be freed from the presence of his troops.

Such was their manner of interpreting Yzquierdo's despatch. Ferdinand's councillors said to themselves that the worst which could happen from a direct negotiation with Napoleon would be the being obliged to make some concessions with regard to the colonies; stipulate anew an alliance which had not ceased to exist, and to concede a military route to Portugal; and that, in return, the acknowledgment of the title of the new king would be certainly obtained. It was this last consideration which exercised the greatest influence on the minds of those ignorant advisers and of their ignorant master, and which caused all others to be regarded as of no importance. Although it never entered their minds that the recognition of Ferdinand VII. might be refused, certain symptoms had given them some uneasiness on this subject. The attentions shown by Murat to the old sove-

reigns, the eagerness to protect them by a detachment of French cavalry, the declaration that no act of violence would be allowed against the Prince of the Peace, some proposals which had come from Aranjuez, when the old court consoled itself by boasting of the protection of its powerful friend Napoleon—all these circumstances excited some apprehensions in the minds of Ferdinand and his little court of some decided change of policy in favour of Charles IV., a change brought about by the intervention of France. Although M. de Beauharnais had given them reason to hope for the good-will of Napoleon without promising it, they had obtained nothing from the ambassadors for many days but vague words—the reiterated advice to throw themselves into the arms of Napoleon in order to obtain his favour, which was, therefore, not yet acquired, since it was necessary to go so far to attain it. Murat, who stood in a still closer and more direct communication with the Emperor of the French, was still less favourable. He showed no inclination to pay court to any except the old sovereigns, and only gave the young king the title of Prince of the Asturias. From the tenor of other propositions from Aranjuez, they began to fear that the old sovereigns entertained the idea of going in person to meet Napoleon to inform him of the manner in which the Revolution of Aranjuez had been effected, to surprise his favour, and obtain redress of their wrongs. They were afraid that power might thus return to Charles IV., and if not into the hands of the Prince of the Peace, at least to the queen, who would put Ferdinand again in the sad situation of an oppressed son, the Duke de l'Infantado and Canon Escóiquiz in strong castles, and thus be avenged upon both for the few days of abasement to which she had been obliged to submit, and above all, for the fall of her favourite, for whom she would always continue inconsolable.

This was the reason which above all others, far more than their ignorance of affairs or than foreign suggestions, led Ferdinand VII. and his silly councillors to adopt the idea of going in a body to meet Napoleon. The danger of compromising by an imprudent negotiation the provinces, colonial privileges, or some other great interest of the Spanish monarchy, never even presented itself to their minds, so exclusively were they occupied with the fear that Charles IV. would go to plead for himself, and perhaps gain his cause from Napoleon. They would have been a hundred times better pleased to see Napoleon reign in Spain than to see the queen again in possession of the royal authority. This same feeling was entertained by the old sovereigns in their turn; and to the misfortune of Spain and France, this feeling caused the sceptre of Philip V. to fall into the hands of the Bonaparte family.

This fear no sooner took full possession of the minds of the

new court, than the question of going to meet Napoleon was decided, and the deliberations to which the journey might still give rise, were the mere hesitations of feeble minds, incapable even of willing resolutely what they desired to do. Efforts were not wanting, either on the part of Murat or of General Savary, to put an end to these hesitations. Murat availed himself of M. de Beauharnais to repeat daily in Ferdinand's ears the advice to set out, impressing on this unfortunate ambassador that this was the only means of repairing the fault that he had committed by hindering the journey to Andalusia. Murat had also seen Canon Escoiquiz. The latter, looking upon himself as necessarily much more clever than a soldier who had passed his life on the battlefield, flattered himself with being able very easily to penetrate the secret of the court of France by a few moments' conversation with the person who represented it at the head of the French army. Murat saw him, took good care not to promise beforehand the recognition of Ferdinand VII., but declared many times that Napoleon's intentions were altogether friendly; that he had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain, and that if his troops were at the gates of Madrid at the moment of the last revolution, it was a pure accident; but that Europe being able to make him responsible for this revolution, he was obliged to be very sure, before recognising the new king, that everything had taken place legitimately and naturally at Aranjuez; that no one was better able to give him complete information on the subject than Ferdinand VII.; and that the presence of this prince, as well as the explanations which he could give, would not fail to produce a decisive effect on the emperor's mind. Murat thus duped the poor canon, who flattered himself with duping him, and who went away convinced that this journey would infallibly lead to the recognition of the Prince of the Asturias as King of Spain.

It was known that General Savary had arrived in Madrid, and although he was in a position inferior to that of Murat, he was regarded as being perhaps more thoroughly informed of Napoleon's real thoughts than the commander-in-chief. An interview with him was therefore desired. The Canon Escoiquiz and the Duke de l'Infantado wished to converse with him themselves, and then to present him to Ferdinand VII. After having received still more explicit assurances from him than those given by Murat, because General Savary was less bound to reserve, they presented him to the Prince of the Asturias. The prince questioned General Savary as to the utility of the journey, he was advised to undertake, and the consequences of an interview with Napoleon. At that time there was no question about going to Bayonne, but only to Burgos or Vittoria; for the emperor, they were assured, was on the point of arriving, and

the matter at issue was that of doing him homage, of anticipating the meeting of the old sovereigns with him, and of being the first to speak in order to explain so as to convince him of the necessity of the inexplicable Revolution of Aranjuez. General Savary, without pledging the emperor's word—with whose intentions on matters unknown when he had left Paris he was, he said, unacquainted—had no trouble in misleading persons who would have deceived themselves had no one else deceived them. Affecting to speak merely his own sentiments, he alleged that when Napoleon should have seen the Spanish prince, heard from his own mouth an account of the late events, and, above all, become convinced that France would find in him a faithful ally, he would acknowledge him as King of Spain. That took place on this occasion which usually happens in conversations of this kind: General Savary thought he had promised nothing by giving abundant reason to hope, and Ferdinand VII. thought that everything he had been given reason to hope for was actually promised. The general had no sooner quitted the prince than the resolution already taken, of going to meet Napoleon, was definitively settled. An incident, however, was very near compromising the result which Murat and Savary were anxious to effect.

The emperor had given orders to rescue the Prince of the Peace from the fury of the enemies who were eager for his death, in order not to suffer the commission of a crime before the eyes, and in some measure on the responsibility of the French army; and secondly, in order to have in his hands an instrument by whose aid he reckoned on being able to influence the old sovereigns according to his will. The old queen, on her part, warmly seconded by the imbecile goodness of Charles IV., asked, as a favour of more value in her eyes than the crown or almost than life itself, the deliverance of him whom she always called Emmanuel, their best, their only friend, who was, she said, the victim of his too strong feeling of friendship for the French. Thus, to save the favourite became not only an act of humanity, but the surest means of filling the old court with gratitude and joy, and of moulding it at will. Murat, with all the arrogance of power, demanded that the Prince of the Peace should be given up to him. The prince, who had first been detained in the village of Pinto, had afterwards been conveyed to Villa Viciosa, a sort of royal mansion, where he was in greater security. He had been sent thither under an escort of the life-guards, resolved to murder rather than give him up. After having loaded him with irons, his trial was conducted with a degree of barbarous ferocity, inspired at once by hatred, by a desire of doing dishonour to the old court, and of guarding, by the death of this old favourite, against a reverse of fortune. Ferdinand VII. and his councillors lent themselves to these

indignities as much on their own account as on that of the base rabble whom they were desirous of flattering.

Murat declared to them, that unless they delivered up the prince to him, he would order his dragoons to cut to pieces the life-guards who kept him imprisoned, and thus settle the difficulty by main force. It must be said to the honour of this valiant man, that on this occasion he was as much impelled by a generous indignation as by any calculations of advantage. The more he insisted, the more the confidential advisers of Ferdinand, who were incapable of comprehending any noble sentiment, saw in his persistence a design of making use of the Prince of the Peace against Ferdinand VII., and it was confidently said that the idea of assassinating the prisoner was for a moment entertained by certain excited minds, it is not known which, amongst the most influential of the new court.

General Savary, more wary than Murat, thought he perceived that the very warmth which was manifested in demanding the release of the Prince of the Peace excited a degree of distrust injurious to their principal object, which was the departure of Ferdinand VII., and he took upon himself to renounce for the moment the surrender of the Prince of the Peace, stating that this would be a matter of subsequent arrangement, like all the others, in the conferences which were about to take place between the new King of Spain and the Emperor of the French.

This concession having been made, the departure of Ferdinand was resolved upon. The prince wished first of all to go to Aranjuez to visit his father, whom he had left there deserted, nay, almost in a state of destitution, since the 19th of March (it was then the 7th or 8th of April), without deigning to see him even once. He was desirous of obtaining a letter from him to Napoleon, in order in some measure to bind his old father by a testimony of good-will given in his favour. Charles IV., however, received the visit of this unnatural son very badly; and the queen still worse. They refused to give him any testimonial with which he might arm himself to establish his good conduct in the events of Aranjuez.

Although somewhat disconcerted by this refusal, he nevertheless made preparations to set out on the 10th of April. He left behind him a regency composed of his uncle, the Infant Don Antonio, O'Farrill, minister of war, Azanza, minister of finance, and Don Sebastian de Pinuela, minister of justice, with a commission to give orders during his absence in cases of urgency, and to refer to him on all matters not requiring immediate decision, and in all cases to consult and advise with the Council of Castille. Ferdinand took with him his two most confidential friends, the Duke de l'Infantado and the Canon Escoiquiz, Cevallos, minister of State, and two experienced negotiators in

the persons of MM. de Musquiz and Labrador. He was, besides, accompanied by the Duke of San Carlos and the grandees who constituted his new household. Cevallos was charged with corresponding with the regency left behind in Madrid.

It was, however, no easy matter to make this resolution acceptable to the people of the capital. Some, from a feeling of pride peculiarly Spanish, thought it would have been enough to send the Infant Don Carlos, the king's brother, to meet Napoleon, and believed in all sincerity that the sovereign of degenerate Spain was at least equal to the Emperor of the French, the conqueror of the continent, and master of Europe. Others, and they comprised the largest number, began to see through the motives which had brought so many French to the Peninsula, put a sinister interpretation on the refusal to acknowledge Ferdinand VII., and to look upon this going to meet Napoleon as the act of a dupe, for this was to put himself into his powerful hands. They were far from supposing that Ferdinand and his advisers would push their folly so far as to go to Bayonne or the French territory, but they considered that the nearer they approached the Pyrenees, the more they would place themselves within reach of Napoleon and his armies. There was an inexpressible commotion in Madrid at the news of this journey, and a regular tumult would have taken place had not a proclamation been issued by Ferdinand VII. calculated to appease their minds, by saying that Napoleon was coming in person to Madrid, there to knit more firmly the bonds of a new alliance, and to consolidate the happiness of the Spaniards, and that they could not neglect the duty of going to meet a guest so illustrious and so great as the victor of Austerlitz and Friedland.

This proclamation prevented the tumult without entirely removing the suspicions which the common sense of the people had led them to entertain. Ferdinand took his departure on the 10th of April, surrounded by an immense multitude, who saluted him with a melancholy interest and with protestations of unbounded devotedness. Amongst a part of the people, however, it was easy to see a kind of disdainful compassion for the foolish credulity of the young king.

It had been agreed upon with Murat that General Savary, for fear of some alteration in Ferdinand's mind, or that of those who accompanied him, should make the journey along with them, to draw them on from Burgos to Vittoria, and from Vittoria to Bayonne, where it was to be presumed the emperor had stopped. It was agreed, besides, that the demand for delivering up the Prince of the Peace should be deferred till Ferdinand had crossed the frontiers, and that even then care should be taken to abstain from that step, or any other calculated to give offence.

By means of Generals Savary and Reille, successively sent to Madrid, Napoleon had informed Murat of his determination of getting possession of Ferdinand VII. by inducing him to come to Bayonne; of placing Charles IV. again for a few days upon the throne; and then availing himself of this unfortunate prince to make him cede the crown. He had at the same time enjoined Murat, if Ferdinand VII. could not be prevailed upon to set out, to publish the protest of Charles IV., to declare that he alone was king, and Ferdinand VII. nothing more than a rebel son. The facility, however, with which Ferdinand VII. was persuaded to go to meet Napoleon relieved him from having recourse to these violent means, and from replacing the sceptre of Spain in the hands of Charles IV. However weak those hands might have been, and however easy it might appear to have snatched from them a sceptre only restored for a moment, Murat was, nevertheless, much better pleased not to be obliged to follow the long course which kept him still at a distance from the object to which all his wishes tended. He saw, therefore, that it was necessary to be satisfied with making Ferdinand VII. set out without restoring the sceptre to Charles IV. Ferdinand VII., whom the Spaniards eagerly desired for their king, being once in the hands of Napoleon, there only remained Charles IV., whom the Spaniards would not have on any conditions, and he might even be prevailed upon to consent to go to Bayonne. Then all the Bourbons, old and young, popular and unpopular, would be at the disposal of Napoleon, and the throne of Spain would be in truth vacant.

What Murat had foreseen did not fail to come to pass. The departure of Ferdinand VII. was scarcely known when the old sovereigns were also eager to be on the road. It had been quite impossible to inspire them with a moment's confidence ever since the 17th of March. Spain had become hateful to them. They constantly spoke of quitting it, and of going to occupy even a humble farm in France, a country which their powerful friend Napoleon had rendered at once so calm, so peaceable, and so safe. But the case was altered altogether when they learned that Ferdinand VII. had set out in order to have a personal interview with Napoleon. Although they had neither any great hope nor a great ambition of resuming the sceptre, they were filled with envy at the idea of Ferdinand gaining his cause with the arbiter of their destiny—of his being recognised and settled as king by the acknowledgment of France—thus becoming their master, and that of the unfortunate Godoy, and of being able to decide their fate and that of all their creatures. Not being able to bear this idea, they conceived an ardent desire to proceed in person to plead their cause against an unnatural son in the presence of the all-powerful sovereign who was approach-

ing the Pyrenees. The Queen of Etruria, who hated her brother Ferdinand, and by whom she was hated in return, had also to defend the rights of her young son, now become King of North Lusitania. She was afraid that his claims might be entirely forgotten in the general confusion of everything in the Peninsula, and was desirous of going with her father and mother to throw herself into the arms of Napoleon, in order to obtain from him justice and protection. She therefore contributed to render the desire of her aged parents more eager, and to urge them to take the road to Bayonne. In this manner these unfortunate Bourbons were seized with a sort of emulation to give themselves up to this terrible conqueror, who attracted them as snakes are said to charm birds which are drawn to them by an irresistible and mysterious attraction.

The expression of this desire was immediately communicated to Murat, who received its announcement with inexpressible joy. Had he merely obeyed his first impulse, he would have put the old court into carriages to make them set out immediately after the young one. But he was afraid of giving too great offence by making all the members of the family leave at the same time, of provoking reflections in the mind of Ferdinand and his advisers, which might lead them, perhaps, to relinquish their journey; and above all, of adopting such a course without the express assent of the emperor. He therefore confined himself to the immediate despatch of this important news, not doubting the answer, and contemplating with pleasure the whole of the princes who had any right to the crown of Spain hastening of their own accord towards the gulf open for them at Bayonne. He entertained foolish hopes, and persuaded himself that everything was possible in Spain to power mingled with a little address.

During this time Ferdinand and his court were proceeding on their way to Burgos with that slowness usual with these indolent princes of degenerate Spain. The eager homage of the population, too, contributed not a little to delay their progress. Everywhere the people broke to pieces the busts of Emmanuel Godoy, and carried about in procession those of Ferdinand VII. crowned with flowers. The towns through which the prince passed pardoned the object of his journey, which procured them the pleasure of seeing him; but deeply impressed with fear for his fate, they swore to devote themselves for him should there be need. They gave a fuller and more energetic expression to these feelings whenever they could be remarked by the French, as if they wished to warn them both of their distrust and of the devotedness which they were ready to exhibit.

On their arrival at Burgos Ferdinand VII. and his travelling companions experienced a new scene, which gave rise in their minds

to the beginning of regret. General Savary had always said to them that the only thing in view was to go to meet Napoleon; that he was on his way to Old Castille, where they would meet him, perhaps even at Burgos. The ardent desire of being the first to see him, to anticipate the old rulers, had wholly deprived them of all clear-sightedness, so that they failed to see a snare so obvious. But on approaching the Pyrenees and plunging into the midst of French armies, a sort of shuddering had seized them, and they were almost tempted to stop, so much the more, as they heard nothing whatever of Napoleon or of his speedy arrival. (He was then at Bordeaux.) General Savary, who never quitted them, presented himself immediately, gave firmness to their wavering confidence, assured them they were at last going to meet Napoleon; that the further they advanced towards him, the more he would be disposed to favour them; and besides, that they would be thus made certain of the fate which awaited them two days earlier. It is a sure means of drawing on agitated minds to promise them an earlier clearing up of the doubts which agitate them. It was then determined to proceed to Vittoria, where they arrived on the evening of the 15th of April.

At Vittoria, Ferdinand's hesitation changed into absolute resistance, and he refused to prosecute his journey further. Firstly, he had been informed that Napoleon, so far from having crossed the frontiers, was still only at Bordeaux, and Spanish susceptibility was deeply offended by having advanced so far towards a meeting when the other party had proceeded so small a distance. Secondly, as they approached the frontiers of France the truth began to burst upon them. In Madrid, in the midst of hostile factions, eager to anticipate one another in obtaining Napoleon's favour, in the midst of a people infatuated respecting itself, which imagined that no foreign hand would dare to touch the crown of Charles V., it had been possible to suppose that the French army had been sent to Spain solely with a view to the interests of the royal family; but in the neighbourhood of France, where every one clearly saw the object of Napoleon, where the French armies, long assembled, had indiscreetly talked of what they supposed to be the object of their mission, it was more difficult to remain in illusion. Every one at Bayonne and its neighbourhood said that Napoleon was simply about to complete his political system by placing the Bonaparte family on the throne of Spain, instead of that of the Bourbons. This conduct was looked upon as quite natural in a conqueror who was the founder of a dynasty, always supposing that the enterprise was crowned with success, and especially that in these changes the Spanish colonies did not go to enlarge the British empire beyond the seas. These ideas had passed from the French Basque provinces into the Basque provinces of Spain, and pro-

duced such a sensation in the minds of Ferdinand VII. and the Canon Escoiquiz, that a resolution was immediately adopted to stop at Vittoria. The reason given was one of etiquette, which had its weight; for it was not a very dignified step to proceed even beyond the frontiers of Spain to meet Napoleon. In order to draw the Spaniards on to Vittoria, General Savary had constantly given them reason to hope, and almost to be certain, of meeting Napoleon at the next post. But the certain news of his being still at Bordeaux no longer permitted the employment of such means. He then said, that since the object of the journey was to see Napoleon, in order to solicit the acknowledgment of the new royalty, it was necessary to put trifling considerations aside, and to proceed towards the object which they wished to attain; that, after all, those who came to meet Napoleon had need of him, whilst he had no need of them; and therefore it was natural that they should take that road which other business of great importance had hitherto prevented him from pursuing; and that, finally, it was necessary to cease rebelling like children against the consequences of a step which had been taken from motives of peculiar interest. The general, with whom a sort of military vivacity often baffled prudence, when he saw that he was not listened to, suddenly changed his bearing; from being fawning and wily he became arrogant and harsh, and mounting his horse, said that they might do as they pleased, but for his own part he would return to Bayonne to join the emperor, and that they might probably have to repent of their change of determination. He left them frightened, but for the moment obstinate in their resistance.

General Savary immediately set out for Bayonne, where he arrived on the 14th of April, a few hours before the emperor, who did not reach that city till the evening of the same day. The latter had remained some days at Bordeaux, in order to give the Spanish princes time to approach the frontiers and to be relieved from the necessity of going to meet them, which he would have been obliged to do had he been at Bayonne. He occupied his leisure in Bordeaux, as he usually did, in informing himself of everything connected with the interests of the country, in ascertaining the nature and extent of the commerce of that large city, and the means of keeping up the relations of France with its colonies. Having seen with his own eyes how greatly the city of Bordeaux was suffering from the war, he had given orders for a loan of several millions from the extraordinary treasury, and for a considerable purchase of wines on account of the civil list. Having arrived at Bayonne on the 14th, he heard with great satisfaction all that had taken place at Madrid for the promotion of his designs, and adopted suitable measures to ensure their definitive execution.

After having concerted these measures with General Savary, he agreed to send him back to Vittoria as the bearer of an answer to a letter which Ferdinand had already addressed to him. This answer was couched in terms calculated to draw this prince to Bayonne, without entering into any formal agreement with him. In it Napoleon said that the papers of Charles IV. ought to have convinced him of his imperial good-will (in allusion to the advice of indulgence given to Charles IV. at the time of the process at the Escorial); that consequently there could be no doubt concerning his personal dispositions; that while directing his troops to such points of the coasts of Europe as were best calculated to second his operations against England, he had conceived the design of going to Madrid, in order to urge his august friend, Charles IV., in passing, to adopt some indispensable reforms, and especially to dismiss the Prince of the Peace; that he had often advised this dismissal, and if he had not insisted upon it more, it was merely out of forbearance towards his august weaknesses—weaknesses which must be pardoned—for kings, like other men, were only *weakness and error*; that he had been surprised in the very midst of these projects by the events of Aranjuez; that he had no idea of constituting himself the judge of them, but that his armies being actually on the spot, he did not wish to appear in the eyes of Europe to be either the promoter or accomplice of a revolution which had overturned the throne of an ally and a friend; that he made no pretensions to a right to intermeddle in the internal affairs of Spain, but that if it could be shown that the abdication of Charles IV. had been voluntary, he should have no difficulty in recognising him—the Prince of the Asturias—as lawful sovereign of Spain; that for this purpose a conversation of some hours appeared desirable, and that notwithstanding the reserve maintained for a month past on the part of France, there was no reason to apprehend in the Emperor of the French a judge prejudiced against him. This was followed by some advice, couched in the loftiest language, on the subject of the prosecution designed against the Prince of the Peace; on the inconvenience that would result from dishonouring not only the prince, but the king and the queen, from initiating a jealous and ill-disposed multitude into the secrets of State affairs, and from teaching them the habit of laying hands upon those who had long governed it; for, added Napoleon, *the people are glad to avenge the homage which they render us*. Finally, he showed himself still disposed to the idea of a marriage, if the explanations which were to be given at Bayonne should prove such as to satisfy him.

This letter, which was a clever mixture of indulgence, haughtiness, and reason, would have been an admirable piece of

eloquence had it not been the means of concealing a treacherous delusion. General Savary was to bear this letter to Vittoria, to give in person the necessary developments of its contents; or, if necessary, to add some of his cunning words, of which he was prodigal, and which should decide Ferdinand VII. without binding the emperor. It was, however, necessary to make provision for the case of Ferdinand VII. and his advisers resisting all these artifices. Should this case arise, Napoleon had no idea of stopping half-way. He decided, therefore, that force was to be employed. In addition to the corps of observation of the Western Pyrenees, he had ordered the reserve of provisional infantry, under General Verdier, to pass into Spain, as well as a corps of provisional cavalry under General Lasalle, and numerous detachments of the mounted imperial guards. These troops, having formed a junction under Marshal Bessières, were to occupy Old Castille and to protect the rear of the army. He sent orders to Murat, as well as to Marshal Bessières, not to hesitate, and upon the mere authority of General Savary to cause the Prince of the Asturias to be arrested—giving publicity at the same moment to the protest of Charles IV.—declaring that the latter alone was king, and the son nothing but a usurper who had set on foot the Revolutions of Aranjuez in order to seize upon the crown. If Ferdinand VII., however, agreed to cross the frontier and come to Bayonne, Napoleon entirely agreed to the opinion of Murat, that the sceptre should not be restored to Charles IV., from whom it must soon be again taken away, and that the aged sovereigns should be sent towards Bayonne, since they had themselves expressed that desire. He continued to recommend to him, as soon as Ferdinand VII. had crossed the frontier, to insist upon the Prince of the Peace being delivered up to him, willingly or by force, and to send him to Bayonne. Such were the arrangements which were to complete, in case of necessity, by force, if cunning failed, this dark scheme laid against the crown of Spain.*

After having given these orders and sent General Savary back to Vittoria, Napoleon occupied himself with forming an establishment at Bayonne which might admit of his sojourning there for some months. Independently of the Empress Josephine, he expected to receive there a great number of princes and princesses, and for this reason he resolved to keep at his disposal the apartments which he occupied in the interior of the town. This country is one of the most attractive in Europe—to it, however, Napoleon has unfortunately attached recollections much less pleasing than those with which he filled

* The account here given is according to the minutes of the orders still existing in the Louvre.

Egypt, Italy, Germany, and Poland. In this country, composed of beautiful hills, watered by the Adour, crowned by the Pyrenees, and bounded on the horizon by the sea, there was about a league from Bayonne a small château of regular architecture, and of uncertain origin, constructed, as it is said, for one of those princesses whom France and Spain formerly mutually gave in marriage. This château stands in the midst of a beautiful garden, in a most charming position, and under a sun as brilliant as that of Italy. Napoleon was anxious to get immediate possession of the place. In order to satisfy the desire, it was happily unnecessary to have recourse either to those artifices or that violence which were needed against the crown of Spain. Its owner was delighted to sell it him for 100,000 francs. It was decorated in haste with such resources as the country offered. The garden was converted into a camp for the troops of the imperial guard. Napoleon established himself there on the 17th, and left the apartments he occupied in Bayonne free, in order to accommodate in them the royal family of Spain, all the members of which he hoped soon to bring together there.

General Savary having set out in all haste for Vittoria, found Ferdinand there, surrounded not only by the advisers who had followed him, but by many other important individuals who had hastened thither to offer him their services and their homage. Among the latter there was a person of great consideration: this was Urquijo, formerly prime minister, brutally disgraced in 1802, when the influence of the Prince of the Peace had finally become supreme, and who then retired into Biscay, his native country. Urquijo, who was a man of firm, penetrating, but morose mind, spoke to Ferdinand, in the presence of his other advisers, like a wise and experienced statesman. He told him and them that nothing could be more imprudent than the prince's journey if they proceeded beyond the frontiers; that as far as respect was concerned, everything had been done which the greatest and most illustrious sovereign could desire, by coming to receive him at the verge of the kingdom; that to go beyond was to prove wanting in the dignity due to the Spanish crown, and to commit an act of remarkable folly; that any one who had read with attention the account of the Revolution of Aranjuez inserted in the official journal (*Moniteur*) must have seen the lurking intention to discredit the new king, to dispute his title, to inspire a feeling of sympathy for the deposed sovereign—all which disclosed the purpose of Napoleon to be, to treat the one as a usurper and the other as incapable of reigning; that any one who had for some time observed the policy of Napoleon with respect to Spain must have discovered the plan of getting rid of the house

of Bourbon, and of making the Peninsula a part of the system of the French empire; that the indifference affected towards the proclamation of the Prince of the Peace, accompanied by the care taken to disperse the Spanish fleets and armies, by bringing the one into the ports of France and sending the other to the north, revealed even to obviousness the project of taking vengeance on the first opportunity, and that the reunion of so many troops in the south at the conclusion of affairs in the north could no longer leave a doubt on such a subject.

MM. de Musquiz and de Labrador, who at the different courts of Europe had learned to form some just ideas of general politics, gave unequivocal marks of assent to these wise observations; but no attention was paid to their advice. The advisers who were in favour were the mediocre and versatile Cevallos, who concealed his duplicity under impetuosity, and had never pardoned Urquijo for the wrongs which he had formerly done to this eminent man, for he had been the subordinate instrument of his disgrace, and was therefore but little disposed to receive his ideas, and the two particular confidants of the prince, the Duke de l'Infantado and the Canon Escoiquiz; both of them delighted to dream of a happy reign under their own benignant sway, and rejecting everything calculated to disturb this dream of their vanity. None of the parties were willing to admit that they had commenced and actively urged forward the most fatal of imprudent steps. They found it very difficult to believe that they could be at the beginning of a long series of misfortunes, instead of being at the commencement of a long course of prosperity. On these grounds they rejected the sinister prophecies of M. de Urquijo as the views of a gloomy mind, embittered by the disgrace inflicted upon him. "What!" said the Duke de l'Infantado, with the strongest assurance, "what! is it likely that a hero surrounded by such a halo of glory would condescend to such base treachery?" "You do not know heroes," replied Urquijo, with bitterness and disdain; "you have not read Plutarch! Read him, and you will learn that the greatest of all have built their reputation on heaps of dead bodies. The founders of dynasties especially have been those who have most frequently built up their work in treachery, violence, and robbery! What did not our Charles V. do in Germany, Italy, and even in Spain? and I do not go back to the worst of your princes! Posterity takes no account of anything but the results. If the authors of so many guilty deeds founded great empires and rendered nations powerful and fortunate, it attributes no blame to princes for having robbed, or for the armies which they sacrificed." The Duke de l'Infantado and the Canon Escoiquiz having continued to insist upon the

reprobation to which Napoleon would expose himself by usurping the crown, and on the commotions which he would excite both in Spain and in Europe, and the perpetual war which he would draw upon himself, Urquijo replied, that Europe had known nothing else but to be beaten by the French; that coalitions, badly managed and thwarted by intestine divisions, had no chance of success; that only a single power, Austria, was still in a condition to fight a battle; but that even with the support of England it would be crushed, and be obliged to pay for its resistance by new losses of territory; that Spain might be able to carry on a war of partisans, but that in reality its character would be confined to serving as a scene of action for the English and French; that it would be horribly ravaged, and that its colonies would avail themselves of the opportunity to shake off the yoke of the mother-country; that if Napoleon knew how to curb his views of aggrandisement, and to give good institutions to the countries which submitted to his system, he would give a permanent foundation to himself and his dynasty; that the people of the Peninsula, bound to those of France by interests of all kinds, whenever they came to see that they were fighting for the cause of a family much more than for that of the nation, would end by attaching themselves to a government which promoted civilisation; that after all, the dynasties which had regenerated Spain had always come from without; that Napoleon only needed to join a little prudence to his genius to make the Bourbons utterly lose their cause; that in every case Spain would be inundated with a deluge of evils, and certainly lose its colonies; that they should, therefore, avoid running into Napoleon's nets, and retrace their steps as soon as possible; that if this could not be done, the king should be concealed, and under a disguise conducted back to Madrid or into the south of Spain, and that there, placed at the head of the nation, he would have a better chance of treating with Napoleon on acceptable conditions.

It is very rare that a statesman entertains as clear a view of the future as Urquijo displayed on this occasion. His only answer, however, was the disdainful smile of blind ignorance, and in his vexation he set out immediately without any desire to accompany the king, to whom he was asked to continue to give his counsels, whilst they absolutely refused to follow them. "If," said he, "you wish me to go alone to Bayonne to discuss, negotiate, and make head against the common enemy whilst you withdraw into the depths of the Peninsula, be it so; but otherwise I have no desire, by accompanying you, to tarnish my reputation, the only thing that remains to me under my disfavour, and in the midst of the misfortunes of our common country."

Urquijo not having been listened to, immediately withdrew,

and left the advisers of Ferdinand to themselves; they continued madly intent on their plans, but nevertheless somewhat troubled at the sinister predictions of a man of such penetrating views and firmness of mind. On General Savary's arrival with Napoleon's letter, they resumed their confidence in their own judgment and in destiny. This letter, in which they ought to have seen in every line a concealed and menacing intention, for the strange pretension of becoming judge in a dispute between father and son ought to have revealed to them the wish to condemn one of the two, and obviously that one of the two the more capable of reigning, so far from opening their eyes, only made them close them the more. The only passage that attracted their attention was that in which Napoleon said that he needed to be informed concerning the events of Aranjuez, and that he hoped, after a conversation with Ferdinand VII., to be in a condition to have no difficulty in acknowledging him as King of Spain. This vague promise filled them again with all their illusions. In it they saw the certainty of hearing this recognition the next morning after their arrival in Bayonne, and they had the simplicity to ask General Savary if this was not the way in which Napoleon's letter must be interpreted; to which the general replied, that they were no doubt right in so interpreting it, and that it could not well mean anything else. Being thus reassured, they resolved to set out from Vittoria on the morning of the 19th, in order to sleep that night at Irun. A courier was sent before them to announce their arrival at Bayonne. It ought to be added, also, that the troops under General Verdier had so completely surrounded them at Vittoria, that they would not have had it in their power to choose had they wished to act otherwise. They did not even notice this constraint, so blind were they to their danger.

But the people of the surrounding provinces, who had been together to see Ferdinand, did not reason on his situation like his advisers. Urquijo had repeated everywhere and to every one the advice which he had given at the court of Ferdinand. His words had found an echo, and multitudes of faithful subjects had assembled to oppose the departure of the young king. On the morning of the 19th, the day fixed for their departure, and when the royal carriages were already in waiting, there arose a sudden commotion among the people. A crowd of armed peasants, who had lain for some days on the ground, either before the gate or in the interior of the royal dwelling, manifested an intention of opposing his journey. One of them, armed with a sickle, cut the traces and unyoked the mules, which were led back to the stables. A collision would then have taken place between the French troops which formed Ferdinand's escort and the people, had not the infantry

fortunately been ordered to remain in their barracks, with their guns loaded, and lighted matches ready to apply to the cannon. The cavalry of the guard alone were in the square where the carriages were, but at a certain distance from the crowd, with drawn swords, and in a position of threatening firmness. Ferdinand's advisers, fearing that a collision would injure their cause, sent the Duke de l'Infantado into the street to speak to the people. The duke, who was greatly respected, rushed into the midst of the crowd, succeeded in calming the people by appealing to the respect due to the royal wishes, and assured them that by going to Bayonne they were certain of returning in a few days with the recognition of Ferdinand as king, and a renewal of the French alliance. The people were appeased rather from respect than conviction. The mules were put to afresh without any opposition, and Ferdinand VII., getting into the carriage, saluted the people, who received him with acclamations mingled with cries of anger and pity. The splendid squadrons of the imperial guards breaking into a gallop, immediately surrounded the royal carriages, as if to render homage to him whom they were carrying off as a prisoner. Thus took his departure this foolish prince, deceived by his own wishes still more than by the ability of his adversary, deceived as if he had been the most simple and most honourable of the princes of his time, whilst he was in fact one of the most hypocritical and least sincere. The Spanish people saw him set out with vexation and contempt, saying among themselves that instead of their king, they would soon see a stranger, supported by formidable armies.

Ferdinand slept at the small town of Irun, with the view of crossing the frontiers the next day. On the morning of the 28th he in fact crossed the Bidassoa, and was very much surprised to find no one to receive him except the three Spanish grandees returned from their mission to Napoleon, and after having seen him, bringing nothing but the gloomiest presentiments. But it was now too late to return; the bridge of the Bidassoa was crossed, and there was now nothing left but to plunge into the gulf which they had not had sense enough to see till they were swallowed up. On approaching Bayonne the prince met Marshals Duroc and Bessières coming to compliment him, but only conferring on him the title of Prince of the Asturias. There was still nothing in this calculated to make them very uneasy, for Napoleon had adopted, as the theme of his policy, to take no notice of anything which had taken place at Aranjuez till after he had received explanations. They were therefore suffered to pass a few hours longer without alarm.

When they reached Bayonne, Ferdinand found there a few troops under arms, and a small number of people, for no one

had been forewarned of his coming. He was conducted to a residence very different from the magnificent palaces of the kings of Spain, but it was the only one in the town at their disposal for the purpose.

He had scarcely alighted from the carriage when Napoleon, who had hastened on horseback from the château de Marac, made him the first visit. The Emperor of the French embraced the Spanish prince with every semblance of the greatest courtesy, always addressing him by the title of Prince of the Asturias—which, in fact, was a part of the policy he had proposed to himself—and quitted him after a short interview, for the purpose, as he said, of leaving him to refresh himself, without having said aught that could give rise to any interpretation whatever.

In the course of an hour the chamberlains waited upon the prince, to invite him and his suite to dine at the château de Marac. Ferdinand repaired thither towards the close of day, attended by his small retinue, and was received in the same manner as before, that is to say, with refined politeness, but with extreme reserve on every point relative to politics. After dinner the emperor entered into general conversation with Ferdinand and his councillors, and speedily discovered beneath the habitually immovable countenance and general reserve of the young king, a mediocrity of character by no means exempt from deceit; in the conversational powers of Escoïquiz, the king's preceptor, he discerned a cultivated mind, which was, however, unskilled in politics; and beneath the gravity of the Duke de l'Infantado, an honest man indeed, but one who thought more highly of himself than he should; ambition, without talent, constituting the sum total of his merit.

Napoleon saw at a glance the kind of men he had to deal with, and speedily dismissed them all, under the pretext that they must be fatigued with their journey; he, however, detained the Canon Escoïquiz, by expressing his desire, which in fact was tantamount to a command, to have some conversation with him. He deputed General Savary to tell the Prince of the Asturias everything which he was himself about to communicate to the preceptor, with whom he preferred conversing himself, as he considered him a man of more intelligence.

His secret was doubly oppressive to him, for he had not only kept it long, but this secret was itself a perfidy, a species of crime to which his breast was a stranger. He felt constrained to reveal it to the least ignorant of the councillors of Ferdinand to exonerate himself in some measure by the frankness in which he couched the *exposé* of his designs, and by the candid and simple avowal of motives of the highest policy for the line of conduct which he adopted.

He set out, therefore, by flattering the canon, saying he knew that he was a man of learning, and that he could therefore speak freely to him. Without further preamble, and as if compelled at once to unburden his heart, Napoleon declared that he had invited the princes of Spain to come to France for the purpose of taking from them all, father as well as son, the crown of their ancestors; that he had for some years been aware of the treachery of the court of Madrid; that he had not taken any notice of it, but that now, being quit of the affairs of the north, he intended to regulate those of the south; that Spain was indispensable to his designs against England, and that he was indispensable to Spain in order to restore her grandeur; that without him she would stagnate eternally under a weak and degenerate dynasty; that old Charles IV. was an imbecile king; that his son, though more energetic, was quite below par, and less trustworthy—witness the Revolution of Aranjuez, the secret of which was known at Paris without any one's having been obliged to go to Madrid in order to learn it; that Spain under such rulers would never gain the moral, administrative, and political regeneration which was indispensable to enable her to regain her rank among the nations; that as for him, Napoleon, he had never found aught among the Bourbons save perfidy and hollow friendship; that he was far too experienced to have any faith in the efficacy of marriages; that a high-minded princess was a treasure not always at his disposal; that even supposing it were, he doubted whether she would be able to influence this taciturn and vulgar prince, whose only talent, if indeed he had any, consisted in the art of dissimulation; that he, Napoleon, everywhere conqueror and founder of a dynasty, was obliged to trample under foot a multitude of secondary considerations in order to reach his goal, which was placed at an immense height; that he had no taste whatever for evil, but it, in fact, cost him an effort to do wrong, but that wherever his chariot passed, all must get out of the way or be crushed by the wheels; that, in fine, his mind was made up; he intended to take the crown of Spain from Ferdinand VII., but he would soften the blow by offering him an indemnity; that he had, in fact, already selected one for him, well calculated to promote his repose—it was no other than the beautiful and peaceful Etruria, where this prince might go and reign, secure from the revolutions of Europe, where he would be far happier than in the midst of his Spaniards, who were possessed by the revolutionary spirit of the times, and could only be subdued, settled, and made prosperous by a powerful and energetic prince.

While making this audacious declaration, Napoleon was sometimes caressing, sometimes imperious, and reached the very acme of the cynicism of ambition. The poor canon was

quite confounded. The honour of being flattered—he, an humble canon of Toledo—by one of the greatest men of the age, struggled with the indignation that filled his breast at hearing such declarations. He was thunderstruck and stupefied, but his talent for discussion did not forsake him, and he immediately employed it with Napoleon, who resolved that he would indemnify him for his pains by giving him a hearing.

The unfortunate preceptor commenced by justifying the Bourbon family to the head of the house of Bonaparte. He reminded him that up to the moment of the greatest horrors of the French Revolution, Spain had not declared war till after the death of Louis XVI. ; that she had herself seized the first opportunity of returning to a system of peace, and from the system of peace to that of alliance between the two States; that since that time she had lavished on France her fleets, her armies, her treasures; that if she had not rendered better service, it was owing, not to want of good-will, but to want of knowledge; that the Prince of the Peace alone was to blame, for that he was the sole author of all the ills of Spain and the cause of her weakness as an ally; that, however, this detestable favourite was for ever banished from the throne; that under a young prince, attached to Napoleon, bound to him by the ties of gratitude and by relationship, and directed by his counsels, Spain would be speedily regenerated, and regain that rank which she ought ever to have maintained among the nations, and would, without the cost of any effort or sacrifice, render France every service that could be expected from her; that in the contrary case Spain would make a desperate resistance, she would be seconded by England, and perhaps by a part of Europe; the colonies would be lost, a misfortune equally great to France and to Spain, and an indelible stain would tarnish the glory of a splendid reign.

“Bad policy this of yours, M. le Canon! bad policy!” replied Napoleon, with a gracious but ironical smile. “With all your learning, you will not fail to condemn me if I suffer the only occasion to escape me which offers, by the submission of the continent and the distress of England, to complete the execution of my plan. As for your Bourbons, they have always served me against the grain, ready to betray me at the first brush. A brother would suit me better, whatever you may say. The regeneration of Spain is out of the question by princes of an old family, which in spite of itself is always supported by old abuses. My resolve is fixed; this revolution must be carried through. Spain shall not lose a single village; she shall retain all her possessions. I have already adopted precautions that she shall preserve her colonies. As for your prince, he shall be indemnified if he submits with a good grace to the force of

events. It is for you to use your influence in prevailing upon him to accept those indemnities which I have in reserve for him. You are sufficiently well informed to know that, in doing this, I only follow the laws of sound policy, which have their exigencies and their unavoidable rigours."

In saying this and other things of a like import, in words which betrayed regret rather than remorse at the intended spoliation, Napoleon gradually became mild and friendly, and sometimes even extremely familiar in his manner to the poor preceptor, whose lofty figure formed a strange contrast with his own. Astounded at this firm resolve, Escoiquiz, with tears in his eyes, enlarged on the virtues of his young prince; he endeavoured to exonerate Ferdinand from the Revolution of Aranjuez; tried to prove that Charles IV. had abdicated voluntarily; that the authority of Ferdinand VII. was consequently quite legitimate, &c. &c. To all this Napoleon replied, with a smile of incredulity, that he knew the whole story, that the Revolution of Aranjuez was not quite such a natural event as the canon tried to make him believe, that Ferdinand VII. had given way to culpable impatience, that he had done wrong in declaring a succession open which nevertheless he ought not to enjoy, and that as a punishment for having sought to reign too soon, he should not reign at all.

The canon endeavoured to soften Napoleon by dilating on the virtues of Ferdinand VII., and to move him by portraying the position to which his unhappy advisers would be reduced in the sight of Spain, of Europe, and of posterity; that they would be eternally dishonoured for having given credit to the word of Napoleon, which had summoned them to Bayonne by leading them to expect that he intended to recognise the new king; that they would be accused of folly, nay, of treason, whereas their only crime was, that they had believed the word of a great man.

"You are honourable men, every one of you," replied Napoleon, "and you especially, M. le Canon, are an admirable preceptor, for the laudable zeal with which you defend your pupil. No, depend upon it, it will merely be said that you have yielded to superior force; neither you nor Spain will be able to resist me. Policy, policy, M. le Canon, must be the main-spring of every action of such a man as I am. Go to your prince, and induce him to become King of Etruria, if he wishes to be king of any place, for you may positively assure him that he shall no longer be King of Spain!"

The unfortunate preceptor of Ferdinand VII. withdrew in consternation; he found his pupil equally surprised and wretched in consequence of the interview which he had just had with General Savary. The latter, without any preliminary form, and

without entering into any of those developments which Napoleon had contrived to introduce by way of excuses, had signified to Ferdinand VII. that he must renounce the crown of Spain, and accept Etruria as an indemnity for the patrimony of Charles V. and Philip V.

Great was the agitation which prevailed at this little court, which had hitherto been completely blind to its fate. All rallied round the prince, weeping and raving, and concluded by believing what they wished, that their misfortunes were not real; that the whole was a stratagem of Napoleon's, for it was impossible that he should touch a person so sacred as Ferdinand VII., or a thing so inviolable as the crown of Spain. Napoleon, they were sure, only wanted some immense concession of territory, or some important colony, and therefore held out this terrible menace to the house of Spain; that, in a word, it was a threat, and nothing more. They therefore flattered themselves that it was enough not to yield to this intimidation, in order to triumph, and they resolved to resist and to reject all the propositions of Napoleon. M. de Cevallos was commissioned to treat with M. de Champagny on the basis of an absolute refusal.

On the following morning M. de Cevallos repaired to the château de Marac, for the purpose of having a conference with M. de Champagny. This man, whose low cunning did not restrain his impetuous temper, spoke to M. de Champagny with a vehemence which was not the result of courage, for here crowns alone, not individuals, were in jeopardy. He spoke so loud that Napoleon heard him, and coming in exclaimed: "What! you talk of fidelity to the rights of Ferdinand VII.! You, who ought faithfully to have served his father, whose minister you were! You, who have abandoned him for a usurping son, and have throughout acted the part of a traitor!"

M. de Cevallos, to whom these words might have been spoken with justice by any one who had nothing wherewith to reproach himself, immediately retired to his new master, to relate to him all that had passed. It was at once considered by the advisers of Ferdinand that such a negotiator possessed neither sufficient authority nor tact to defend the rights of his sovereign; and the mission was therefore confided to M. de Labrador, who in various embassies in which he had been engaged had learnt the art of negotiating great political questions with the requisite reserve. The basis of the negotiation remained unaltered, namely, the inalienable right of Ferdinand VII. to the crown of Spain, or, in default of his, that of Charles IV., the only legitimate king if Ferdinand VII. were not so.

Napoleon was rather chagrined at this resistance, but he hoped that it would soon give way to necessity, and especially before Charles IV. should come and make good his claims, which were

far better founded than those of Ferdinand VII. ; for although the idea of protesting against this abdication had been suggested to him by Murat, it was not less true that his abdication had been the result of moral violence exercised over his feeble character, and that he was fully justified in reclaiming his crown. Hence, in taking away the crown from Ferdinand VII., it would have been but an act of justice to have restored it to Charles IV. Napoleon, regarding the presence of Charles IV. as indispensable to oppose to the pretensions of the son the rights of the father, which, while it did not create the rights of Bonaparte, nevertheless threw all these rights into a state of confusion, by which he hoped to profit, urgently pressed Murat to induce the aged sovereigns to quit, and also to send him the Prince of the Peace, who was still a prisoner at Villa Viciosa. Napoleon enjoined Murat to employ force if needful, not for the departure of the old court, which had earnestly desired to set out, and which nobody sought to detain, but to effect the deliverance of the Prince of the Peace, whom the Spaniards were unwilling to release at any price. He also recommended that, in order to prepare the mind of the public, the junta of the government and the Council of Castille should be made acquainted with the protest of Charles IV., which reduced the royalty of Ferdinand VII. to nothing, without re-establishing that of Charles, and thus commenced a convenient sort of interregnum for the accomplishment of his projected usurpation. He endeavoured to make Murat comprehend that he must not wait for a majority of opinions in effecting a change which was not consonant to the minds of the Spaniards, but constrain them by fear, and afterwards gain over men of judgment by demonstrating the good which a French royalty would effect, by assuring them that a change of dynasty would not cost Spain one colony or even a single village, an advantage which would result from no other arrangement ; and if this should fail to secure their assent, to have recourse to a display of military force.

Napoleon desired Murat to be well on his guard, to fortify two or three points in Madrid, such as the royal palaces, the Admiralty, the Buen Retiro ; not to permit a single officer to sleep in the city, to insist that they should all be lodged with their soldiers ; in a word, so to conduct himself as if he were on the eve of an insurrection which he considered inevitable ; for the Spaniards would probably try the mettle of the French ; that in this case he must meet them with energy, so as to deprive them of every hope of effectual resistance ; that he must not forget how he carried on war in the streets of Egypt, in Italy, and elsewhere ; that he must not upon any account come to an engagement within the city, but occupy the heads of the principal streets with strong batteries, make the power of his

guns felt, and wherever the crowd should be bold enough to show itself, openly annihilate it by the swords of the cuirassiers. Thus was Napoleon led from artifice to violence by this usurpation of the crown of Spain.

On a single point only Murat had outstripped the instructions of Napoleon: this was relative to the departure of the aged sovereigns and the deliverance of the Prince of the Peace. He informed Charles IV. and his queen, in reply to the expression of their desires, that it would give the emperor pleasure to have them near him, and that consequently they had nothing to do but to prepare for their departure, and that he was about to demand the release of the Prince of the Peace in order that he might travel with them as far as Bayonne; intelligence doubly welcome, which shed a gleam of joy into hearts that had been sad since the fatal days of Aranjuez.

As soon as he had learnt that Ferdinand VII. had actually crossed the frontier, Murat felt at liberty to throw off the mask, especially as the Spaniards, who were irritated at the weakness of their princes, and humbled at being under their sway, seemed ready for a moment to throw off their allegiance to a family so unworthy of the loyalty of the nation. For a few days, therefore, all went on smoothly; but as soon as he began to speak of the deliverance of the Prince of the Peace, there was a sort of commotion among them. The multitude, greedy of revenge, were in despair at seeing their victim escape them. The higher classes, and among them were the men who were compromised in the Revolution of Aranjuez, feared that in the midst of all these political changes the Prince of the Peace might some day regain power, and revenge himself upon them for the past. These diverse motives made them politely refuse to set him at liberty. The junta of the government, composed of the ministers and the Infant Don Antonio, were more than any others filled with these sad apprehensions. They had from the very first offered a firm resistance to the demands of Murat, and pretended that, having no authority to decide a question of such importance, they must refer it to Ferdinand VII. In fact, they addressed themselves to him, and demanded his orders. Ferdinand, greatly embarrassed how he should reply to this message, declared that this question should be treated and resolved upon at Bayonne, together with those various points which were about to occupy the two sovereigns of France and of Spain.

The reply of Ferdinand having been instantly transmitted to Murat, he considered the question settled by the orders of Napoleon, and demanded that the Prince of the Peace should be instantly released from prison, in order that he might send him to Bayonne. He, however, stated that Emmanuel Godoy should be for ever exiled from Spain, and would be transported

to France, where his life would be the only boon granted to him. Murat, after having addressed this communication to the junta, directed a body of cavalry upon Villa Viciosa, with orders to carry off the prisoner either with consent or by force. The Marquis de Chasteler, under whose custody he was placed, deeming it an honour to serve the national hatred, refused to give him up; when the junta, in order to prevent a collision, sent him word straightway to deliver up the prisoner.

The unfortunate ruler of Spain, who had till lately been surrounded by all the superfluities of luxury, surpassing royalty itself in sumptuousness as he had also surpassed it in power, arrived at the camp of Murat almost without clothes, his beard unshaven, and his body covered with wounds which were scarcely healed, and marked with the chains which had galled him. In this deplorable state he for the first time met the friend whom he had chosen in the bosom of the imperial court, in the prospect of far other fortune than what he realised this day. Murat, whose generosity never failed him, loaded Emmanuel Godoy with kindness, supplied him with everything he needed, and sent him on to Bayonne under the escort of one of his aides-de-camp and a body of cavalry.

Having executed this part of Napoleon's orders, Murat turned his attention to the departure of the old sovereigns, who in the midst of their misfortunes were filled with joy that their friend was saved, and that they should soon be in the presence of the all-powerful emperor, who would avenge them of their enemies. The preparations for their journey being completed—preparations which principally consisted in obtaining possession of the most valuable of the crown jewels—they desired Murat to arrange their departure. They went accordingly on the 23rd from the Escorial to the Pardo, and there passed the night in the midst of the French troops, where they saw and embraced Murat with the greatest enthusiasm and joy. They set out from thence for Buitrago, taking the highroad to Bayonne, and travelled with that leisure which their age and infirmities demanded. On their route they met with some marks of respect, but none of sympathy. The presence of the old queen, who for twenty years had been an object of hatred and contempt to the nation, was enough to stifle every display of affection.

Murat was now almost sole master of Spain, and might have fancied himself a king. He proceeded, by order of Napoleon, to communicate to the junta the protest of Charles IV., drawn up in a great measure under his own dictation, and to demand by the proclamation of that document the suppression of the name of Ferdinand VII. in the acts of the government. The junta, greatly embarrassed, wished to make the Council

of Castille share the responsibility by consulting it. The council, however, returned the document, and refused to give an opinion. Murat then settled the question by a word, and it was agreed that the acts of the government should be published in the name of the king, without specifying what king. Thus the throne of Spain had suddenly become vacant, and the Spaniards, with profound grief, began to take cognisance of their true position. Sometimes indignant at the folly and weakness of their princes, who suffered themselves to be deceived and plunged into an abyss from which they could not possibly extricate themselves, and then overwhelmed with pity for their fate, they turned their fury against those foreigners who had insinuated themselves into their territory by stratagem and violence. Those of enlightened minds, now clearly seeing why the French had invaded Spain, fluctuated between their hatred to the foreigners and their desire to see Spain reorganised as France had been by the hand of Napoleon.

Attracted, in company with their wives, to the fêtes given by Murat, they were sometimes entrapped and half seduced, but never entirely conquered. The populace, on the contrary, never gave in to this species of seduction under any form. Sometimes the appearance of the national guard and of our cavalry would call forth their enthusiasm, and they even admired Murat; but our infantry, composed chiefly of young men, scarcely trained, suffering from the itch, and completing their military instruction under their own eyes, did not inspire them with any respect whatever, and they were even buoyed up with the confident expectation that they would be our victors. The lazy peasants of the environs had rushed to Madrid with their muskets and their cutlasses, and were in the habit of defying us with their looks before combating us with their arms. Some of them, excited by fanatical monks, committed the most horrible assassinations. One of their number killed two of our soldiers and wounded a third with his sword under the inspiration, as he said, of the Blessed Virgin. The priest of Caramanchel, a village at the very gates of Madrid, assassinated one of our officers. Murat made a memorable example of the authors of these crimes, but he could not thereby appease the hatred which now began to manifest itself. The minds of men were excited to such a pitch, that on one occasion a horse having run away on the grand promenade of the Prado, everybody took to flight under the idea that a combat was about to commence between the French and the Spaniards.

Murat always contrived to deceive himself in regard to the disposition of the Spaniards, but stimulated by the reiterated advice of Napoleon, he adopted some precautionary measures.

He lodged the guard and the cuirassiers within the city, but placed the rest of the troops upon the heights which commanded Madrid. To the three divisions of Marshal Moncey he added the first division of General Dupont, and thus occupied Madrid with the guard, the whole of the cavalry, and four divisions of infantry. The second division of General Dupont was stationed at the Escorial, and the third at Segovia. The troops were lodged under tents around the whole of Madrid. Though there was some difficulty in furnishing them with provisions on account of the insufficiency of conveyance, they had nevertheless an abundant supply. The remedies which were applied to our young soldiers for the disease under which they were suffering had almost restored them to health. They were now exercised daily, and began to acquire that strength which it would have been desirable for them to have had from the time they entered Spain. Murat had placed over them officers selected from among the subalterns of the guards, and in fact took infinite pains in the organisation of an army which he regarded as the support of his future crown. The division under General Dupont especially was extremely fine. Unhappily, however, this should have been displayed, we repeat it, in its maturity to the Spaniards, and not have grown up under their eyes.

Murat, consecrating himself to a work in which he delighted, sometimes even applauded by the Spanish populace, who were dazzled by his presence and by the splendid squadrons of the imperial guard, master of the junta, which, balanced between two absent monarchs, uncertain which to obey, yielded to present authority—Murat thought himself already King of Spain. His aides-de-camp, in their turn, dreamt that they were grandoes of the new court, flattered him more and more; while he, re-echoing these flatteries to Paris, wrote to Napoleon—"I am master here in your name; give the word, and Spain will do all you desire; she will give the crown to whichever of the French princes you may be pleased to designate." Napoleon merely replied to these idle assurances by reiterating his order to fortify the principal palace of Madrid, and to keep the officers lodged with their troops; measures which Murat executed rather as an act of obedience than from a conviction of their utility.

The Prince of the Peace performed the journey to Bayonne with the utmost speed, so as not to give the populace time to create a mob on his road, and arrived at his destination long before his old sovereigns. Napoleon was extremely impatient to see this former ruler of the Spanish monarchy, and above all, to make use of him. After a few moments' conversation, he saw that the favourite was as inferior in talent as he had been described; remarkable only for some physical advantages which had endeared him to the Queen of Spain, and a certain

shrewdness, combined with much experience in State affairs, but calumniated by those who had depicted him as a monster. Napoleon, however, in pity for his misfortunes, refrained from manifesting the disdain which such a head of the empire inspired him with, and he hastened to set his mind at ease respecting his future destiny and that of his old masters, which he promised to render secure, peaceable, and opulent, and worthy of the ancient possessors of Spain and the Indies.

To these promises Napoleon added another, not less soothing, that of promptly and cruelly avenging them on Ferdinand VII., by making him descend from the throne; and he called upon the Prince of the Peace to second him in these projects with the queen and Charles IV. This he readily promised to do, and this promise it would be easy to keep, because both the father and mother were so irritated against their son, that they would rather have seen a stranger, nay, an enemy, on the throne of their ancestors than Ferdinand VII.

The arrival of Charles IV. and the queen was announced for the 30th of April. It was the policy of Napoleon that the old sovereigns should be received with royal honours, and everything was arranged for their reception as if they were still in the enjoyment of their power, and as if the Revolution of Aranjuez had never taken place. He ordered the troops to be drawn up under arms, sent his court to meet them, commanded the cannon of the forts to be fired, the flags to be hoisted in the vessels in the waters of the Adour, and prepared to put the crowning honour upon his plans by his own presence. At mid-day they made their entry into Bayonne, amid the firing of guns and the ringing of bells. They were received at the gates of the city by the civil and military authorities, were met on their road by the two princes, Ferdinand VII. and the Infant Don Carlos, who welcomed them with visible though repressed indignation, alighted at the government palace, which was placed at their disposal, and for an instant might perhaps have pleased themselves with the fond delusion that they were still in possession of the supreme power; but this was the last and vain shadow with which Napoleon amused their old age before he precipitated them all, father as well as children, into that abyss into which he desired to plunge all the Bourbons.

A moment afterwards Napoleon himself arrived, at full gallop, accompanied by his lieutenants, in order to pay his all-potent homage to the aged pair, the victims of his ambitious calculation. He was scarcely in the presence of Charles IV., whom he had never before seen, when he opened his arms, and the unfortunate descendant of Louis XIV. flung himself into them, weeping, as he would have done to a friend from whom he hoped to receive consolation in his misfortune.

The queen exerted all the art of a woman of the court to please, especially with the Empress Josephine, who had arrived a few days before at Bayonne, and had hastened to greet the sovereigns of Spain. After a short interview Napoleon quitted Charles IV., surrounded by the Spaniards who had assembled at Bayonne, and by the French officers and chamberlains who were appointed to constitute his suite of honour. According to the desires of Napoleon, who wished none of the usages of the court of Spain to be neglected on this occasion, there was a general kissing of hands. Each of the Spaniards present approached, and kneeling down kissed the hand of the aged king and of the queen his consort. Ferdinand, taking his rank as son and Prince of the Asturias, went in his turn to kneel before his august parents, but their countenances plainly indicated the sentiments which filled their breasts.

As soon as this ceremony was over, the king and queen, who were much fatigued, rose to retire. Ferdinand VII. and his brother being about to follow them into their apartment, Charles IV., unable any longer to contain himself, stopped his eldest son, exclaiming, "Unhappy man! hast thou not sufficiently dishonoured my white hair; at least have respect to my repose;" and thus the king refused to see him except in public. Ferdinand VII., reduced in a few hours by this single etiquette to the quality of Prince of the Asturias, felt that he was lost: he was punished, and Charles IV. avenged. But Charles was soon obliged to resign into the hands of Napoleon the price at which that vengeance had been attained.

The aged sovereigns desired with the utmost impatience to embrace their friend, their beloved Emmanuel, whom they had not seen since the fatal night of the 17th of March. They threw themselves into his arms, and Napoleon, who wished to give them time to unbosom themselves and enjoy unrestrained intercourse, deferred till the following day the reception which he had prepared for them at Marac, and left them at liberty the whole day to converse freely of their situation and their future lot.

The Prince of the Peace promptly informed them of the subject that was mooted at Bayonne. This neither astonished nor afflicted them, for they had no longer any pretensions to reign, and they had the satisfaction of learning that Napoleon, in avenging them of Ferdinand VII., designed to give them in France a secure and magnificent retreat, revenues equal to those of the wealthiest reigning princes of Europe, and all this for the loss of a power of which they had long foreseen the approaching termination. It was therefore by no means difficult to make them fall in with the projects of Napoleon, to which they were in fact resigned, even while they were yet in ignorance of the indemnification which he had in reserve for them.

On the following day Napoleon invited them to dine at the château de Marac, where he proposed entertaining them daily with every mark of distinction. Charles IV. and his consort went thither in the imperial carriages, so different from the antique vehicles of the court of Spain, which were built on the same model as those of Louis XIV. Charles had the greatest difficulty to get into and alight from the carriage, and manifested in the minutest points how utterly he was a stranger to the usages and ideas of the present age.

When he had arrived at the château de Marac, Napoleon hastened to the coach door to receive him, and the aged monarch leaned on his arm as he put his foot to the ground. "Support yourself upon me," said Napoleon; "I have strength enough for us both." "I depend most surely on it," replied the old king, and testified his sincere gratitude to the emperor, happy at finding in France repose, security, and opulence for the remainder of his days.

Napoleon had forgotten to insert the name of the Prince of the Peace in the list of the persons invited. Charles IV., not seeing him, cried out with a vivacity which embarrassed all the attendants, "Where is Emmanuel?" The emperor desired that the Prince of the Peace might be sought for, and this friend, without whom he could no longer exist, was brought to Charles IV.

While Napoleon thus strove to soften the lot of this aged, dethroned, childish king, the Empress Josephine watched with her accustomed grace over the Queen of Spain, and procured her those fertile amusements which were within her reach, by offering her all the newest and most exquisite personal ornaments of Paris. But the wife of Charles IV. was more difficult to console than her husband, owing to her understanding and her ambition. Nevertheless, she could fully reckon on two consolations—the safety of Emmanuel Godoy, and the dethronement of Ferdinand.

Napoleon, having loaded his angust and unhappy guests with favours, was impatient to arrive at a conclusion, and set to work the various instruments which he had at his disposal. By his desire, Charles IV. addressed a letter to Ferdinand, reminding him of his culpable conduct in the scenes at Aranjuez, his imprudent ambition, his inability to reign over a country which through his delinquency was abandoned to revolutionary agitation, and requiring him to resign the crown. This demand clearly revealed to the councillors of the duped Ferdinand how the negotiations were to be carried on after the arrival of the old court. It was evident that the crown was demanded from the son in order that it might rest for a certain number of days, or perhaps hours, on the head of his father, and then pass from his aged head to that of a prince of the Bonaparte family.

The advisers of the young king replied to this demand by a very clever letter, in which Ferdinand VII., speaking to his father as a submissive and respectful son, declared himself ready to restore the crown, although he had received it in consequence of a voluntary abdication, subject, however, to two conditions: the first, that Charles IV. would reign himself; the second, that the restoration should take place publicly at Madrid, in presence of the Spanish nation. Without these two conditions, Ferdinand formally refused to restore the crown to his father; because, if the latter would not reign, Ferdinand considered himself as the only legitimate king, in accordance with the laws of the Spanish monarchy; and if the retrocession took place elsewhere than at Madrid, in the very bosom of the assembled nation, it would be neither free, dignified, nor secure.

This reply was able and suitable. But Charles IV. was desired to reply to it, to enlarge on the irregularity of the abdication, on the violence by which it had been brought about, on the incapability of Ferdinand to govern Spain, just awoke out of a long sleep and ready to plunge headlong into revolutions, and on the necessity of confiding to Napoleon the charge of securing the happiness of the people of the Peninsula. The letter concluded by an indication of menacing measures if this obstinacy were persevered in. To this reply the young court opposed a counter-reply, similar to the first reply of Ferdinand VII.

The negotiation did not make any progress, for the interchange of this idle correspondence had occupied from the 1st to the 4th of May. Napoleon began to manifest the most lively impatience, and resolved to declare Ferdinand VII. a rebel, and to restore the crown to Charles IV., who should then transmit it to him, after a delay more or less brief. By the intervention of the Prince of the Peace, he in the first place caused an act to be drawn up, by which Charles IV. declared himself the sole legitimate king of the Spanish dominions, but that being himself incapable of exercising his authority, he appointed the Grand Duke of Berg his lieutenant, confided to him his royal powers, and especially the command of the troops. Napoleon regarded this transition as necessary in passing the royalty from the Bourbons to the Bonapartes. He hurried the despatch of this decree with the reiterated order given a few days before, that all the Spanish princes still remaining in Madrid should quit it immediately; the youngest of the Infants, Don Francisco de Paula, Don Antonio, uncle of Ferdinand and president of the junta, and the Queen of Etruria, who had been prevented by indisposition from accompanying her parents. After having taken these measures, he prepared to put an end to the scenes at Bayonne by a solution which he himself intended to propose, when

the events of Madrid facilitated the *dénouement* which he desired by enabling him to dispense with the employment of force.

While Napoleon corresponded with Madrid, Ferdinand VII., on his side, neglected nothing to transmit thither intelligence which was calculated to enlist the national interest in his favour, and above all counteract the bad effect which his indiscreet conduct had produced. He was not ignorant that the Spaniards felt as much pity, and almost as much dislike, to his person as to that of his aged father, for having fallen into the snare laid by Napoleon. He therefore, by means of couriers, who set out from Bayonne in disguise, and traversed the mountains of Aragon to gain Madrid, spread abroad such intelligence as he deemed most likely to reinstate him in the public opinion. He made known that they wished to treat him with treachery and violence at Bayonne in order to wrench from him the sacrifice of his rights, but that he resisted, and would resist every menace, and that his people should hear of his death rather than of his submission to the wishes of the foreigner. He depicted himself as the most noble, the most interesting of victims, so as to enlist every generous heart in his favour.

These couriers, in order to avoid the direct route, which was covered with French troops, lost a day or two in reaching Madrid, but they all arrived there safely, and the news which they carried, and which was rapidly spread, regained Ferdinand VII. the good feeling which had for a moment been alienated. The universally credited report that Ferdinand VII. was the object of brutal violence at Bayonne, and that he opposed it by heroic resistance, regained him the favour of the populace of the capital, numerically strengthened, as we have already said, by the idle peasants from the environs.

Unable to have recourse to the press, which was closely watched by the agents of Murat, manuscript bulletins were employed, and these bulletins, reproduced in profusion, and circulated with incredible rapidity, excited the passions of the people to the highest pitch.

The junta of the government, profoundly dissembling its secret sentiments, affected great deference for the desires of Murat, but devoted, as was natural, to Ferdinand VII., it was, in fact, the agent of the communications with Bayonne, and of the publications which resulted from it. It despatched emissaries to Ferdinand to ascertain whether he wished it to withdraw itself from the French—whether it should in some place proclaim the legitimate sovereign, provoke a rising of the nation, and declare war against the usurper. While waiting for a reply to these propositions, the junta, after interminable delays, yielded to the demands of Murat, which were calculated to serve the designs of Napoleon.

Among these demands, one had caused much perplexity in the junta; it was that which required that all the members of the royal family still in Madrid should be sent to Bayonne. On the one hand, the old Queen of Spain desired that the young Infant Don Francisco, who had been left behind in consequence of the state of his health, should be sent to her; on the other hand, the Queen of Etruria, who had remained at Madrid from a similar cause, was herself urgent to go, terrified at the state of agitation which was daily increasing among the Spaniards. Murat, who had been commissioned by the emperor to make all the members of the royal family repair to Bayonne, imperiously demanded this twofold departure. With regard to the Queen of Etruria there could be no difficulty whatever, because she was an independent princess, and was anxious to depart; but with regard to the young Infant Don Francisco, who on account of his age was placed under royal authority, he was actually dependent on the junta of the government, which exercised that authority in the absence of the king.

The junta easily divined the motives of these successive departures, and assembled during the night between the 30th of April to the 1st of May to deliberate on the demand of Murat. The numbers were augmented by the adjunction of the divers presidents of the Councils of Castille and the Indies, and several members of those councils. The sitting was extremely agitated. Some of the members demanded that a positive refusal should be given to a proposition, the evident object of which was to remove the last representatives of the royal family; and that rather than yield, open resistance should be resorted to.

The minister of war, M. O'Farrill, exposed the state of the army, the corps of which were disorganised and dispersed, some in the north, some in Portugal, and some on the coasts, while did not leave in Madrid at this present moment a combined force of more than 3000 military. Men of more ardent temperaments proposed that the populace should be supplied with knives and fowling-pieces, and the nation seek its safety in one grand act of popular desperation. The majority were of opinion that Murat should be answered by a dissembled refusal, and everything avoided that might provoke a collision.

Besides the junta, a party of patriots, discontented at what they called its weakness, desired that the departure of the Infants should be prevented by every possible means, and infused their passions into the people; though certainly there was not much necessity for exciting them.

The 1st of May, which fell on a Sunday, attracted an immense concourse of country people into the city; and wild, energetic figures mingled amid the numerous groups which took their stations in the different squares of Madrid. At the Puerto del

Sol, a large square situated in the centre of the city, from which issue the principal streets, such as that of Mayor, Alcala, Montera, and Las Carretas, a dense and menacing crowd was assembled. Murat sent thither a few hundred dragoons, whose very appearance dispersed the multitude, and compelled them to remain tranquil.

Murat, to whom the junta had communicated its refusal in very mild terms, replied that he should take no notice whatever of it, and that on the following morning, the 2nd of May, he should make the Queen of Etruria and the Infant Don Francisco set out; a declaration to which the junta did not give any reply.

The next morning, at eight o'clock, the court carriages accordingly drew up before the palace to receive the royal personages. The Queen of Etruria displayed great readiness to depart; but the Infant Don Francisco burst into tears, so at least it was reported, at the gates of the palace. These details passed from mouth to mouth in the ranks of the assembled throng, and produced a lively agitation. Suddenly an aide-de-camp of Murat's arrived, having been sent by him to pay his respects to the queen at the moment of her departure. At the sight of the French uniform the populace raised a shout, pelted the aide-de-camp with stones, and were preparing to murder him, when a dozen grenadiers of the imperial guard, who were on duty at the palace occupied by Murat, whence the tumult could be seen, rushed into the thick of the crowd, bayonet in hand, and rescued the aide-de-camp, who was on the very point of being massacred. Some discharges of musketry which were fired in this conflict were the signal for a general rising, and a universal firing was heard on all sides. A furious populace, composed chiefly of the peasants who had come from the environs, threw themselves upon the French officers who were dispersed in the various houses of Madrid in spite of the recommendations of Napoleon, and upon the detached soldiers who came by squadrons to receive their rations. Several were slaughtered with horrible ferocity, while others were indebted for their lives to the humanity of the citizens, who concealed them in their houses.

Murat mounted his horse at the first alarm, and issued his orders with the resolve of a general who is accustomed to all the chances of war. He ordered the troops of the camp to fall back and enter Madrid by all the gates at the same moment. The most distant, those under General Grouchy, stationed near Buen Retiro, were to enter by the main streets of San Geronimo and Alcala, and march towards the Puerto del Sol; while Colonel Frederichs, setting out with the fusiliers who were keeping guard at the palace situated at the opposite extremity, were

to go by Mayor Street to meet General Grouchy towards the Puerto del Sol, which was the centre of the movement. General Lefranc, who was stationed at the convent of St. Bernard, was to march thither concentrically by the gate of Fuencarral. At the same instant the cuirassiers and the cavalry, arriving by the road of Caravanchel, received orders to advance by the gate of Toledo.

Murat, at the head of the cavalry of the guard, was in the rear of the palace at the foot of the height of St. Vincent, near the gate by which those troops that were on duty at the royal palace del Campo were to enter. Thus, placed just without the populous quarters, and in a commanding position, he could readily repair wherever his presence might be required.

The action commenced in the square of the palace, whither Murat had directed a battalion of the infantry of the guard, preceded by a battery. A shower of musketry, followed by a volley of grapeshot, very speedily cleared the square. The people fled with such precipitation that, as is generally the case in occurrences of this kind, the number of victims was comparatively small.

Colonel Frederichs marched with his fusiliers by the streets Plateria and Mayor towards the Puerto del Sol, whither the troops of General Grouchy were also marching by the streets Alcala and St. Geronimo. Our soldiers, young and old, advanced with that steadiness for which they were indebted to experienced and warlike leaders. The populace, backed by the peasants, who were braver than themselves, could not hold out; but stopping at the corner of the cross streets, fired upon our soldiers, and then disappeared into the houses in order to fire from the windows. They were pursued by our soldiers, despatched with the bayonet, and the fanatics found with arms in their hands were thrown from the windows.

The two French columns, marching to meet one another, had enclosed in the centre, that is to say, in the Puerto del Sol, the infuriated mob, which by its denseness formed an obstacle, and had not even the liberty of flight. The most obstinate among the crowd fired upon our troops. Several squadrons of the chasseurs and the Mamelukes of the guard rushed sabre in hand amid this mass of people, and compelled them to disperse by every outlet that was still left open. The Mamelukes especially used their curved sabres with great dexterity, cutting off the heads of several with a stroke, and thus spread a panic, the remembrance of which left a lasting impression upon the people of Madrid. The crowd, repelled on every side, had no other resource than to take refuge in the houses, and to fire from the windows. The troops of General Grouchy had many a murderous execution to perform in the street of St. Geronimo,

especially in the hotel of the Duke de Híjar, whence a deadly fire had issued.

The troops under General Lefranc sustained a very obstinate combat at the arsenal, where a part of the garrison of Madrid had been shut up with orders not to fight. The insurgents, having repaired thither, fired upon our troops, and the corps of Spanish artillery was then compelled, in spite of itself, to enter into the combat. The storming of a strong edifice, while exposed to the fire of the enemy, who sent a brisk shower of musketry upon us from every part, cost us several men. But our soldiers led the assault with energy, dislodged the defenders, and made them pay dear for this engagement. The arsenal was carried before the people had time to take possession of the arms and ammunition.

Two or three hours sufficed to suppress this sedition, and after the taking of the arsenal only a few isolated shots were heard here and there. Murat had constituted a court-martial at the post-office, which ordered the immediate execution of all the peasants who were seized with arms in their hands. Some of these, by way of example, were shot on the spot, upon the Prado itself; while others who endeavoured to fly to the environs were pursued by the cuirassiers, and cut down by their sabres. The troops of the camp, who arrived at this instant, found no occasion to use their arms. Everything was quieted by the terror of prompt repression, and by the presence of the ministers O'Farrill and Azanza, who, accompanied by General Harispe, chief of Murat's staff, put a stop to this combat wherever there was yet any trace of it. They demanded, and their request was granted without difficulty, that an immediate stop should be put to the executions which had been ordered by the court-martial established at the post-office.

This fatal morning, which was afterwards to be most fearfully re-echoed throughout Spain, had the immediate effect of restraining the populace of Madrid, by taking from them every illusion of their strength, and teaching them that our young soldiers, led on by experienced officers, were as invincible to the ferocious peasants of Spain as they were at Essling and Wagram to the most disciplined soldiers of Europe.

The Infant Don Antonio, who at the nocturnal session of the junta had not been one of the fomenters of the revolt, but had even appeared annoyed at the braggings of the partisans of the insurrectionary movement, said to Murat in the evening, like a man who was able to breathe after a long fatigue, "At length they will cease to reiterate that peasants armed with knives will be able to rout the regular troops."

The impression, in fact, upon the people of Madrid was profound, and in their excitement they stated and believed that

several thousand of their fellow-citizens had been killed or wounded. However, there were not many after all, for the insurgents scarcely lost 400 men, and the French about 100 at the most. But terror, as usual, magnified these numbers, and gave a moral importance to this morning very superior to its material importance.

From this moment Murat could act as he pleased. On the following morning he sent off not only the Infant Don Francisco, but the Queen of Etruria, her son, and the aged Infant Don Antonio himself, who was imbued with all the sentiments of the insurgents save their energy, and who asked for nothing better than to go to Bayonne, and find there, what all the other princes of Spain expected to find, repose with certain losses. The Infant Don Antonio readily consented to set out immediately, and abandoned the presidency of the junta of the government without even informing that body of his intentions.

Murat had now received the decree of Charles IV., which conferred on him the lieutenancy-general of the kingdom. He summoned the junta, made them accept him as president in the room of Don Antonio, and was from this moment invested with all the powers of royalty. He took up his abode in the palace, where he occupied the apartments of the Prince of the Asturias, and resuming in his correspondence with Napoleon his habitual language, he wrote that the entire force of resistance on the part of the Spaniards was exhausted on the morning of the 2nd of May; that it was only needful to designate the king destined for Spain, and that this king would reign without obstacle. In more letters than one he had already stated, as a fact, which he cited without comment, that the Spaniards, impatient to be relieved from their long and painful anxieties, frequently cried out, "Let us run to the Grand Duke de Berg and proclaim him king." There was, however, some truth in these vain allusions; if they were to have a French king, Murat, by his military renown, his courtly bearing, his southern bravadoes, his presence at Madrid, would have been the most readily accepted by the Spanish nation.

The news from Madrid arrived at Bayonne on the 5th of May, at four o'clock in the afternoon. When he received it, Napoleon saw at a glance that it was the very means of producing that shock which he needed for terminating this lengthened species of negotiation with the Spanish princes. He immediately went to Charles IV. with the despatch of Murat in his hand, and displayed much more irritation than he really felt at these Sicilian vespers which had been attempted in the streets of Madrid. He loved his soldiers, but he, who could sacrifice 10,000 or 20,000 in one morning, was not the man to regret the loss of a paltry 100 for so great an achievement as

the conquest of the throne of Spain. However, he pretended to be extremely angry in the presence of these aged sovereigns, who were terrified to see the violence of the man upon whom they were dependent. The Infants, with Ferdinand VII. at their head, were immediately summoned. As soon as they entered the apartment of their parents, they were apostrophised by their father and mother with extreme violence. "See what you have done, sir!" exclaimed Charles IV. "The blood of my subjects has flowed, and the blood of the soldiers of my friend, my ally, the great Napoleon, has also been shed. See to what ravages you would expose Spain if we had had to deal with a less generous conqueror! Look at the consequences of all that you and your friends have done, in order that you might enjoy some few days too soon that crown which I was in as much haste as you were to place upon your head. It is you who have unchained the people, and there is no longer a master over them to-day. Restore, restore that crown which is too weighty for you, and give it to him who alone is capable of bearing it."

While uttering these words, the aged king, who was condemned to act this afflicting comedy, kept brandishing a long gold-headed cane, upon which, in consequence of his infirmities, he generally leaned, and it was evident to all present that he menaced his son with it.

The father had scarcely finished when the aged queen, with a violence which was certainly not feigned, flew upon Ferdinand, loaded him with abuse, reproached him with being a wicked son, with having wished to dethrone his father, with having desired to murder his mother, with being false, perfidious, heartless, without bowels of compassion, &c. &c.

While listening to all these apostrophes, Ferdinand VII. stood immovable, his eyes riveted on the floor with a sort of stupefied insensibility. He said nothing, he manifested nothing, but he suffered everything. Several times his mother called upon him to answer, went up to him, menaced him with her hand, and exclaimed, "Yes, I see very well you are just as you always were. Whenever your father and I wished to give you any exhortations which were for your own interest, you held your tongue, and only replied to our counsels by silence and hatred. Speak to your father, sir, to your mother, to our friend, our protector, the great Napoleon." But the prince, quite insensible, was perfectly silent, merely affirming in a quiet way that he had nothing whatever to do with the disturbances of the 2nd of May.

Napoleon, greatly embarrassed, nay, almost confused at a scene like this, although it furthered the solution he desired, said to Ferdinand, in a cold but imperious tone, that if he had

not resigned the crown to his father that same evening, he should be treated as a rebellious son, the author or accomplice of a conspiracy which, on the days of the 17th, 18th, and 19th of March, had ended in depriving the legitimate sovereign of his crown. He then retired to Marac to wait for the Prince of the Peace, for the purpose of concluding with him a definitive arrangement, under the present impression of the events at Madrid.

"What a mother! what a son!" cried Napoleon, as he returned to Marac, addressing those around him. "The Prince of the Peace is certainly a very inferior sort of person, that is true enough; but after all, he is perhaps the least incompetent of this degenerate court. He proposed to them the only reasonable idea—an idea which might have led to great results had it been carried out with courage and resolution: it was this, to go and found a Spanish empire in America, there to save both the dynasty and the finest part of the patrimony of Charles V. But they could do nothing that was noble or great. The old people by their want of energy, the son by his perfidy, have ruined this design, and now behold them actually denouncing each other to the very power upon which they are dependent." Napoleon spoke long, grandly, and with rare eloquence on the vast subject of America, of Spain, of the translation of the Bourbons into the Indian empire. After having judged others, he proceeded to judge himself, for he added these words: "What I am doing now is not good in a certain point of view; I know that well enough; but policy demands that I should not leave in my rear, and that, too, so near Paris, a dynasty inimical to mine."

That evening the Prince of the Peace went to Marac, and the results which Napoleon obtained by means so deeply to be regretted, was defined in the following treaty, which was signed by the Prince of the Peace himself and by the Grand-Marshal Duroc:—

"Charles IV., recognising the impossibility that he and his family should secure the peace of Spain, resigns the crown, of which he declares himself the sole legitimate possessor, to Napoleon, that he may dispose of it as it shall seem good to him. He resigns it to him on the following conditions:—

"I. The integrity of the soil of Spain and of its colonies, no portion whatsoever of which shall be severed.

"II. The preservation of the Catholic faith as the dominant religion, to the exclusion of every other.

"III. That Charles IV. shall for his life have the château and forest of Compiègne and the château of Chambord in perpetuity, together with a civil list of 30,000,000 reals (9,500,000 f.), to be paid by the treasury of France.

“IV. A proportionable revenue for all the princes of the royal family.”

Ferdinand VII. had returned home; his eyes were at length opened to his actual situation, and the firm resolve of Napoleon not only to intimidate, but to dethrone him. His councillors also were undeceived; among them, one only, the Canon Escoiquiz, though he was not the least honest, nevertheless gave his young master the most undignified counsel; namely, to accept the crown of Etruria, in order that Ferdinand might remain king of some place, and he, Escoiquiz, the director of some king, it mattered not of what realm.

The other councillors, with more reason, conceived that this would be tantamount to a declaration to Spain that it need not take any further steps with regard to Ferdinand, since he accepted a foreign crown as an indemnification for that which had been snatched from him. They conceived that to accept nothing save an alimentary pension would be an indication to Spain that he had been dealt with treacherously, that he protested against this treachery; that, in fine, he always thought of Spain, and consequently she ought always to think of him.

Ferdinand VII., however, signed a treaty in his turn, by which Napoleon secured to him the château of Navarre, with a net revenue of 1,000,000 f., besides 400,000 f. for each of the Infants, on condition of their common renunciation of the crown of Spain.

A couple of châteaux and 10,000,000 f. a year were the price that was to be paid to the father and the children for this magnificent crown of Spain—a very moderate, nay, a very mean price; but to this was to be added a fearful complement then unknown—six years’ hateful war, the death of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, the lamentable division of the forces of the empire, and an indelible stain upon the glory of the conqueror.

Napoleon, who, blinded by power, did not foresee the consequences of this fatal step, hastened to execute the conditions. Success restored his natural generosity. He gave orders that every possible attention should be shown to a family which had just fallen beneath the strokes of his policy, as so many others had fallen beneath the strokes of his sword. He charged the Prince Cambacérès to receive the aged sovereigns; and while the necessary arrangements were completing at Compiègne, he wished them to have a first essay of French hospitality at Fontainebleau, a place which was more calculated than any other to afford pleasure to Charles IV. He assigned to them the company of the aged and mild arch-chancellor as more congenial to their humour. This was the first intimation of the affair of Spain which Napoleon gave to this grave personage, for he dared no longer speak to him of projects which could not bear the scrutiny of a politician who was as wise as he was devoted.

As for the young prince, he assigned to him the château of Valençay as a residence until that of Navarre should be completed, and as a companion he gave a man as subtle as he was dissipated, the Prince de Talleyrand, who had lately become proprietor of this same château of Valençay by an act of imperial munificence. Napoleon wrote to him the following letter, for Napoleon executed with the refinement of the manners of the nineteenth century a policy which was worthy of the knavery of the fifteenth:—

“To the Prince de Bénévent.

“BAYONNE, *May 9, 1808.*

“The Prince of the Asturias, the Infant Don Antonio his uncle, and the Infant Don Carlos his brother, will set out from this place on Wednesday next, rest on Friday and Saturday at Bordeaux, and on the following Wednesday reach Valençay. Be there on Monday evening. My chamberlain, de Tournon, will proceed thither by post, in order to prepare everything for their reception. Take care that there be plenty of table and bed linen, and that the kitchen be well supplied. There will be about ten or twelve persons in their train, and double the number of servants. I have given orders to the general who acts as chief inspector of the gendarmerie at Paris to go thither and organise the service of surveillance.

“I desire that the princes be received without external pomp, but heartily and with sympathy, and that you do everything in your power to amuse them. If you have a theatre at Valençay, and can engage some comedians to come, it will not be a bad plan. You had better bring Madame de Talleyrand thither, with four or five other ladies. If the Prince of the Asturias should fall in love with some pretty woman, it would not be amiss, especially if we were sure of her. It is a matter of great importance to me that the Prince of the Asturias should not take any false step. I desire, therefore, that he be amused and occupied. Stern policy would demand that I should shut him up in Bitche, or some other fortress; but as he has thrown himself into my arms, and has promised to do nothing without my orders, and that everything shall go on in Spain as I desire, I have adopted the plan of sending him to a country seat, surrounding him with pleasure and surveillance. This will probably last throughout the month of May and a part of June, when the affairs of Spain may have taken a turn, and I shall then know what part to act.

“With regard to yourself, your mission is extremely honourable. To receive under your roof three illustrious personages, in order to amuse them, is quite in keeping with the character of the nation, and also with your rank.”

Charles IV. quitted the frontier of Spain with a broken heart, for he bade adieu to his native land, to his throne, and to those habits which had always constituted his pleasure, so far at least as he was capable of enjoyment. The popular agitation, however, of which he had seen the first indications, had so greatly troubled him, and the intestine divisions of his family had so overwhelmed him with grief, that he fondly consoled himself for his fall with the prospects of finding in France security, rest, an opulent retreat, religious exercises, and the fine hunting grounds of Compiègne. His aged consort, disconsolate at the loss of her throne, had also more than one indemnification—revenge, the secured presence of the Prince of the Peace, and ample revenues.

Ferdinand VII., who had passed from stupid blindness to positive terror, was full of regrets; and few will conjecture the subject of these regrets. He regretted having sent to the junta of the government, in reply to its interrogations, the secret order to convoke the Cortes, to excite the nation to rise, and to make open war upon the French. He dreaded lest the execution of this order should irritate Napoleon, and place in jeopardy his own person, his allowance, and the estate of Navarre. He therefore sent a fresh messenger, and recommended the junta to act with extreme prudence, counselling that it should do nothing that might alienate the French. Not content with this precautionary measure, he had scarcely set out for Valençay when he wrote to Napoleon, to ask for one of his nieces in marriage; and not forgetting his preceptor, Escouquiz, he requested for him the confirmation of two royal favours which he had conferred on him on succeeding his father, which favours consisted in the grand cordon of Charles III., and the appointment of councillor of State! It is evident that the victims of Napoleon's ambition might charge themselves with having annihilated all remorse in him, and all interest in the public.

Napoleon, master of the crown of Spain, hastened to dispose of it. This crown, the most illustrious, next to that of France, of all the crowns which he had had at his command, seemed to him to belong of right to his brother Joseph, now king of the peaceful and considerable kingdom of Naples. Napoleon was led to this choice by affection in the first instance, for he preferred Joseph to his other brothers; secondly, by a certain respect for hierarchy, because Joseph was the eldest; and lastly, by confidence, for he had more in him than in any of his other brothers. He considered Jerome devoted to him, but too young; Louis honest, but so soured by illness, domestic troubles, and pride, that he deemed him capable of taking the most vexatious steps. With regard to Joseph, while he reproached him for an excess of vanity and weakness, he never-

theless judged him a sensible man, mild, and very much attached to his person ; and he resolved that to him alone he would confide that important kingdom which lay so near France. This choice was by no means the least fault which Napoleon committed in this fatal affair of Spain. Joseph could not possibly be at Madrid before the expiration of two months, and these two months would suffice to decide upon the submission or insurrection of Spain. He was weak, inactive, not much of a soldier, and quite incapable of commanding the Spaniards or inspiring them with respect.

Murat, on the other hand, was actually at Madrid ; he was liked by the Spaniards, and by the promptness of his resolutions was the very man to stifle an insurrection at its birth ; from being accustomed to command the army in the absence of Napoleon, he knew how to make the French generals obey him : to Murat, therefore, ought to have been confided the charge of restraining and gaining the Spaniards. But Napoleon had confidence in none but his brothers ; he saw in Murat merely a simple ally ; he was afraid of his levity and the ambition of his wife, although she was his own sister, and he determined to give him only the kingdom of Naples.

He accordingly wrote to Joseph as follows :—

“ King Charles, by a treaty which I have just concluded with him, has ceded to me all his rights to the crown of Spain. . . . This crown I have destined for you. The kingdom of Naples cannot be compared with Spain ; there are 11 millions of inhabitants, a revenue of above 150 millions, and the possession of America. Besides this, it is the crown which will place you at Madrid, three days’ journey from France, and which entirely defends one of its frontiers. At Madrid you are actually in France ; Naples is at the other end of the world.

“ I desire therefore that, immediately on the receipt of this letter, you will commit the regency to whomsoever you please, and the command of the troops to Marshal Jourdan, and that you set out for Bayonne by the shortest route possible, Turin, Mont Cenis, and Lyons. . . . Keep the secret from everybody ; as it is, it will only be suspected too readily. . . . &c. &c.”

Such was the simple and expeditious manner in which crowns were then disposed of, nay, even the crown of Charles V. and of Philip II.

Napoleon wrote to Murat to inform him of what had passed at Bayonne, announced that he had made choice of Joseph to reign in Spain, the consequent vacancy of the kingdom of Naples, which, added to the vacancy of the kingdom of Portugal (for the treaty of Fontainebleau vanished with Charles IV.), left an option between two vacant thrones. Napoleon in the

same despatch offered Murat the choice of whichever of the two he preferred, leading him, however, to prefer that of Naples, because by the maritime projects which he meditated before securing Sicily to him, this kingdom would, as formerly, comprise about six millions of inhabitants. He enjoined him meanwhile to make himself master of Madrid with all authority, to make sure of it with the greatest vigour, to inform the junta of the government, the Councils of Castille and the Indies, of the renunciation of Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII., and to compel these divers bodies to ask for Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain.

It would be difficult to form any idea of the surprise and grief of Murat in learning the choice, however natural, which Napoleon had just decreed. The command of the French armies in the Peninsula, so speedily converted into the lieutenantancy-general of a kingdom, had appeared to him a certain presage of his elevation to the throne of Spain. The overthrow of all his hopes was a blow that profoundly shook, not his mind only, but even his strong constitution, the proof of which was speedily visible. The fair crown of Naples, with which Napoleon sought to dazzle his eyes, was far from indemnifying him, and appeared to him nothing better than a painful disgrace. He nevertheless refrained—so great was his submission to his all-powerful brother-in-law—from testifying to him any discontent; but in his reply he maintained a silence upon this subject which plainly proved what he felt, and clearly showed M. de la Forêt, who had made himself master of his confidence, the painful sentiments that filled his breast. M. de la Forêt, formerly minister at Berlin, had been sent to him in place of M. de Beauharnais, punished by an unmerited recall for blunders which he had committed, and which were inevitable in the situation in which he was placed, even if he had been more skilful.

Murat had, however, still one chance; namely, that Joseph would not accept the crown of Spain, or that the very difficulties of its transmission to a prince removed to a distance from Madrid, and who had not in his hands the reins of the Spanish government, might induce Napoleon to change his mind. He therefore tried to conquer his painful emotion, conceived a sort of hope, and laboured sincerely to execute the orders he had received. The junta of the government, no longer under the presidency of Don Antonio, and enlarged, as we have seen, by several members of the Councils of Castille and the Indies, was naturally attached to Ferdinand VII., for the men who composed it were Spaniards at heart; but they were irresolute, and knew not what part to take to promote the interests of their country. As Spaniards, it cost them much to renounce the

ancient dynasty, which for a century had reigned over Spain, and was as completely identified with the country as if it had descended directly from Ferdinand and Isabella. This attachment on their part was strengthened by the energetic passions of the people, who, excited by hatred to foreigners, by their aversion to the favourite Godoy, saw in Ferdinand VII. the victim of both, and were everywhere disposed to insurrection. But they were restrained by the apprehensions entertained by all men of discernment, that if opposition were made to the French, they should see Spain turned into a field of battle for the armies of Europe; a fanatic and barbarian populace entering the lists, to the detriment of all men of honour; and lastly, the colonies shaking off the yoke of Spain, or perhaps opening their arms to the English. Such was the conflict of ideas which made the junta hesitate, and agitated the breast of every Spaniard who understood and cherished the interests of his country.

Where the mind is uncertain, the conduct will be so also. The junta, and with it the enlightened classes, acted therefore amid these grave occurrences an indecisive and equivocal part. In receiving the renunciations of Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII., and the declarations by which these princes released the Spaniards from their oath of allegiance, the members of the junta, though firmly persuaded that these renunciations had been extorted by force, felt disposed to bow before a superior destiny. The recent recommendations of Ferdinand VII., which engaged them to abstain from every act of imprudence, gave the finishing stroke to confirm them in this resolution. They were, however, for a moment in painful uncertainty, when the reply to the former questions of the junta, inquiring whether they should assemble in any other place than Madrid, convoke the Cortes, and make national war upon the French, reached them by a secret messenger, who had lost much time in traversing the Castilles. The first reply to these questions had been in the affirmative, as will be remembered, and was dated on the morning of the 5th of May, shortly before that eventful scene took place at the residence of the aged monarch, Charles IV., which had decided the renunciations.

After mature reflection, the members of the junta, considering that what had since passed between the father and the son had completely changed the face of things, induced Ferdinand VII. to resign his royalty, and himself to counsel them to act with prudence, conceived that they could take no account of orders which were annulled by posterior resolutions. It therefore testified its perfect resignation to Murat, its readiness to obey his commands, and to recognise the king whom Napoleon should give them. Those especially who, from con-

viction or interest, adopted the idea of a change of dynasty—the Marquis de Caballero, for example—were disposed to serve the new sovereign with great energy, especially if Murat, with whom they were acquainted, was to be invested with that dignity.

Murat, however, had more to demand from them than passive concurrence. He had orders to elicit from the junta and the councils of Castille and the Indies the formal demand of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain. This was too much for the weakness of some, and the interested calculations of others. To drop the rights of the house of Bourbon, without taking upon themselves the responsibility of a change of dynasty, was all that could have been expected from them. To compromise themselves for a new prince, on condition of doing so before his face, and thus to acquire all his favour, might have suited ambitious minds; but it was not in accordance with their feelings to compromise themselves for an absent prince, who was unknown, and was not even witness of the ardour manifested in his service.

Murat, therefore, found their courage completely cooled when he proposed to the junta that it should concert with the Councils of Castille and the Indies to call Joseph Bonaparte to the throne of Spain. Some did not conceal their apprehensions, others their want of zeal for the interests of an absent king. In all this there was much to flatter the secret inclinations of Murat, for it was evident that the initiative of the Spanish authorities would have been far more easily obtained if he himself had been proposed, both because he pleased, and because he was upon the spot. He did not, however, on this account insist the less urgently and energetically with the Spanish authorities, in order to extort from them what he had been commissioned to obtain.

The Councils of Castille and of the Indies, which in some respects answered, as we have already said, to the former French parliaments, had always sought occasion to extend their power; now, however, far from seeking to extend it, they availed themselves of its circumscribed limits, and exclaimed against the pretension which was suggested to them of trenching upon the rights of the throne, and of deciding whether one dynasty had deserved to descend from it and another to mount it. However, after numerous and active negotiations, in which the Marquis de Caballero was the negotiator, the Councils of Castille and the Indies agreed upon a declaration to the effect that, in case Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII. should have definitively renounced their rights to the crown, the sovereign whom they considered most capable of promoting the happiness of Spain was the Prince Joseph Bonaparte, who reigned with so much wisdom in a part of the ancient Spanish patrimony in the kingdom of Naples. Thus the councils did not take upon themselves

to pronounce on the rights of Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII., but confined themselves, in case of a well recognised vacancy of the throne, to signify a preference which, after all, amounted to no more than a mark of high consideration for one of the most esteemed princes of the family of Bonaparte.

Murat transmitted this result to Napoleon, without concealing from him the trouble it had cost him to obtain it, and the extreme difficulties which an absent candidate would meet with. It was easy to perceive that he expressed a sort of satisfaction in seeing objections started against the candidanship of Prince Joseph which might revive his own. Napoleon, who was not in the habit of sparing him, refrained nevertheless from irritating him at a moment when he stood in need of his zeal, and contented himself with addressing to M. de la Forêt the most violent and unjust reprimands, saying that he had placed him near the person of Prince Murat in order that he might give him wise and good counsels, not flatter his inclinations; that the indecision which was met with at Madrid proceeded only from the weakness of action displayed before the Spanish authorities; that the Grand Duke of Berg was lulling himself with the hope of reigning over Spain, and that his conduct evidenced this; that this was a vain delusion, which must be crushed, for no one in Spain would ever think of having him for king; that it would never be forgotten that he was the author of the whole plot which had effected the dispossession of the fallen family, and the general who had commanded the slaughter of the 2nd of May; that a prince who was a stranger to all these acts, to whom no recollections of intrigue or rigour were attached, would be far better received; and that the reward of the services rendered by Prince Murat would be the kingdom of Naples, destined to become vacant by the very success of what had been done at Madrid.

This reprimand, which was addressed to M. de la Forêt in order that it might come to the ears of Murat, was a melancholy reward to the latter for his complaisance in seconding an odious machination; a melancholy reward, we say, but a well-merited reward, for thus should all those be treated who lend their aid to guilty designs.

After having manifested his discontent to Murat in this indirect way, Napoleon considered that, while waiting for the definitive proclamation of the new dynasty, it would be well to employ the few weeks that must elapse in preparing the administrative reorganisation of Spain. He wished to exonerate himself in the eyes of the statesmen of every country for the act which he had just committed by a marvellous use of the resources of Spain; and no man—for it is impossible to deny this—was more capable than he was of redeeming, by his manner of reigning, the crime which he had committed in order to reign. The projects which

he formed, and which Spain baffled by fanatic and generous resistance, were the most comprehensive, the best combined, which he had ever conceived in his life.

He commenced, in the first instance, by desiring that all the documents made use of by the Spanish administration relative to the finances, the army, and the navy should be sent to him at Bayonne. Very few were found, for, as we have said elsewhere, the finances were a state secret of the minister of finances, a creature of the Prince of the Peace. The distribution of the army and the navy, their condition, their resources, their wants, depended upon local circumstances, which were scarcely known to the central administration at Madrid. When Murat applied, in the name of the emperor, for a statement of the navy, a printed annual was presented to him; but Napoleon was not the man to be contented with documents such as these. To M. O'Farrill, the minister of war, and M. Azanza, the minister of finance, the principal persons of the junta, he sent marks of esteem, and even flattering intimations which might lead them to expect some great favour under the new reign, and requested of them an immediate thorough investigation of every part of the service. He ordered that engineers should forthwith be despatched to every port, and officers to all the principal military stations, to obtain accurate and positive documents on every subject.

The Spaniards were not accustomed to such activity or rigorous precision, but they were at last roused by this all-powerful energy, of which Murat gave a fresh instance on the arrival of every courier, and they sent to Napoleon a tabular statement of the monarchy, a table which we have already made known. It was singular that Napoleon in demanding these documents said to Murat, "I shall want them, in the first instance, for the measures which I shall order; and I shall want them afterwards in order that posterity may learn in the sequel in what state I find the Spanish monarchy." Thus he was himself conscious that, in order to justify himself, he should be compelled to demonstrate the state in which he found Spain, and the state in which he hoped to leave her. But avenging Providence granted him only half this justification.

The first and most urgent need of Spain was want of money. Murat had not wherewith to furnish the pay of the troops, or to send the indispensable funds to the ports for sending a few vessels to sea. Ferdinand VII. on his accession to the throne had found means to dispose of sums in cash which belonged either to the consolidated fund or to the Prince of the Peace, and which had been seized the moment the old court had set out for Andalusia. He had employed them in making several

large presents, and—what was of more importance—in paying to the annuitants of the State a sum of money of which they stood in great need, and for which they had been waiting for some months. This done, there was nothing left. Murat, exhausted, and reduced to the necessity of paying his own personal expenses out of the chest of the French army, had informed Napoleon of the desperate state of the finances, and demanded immediate pecuniary aid, relying on the wealth which victory had placed in the hands of Napoleon. But Napoleon, fearful of dissipating a treasure which he had destined as a recompense for his army in case of continued prosperity, or as a fund for creating grand resources of defence in case of reverses, at first replied that he had no money—an answer which he always gave when he was applied to—at all events, when not required for works of beneficence.

Speedily sensible that Spain was actually more denuded than he had supposed, Napoleon reconsidered his refusal, and decided upon succouring her—his first punishment for desiring to be master of her. Nevertheless, he would not suffer his hand to be seen even while conferring a benefit, for he knew that there would be no haste to repay if only himself were known to be the debtor. He therefore pretended to obtain a loan to Spain of 100 millions of reals, 25 millions of francs, from the Bank of France upon the crown jewels of Spain, which Charles IV. was, according to his engagements, to have left at Madrid. But the principal of these jewels could not be found, for they had been carried off by the old queen. Napoleon, however, concluded this financial operation upon reasonable conditions, which he obtained the more easily from the bank as it only lent its name to the treasurer of the army. It was secretly stipulated with the governor of the bank, that Napoleon should furnish the funds and run all the chances of the loan, but that the bank should act with all the precaution and circumspection of a creditor acting on his own account. In order that no time might be lost, Napoleon instantly threw into the treasury of Spain several millions of the specie which he had accumulated at Bayonne; thus by his energetic foresight abridging the delays which are ordinarily attached to all transactions of this nature.

With these first succours, far more efficacious from being in specie and not in royal vales (paper-money issued by the Prince of the Peace at a loss of 50 per cent.), he gave a large sum to the public functionaries and to the army, but he reserved the greater part of his store of cash for the service of the ports, which more than any other he was anxious to reanimate. Although he did not foresee a general insurrection in Spain, especially after all that Murat continued to write him, Napoleon

was especially distrustful of the army. He commanded that it should receive a distribution which, had it been executed in time, might have averted many evils. He was at first very anxious that the troops of General Solano should be sent from Madrid and marched to Andalusia. He subsequently renewed this order, but prescribed that a portion of them should be sent to the camp of St. Roch, before Gibraltar, another to Portugal, for the purpose of employing them on the coast, where they would be useful rather than dangerous in face of the English. He commanded that the 1st division of General Dupont should instantly be sent from the Escorial to Toledo, and from Toledo to Cordova and Cadiz, to protect the fleet of Admiral Rosily, which had become the object of his greatest care since the change of the dynasty was known. He at the same time enjoined that the 2nd division of General Dupont should go to Toledo, and there be ready to support the 1st and the 3rd to the Escorial, in order that it might be at hand to aid the two others.

He made divers other dispositions for the purpose of reinforcing General Dupont. He added to his first division a strong artillery, 2000 dragoons, and four Swiss regiments serving in Spain. He announced to the latter that he would take them into his pay, and grant them exactly the same conditions as those which they enjoyed in Spain, not doubting that they would be far prouder to serve Napoleon than Ferdinand VII.; but he added, in writing to Murat, that if these Swiss troops were *in a current of French opinion* they would conduct themselves well, but ill if they were *in a current of Spanish opinion*. He consequently ordered that the two regiments of Preux and of Reding, which had formed part of the garrison of Madrid, should assemble at Talavera, in order to be placed on the route of General Dupont, who should take them up in passing. He commanded that the two Swiss regiments which were at Carthagena and Malaga should assemble at Grenada, whence they should join General Dupont in Andalusia. Among other things, he prescribed to General Junot to march the Spanish troops to the Portuguese frontiers, and to remove the French troops from thence, taking two divisions of the latter, the one towards Upper Castille to Almeida, the other towards Andalusia to Elvas.

There General Dupont was to control the Andalusians with 10,000 French of his 1st division, 4000 or 5000 of the division sent by General Junot, and 5000 Swiss. The Spaniards assembled in the camp of St. Roch were to join him, and in common to protect the interest of the new order of things against the English and the discontented Spaniards. The fleet of Admiral Rosily had therefore nothing more to fear.

Napoleon next ordered that a large portion of the Spanish

troops stationed in the south should be sent to the Balearic Isles, to Ceuta, and all the other presidencies of Africa, in order that these important points should be well secured against every attack of the English, and also that as few Spanish troops as possible should at this moment remain on the continent of Spain. He made one division go northwards, that is to say, towards Ferrol, for an expedition to the colonies—the importance and object of which will afterwards be seen. Lastly, he desired Murat to dispose of a certain number of those who were stationed in the environs of Madrid, on the route of the Pyrenees, to prepare them gradually to pass into France, under the pretext that they were to go and share the glory of the Romana division in an expedition for Scania against the English and the Swedes.

A similar disposition was prescribed for the life-guards, which had displayed such hatred to the Prince of the Peace and so much devotion to Ferdinand VII., and who for this reason were greatly suspected. A northern campaign, side by side with the French army, was the bait held out to them in making them choose between this glorious mission and their disbandment.

It is impossible duly to conceive a more able distribution ; for the Spanish troops, dispersed on the frontiers of the Peninsula, in Africa, in America, and in the north of Europe, moreover, placed everywhere under the surveillance of the French army, could no longer be an object of apprehension. Unhappily, however, the unanimous effort of a great nation speedily defeated the most profound combinations of genius.

Let us now come to the dispositions relative to the navy. The first care of Napoleon, in the very first moment, was to secure the Spanish colonies from the dangers of an insurrection, by this means gaining the hearts of the Spaniards in securing the interest which most nearly touched them, and exalting their imaginations by finally realising those vast maritime projects which he meditated since the days of Tilsit, but for the carrying out of which he had hitherto, in the first instance, wanted time, and in the second, the free co-operation of Spain.

Napoleon commenced by commanding multiplied communication, as well with the French colonies as with those of Spain. To this end he sent off from France, from Portugal, and Spain, small vessels bearing proclamations filled with the most seductive promises, with papers emanating from all the commercial companies confirming these proclamations, with commissioners charged to spread them abroad ; lastly, with warlike stores and provisions, of which the recent events in Buenos Ayres had revealed the urgent need. All the colonies had, in fact, manifested the greatest zeal to defend the domination of Spain, and their want of arms alone had prevented this zeal from being efficacious. Napoleon, who not only ordered everything, but

himself carried those orders into execution wherever he might himself be, had already discovered at Bayonne, a port from which there was at that time a good deal of intercourse with the Spanish colonies, the means of communicating with America. He had there found out a vessel very small, very neatly rigged, very inexpensive to build, almost imperceptible at sea on account of her small sails, and able to escape all the enemy's cruisers. He despatched one which was already complete, immediately caused six others to be put upon the stocks under the name of *mouches* [flies], in order to send them to Spanish America laden with arms and communications for the authorities. One month sufficed to build them; he was therefore sure that he should very soon have an adequate number ready to send out.

He had ascertained by observations made at Cadiz that this port was the best for distant expeditions, because vessels steering for the coast of Africa, and running down it as far as the latitude of the trade-winds, were not obliged to double any of the Spanish capes, where they generally encountered the enemy's cruisers. He desired that from this port a multitude of little vessels should be immediately despatched, carrying like the others a number of proclamations and warlike stores.

Having provided for frequent communication with the colonies, he turned his attention to sending considerable forces thither. He commanded that armaments should be equipped at Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthage. A part of the loan granted to Spain was to be employed in this object, and to obtain the double result of gladdening the eyes of the Spaniards by the sight of great maritime activity, and of preparing expeditions capable of saving the colonial possessions. There were at Ferrol two ships of the line and two frigates ready for sea. He commanded that two other vessels should be immediately refitted; that these six ships should be manned, freighted with arms and ammunition, and kept in readiness to receive from 3000 to 4000 soldiers, who were at that moment on their way to Ferrol. This expedition was destined for Rio de la Plata, and as a few hundred men under the command of a French officer, M. de Linières, had sufficed to expel the English from Buenos Ayres, and a hundred French at Caraccas to defeat the attempt of the insurgent Miranda, there was every reason to hope that the sending of such a succour would suffice to secure the vast possessions of South America from every hostile attempt.

At Cadiz there had long been six sail of the line equipped. Napoleon commanded that they should be furnished with whatever they might require in regard to crews and provisions; that to these should be added five other vessels, which the resources of this port, if there were a supply of money, would be adequate to refit, to arm, and to equip. There were already at Cadiz five

French ships of the line and several French frigates under Admiral Rosily, the glorious remains, as we have before said, of the disaster of Trafalgar, and as well organised as the best of the English ships. Napoleon wished to reinforce this division by two other vessels, by means of a very ingenious combination which was highly advantageous to Spain. He sent from the funds of the French treasury the necessary advance for the construction of two new ships, which were to be put on the stocks at Carthagena, a port where shipbuilding was continually going on, while in that of Cadiz the timber was reserved for repairing the armed fleet. In return for this advance, Spain was to lend France the *Santa Anna* and the *San Carlos*, two magnificent three-deckers, which were to be returned after the completion of the two vessels at Carthagena.

Napoleon prescribed to the battalion of the marines of the guard, from 600 to 700 strong, which had followed the detachments of the guards in Spain, to repair to General Dupont at Cadiz. Besides these 600 or 700 excellent seamen, Admiral Rosily might be able, without weakening his own squadron, to take from it 300 or 400 men, whom General Dupont should replace by giving conscripts from his battalions, and by these means it would be perfectly easy to man the two vessels borrowed from the arsenal at Cadiz. Thus, therefore, there would be immediately at Cadiz seven French sail of the line, five or six Spanish, making in all twelve or thirteen, and with the five Spanish, the equipment of which had been commenced, a total of eighteen, to be employed, as will soon be seen, in the execution of the grandest designs.

At Carthagena, the construction of two new French vessels for the account of France was about to reanimate the works and to reassemble the dispersed workmen. From this port a squadron of six vessels had sailed for Toulon. There were left two others capable of keeping the sea, and these Napoleon commanded to be immediately armed, and to be joined by several frigates. He enjoined the fleet of Carthagena, which had taken refuge at Mahon, to repair to Toulon or to return to Carthagena, where with the two vessels which were about to be manned it would form a division of eight vessels. "Take to yourself the glory," wrote Napoleon to Murat, "of having, during your short administration, reanimated the Spanish navy; it is the best means of attaching the Spaniards to us, and of assigning an honourable motive for our presence among them."

It is easy to see that these preparations, which were calculated to reawaken activity in all the ports of Spain, would act in concert with the naval forces already created throughout the whole extent of the French empire. We have before said that the project of Napoleon was to station in all the ports of Europe,

from the Sound to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Toulon, from Toulon to Corfu and Venice, fleets completely equipped, and at the side of these fleets camps, which the return of the grand army would enable him to compose of the finest troops, for the purpose of ruining and disheartening England by the already impending possibility of an immense expedition to every part of the globe—for Sicily, Egypt, Algiers, the Indies, Ireland, nay, England herself. In this way Napoleon showed whither his projects tended, and what they would become by the union of Spain and France under the same authority.

The expedition of Corfu, destined principally for Sicily, had many storms to encounter, but had been master of the Mediterranean for two months, from the 10th of February to the 10th of May. Admiral Ganteaume, who, as we have stated, left Toulon on the 10th of February with the two divisions of Toulon and Rochefort, consisting of ten sail of the line, two frigates, two corvettes, and one flute, encountered a fearful tempest on the night of the 11th. This squadron once dispersed could not rally. With his three-decker, *Le Commerce de Paris*, and the division of Rochefort, he had kept out at sea, doubled Sicily, and arrived in sight of Corfu, which he entered on the 23rd.

Rear-Admiral Cosmao, on his part, with four ships of the line, two frigates, two flutes, had long battled with the seas of Sicily in order to rejoin the admiral; had afterwards gained Cape Santa Maria, the rendezvous which had been assigned at the extremity of the Otranto territory, and instead of entering Corfu, where he would have found the rest of the fleet, had returned to the gulf, to Taranto, on the false report of the approach of the English squadron.

Admiral Ganteaume, who sailed from Corfu on the 25th of February to join the division of Cosmao, was tossed about by a frightful tempest for nineteen days, and at length fell in with his lieutenant on the 13th of March; thus collecting his ten ships of the line, his two frigates, his two corvettes, and one of his two flutes, he took them back to Corfu. He had there landed a considerable quantity of provisions and stores, and increased the garrison to 6000 men. He was preparing to enter the strait of Messina, to effect the passage of the French troops into Sicily, when he received intelligence from Joseph that the English Admiral Strachan was at Palermo with seventeen vessels; he was therefore obliged to return to Toulon, leaving at Corfu his newly-equipped frigates, and taking with him the *Pomone* and the *Pauline*, which had exhausted their stores and worn out their rigging by their prolonged sojourn in that island. He encountered the equinoctial gales, and did not make Toulon till the 10th of April.

This expedition of two months, though greatly impeded by

weather, nevertheless gave Napoleon extreme satisfaction, and he ordered that the most pompous eulogiums should be lavished upon the admirals and officers in all the public journals throughout the empire. He arrived at the conclusion that, with a little more daring and more practice, his admirals would be able to attempt great things. He accordingly commanded that Admiral Ganteaume's ten ships should be instantly repaired, provided with excellent crews and two good officers—Rear-Admirals Cosmao and Allemand; to put to sea the *Austerlitz*, the *Breslau*, and the *Donauwerth*, and that there should be added to them two Russian vessels which had taken refuge at Toulon, for which step he had obtained the concurrence of the Russian government. He decreed a new levy of seamen on the coast of Provence, Liguria, Tuscany, and Corsica, with an addition of conscripts for manning the three new vessels, the *Austerlitz*, the *Breslau*, and the *Donauwerth*. He ordered that several frigates and old ships should be equipped as flutes, so that he might be able to embark 2000 men and 800 horses. The arrival of the Spanish division from Carthage, if it came from the Balearic Islands to Toulon, would thereby augment by a third or even a fourth the means of transport.

We have spoken of the preparation commanded at Carthage and at Cadiz. General Junot had found at Lisbon two vessels ready for sea, and one on the stocks on the eve of being launched. Napoleon had sent to him several officers and some sailors, and had desired him to enrol the Danish, Spanish, and Portuguese sailors who might be found unemployed at Lisbon to man the three Portuguese vessels.

At Rochefort, Napoleon had supplied the place of Allemand's division by three ships of the line already under sail, and a fourth just launched. At Lorient he had a division consisting of three new ships of the line, besides *Le Vétéran*, which was about to return thither, with several frigates and store-ships. He ordered preparations to be made at the last-mentioned port for the embarkment of 4000 or 5000 men. At Brest there still remained seven ships of the old fleet in good condition; to these were to be added several frigates and other ships armed *en flûte*, that is to say, having only one tier of guns, so that a very few of them would be capable of embarking 12,000 men. Admiral Villamez was to command this squadron.

Finally, there were already at Flushing eight new ships of the line just come down from Antwerp, besides about a dozen others in the course of construction, several of which were ready for launching. Napoleon ordered that a portion of the crews should be detached from the ships forming this flotilla at Boulogne and organised into marine battalions, serving alternately by land and by sea, and made capable of manning ships of war.

The flotilla, reduced to such limits as the roads of Boulogne could easily contain, was still sufficiently considerable to transport 80,000 men in two or three trips across the Channel. In the harbour of Texel, King Louis had eight ships of war ready for sea, and several detachments of Dutch troops.

Napoleon had thus forty-two French ships of war, equipped and manned; twenty Spanish ships, already equipped or nearly so; ten Dutch and eleven Russian ships, in the various ports of France; twelve Russian vessels in the Adriatic, together with one or two belonging to Denmark. In addition to all these, he hoped to be able to build thirty-five more ships by the close of the year; namely, twelve at Flushing, one at Brest, five at Lorient, five at Rochefort, one at Bordeaux, one at Lisbon, four at Toulon, one at Genoa, one at Spezzia, and three or four at Venice. These thirty-five ships were already two-thirds finished. He calculated that the completion of all these naval constructions would put him in possession of 131 ships of the line; and his design was to station 7000 men at the Texel, 25,000 at Antwerp, 80,000 at Boulogne, 50,000 at Brest, 10,000 between Lorient and Rochefort, 6000 Spaniards at Ferrol, 20,000 French round Lisbon, 30,000 round Cadiz, 20,000 round Carthage, 25,000 at Toulon, 15,000 at Reggio, and 15,000 at Taranto. With 131 ships of the line, and about 300,000 men always ready to embark at one point or another, it would be easy to keep the English in continual alarm.

Whilst this vast development of force was accomplishing, Napoleon calculated that the English would have ten ships of war in the Baltic, keeping watch over the Russians and the operations in Holland; eight to observe the fleet assembled at the Texel and at the outlets of the Meuse; twenty-four to oppose the eight or ten at Flushing, the seven at Brest, the four at Lorient, and the three at Rochefort; four to hold in check the expedition at Ferrol, twelve to oppose the armament at Lisbon, twenty to make head against the armament at Cadiz, and twenty-two or twenty-four against the armament at Toulon. For all this 102 ships were required, to say nothing of the naval forces necessary to be kept up on the coasts of America, India, and other parts of the world. It must inevitably have been ruinous to Great Britain to condemn her to a continuance of these efforts for the space of two or three years.

But Napoleon was not disposed to confine himself to empty threats, whatever degree of alarm or expense it might occasion to England. He determined to direct his immense preparations to two immediate results; viz., an expedition to India, and one to Egypt. This twofold scheme engrossed his whole attention whenever it was diverted from the straits of Calais. He had given orders for adding to the divisions of ships armed for

war a certain number of transports, consisting of old frigates and other vessels armed *en flûte*, and capable of conveying numerous forces and great quantities of provisions, without the inconvenience of numerous vessels. By this means he could embark 12,000 men at Brest, 4000 or 5000 at Lorient, 5000 at Rochefort, all with supplies of provisions for six months. At Toulon there were arrangements for embarking 20,000 men, with provisions for three years. At Cadiz he had given orders for similar preparations for 20,000 men, but with reference to a more remote period.

Profiting by the perplexity of England when thus menaced on all points at once, it was determined that the Lorient expedition should be the first to sail, conveying 4000 or 5000 men to the Isle of France. This augmentation of troops, ammunition, and naval force would render the Isle of France a formidable post to the trade of India. The Brest expedition was to be the next in the order of departure. In the event of its also reaching the Isle of France, General Decaen, with a force of between 16,000 and 17,000 troops, and a powerful squadron, would be enabled to overthrow, or at least to shake, the British empire in India. After the lapse of a little time, Admiral Ganteaume, with 20,000 men, was to proceed either to Sicily or Egypt, whilst the fleet at Cadiz would follow in the one or the other direction. The least important result that might be expected from these combined movements, would be the conveyance of supplies to our colonies in the ocean, and the conquest of an important point in the Mediterranean; whilst in both those quarters the English navy would find so much occupation, that any attempt against the Spanish colonies would be out of the question.

Whilst Napoleon was warmly discussing these plans, alternately with the minister Decrès and with the admirals charged with the several commands, he directed the arrangements of the whole project, and verified the details by the opinions of practical men. In his intervals of leisure he mounted his horse and rode along the seashore, visiting the mouth of the Adour, and collecting by his own personal observation much information relative to naval affairs. During his visit to the Landes he had seen numbers of fine firs and oaks felled, and lying on the ground rotting for want of the means of transport. On beholding this waste of useful resources, he determined to conquer nature by the force of art. "*My heart bleeds*," he said, in a letter addressed to M. Decrès, "to see all this valuable wood perishing uselessly." He forthwith gave orders for transporting a portion of the timber by water down the Adour to Mont-de-Marsan; from thence it was to be drawn by teams of oxen to Langon, and afterwards to be floated by the Garonne to Bordeaux and

Rochelle. But this mode of conveyance being very expensive, he continued building ships at Bayonne, in order to use the timber remaining in that part of the country. The bar which obstructs the river was the only obstacle that opposed these works. There being only fourteen feet water at high tide, the depth was insufficient to float a 74-gun ship, which Napoleon wished to construct in that port. He devised works for throwing back the bar some hundred fathoms, which would have procured a depth of twenty or thirty feet of water; for at a little distance out the sea becomes extremely deep, and the bar sunk in proportion. He sent for engineers from Holland to discuss and arrange the plan of the works. He next entertained various schemes for furnishing the colonies with recruits and supplies of corn, which they wanted, and for bringing home to the mother-country the sugar and coffee which they could not use. He proposed to give the owners of merchant-vessels a certain sum per ton for the transport of troops and stores; but this proposition was met by demands so exorbitant, that he determined on sending out sloops and frigates to convey the troops and corn, and to bring back colonial produce at the charge of the State. "Extraordinary circumstances," he used to observe, "demand extraordinary measures. To remain inactive, and to do nothing, would be the worst thing possible, for our colonists would perish of hunger whilst surrounded by their barrels of sugar and coffee, and we should be in want of those valuable articles, with our warehouses stored with unsold corn and salted provisions."

About this time there arrived in Bayonne a certain number of Spaniards, men of high respectability, who had been selected by order of Napoleon from the different provinces of Spain for the purpose of forming a junta. They had readily responded to his summons;—some, because they felt convinced that, for the welfare of Spain, to save her from a destructive war, to preserve her colonies, and ensure her regeneration, it was necessary to support the Napoleon dynasty; others, because they were attracted by interest and curiosity, or by the sympathy which an extraordinary man never fails to inspire. Meanwhile the insurrectional movement, commenced in Madrid on the 2nd of May, had simultaneously spread into several of the provinces. In Andulasia, it was favoured by the distance of the French troops; in Aragon, by the national spirit prevailing in that frontier province; in the Asturias, by the old feeling of independence peculiar to that inaccessible region. There the sentiments of the intelligent class of the people were subdued by those of the populace who were less alive to political considerations than offended at the disposition of a national dynasty. In those provinces the attempt to nominate deputies for the junta would have been abortive, and therefore the government of

Madrid took upon itself the task of nominating them. Some of the deputies, though commissioned to proceed to Bayonne, were afraid to go, for the idea began to be generally spread abroad that those who went thither would never return. A sort of popular and superstitious terror pervaded the public mind. The troops destined for the Pyrenees, and especially the life-guards, refused to march—a circumstance the more unfortunate, as it served to strengthen the insurrectionary feeling. Napoleon, warned by Murat of this disposition of the public mind, sent away for a few days MM. de Frias, de Medina Celi, and some other persons of note, for the purpose of showing that it was possible for persons to leave Bayonne after having been there.

The end of May was now approaching, and the warmth of public feeling in Spain was visibly declining. This change was especially assignable to the delay in proclaiming the new king. Murat urgently insisted that matters should be brought to a crisis; first, for determining a question which had incessantly occupied his mind; and next, for checking the increasing indifference felt towards him by the Spaniards. Napoleon, who clearly perceived the personal motives of his brother-in-law, and who could not hasten the arrival of the answer he expected from Naples, wrote in a very angry tone to Murat. The latter, agitated by a thousand fears and hopes, which he alternately conceived and abandoned, and tormented by the unjust reproaches of Napoleon, fell ill of a fever, caused not less by anxiety of mind than by the effect of the climate. This circumstance, which placed his life in jeopardy, served to convince the ignorant class of the people that Napoleon's lieutenant had been struck by the avenging hand of Providence. This popular superstition, together with the sudden suspension of the authority of the lieutenant-general, were not a little unfortunate in the then existing circumstances.

At the commencement of June, after a delay of three weeks, Napoleon received intimation of the arrival of Joseph, and his acceptance of the proposal made to him—the delay of both the answer and the arrival having been the unavoidable consequence of distance. Napoleon determined on at once proclaiming his brother King of Spain, so that he might present himself with that title in Bayonne, and there receive the homage of the junta. He issued a decree in which, resting upon the declarations of the Council of Castille, he proclaimed Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain and the Indies, guaranteeing to the new sovereign the integrity of his dominions in Europe, Africa, America, and Asia. On the 7th of June Napoleon set out to meet Joseph on the road to Pau: he overwhelmed him with demonstrations of regard, which, though dictated by policy, were not the less sincere; for he loved his brother, and wished to give him credit

in the eyes of the junta. Joseph, though transported with joy by the high position in which he found himself, was nevertheless dismayed by the difficulties he beheld in perspective, difficulties of which the insurrection in Calabria already afforded a distinct prognostic. Like all persons suddenly raised to greatness, he was less happy than jealous envy supposed. He received with a certain degree of alarm the sovereignty of Spain, which Murat had so ardently longed for; and his perplexed thoughts turned with regret to the fair kingdom of Naples, which was insufficient to satisfy the ambition of Murat. This strange state of things arose out of one of the many singular positions presented by the Bonaparte family, who after being at one moment elevated by a great man to the region of marvels, descended again to the region of reality; falling from the height of the loftiest thrones of the earth.

As soon as Joseph arrived, Napoleon presented to him those Spaniards of high rank and importance whom he had successively invited to Bayonne, either to be members of the junta, or because they were men of consideration whom he wished to know, and who, flattered by such a mark of attention, readily obeyed his summons. Joseph's countenance possessed some traces of the classic beauty which marked that of Napoleon; he had not, it is true, the perfect regularity of features, or that grandeur of expression which imparted to the conqueror of Rivoli and Austerlitz a resemblance to Cæsar or Alexander. But Joseph, on the other hand, possessed extreme amiability of manners, and a certain grace, combined with some slight share of borrowed dignity. The brothers of Napoleon had, in their intercourse with him, contracted the facility of conversing on military affairs, on diplomacy and government; and on all those subjects they possessed such an amount of general information as was requisite to make them feel at ease in the extraordinary positions to which the author of their fortunes had raised them; moreover, they were not wanting in natural intelligence. The Spanish grandees, who were ignorant, and vain of their own greatness, had already been fascinated by the presence of Napoleon; and Joseph, by his amiable manners, and a display of the stock of information he had acquired in Naples, succeeded in pleasing and inspiring them with confidence in his capacity. Servility is contagious; and the Spaniards who were gathered round the new king began to laud his virtues, and even to put faith in his high qualities. The Dukes de San Carlos, de l'Infantado, del Parque, de Frias, de Hajar, and de Castel Franco; the Counts de Fernand Nuñez, de Orgaz, and even the famous Cevallos, with all his hostility to the French, were already persuaded that the interests of Spain demanded submission to the new dynasty; a fact which certainly admitted of no doubt.

O'Farrill and de Azanza, the ministers of war and of finance, who had been invited to Bayonne, were led to the same conviction; which was, however, on their part much more natural, for not being courtiers, but mere men of business, they were not influenced by private or personal feelings, and had no political object but to secure the greatest degree of benefit to their country. In the minds of such men there could exist no doubt of the advantage of superseding the old dynasty by the new one. Moreover, their introduction to Napoleon had filled them with admiration, and made them almost forget his conduct towards the dethroned family. They readily pledged themselves to serve the new king. Whilst awaiting the arrival of Joseph, Napoleon, in conjunction with the Spaniards present in Bayonne, had drawn up the plan of a constitution, adapted at once to the age and to the manners of Spain. It was determined that the junta should assemble in the ancient episcopal palace of Bayonne, which was arranged for the purpose; that there the king should be recognised and the constitution discussed, so as to give the appearance of a free and voluntary adoption. The whole plan was carried into effect with military promptitude and precision. Joseph had arrived on the 7th of June. On the 15th the junta was convoked, the president being Señor de Azanza, minister of finance under Ferdinand VII., now destined to fill the same post under Joseph Bonaparte, and well worthy to fill it under any enlightened sovereign. Señor de Urquijo discharged the duties of secretary. After a few formal speeches (all adverting to the advantage of receiving from the hand of Napoleon a member of that miraculous dynasty which had been sent on earth for the regeneration of thrones, and announcing that that member was Joseph Bonaparte), the imperial decree proclaiming Joseph King of Spain and of the Indies was read. The junta then waited on the new king to offer the homage of the Spanish nation; of which, unluckily, they represented the intelligence but not the passions. After taking leave of Joseph, the junta visited Napoleon, returned thanks to the powerful benefactor, to whom, they believed, they owed a bright and prosperous future.

Several succeeding days were occupied in discussing the plan of the constitution; some changes were suggested and taken into consideration. It was framed on the model of the French constitution, with some modifications adapted to the manners of the Spaniards; and it contained the following provisions:—

An hereditary monarchy, transmissible in the male line in the order of primogeniture, reversible from the branch of Joseph to those of Louis and Jerome. Any union of the crown of Spain with the crown of France was expressly interdicted, and thus the independence of Spain was secured.

A senate composed of twenty-four members, like that of

France, was entrusted with the defence of the constitution, and also empowered to protect the liberty of the press and personal liberty; a commission being appointed to make known cases in which either freedom of the press or of persons should be violated.

An assembly of the Cortes, comprising, under the name of the *Bench of Clergy*, twenty-five bishops chosen by the king; under the name of *Bench of Nobility*, twenty-five *grandees* of Spain, also chosen by the king; sixty-two deputies from the provinces of Spain and the Indies; thirty deputies from the principal cities; fifteen eminent merchants; fifteen literary and scientific men, the latter representing the universities and academies; all to be elected by those whom they were to represent. The assembly, which was to be convoked at least every three years, was to discuss the laws, and to fix the revenue and expenditure for three years to come.

A permanent magistracy, dispensing justice according to the forms of modern legislature, under the supreme jurisdiction of a high court, which was to be no other than the Council of Castille, under the title of Court of Cassation.

Finally, a Council of State, for the supreme regulation of the government, on the model of that of France.

Such was the constitution of Bayonne, which was certainly alike adapted to the manners of Spain and to the state of her political advancement. It made no mention of the inquisition, the clergy, or the privileges of the nobility; for it had been drawn up with a desire not to give umbrage to any class of the people. To the legislature was consigned the task of subsequently deducing consequences from the principles laid down in this act, which contained the germ of the regeneration of Spain.

The discussions on the constitution being ended, a royal sitting was held on the 7th of July in the episcopal palace. Joseph, seated on the throne, read a speech expressive of the sentiments of devotion with which he was about to assume the government of Spain; then laying his hand on the Gospel, he took the oath of allegiance to the new constitution. At the close of these proceedings, which elicited loud and enthusiastic acclamations, the assembly adjourned to Marac to compliment the man whose will ruled the events of the time.

It was urgent that Joseph should forthwith take possession of his kingdom. It was said that the Spaniards, irritated at sight of the blood shed on the 2nd of May in Madrid, and indignant at the artifice which had enticed the Bourbon family to Bayonne, were already showing symptoms of discontent; that an insurrectionary feeling prevailed in Andalusia, in Aragon, and in the Asturias, and that the route by which the king had to travel was scarcely safe. Nevertheless, it was

indispensable that Joseph should go to relieve Murat, now ill, and in a delirium of impatience to quit a country which had become hateful to him, and in which he could not remain without peril to his life.

Napoleon, beginning to perceive the real state of things, and unwilling to send his brother into a foreign country in a way which would not command respect, prepared new military forces for his escort. The reserves of infantry formed at Orleans, and the reserves of cavalry assembled at Poitiers, had already entered Spain under the command of Generals Verdier and Lasalle, and they formed a *corps d'armée* which occupied the centre of Castille. Some old regiments, drafted from the grand army, were sent to the coast camps, and from the forces previously occupying those camps, four fine regiments were selected, viz., the 13th of the line, and the 2nd, 4th, and 12th light infantry. To these were added some Polish lancers, and a superb regiment of cavalry, raised by Murat in the territory of Berg; and out of all these various corps Napoleon composed a division of veteran troops, amidst which Joseph was to advance on Madrid by short stages, thereby affording the troops the indulgence of slow marches, and giving the Spaniards ample opportunities of seeing their new king. The junta and the grandees of Spain followed in the suite of the king, all proceeding by short and slow journeys.

Joseph departed on the 9th of July, escorted by veteran troops, and preceded and followed by upwards of a hundred carriages filled with the members of the junta. Napoleon conducted his brother to the frontier of France, where he affectionately took leave of him. He recommended him to be of good heart, whilst he hinted only partially what his keen intelligence enabled him to foresee. The irresolute spirit of Joseph would have sunk under the disclosures which his brother could have made; and yet Napoleon's keen glance, though it enabled him to see the impending future, did not discern one-half of the evils which were destined to result from the great fault committed at Bayonne.

Such were the measures to which Napoleon was prompted by his deference to a systematic idea, rather than by feelings of family affection, for he had the means of establishing all his relations in high positions without usurping the crown of Spain and dethroning the last of the Bourbons reigning in Europe. By reason of the weakness of the Spanish Bourbons he could not resort to force, for it would have been ridiculous to declare war against Charles IV. He therefore had recourse to stratagem, and he forced them to fly by arousing their fears. The indignation of Spain having arrested the unfortunate Bourbons in their flight, Napoleon took advantage of their

family discord and enticed them to Bayonne by the hope of obtaining justice, which justice he dispensed in the manner of the judge in the fable, who gave an oyster-shell to each dissatisfied party. He was led on from stratagem to dishonesty, and thereby affixed to his name one of the two great stains which tarnish his glory. To have escaped from this stigma, he must have effected the good which he intended to render to Spain; and by Spain he must have secured the advantages he contemplated for France. Providence did not reserve for him the opportunity of absolving himself from an act of perfidy unworthy of his character.

But why anticipate the justice which time never fails to award. In the events which remain to be narrated, stern justice will be seen arising out of the events themselves, and showing by its punishment that men of high genius, no more than those of ordinary capacity, can hope for dispensation for any departure from rectitude and common sense.

NOTE TO PAGE 320.

The letter I have mentioned on p. 302 first appeared, if I mistake not, in the *Mémorial de Sainte Hélène*; and since then it has been printed in a multitude of publications. To me it has been a subject of diligent inquiry and examination, with the view of ascertaining its authenticity, respecting which I often had doubts. I will here explain the reasons on which those doubts were grounded, and also the reasons which definitively led me to believe it to be genuine. Of this fact, a series of the most careful comparisons brought me to an entire conviction on this subject.

I will commence by quoting the letter literally :—

“ March 29, 1808.

“ MONSIEUR, GRAND DUKE OF BERG,—I fear that you may be deceiving me respecting the situation of Spain, and that you may be deceiving yourself. The affair of the 19th of March has very considerably embarrassed the state of things. Do not imagine that you are attacking an unarmed nation, and that your troops have only to show themselves in order to reduce Spain to subjection. The revolution of the 20th of March proves that there is spirit among the Spaniards. You have to deal with a people in the prime of their energies, fired with all the courage and all the enthusiasm which animate men who have not been worn out by political excitement.

“ The aristocracy and the clergy are the masters of Spain. Should they become alarmed for their privileges and their existence, they may raise against us levies en masse which will perpetuate the war. I now have partisans; but if I present myself as a conqueror, I shall have none.

“ The Prince of the Peace is detested, because he is charged with having delivered Spain over to France; this is the grievance which favoured the usurpation of Ferdinand. The popular party is the weakest.

“ The Prince of the Asturias has none of the qualifications requisite for the head of a nation; nevertheless, for the sake of setting him up in opposition to us, he will be elevated into a hero. I will not consent to any

violence being exercised towards the personages of that family. It never answers any purpose to render one's self odious and to stir up hatred. Spain has upwards of 100,000 men in arms—more than enough to carry on internal war with advantage; and this force, if dispersed over various points, may serve to keep the whole monarchy in a state of insurrectionary ferment.

"I here point out to you all those obstacles which are inevitable. There are others which your judgment will enable you to comprehend.

"England will not let slip this opportunity of multiplying our embarrassments. She is daily forwarding *avisos* to the forces she keeps up on the coast of Portugal and in the Mediterranean, and she is enlisting Sicilian and Portuguese troops.

"The royal family not having quitted Spain to proceed to South America, nothing but a revolution can change the face of the country; and Spain is, perhaps, of all the countries of Europe, that which is least prepared for revolution. The persons who are sensible of the monstrous vices of the government and of the anarchy which has usurped the place of legal authority are in the minority: the majority take advantage of those vices and that anarchy.

"In the interest of my empire I can effect much good to Spain. The question is, what are the best means of doing so?

"Shall I go to Madrid? Shall I set up the authority of a grand protectorate by deciding between the father and the son? It appears to me that it would be a very difficult matter to keep Charles IV. on the throne. His government and his favourite have sunk so low in popular estimation that they could not support themselves for three months.

"Ferdinand is the enemy of France, and for that reason he has been made king. To place him on the throne will be to serve the factions which for the space of twenty-five years have been seeking the annihilation of France. A family alliance would be but a feeble bond. Queen Elizabeth and other French princesses have been cruelly put to death when they could with impunity be made the victims of atrocious vengeance. It appears to me that matters ought not to be precipitated, and that it will be well to take counsel of coming events. We must reinforce the corps on the frontiers of Portugal, and wait patiently. . . .

"I do not approve of the course adopted by your imperial highness in so hurriedly taking possession of Madrid. The army ought to have been kept at a distance of ten leagues from the capital. You had no satisfactory assurance that the people and the magistracy would willingly recognise Ferdinand. The Prince of the Peace must have partisans in the public departments; besides, the attachment of habit which is cherished towards the old king may produce results. Your entrance into Madrid, by exciting the alarm of the Spaniards, has powerfully served Ferdinand. I have ordered Savary to go to the old king, and to learn how things are proceeding. He will concert with your imperial highness. I will hereafter direct what course is to be adopted; in the meanwhile, I think it necessary to prescribe to you the following line of conduct. You must not bind me to any interview in Spain with Ferdinand, unless you judge the position of things to be such as will warrant me in recognising him as King of Spain. You must keep up an appearance of amicable sentiments towards the king, the queen, and Prince Godoy. You must exact for them and render to them the same honours as formerly. You must manage so that the Spaniards may have no suspicion of the course I am about to take; this will not be difficult, since I do not myself know what that course will be.

"You must make known to the nobility and clergy that if France should interfere in the affairs of Spain, their privileges and immunities will be respected. Inform them that the emperor desires the improvement of the political institutions of Spain, that they may be raised to a level

with the state of civilisation throughout Europe, and released from the control of favourites. Tell the magistrates, citizens, and all enlightened persons, that Spain must reconstruct the machine of her government; that she must have laws which will protect her citizens against the arbitrary power and the usurpations of feudalism; institutions which will revive industry, agriculture, and the arts. Portray to them the state of tranquillity and happiness enjoyed by France, notwithstanding the wars in which she has been involved, and point to the glory of her religion, which owes its re-establishment to the concordat I have signed with the Pope. Prove to them the advantages they may derive from a political regeneration—order and peace at home, respect and power abroad. Such must be the spirit of your addresses to the Spanish people either in speaking or writing. Do not hurry on any measure. I can wait at Bayonne, or I can cross the Pyrenees, and fortifying myself in the direction of Portugal, I can continue the war in that quarter.

"I will attend to your private interests—do not trouble yourself about them. . . . Portugal will be at my disposal. Let no personal project occupy your thoughts or guide your conduct; that would injure me, and would injure you still more. You go too fast in your instructions of the 14th. The movement you prescribe for General Dupont is too rapid; the event of the 19th of March has rendered changes necessary. You must make new arrangements; and you will receive instructions from my minister for foreign affairs. I desire that discipline may be maintained in the strictest manner—no pardon even for the smallest faults. Let the inhabitants be treated with the greatest consideration; above all, let churches and convents be respected.

"Our troops must avoid any sort of collision either with the corps of the Spanish army or with detachments. Not a cartridge must be fired on either side.

"Let Solano get beyond Badajoz, and keep watch upon him. Trace out yourself the marches of our army, so as to keep it always at the distance of several leagues from the Spanish corps. If war should be kindled, all is lost.

"The destinies of Spain must be determined by diplomacy and negotiations. I recommend you to avoid explanations with Solano, as well as with the other Spanish governors and generals.

"You will send me two expresses daily. In case of events of urgent importance you must despatch orderly officers. Send back immediately the chamberlain de Tournon, who is the bearer of this despatch, and deliver to him a detailed report, &c.

(Signed) "NAPOLEON."

Before I proceed to discuss the authenticity of this letter, I have a word or two to say respecting the inferences which have been drawn from it. This document has been regarded as evidence that Napoleon did not approve of anything that was done in Spain—that all was done, without his knowledge and against his will, by Murat, prompted by his imprudence and his impatient ambition. This is a very false conclusion, for the day before and the day after the date of this letter, and during a considerable interval succeeding it, Napoleon wrote a long series of letters ordering Murat point by point to do everything that was done; and when Murat, inspired by events, took some little upon himself, he received Napoleon's orders from Paris or Bayonne to do the very things which he had actually done. For example, Murat entered Madrid on the 23rd, but he had received formal orders to enter one or two days earlier. It is therefore only by a false induction that this document can be made to exempt Napoleon from the responsibility of the events of Spain, and to cast that responsibility on Murat.

The letter could only be the offspring of a moment of indecision, amidst a line of conduct marked by the most resolute and undeviating firmness. Even this indecision is marked with the impress of genius, for it betrays the most extraordinary and accurate prescience of all that actually came to pass. Nevertheless, it was indecision, for during a brief space Napoleon's will wavered, and he abandoned one day that which he had desired the day before, and which he again desired on the morrow. He seemed as though enlightened by a supernatural intelligence which unfolded the whole future before him.

This indecision, which at the first glance appears improbable, does not tend in any way to the justification of Napoleon; but it presents an interesting subject of reflection as regards the history of the human mind. It naturally creates astonishment that one of the most firm and resolute minds that ever man possessed, should, within a brief interval of time, survey things under such contradictory aspects as led at one moment to determinations alike at variance with those formed the moment before and with those formed the moment after. Nevertheless, those who know the human heart, those who have attentively observed its workings in great and trying circumstances, are fully aware how greatly even the firmest will is dependent on events, and how the smallest circumstances frequently suffice to shake the highest resolves. Many a victory enrolled in the annals of immortality might never have been won, because the veriest trifle would have caused the battle not to have been fought. Vacillation is in the ordinary course of things: the greatest minds are liable to it, and the firmest minds vary ere they resolve. The letter in question proves in a striking manner how clearly Napoleon could see the contrary side of the resolutions he formed; it proves, too, the extraordinary foresight with which he was endowed; but at the same time it shows how light was the weight of that foresight when balanced in the scale with his passions. I felt as it were a certain degree of philosophic interest in investigating the authenticity of this letter, and I will now proceed to detail the various views I took of it before I definitively arrived at the conviction that it was genuine.

At first glance, the superior style of the letter, both in respect to ideas and language, leaves scarcely a doubt of its having been written by Napoleon. Few besides himself could discuss great political and military events in that masterly manner. Such is the impression it produced on the authors of all the works hitherto published in relation to Napoleon. But those writers, knowing little or nothing of official documents, were not, like myself, struck by the manifest discrepancies between the letter and certain unquestionable historical facts; accordingly, no doubt of its authenticity ever occurred to them. For my part, however, I saw such strong reasons for questioning that authenticity that I fear I shall not be able in the eye of rigorous criticism to show that those doubts were unfounded.

In the first place, the letter stands in formal contradiction to all that preceded and all that followed it. Some have assigned to it the date of the 27th, others that of the 29th of March; but the real date, as will be seen, can be no other than the 29th. There exist letters from Napoleon, of dates between the 27th and the 30th, the purport of which is totally at variance with that now under consideration. In the communications dated between the 27th and the 30th, he approves of everything done by Murat; not only does he approve, but he orders the entrance into Madrid, and prescribes a plan for getting all the royal family of Spain into his power. The letter of the 29th of March is the only one, amidst a lengthened correspondence, which expresses any disapproval of the course pursued by Murat—a course which was, in fact, conformable with his own directions.

Secondly, almost all Napoleon's letters are in the collections in the Louvre ; but this one is not there. This circumstance does not, it is true, amount to any absolute proof, for out of 40,000 of the emperor's letters, one is here and there missing ; and the letter in question may possibly be one of the very few of which the minute has not been preserved. These are so very few in number that they do not, perhaps, amount to 100 in the whole 40,000. Another curious circumstance is, that one of the emperor's letters, from which the following is an extract, enumerates all the letters he wrote at this particular juncture, and makes no mention of the one of the 29th of March.

On his arrival at Bordeaux, he wrote to Murat, and adverting to the letters he had successively addressed to him, he says : "*I received at midnight your letter of the 3rd, by which I perceive that you have received mine of the 27th of March. My letter of the 30th, and Savary, who must by this time have arrived, will make you better acquainted with my intentions. General Reille will depart immediately to join you.*" Here not a word is said of the letter of the 29th. Can it be believed that he would not have mentioned it, had it been written—the more especially as it was a letter countermanding all that he had ordered on the 27th and the 30th ? He might, at least, be expected to have alluded to it by declaring that it was to be regarded as though it had never been received.

But the non-existence of this minute at the Louvre acquires additional significance from the following circumstance. The very voluminous correspondence of Murat, without the aid of which it would never have been possible to understand and narrate the events of Spain, exists in entirety in the Louvre. It contains exact and minute answers to all the emperor's letters, even those of the least consequence. It may be said that this correspondence comprises question and answer on every point ; yet there is no letter from Murat in reply to this letter—so important, so serious, and containing instructions so much at variance with those previously given. Throughout this correspondence Murat shows himself keenly sensible to the slightest reproaches of the emperor ; and can he be supposed to have left unanswered a letter expressive of so much disapproval, and differing so essentially from those which preceded and followed it ? This is evidently impossible. Should there still remain any doubt on the question, it must vanish when it is found that Murat, in a letter dated 4th April (eleven o'clock at night) says : "*M. de Tournon arrived this evening ; he will have found your majesty's place of residence ready prepared.*" Murat does not add, "he has delivered to me your letters, &c." It must be evident that M. de Tournon delivered nothing—above all, nothing so important as the letter of the 29th of March. I believe that the letter never was delivered, which, however, is no proof that it was not written, as I will presently show.

The discrepancy between this letter and all that preceded and followed it, its non-existence in the Louvre, the mutual silence of both Napoleon and Murat respecting it, caused me at first to entertain doubts of its authenticity, and at length convinced me that it could never have been delivered.

I will now explain how my doubts of its authenticity came to be removed, and how I arrived at the conviction of its having been written without having been delivered. That it is from the pen of Napoleon I entertain no doubt. Imitators may succeed in forging style, but not in forging ideas ; besides, the writer must necessarily have been in the very vortex of events to have spoken with so much precision of the departure of General Savary, of the commission entrusted to M. de Tournon, and various other particulars of the same nature with which the letter is full. There is one point which, in my opinion, completely establishes its authenticity. It is this : "*You have been too precipitate in*

your instructions of the 14th to General Dupont." Now, it happens that on the 14th instructions were given to General Dupont which fairly deserve the reproach applied to them by Napoleon, when considered from the point of view in which he saw them at the moment. By urging General Dupont too forward, Murat left the rear of the army exposed to the attack of the Spanish general Taranco, who had been recalled from Portugal by command of the Prince of the Peace. A person forging the letter could not have been aware of this fact, which could be known only to one who had carefully read the orders of Napoleon. I also think that this fact proves that the letter could not have been forged at St. Helena by Napoleon himself, endeavouring in afterthoughts to justify the most serious mistake of his reign. He had too much pride to resort to such a device, for he disdained to justify by falsehood the death of the Duke d'Enghien; and, moreover, it is impossible that he could have invented the circumstance relative to the orders of the 14th, for he had not at St. Helena the documents of the Louvre; and I have evidence from what he wrote at St. Helena that without any desire to deviate from the truth, he was often incorrect in dates and facts when he had not official documents to refer to. The best "Memoirs" are not free from similar errors, and I have frequently detected them when comparing contemporary publications with the correspondence of their authors.

Thus, independently of its style, the letter bears internal evidence of its authenticity. But how are we to account for the contradiction between this letter and the correspondence which preceded and followed it? and above all, how explain the silence of Murat, who does not even acknowledge the receipt of the letter? I have endeavoured to solve these questions by the following facts.

I found in the Louvre the correspondence of M. de Tournon. I there discovered that he alone of all the French agents had condemned the Spanish enterprise, and had implored Napoleon to suspend all decision on the subject until after he should see the country with his own eyes. I have also read in Murat's correspondence that he himself, General Grouchy, and others, had at Somosierra ridiculed the gloomy forebodings of M. de Tournon. Murat's correspondence, moreover, contains earnest solicitations that Napoleon will not form a decision from anything he may hear from M. de Tournon, the only person adverse to Murat and the officers of his staff. I have another proof of this fact. In the correspondence of M. de Tournon it appears that he remained at Burgos until the evening of the 24th, impatiently waiting for the emperor. It is authentically recorded that he arrived in Paris a few days afterwards. He could not, at the most speedy rate of travelling, have arrived before the 29th, which fixes the date of the letter in question at the 29th (at the very earliest), since it is mentioned in the letter itself that M. de Tournon was to deliver it. Having arrived on the 29th, he found that the emperor had received no intelligence; for Murat not having written either on the 22nd or 23rd, Napoleon necessarily passed two days without despatches from Spain; and it must have been the 28th and 29th, or possibly the 30th, when he received answers to his communications of the 22nd and 23rd, on account of the time then required for the journey from Madrid to Paris. There is consequently no letter from the emperor bearing date of the 28th or 29th, save the letter in question. M. de Tournon found the emperor in the state of uneasiness naturally created by the absence of intelligence in critical circumstances (and circumstances were then critical indeed, Murat being at the gates of Madrid, and ready to enter). Napoleon being in this anxious condition of mind, is it not possible that M. de Tournon might have exercised considerable influence over him, and might have even persuaded him to write the letter here under consideration? Napoleon naturally charged him to deliver it, it being in some measure his own work. The phrase, "*M. de*

Tournon will deliver this letter to you," connects it with M. de Tournon, and the personal opinions of that individual connect it still more closely with him. In the next place, dates concur in fixing the transient indecision of Napoleon to the two days during which he received no news after having been apprised of the movement of Murat on Madrid. Finally, having received on the 30th the letter of the 24th, in which Murat informs him how successfully everything had proceeded, he reverted to his former views, approved everything, and probably took back the letter from M. de Tournon, or it may be he despatched a courier to desire him not to deliver it, as the aspect of affairs was changed. However this may be, it is certain that the letter was not delivered, for Murat makes no more allusion to it than if it had never been written, though, from what he heard from M. de Tournon, he must have been aware of the emperor's transient displeasure.

One thing is certain, viz., that between the evening of the 24th of March and the evening of the 4th of April, M. de Tournon went from Burgos to Paris, and from Paris to Madrid, which affords sufficient reason for believing that he did not stop a moment on his journey, and that he was in Paris on the 29th, on which day he might have caused the emperor to vacillate and to write the letter. In this manner all is explained. The observation in the letter itself, stating that it is to be delivered by M. de Tournon, and thereby connecting the document with that individual, enabled me, by inquiring into his personal opinions and comparing dates, to elucidate the mystery.

Now, it may be asked, how did this letter, which is not in the collection at the Louvre, gain publicity? Of that I know not. M. de Tournon is dead; M. de las Cases, who was the first to send it forth to the world, is also dead. It is possible that M. de las Cases received it from Napoleon as evidence that he was not wholly in the dark respecting the affairs of Spain. It is also possible that it may have been brought to light through some unknown channel which cannot now be traced out. But the style in which it is written, together with the facts to which it adverts, prove that it is not a forgery. Other facts equally authentic prove that it was not delivered. The well-ascertained opinions of M. de Tournon, as well as the circumstance of his having been entrusted with it, connect it with him; dates identify it with a period which must have been to Napoleon one of great anxiety, and the apparent inconsistency it betrays may be thereby explained. Napoleon, in a moment of hesitation, dictated the counter-orders contained in this letter; then, his confidence being restored by the intelligence of Murat's successful entry into Madrid, he came back to his original plans, and did not transmit the letter, which at a subsequent period was discovered and made use of for the purpose of a justification. It proves one thing, which is, that Napoleon's intelligence always directed him rightly, whilst his passions frequently misled him, and that it would have been well had he followed the dictates of the former without yielding to the influence of the latter. I conceived it to be important to verify this point of history, as it affords a curious insight into human character; and I trust the candid portion of the public will readily admit that for the elucidation of truth I have performed a more laborious task than historians frequently deem it necessary to undertake; moreover, I have had the means of consulting documents which are still less frequently accessible to writers in general.

NOTE ON THE MARRIAGE OF PRINCE JEROME BONAPARTE.

M. Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte, French citizen, residing in the United States at Baltimore, required the editors on the 7th May 1859 to insert in the present volume the following note, which they believe they ought to insert, not being judges of a question of State policy, which the legal authorities can alone decide.

"On the 24th December 1803, M. Jerome Bonaparte, at that time an officer in the navy of the French Republic, married Miss Elizabeth Pater-son, daughter of a respectable citizen of the United States : this marriage was celebrated at Baltimore by the Bishop of Baltimore, according to the rites of the Holy Catholic Church, and the act of celebration was inserted the same day in the register of marriages at the cathedral of the city of Baltimore.

"M. Jerome Bonaparte, then aged nineteen, had attained the age required by the laws of France to render a marriage valid. (Art. 144 of the Civil Code.)

"This marriage was not contracted under any of the conditions which would render it null by the 184th article of the same code.

"The father of M. Jerome Bonaparte was dead. His mother, Madame Lætitia Bonaparte, was still living, but her consent was not necessary to the validity of the marriage, neither by the American nor canon law. According to the French law, the invalidity resulting from the absence of the paternal and maternal consent was not absolute ; this invalidity not having been appealed against during the first year that the marriage was known to his mother. (Art. 183 of the Civil Code.)

"Madame Lætitia never judicially demanded that her son's marriage should be annulled : on the contrary, in her later correspondence, Madame Lætitia called M. Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte, the issue of this marriage, *her dear son*, and especially in a letter of the 10th November 1829 she congratulated him on his marriage, and concluded with the words, '*your very affectionate mother.*'

"The Princes Joseph and Louis Bonaparte have always in like manner spoken of and written to him as their nephew.

"In 1803, Napoleon Bonaparte shared the dignity of Consul of the Republic with two other French citizens : he was not invested with any of the rights attributed to the heads of royal houses with regard to the members of their families, who cannot marry without their consent. The First Consul had no legal authority to recognise or refuse to recognise the validity of his brother's marriage.

"On the 24th May 1805, the Emperor Napoleon wrote to Pope Pius VII. in these terms : '*I wish for a bull from your Holiness to annul this marriage. Your Holiness will please to do this without publicity : I shall not have the marriage annulled in the civil courts until I hear your Holiness is willing to declare it void.*'

"The Holy Father replied to the emperor in a very detailed brief, dated 27th June 1805, in which we find the following : '*In order to preserve an inviolable secrecy, we have done ourself the honour of satisfying your majesty's solicitations with the greatest exactness : for this reason we have reserved to ourself exclusively the task of examining the proofs touching the marriage in question.*

"'*We regret that we cannot find any cause that would authorise us to declare the marriage invalid.*

"'*Did we usurp an authority that did not belong to us, we should render ourself guilty before the tribunal of God and in face of the entire Church of a most abominable abuse of our sacred ministry. Your majesty,*

in your justice, would not wish that we should pronounce a judgment contrary to the *testimony of our conscience* and the invariable principles of the Church.'

"It does not in any way touch the validity of the marriage contracted in 1803 by the citizen Jerome Bonaparte, that this marriage became at a later period opposed in the highest degree to the political designs of the Emperor of the French."

REPLY TO THE NOTE ON THE MARRIAGE OF PRINCE JEROME BONAPARTE.

Having been compelled by order of the Court to insert the preceding note, we think it our duty to publish the following statement which has been forwarded to us by H.I.H. Prince Napoleon, together with documentary evidence which thoroughly confirms the story of M. Thiers (p. 15), and the result of which is that the controversy is definitely settled.

The note of M. Jerome Bonaparte (Paterson) seeks to obscure by means of incorrect insinuations and imperfect quotations a question of civil law which has been *definitely and authoritatively settled* by competent jurisdiction. The marriage of Prince Jerome with Miss Elizabeth Paterson never possessed the characteristics necessary to make it valid according to French law. This union, contracted in a foreign country by a young officer only nineteen years of age, without the authority of his military superiors, without the consent of the head of his family [who was also the chief of the State], without the consent of his mother, and without proper notice in his own country, was followed as soon as the news reached France by the following authentic protest on the part of his mother, dated 3rd Ventôse, an XIII.—"*That the deponent, in order that her intentions may be well known, and that it may not be possible at any time to interpret her silence in a manner contrary to her real sentiments, and in order to express her opinion respecting the offence which her son has committed against her maternal rights and dignity, declares—I. That her consent was never asked by her son, who is a minor, and that she would have refused it for reasons which the law does not require her to state. II. That she protests solemnly by the present deed against any marriage contracted by her son Jerome Bonaparte in a foreign country, without her consent and in defiance of legal forms. III. That she expressly reserves the right, as soon as she can procure a copy of the deed of celebration, of having the marriage pronounced null and void.*"

This nullity of the marriage was actually pronounced by a decree dated 11th Ventôse, an XIII., which emanated from the Emperor Napoleon I., was endorsed by the Council of State, and was worded as follows:—

"Palace of the Tuileries, 11th Ventôse, an XIII. (March 2, 1805).

"Napoleon, Emperor of the French.

"According to the deed received by Raguidean, notary at Paris, the 3rd Ventôse, an XIII., containing the protest of our mother against the pretended marriage of her son Jerome Bonaparte, a minor, contracted in a foreign country, without the consent of his mother, and without previous announcement in his place of domicile;

"According to Article 3, Section 1, and Article 1, Section 2, of the law of Sept. 20, 1792, Articles 63, 148, 166, 168, 170, 171, and 183 of the Civil Code, and the *Senatus-Consultus* of 28th Floreal, an XII.;

"With the consent of the Council of State;

"Considering that the marriage of a minor, contracted in a foreign country,

without publication, and without the consent of father and mother, is of no effect according to French law; and that it is the right of the chief of the State to intervene in or to repress anything which may wound his own dignity or offend the majesty of the throne;

"It is decreed

"I. That all civil officers of the empire are forbidden to receive or enter in their registers a record of any pretended marriage which M. Jerome Bonaparte may have contracted in a foreign country.

"II. That the present decree shall be inserted in the 'Bulletin des Lois,' and that the minister of justice is directed to superintend its execution."

On October 6, 1806, the French authorities dissolved the religious union, just as the civil union had already been dissolved, and declared that no marriage had been contracted. This situation and these results had been foreseen from the first. At the time of the marriage in 1803, the French chargé d'affaires in the United States (M. Pichon) had, as is proved by his letters of 11th Brumaire, an XII., and Oct. 28, 1803 (preserved in the archives of the ministry of foreign affairs), informed Mr. Paterson and his daughter of the difficulties which stood in the way of the celebration of the marriage; and the contract itself, dated Dec. 24, 1803, contains these significant clauses:—

"I. In case of any difficulties being raised with reference to the validity of the said marriage, either in the State of Maryland or in the French Republic, the said Jerome Bonaparte undertakes, on the requisition of the said Elizabeth Paterson and the said William Paterson, or of either of them, to perform all acts necessary to remove these difficulties, and to make the said union in every respect a valid and perfect marriage in accordance with the laws of the State of Maryland and the French Republic respectively.

"IV. That if the marriage should be annulled, whether on the demand of the said Jerome Bonaparte or of any of the members of his family, the said Elizabeth Paterson shall be entitled, under any circumstances, to one-third of the property of her future husband, both real and personal, &c."

Also Miss Paterson accepted without protest a position of the perils of which she had been so amply warned in advance; and the pension of 60,000 francs which she received from the Emperor Napoleon I. until the restoration *was nothing but an acknowledgment of the nullity of the marriage.* This is shown by a letter which was written by the Emperor Napoleon I. to his brother, the 16th Floréal, an XII. He said to him, "*Your union with Mlle. Paterson is invalid from the religious as well as the legal point of view. Write to her to return to America. I will grant her a pension of 60,000 francs on condition that under no circumstances will she bear my name. She has no right to it, because of the absolute non-existence of her marriage. Let her know yourself that you could not and cannot change the position of affairs.*"

Unquestionably testimonies of affection and of interest on the part of the entire family have not been wanting to M. Jerome Bonaparte (Paterson) since he made his first journey to Italy in 1820; but when, since the re-establishment of the empire, the descendants of this union have sought to make capital out of these expressions of good feeling, their pretensions have been promptly disposed of. The law has been appealed to, and their Imperial Highnesses Prince Napoleon and Princess Mathilde, who are the issue of a marriage contracted on the basis of the absolute nullity of the union of 1803, have obtained from the council of the imperial family, the only competent tribunal according to the statute of June 21, 1853, a decision having for its object a prohibition to M. Jerome Paterson to use the name of Bonaparte "*in a connection which could not belong to him legally.*" The defendant, who was represented by M. Berryer, demanded on the other hand "*that all the rights, names, and qualities of a legitimate son should be recognised in him.*"

The family council, under date of July 4, 1856, decided as follows:—

"Having heard the report of his excellency the Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice ;

"Having heard also the pleadings of M. Allou, counsel for their Imperial Highnesses Prince Napoleon and Princess Mathilde, and of M. Berryer, counsel for M. Jerome Bonaparte ;

"Whereas the demand brought before the family council by their Imperial Highnesses Prince Napoleon and Princess Mathilde has for its object the withdrawing from M. Jerome Bonaparte, son of Madame Paterson, the right of bearing the name of Bonaparte, and of any pretension to the rights of the members of the Bonaparte family.

"Whereas also to attain this double object it is necessary to recognise that the decree of March 2, 1805, has declared to be null and non-existent, even as regards children born and unborn, the marriage contracted in 1803 by Prince Jerome, then a minor ;

"It is decided that the authority of this sovereign decree, on the faith of which another marriage has been contracted, cannot be contested ; and the defendant has no right to avail himself of Articles 201 and 202 of the Code Napoleon.

"Whereas, however, the said defendant has from his birth borne the name of Bonaparte ;

"That this name was given to him in his certificates of birth and baptism, in all the transactions of civil life, in his relations with the world, and above all, by all the members of the imperial family.

"That in such a case it is impossible to take away from him the right of continuing to bear a name which has always been conceded to him.

"For these reasons :

"The family council recognises his right to the name of Bonaparte, by which he has always been known, but denies that this carries with it the right of availing himself of the benefits contained in Articles 201 and 202 of the Code Napoleon."

This decision was made valid, in the words adopted by the family council, by the sanction of the Emperor Napoleon III.

Since this decision, by his conduct towards the descendants of Mlle. Paterson, His Majesty the Emperor has given ample proof that he did not look upon them as belonging to the imperial family.

Recently, on the occasion of the proving of the will of his eminence Cardinal Fesch, in which all the members of the Bonaparte family in all its four branches were interested, M. Jerome Bonaparte (Paterson) again claimed the right of belonging civilly and legally to the family. This pretension was once more disposed of by a decision of the family council, dated December 23, 1859, after a reconsideration of all the circumstances.

The situation now is very simple and very clear. In a spirit of good feeling, easy enough to understand, the name claimed by M. Bonaparte (Paterson) was conceded to him ; but a reference to the earlier decisions, which admit of no contradiction, and to the later decisions, which have reaffirmed it anew, will show that the union of 1803 was NULL AND VOID, and that the defendant, under the circumstances of the case, could not be allowed to avail himself of the privileges of Articles 201 and 202 of the Code Napoleon.

The reason assigned was that *to do so would invest a marriage which was invalid with all the civil rights appertaining to a marriage contracted in good faith.* The dispute therefore must be looked upon as definitively settled ; and although the reason of the revival of the claim, after it had been repudiated so many times by the most competent authorities during a period of fifty-five years, can easily be guessed, the end is impossible to be attained.

BOOK XXXI.

BAYLEN.

WHEN Napoleon left Bayonne to visit, on his return, Gascony and La Vendée, he retained none of the illusions which he had conceived for a moment concerning the spirit of Spain and the ease with which he should dispose of her. An insurrection, partial at first, soon universal, had just broken out, and cries of implacable hatred had rung even in his ear. He reckoned, however, upon his young soldiers and some veteran regiments, recently marched towards the Pyrenees, for quelling a movement which might yet turn out to be but a partial insurrection like that in the Calabrias. Though he was already undeceived, and perhaps even repented of what he had undertaken, he had yet much left to learn on that head, and before he had reached Paris he was fated to know all the consequences of the fault committed at Bayonne.

The Spaniards, since the month of March, had passed in a short time through the most diverse emotions. Full of hope on seeing the French make their appearance, of joy on seeing the downfall of the old court, of anxiety on seeing Ferdinand VII. obliged to go and seek in France the acknowledgment of his royal title, they had been speedily enlightened relative to what was about to be done at Bayonne, and an ardent hatred was suddenly kindled in their hearts. By all of them, it is true, this sentiment was not shared in an equal degree. The higher, and even the middle classes, appreciating the benefits which might proceed from a regeneration of Spain by the civilising hands of Napoleon, animated against foreigners by sentiments less savage than the populace, less disposed to agitation than it was, suffered only in their pride, deeply hurt by the manner in which their country was intended to be disposed of. Still, with mild treatment and a sudden and irresistible display of force, they might have been overawed, and perhaps in time even reconciled.

But the people, and especially the monks, that cloistered portion of the people, were exasperated. Among these last nothing could mitigate the feeling of wounded pride—neither the hope of a regeneration which they were incapable of appreciating, nor tolerance in regard to foreigners whom they detested, neither the

love of repose nor the fear of disorder. The Spanish people, the people of the streets and the fields, like those of the cloister, ardent, indolent, weary of quiet, so far from being fond of it, caring little about the burning of towns or country houses, in which there was nothing belonging to them, were ready to gratify that propensity to agitation which the French people had gratified in 1789, by effecting a great democratic revolution. They were ready to exert in support of the old system all the demagogue passions which the French people had exerted for the foundation of the new one. They were about to be as violent, as tumultuous, as sanguinary, for the throne and the altar, as their neighbours had been against both. They were about to be so in proportion to the warmth of their blood and the ferocity of their disposition. In the Spanish people, nevertheless, a noble sentiment blended with the feelings that we have just mentioned—the love of their country, of their kings, of their religion, which they amalgamated into one affection, and under the inspiration of which they were destined to furnish splendid examples of fortitude and frequently of heroism.

I am not, I never shall be, the flatterer of the multitude. I have resolved, on the contrary, to defy its tyrannical power, because I have been doomed to live in times when it domineers and disturbs the world. Still I do it justice: if it sees not, it feels; and on very rare occasions, when one must shut one's eyes and obey one's heart, it is not an adviser to be listened to, but a torrent to be followed. The Spanish people, though in rejecting the royalty of Joseph they rejected a good prince and good institutions, were perhaps under better inspiration than the other classes. They acted nobly in rejecting the benefit proffered by a foreign hand, and without eyes, they saw more correctly than enlightened men, in conceiving that they could make head against a conqueror whom the mightiest armies and the greatest generals had been unable to resist.

The departure of Ferdinand VII., followed by the departure of Charles IV., and then by that of the Infantes, had clearly revealed the intention of Napoleon; and the people of Madrid, incapable of refraining any longer, rose on the 2nd of May, as we have seen in the preceding Book. They rose to be cut in pieces by Murat, but had the inexpressible satisfaction of slaughtering a few Frenchmen who fell singly into their hands. In the twinkling of an eye, the news, spreading through Estramadura, La Mancha, and Andalusia, was about to kindle a fire which smouldered there, when the prompt and terrible measures of repression adopted by Murat struck terror into those provinces, and kept them quiet for some time. All faces reassumed a dull, sullen aspect, but impressed with profound hatred. Men held back under the check of a threatening hand; but the exaggerated

account of the blood spilt at Madrid, the particulars of the events at Bayonne, circulated by the correspondence of the convents, increased every moment the secret rage which reigned in minds, and prepared an explosion so sudden, so universal, that it could not have been prevented by any blow, though struck ever so opportunely. If, however, Napoleon, treating this grave enterprise more seriously, had had a sufficient force everywhere; if, instead of 80,000 conscripts, there had been 150,000 veteran soldiers, controlling at one and the same time Saragossa, Valencia, Carthagena, Grenada, Seville, Badajoz, as Madrid, Burgoes, and Barcelona were controlled; if Murat, present and in health, had shown himself everywhere, perhaps it might have been possible to prevent the conflagration from spreading, admitting that it is given to material force to prevail against moral force, especially when the latter is strongly excited. Unfortunately, while Marshal Moncey, with 20,000 young soldiers, occupied the left of the capital from Aranda to Chamartin; while General Dupont, with 18,000, occupied the right, from Segovia to the Escorial; while Marshal Bessières, with about 15,000, occupied Old Castille, and General Duhesme, Catalonia, with 10,000; * in rear the Asturias, on the right Galicia, on the left Aragon, in front Estramadura, La Mancha, Andalusia, Valencia, were left to themselves, and kept in order by the Spanish authorities alone, wishing no doubt to prevent disturbance, but grieved to the heart, and served by an army which shared all the sentiments of the people. It was quite plain that they would not use any great energy to suppress an insurrection with which they secretly sympathised. However, under the impression of the 2nd of May, and awaiting what was to be definitively done at Bayonne, people still restrained themselves, but with all the signs of extraordinary anxiety, and of a violent passion ready to break forth.

In this state the popular imagination, strongly excited, grasped at the most absurd reports. The forced journeys to Bayonne were chiefly the text for them. It was said that after the royal family, all the principal personages were to be carried to that town, now become the gulf in which all that was most illustrious in Spain was about to be absorbed. After royalty, after the grandees, the turn of the army would come. It would be taken, regiment by regiment, to Bayonne, and from Bayonne to the shores of the ocean, where the troops of the Marquis de la Romana already were, and perish in some distant war, in support of the greatness of the tyrant of the world. This was not all—the entire population was to be carried off by means of a general conscription which would be imposed upon the Peninsula, as it was imposed upon France, and they would see

* The rest of the 80,000 young soldiers sent to Spain were in the hospitals.

the flower of the Spanish population sacrificed to the atrocious projects of the modern Attila. On this subject the most singular details were circulated. Great quantities of manacles had been manufactured, it was said, and brought in the ammunition waggons of the French army, for the purpose of carrying away the unfortunate Spanish conscripts, bound hand and foot. People affirmed that they had seen and touched them. There were, in particular, thousands of them in the arsenals of Ferrol, where neither a battalion nor an ammunition waggon of the French had made its appearance, but where much work was going on, by order of Napoleon, for refitting the Spanish navy, and where an expedition was preparing to protect the rich colonies of La Plata against the attacks of the English. To these rumours were added a multitude of others of like value. Under a French king, they said, they should have to go and oblige all the world to speak and write French. A host of French employés would accompany this king, and appropriate all offices to themselves.

The first and the most serious consequence of these reports was to cause almost the whole Spanish army to desert, for fear of being carried by force to France. At Madrid, two or three hundred men were to be seen every night deserting at once. The soldiers went off without their officers, sometimes even with them, carrying away arms, baggage, military stores. The life-guards, who were at the Escorial, disappeared in this manner by degrees, so that in the course of a few days there was not one left. This desertion took place not only at Madrid, but at Barcelona, at Burgos, at Coruña. In general, the soldiers who deserted fled either towards the south, or to those provinces which the agitation and distance rendered a safer asylum for the fugitives. Those at Barcelona fled towards Tortosa and Valencia. Those of Old Castille made for Aragon and Saragossa, a country reputed among the Spaniards to be invincible. Those of Coruña went to join General Taranco, stationed with a corps of troops in the north of Portugal. Those of New Castille betook themselves partly to the left, towards Guadalaxara and Cuença, where they had Saragossa and Valencia for a retreat; partly to the right, towards Talavera, where they had a safe and impenetrable asylum in Estramadura. The Spanish generals, habituated to subordination, reported this alarming desertion, which left them no means of preserving order whatever sovereign might be definitively imposed upon unhappy Spain.

There were none but the troops of the south, especially those of Andalusia, which were the furthest possible from the French, and to which all who were not with them would gladly have gone, that continued to be united and compact; and unfor-

tunately for us, these were the most numerous; for there were besides the camp of St. Roque, before Gibraltar, 9000 strong, the garrison of Cadiz, which was at all times kept considerable, lastly, the division of General Solano, Marquis del Socorro, destined at first to occupy Portugal, drawn afterwards toward Madrid, and finally sent back to Andalusia, of which he was captain-general. These troops, united to those in the camp of St. Roque, under the command of General Castaños, amounted to no fewer than 25,000 men; and they were the only corps not addicted to desertion. To them must be added the Swiss troops long engaged in the service of Spain. The two Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding had been, by order of Napoleon himself, united at Talavera, for the purpose of being joined to General Dupont's first division, destined to occupy Cadiz, where, as we know, a French squadron was lying. By his order, too, the three Swiss regiments stationed at Tortosa, Carthagena, and Malaga had been marched for Grenada, where General Dupont was to pick them up on his way. Napoleon thought, as he said, that by placing them in a *current of French opinion* they would serve the cause of the new royalty, and not that of the old one. Unluckily, all his views were destined to be thwarted by the movement which hurried away all hearts. The Spanish military authorities, though like the enlightened classes they regretted but little the incapable and corrupt government which had recently been overthrown, were also indignant at the occurrences at Bayonne, and would gladly have deserted with their men to the provinces inaccessible to the French. Murat alone, who had a certain ascendancy over them, could have kept them to their duty; but attacked by a violent fever, weakened, exhausted, scarcely able to bear being talked to about business, painfully affected by the mere sound of the footsteps of his officers, he had taken an aversion to the country where he was not called to reign, attributed to it his death, which he believed to be at hand, asked with doleful cries for his wife and children, and insisted on being allowed to depart immediately. It was necessary to detain this heroic man, who had become all at once as weak as an infant, against his will till the arrival of Joseph, lest the shadow of authority assumed by those about him, for ordering everything in his name, should completely disappear. The Spaniards, apprised of the state of Murat, who had been removed to the country, and who was no longer shown, regarded his illness as a punishment of Heaven, which they would rather have seen falling, not on Murat, whom they pitied more than hated, but on Napoleon, who had become thenceforward the object of their inexorable detestation. Some of them went so far as to say that it was Napoleon himself, who, to bury in the tomb the secret of his abominable machinations, had caused Murat to be

poisoned. Thus does the popular imagination, when once moved and excited, go astray, and invent, utterly regardless of truth, or even of probability.

So great was the anxiety at Madrid, that the slightest noise in a street, the mere tramp of a piquet of cavalry in a public place, was sufficient to draw out the population in a mass. In every town the people thronged to await the arrival of the courier, and to learn the news, and they remained assembled for whole hours in order to descant upon it. The populace, the citizens, the grandees, the priests, the monks, mingled together with the customary familiarity of the Spanish nation, conversed incessantly about political events in the public places. In all quarters, curiosity, expectation, anger, hatred, agitated all hearts, and nothing was wanting but a slight spark to kindle a vast conflagration.

Such, then, was the state of minds when all at once arrived the tidings of the twofold abdication extorted from Charles IV. and from Ferdinand VII. It was published in the *Madrid Gazette* of the 20th of May, immediately after the manifestation imposed on the Council of Castille in favour of Joseph. In this intelligence there was assuredly nothing unforeseen, since it was known through a multitude of emissaries that Ferdinand was at Bayonne a prisoner, and beset by the most menacing importunities to make him give up his crown to the Bonaparte family. But the official knowledge of the sacrifice wrung from the weakness of the father and the captivity of the son, acted upon the public feeling with inexpressible violence. People were deeply indignant at the act itself, and cruelly offended by its taunting form. The effect was instantaneous, general, prodigious.

At Oviedo, the capital of the Asturias, people were already strongly agitated by two accidental circumstances: in the first place, the convocation of the provincial junta, which was accustomed to meet every three years; and secondly, a suit instituted against some Spaniards for having insulted the French consul at Gijon. This suit, ordered by the government at Madrid, had excited general disapprobation; for everybody felt ready to do what had been done by the authors of the outrage whose punishment was demanded. The news of the abdications having been brought by the courier from Madrid, the people were no longer to be restrained. In this province, which was a Spain within Spain, and which felt the same aversion for all innovations as *La Vendée* had formerly manifested, there was but one spirit; and the highest nobles completely sympathised with the people. They put themselves at the head of the movement, and on the 24th of May, the day on which the courier arrived from Madrid, they concerted, through the medium of the monks and of the

municipal authorities, with the country people to take Oviedo. At midnight, at the sound of the alarm-bell, the people of the mountain actually descended to the town, made themselves masters of it, and joined by the townsfolk, hastened to the authorities, deposed them, and conferred all the power on the junta. The latter chose for its president the Marquis de Santa Cruz de Marcenado, a distinguished personage of the country, a bitter enemy to the French, passionately attached to the house of Bourbon, and full of patriotic sentiments, which we must honour, though contrary to the cause of France. Under his instigation, the junta hesitated not to consider the abdications as null, the transactions at Bayonne as atrocious, the alliance with France as broken, and solemnly to declare war against Napoleon.

After proceeding in this manner, they seized all the arms in the royal arsenals, which were most abundantly supplied in this province through local industry. One hundred thousand muskets were carried away, and partly distributed among the people, partly reserved for the neighbouring provinces. Considerable donations were made to fill the chest of the insurrection, donations to which the clergy and the great landholders contributed a large part. Lastly, peace with Great Britain was proclaimed, and two deputies were despatched in a Jersey privateer to London, in order to solicit the alliance and aid of England. One of these two deputies was the Count de Matarosa, since Count de Toreno, so well known by men of the present day as a statesman, ambassador, and historian.

But unfortunately the patriotic enthusiasm of the Spaniards could not break forth without the accompaniment of horrible cruelties, and blood, which was soon to flow in the other provinces, began to flow in the Asturias, when for the honour of that province a priest put a stop to the effusion. There were at Oviedo two Spanish commissioners, sent at the instigation of Murat to accelerate the proceedings commenced against the offenders of the consul at Gijon. There were also the commandant of the province, named La Llave, who had appeared unfavourable to an insurrection, which seemed to him extremely imprudent; lastly, the colonel of the regiment of royal carabineers and the colonel of the regiment of Hibernia, who had both differed in opinion from their officers when it became a question whether they should oppose or promote the popular movement. These five persons were immediately proclaimed traitors, and the new authority had put them in prison to appease the populace. With a view to remove them from its fury, the junta resolved to send them out of the principality. The people took advantage of this opportunity to seize their persons, and a mob, composed principally of new volunteers, were about to

bind them to trees with the intention of shooting them, when a canon conceived the idea of going in procession to the spot where preparations were making for the crime; and covering his victims with the host, he contrived to save them. This was not the only effort of honest ecclesiastics to prevent bloodshed, but the only successful effort; for Spain soon became a theatre of atrocious crimes, committed not only upon the French, but on Spaniards the most illustrious and the most devoted to their country.

The insurrection of the Asturias preceded by only two or three days that of the north of Spain. At Burgos the people could not stir, for Marshal Bessières had his headquarters there. But at Valladolid, where there were no longer any of Dupont's divisions, which were already beyond the Guadarrama, at Leon, Salamanca, and Benevente, lastly, at Coruña, the news of the abdications had revolted all hearts. However, the plains of Castille and the kingdom of Leon, which the French cavalry could scour on the gallop without encountering any obstacle, were too open for the people not to hesitate a little longer about rising. It was Galicia, protected like the Asturias by almost inaccessible mountains, that first responded to the signal of Oviedo. Coruña, the capital of that province, still contained a great number of Spanish troops, though most of them had gone to Portugal with General Taranco. The spirit of subordination, military and civil, prevailed in that province, one of the centres of Spanish power. The captain-general, Filangieri, brother of the celebrated Neapolitan lawyer, a discreet, mild, enlightened man, universally beloved by the population, but somewhat suspicious to the Spaniards in his quality of Neapolitan, strove to preserve order in his command, and was one of the military and civil chiefs who considered insurrection as neither prudent nor profitable to the country. Having perceived that the regiment of Navarre, which was in garrison at Coruña, was ready to lend a hand to the insurgents, he had sent it to Ferrol. He had thus gained a few days, for till the 30th of May the insurrection, which had broken out on the 24th in the Asturias, and which was reported to be accomplished or nearly so in Leon, Valladolid, and Salamanca, was prevented in Galicia. But the 30th was the feast of St. Ferdinand. It was customary on that day to hoist flags with the effigy of the saint at the hotel of the government and in the public places. On this occasion the authorities had not ventured to follow the practice, for in doing honour to St. Ferdinand, it would seem as though they were paying homage to the sovereign, detained at Bayonne, and who had just abdicated. At this sight the people of Coruña could no longer contain themselves. A mob of men, women, and children collected in front of the troops guarding the hotel of the govern-

ment, shouting "Long live Ferdinand!" and carrying images of the saint. The boys, bolder, pushed in among the soldiers, who allowed them to pass through their ranks. The women followed, and the hotel of the captain-general was soon stormed, ravaged, and surmounted by the ensigns of the saint, which had not been hoisted at first. The captain-general, Filangieri, found himself compelled to flee.

A junta was immediately formed, insurrection proclaimed, war declared against France, a levy en masse ordered, as at Oviedo, and the muskets in the arsenal distributed among the multitude. Forty or fifty thousand muskets were taken from the royal arsenals to arm all the hands that offered themselves. The regiment of Navarre was immediately recalled from Ferrol, and received in triumph. Abundant donations poured in from the *grandees* and the clergy. The treasury of St. Jago de Compostella sent two or three millions of reals. People nevertheless esteemed the Captain-General Filangieri; they felt the need of so eminent a personage at the head of the junta, and offered him the presidency, which he consented to accept. That excellent man, giving way, though with regret, to the patriotic impulsion of his fellow-citizens, put himself honestly at their head, for the purpose of redeeming the temerity of resolutions by the wisdom of measures. He recalled General Taranco's troops from Portugal; he poured the insurgent population into the skeletons of the corps of the line, to swell their numbers; he employed the considerable matériel at his disposal in arming the new levies; and he thus lost no time in organising a military force of some value.

In order to check the hostile troops which might come from the plains of Leon and Old Castille, he had meanwhile marched his best organised corps to the débouche of the mountains of Galicia, between Villafranca and Manzanal. But while he was himself engaged in placing his posts, some furious wretches, who forgave neither his hesitations nor a prudence not in harmony with their unruly passions, atrociously murdered him in the streets of Villafranca. At that place there was a detachment of the regiment of Navarre, still irritated on account of its few days' exile at Ferrol; and to this regiment was attributed a crime which became the signal for the massacre of most of the captains-general.

The commotion in Galicia spread immediately to the kingdom of Leon. On the arrival of 800 troops sent from Coruña to Leon, the insurrection broke out there in the same manner and with the same forms. A junta was instituted, war was declared, a levy en masse was decreed, and people armed themselves with all the weapons brought from the arsenals of Oviedo, Ferrol, and Coruña. At Leon they were already in the plain, and pretty

near the squadrons of Marshal Bessières; but at Valladolid they were still nearer. It was sufficient, however, for the imprudent enthusiasm of the Spaniards not to see those squadrons, though but a few leagues off, to break out into insurrectional movements. The captain-general of Valladolid was Don Gregorio de Cuesta, an old officer, an inflexible observer of discipline, of a peevish and morose disposition, wounded to the heart, like all the Spaniards, by the occurrences at Bayonne, but not imagining that it was possible to withstand the power of France, and disposed to think that the regeneration of Spain ought to be accepted from her as a compensation for the wound inflicted on the national pride by the benefits which would result from a general reform of the old abuses. A particular sentiment acted, moreover, upon his mind—this was aversion to the multitude, and to its interference in affairs of State. The populace of Valladolid, whom the occurrences at Oviedo, Coruña, and Leon had strongly excited, and who would not appear more insensible than the other populations of the north to the news of the abdications, assembled, went beneath the windows of the captain-general, Gregorio de la Cuesta, and obliged him to show himself. The old soldier made his appearance with looks of displeasure, and attempted to oppose some very sensible reasons to a rising in arms so near to the French troops; but his voice was drowned by hooting. A gibbet, brought by some of the populace, was set up in front of his palace: at this sight he yielded, and gave his assent to what he regarded as an act of insanity. Valladolid had its insurrectional junta, its *levy en masse*, and its declaration of war.

Segovia, situated at some distance on the Madrid road, though within a few leagues of General Dupont's third division, Frère's division, encamped at the Escorial—Segovia also had its insurrection. In that city there was, in the castle which commands it, a military college for artillery. The whole college rose, and joined by the people, barricaded the city. On the right Ciudad Rodrigo followed the same example, and murdered its governor because he had not been prompt enough in declaring himself. The city of Madrid started at these tidings; but the corps of Marshal Moncey, the imperial guard, all the cavalry of the army, and lastly, the presence of General Dupont's corps at the Escorial, at Aranjuez, and at Toledo, forbade it to show what it felt. Besides, that capital conceived that it had paid its patriotic debt on the 2nd of May, and expected the provinces of the monarchy to come and release it from its chains. Toledo, which had manifested a disposition to rise a few weeks previously, had been speedily curbed, and was now waiting also to be delivered, watching with ill-dissembled satisfaction the universal outbreak of the national indignation. La Mancha participated in this

sentiment, and proved it by affording an asylum to the deserters from the army, who everywhere found lodging, food, assistance of every kind for reaching the remote provinces, where there were assemblages of Spanish troops.

But the wealthy and powerful Andalusia, calculating upon its strength and the distance which separated it from the Pyrenees, aspiring to become the new centre of the monarchy since Madrid was occupied, had been among the first to resent the blow struck at the dignity of the Spanish nation. It had not waited, like some other provinces, for the feast of St. Ferdinand. The news of the abdications had sufficed for it, and on the evening of the 26th of May it had risen. A conspiracy had been for some time in progress at Seville. A Spanish noble, a native of Estramadura, the Count de Tilly, brother of a Tilly who had figured in the French Revolution, a restless, enterprising person, of bad character, ready to engage in any new schemes whatever they might be, was secretly concerting with men of all classes preparations for a rising against the French. Another still more singular person, likewise a stranger to Seville, but who had been much there since the late events, named Tap y Nufiez, a sort of adventurer, engaged in smuggling with Gibraltar, for the rest a good Spaniard, endowed in the highest degree with a talent for acting upon the multitude, had acquired an immense ascendancy over the lower classes in that city. He had an understanding with Count de Tilly's accomplices, and on the arrival of the news of the abdications, all of them with one accord chose the 26th of May, Ascension Day, for effecting a rising of the province. Accordingly, on the night of the 26th a mob collected by them, and among which appeared men of the lowest class, with soldiers of the regiment of Olivenza, proceeded to the Maestranza, an extensive establishment of artillery containing a rich depôt of arms, stormed it, and seized all that was in it. The populace of Seville was armed in a moment, and paraded the streets of that great city in a sort of intoxication. In order to deliberate in more quiet and independence, the municipality had quitted the Town Hall and removed to the military hospital. The Town Hall being left vacant, the people took possession of it, and an insurrectional junta was instituted there, as was then the practice throughout all Spain. It was the leader of the populace, Tap y Nufiez, who nominated the members, under the inspiration of those who were conspiring with him. Such men were chosen as are favourites in times of agitation, that is to say, turbulent characters, with the addition of a few sedate persons to cover the inconsistency of the others. This junta, full of Andalusian pride, hesitated not to proclaim itself the *Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies*. It disguised not, as we see, the ambition

of governing Spain during the occupation of the Castilles by the French. All this was done amidst an enthusiasm which it is impossible to describe. But on the following day this enthusiasm became sanguinary, as might be expected. The municipal authority, which had withdrawn to the military hospital, was suspected, like every old authority, for it was, we repeat it, popular factiousness that triumphed at this moment under the cloak of royalism. This municipal authority was accused of patriotic lukewarmness, and even of secret connivance with the government of Madrid. Its head, the Count del Aguila, one of the most distinguished nobles of the province, came in its name to the junta to offer to concert with the latter. At the sight of him the furious multitude demanded his head. The junta, not participating in the ferocious sentiments of the populace, wished to save him, and with this view pretended to send him prisoner to one of the towers of the city. On the way the unfortunate Count del Aguila was carried off by the insurgents, dragged to the court of the prison, bound to a balustrade, and despatched with carbines; the rabble then paraded the streets with the fragments of his body. Amidst the popular intoxication, and the terror which began to seize the higher classes, a series of measures, dictated by circumstances, were adopted. The junta decreed the declaration of war against France; the levy en masse of all the men from the age of sixteen to forty-five; the sending of commissioners to all the towns in Andalusia, to raise their populations, and to attach them to the junta, which constituted itself the supreme junta of Spain and the Indies. These commissioners were to go to Badajoz, Cordova, Jaen, Grenada, Cadiz, the camp at St. Roque. In declaring war against France, the junta engaged not to lay down arms till Napoleon should have replaced Ferdinand VII. in the Escorial; and they promised, when the war was over, to convoke the Cortes of the kingdom, in order to effect the reforms, of the utility of which they said they were sensible, and the merit of which they appreciated, without needing to be initiated by foreigners into the knowledge of the rights of nations; for the new insurgents comprehended the necessity of opposing some promises of meliorations to the constitution of Bayonne.

It was more particularly towards Cadiz that all eyes were turned, for there resided the Captain-General Solano, Marquis del Socorro, who combined with the command of the province that of numerous troops spread over the south of Spain. A commissioner was despatched to him, to decide him to take part in the insurrection, and another had been sent to General Castaños, commandant of the camp at St. Roque. The Count de Teba, who was sent to Cadiz, presented himself there with all the

insurrectional surliness of the moment. He had come to the wrong person so to address himself, to the Marquis del Socorro, a man of fiery, haughty temper, esteemed by the army, and beloved by the population. Like all well-informed military men, he was thoroughly convinced of the power of France, and considered the insurrection into which people were blindly rushing as extremely imprudent. He had expressed this opinion on his return from Portugal, both at Badajoz and at Seville, with a boldness of language which had much damped the conspirators. This they remembered, and they were filled with distrust in regard to him. General Solano summoned a meeting of generals to hear the proposals from Seville. This assembly was of opinion with him, that all military and political reasons concurred to oppose an armed contest with France; and it made a declaration, in which, arguing against and concluding for the insurrection, it ordered voluntary enrolments, thus conceding out of mere deference to a popular wish, which it declared to be unreasonable. This paper, which placed a censure beside an act of condescension, read publicly in the streets of Cadiz, produced the strongest emotion there. The mob repaired to the residence of the captain-general. A young man undertook to be spokesman, entered into discussion with General Solano, contrived to embarrass that brave officer, accustomed to command, not to reason with such interlocutors, and wrung from him a promise that on the morrow the popular wish should be fully gratified. The rabble, content for that day, was nevertheless desirous of enjoying the pleasure of ravaging, and ran off to the house of the French consul, Leroy, which it pillaged. This unfortunate representative of France, lately so feared, had no other resource but to take refuge on board the squadron of Admiral Rosily, who had been waiting in vain for three years in the harbour of Cadiz for a favourable opportunity to leave it.

Next day the populace had conceived a new wish; it desired that war should be immediately commenced against the French, and that the fire of all the guns in the road should be poured upon Admiral Rosily's squadron. The multitude feasted itself with transport on the idea of this triumph—a triumph easy and very senseless over a naval ally, for the benefit of the English marine. There was some difficulty, however, in destroying ships manned by brave crews, commanded by brave officers, unfortunate heroes of Trafalgar, who on that terrible day stayed to be killed at their post, while most of the Spanish seamen fled from the field of battle. Besides, they were so mingled with the Spanish ships, that these were liable to be burnt first. Such was the declaration of rational men both of the army and of the navy. They added that Spain still had in the north the Marquis de la Romana's division, which might possibly have

to atone for the barbarities committed upon the French seamen. At this moment, however, reason and humanity had but little chance of obtaining a hearing.

Another meeting of the generals, convoked the next day by the Marquis del Socorro, had acceded in every point to the wish of the people, and several of its members had, in conversation, basely thrown upon the marquis the blame of the demi-resistance opposed to it on the preceding day. There was yet left to be decided the very serious question of an immediate attack on the French fleet. This question concerned the naval officers more than the military officers; and they unanimously declared that, before the popular rage could be satisfied, the Spanish ships must run the risk of being burned. The communication of this opinion of competent men, made in the public place, had brought the populace once more before the residence of the unfortunate Solano. He was immediately called to account for this new resistance to the popular wish, and three deputies were sent to bring him to an explanation. One of these three deputies having appeared at the window of the hotel to report the result of his mission, and being unable to make himself heard amidst the tumult, the populace believed, or pretended to believe, that they were refused satisfaction, and broke into the hotel. The Marquis de Solano seeing the danger, fled to the house of a friend of his, an Irishman settled at Cadiz, who resided in his neighbourhood. Unluckily he was perceived by a monk, watched, and denounced. Pursued immediately by the furious rabble, found, wounded in the arms of the courageous wife of his Irish friend, who strove to rescue him from the assassins, he was conducted along the ramparts, riddled with wounds, and at last struck down by a mortal blow, which he received with the fortitude and dignity of a brave soldier. Thus did the Spanish people prepare for their resistance to the French, by commencing with the slaughter of the most illustrious of their best generals.

Thomas de Morla, an hypocritical flatterer of the multitude, disguising under great stateliness a base submission to all in power, was nominated by acclamation captain-general of Andalusia. He entered immediately into parley with Admiral Rosily, and summoned him to surrender, which the brave French admiral declared he would not do till he had defended the honour of his flag to the last extremity. Thomas de Morla, however, sought to gain time, not daring to resist the Spanish populace or to attack the French; meanwhile he busied himself in making the Spanish ships take a position less dangerous for them. Cadiz had also its insurrectional junta, which acknowledged the supremacy of that of Seville, and placed itself in communication with the English. The Governor of Gibraltar, Sir Hew Dalrymple,

commanding the British forces in those parts, and observing with extreme solicitude what was passing in Spain, had already sent emissaries to Cadiz to negotiate a truce, to offer the friendship of Great Britain, her succours by land and sea, and a division of 5000 men which was coming from Sicily. The Spaniards accepted the offers of a truce and of alliance, but paused before so serious a measure as the introduction of an English fleet into their ports. The remembrance of Toulon was sufficient to bring the blindest of men to reflection.

While these things were passing at Cadiz, the commissioner sent to the camp of St. Roque had found no difficulty in obtaining a favourable reception from General Castaños, for whom Fortune had destined a higher part than he hoped or perhaps even wished for. General Castaños, like all the Spanish military officers of that time, knew no more of war than was learned under the old system, and particularly in the country farthest behindhand of any in Europe. But if he did not surpass many of his fellow-countrymen in military experience, he was a discreet politician, full of sagacity and shrewdness, but sharing none of the savage passions of the Spanish people. He had begun by judging of the insurrection quite as severely as any of the other military commandants his colleagues, had explained himself frankly to Colonel Rogniat, who was sent to Gibraltar to make an inspection of the coast, and had appeared to accept very cheerfully the regeneration of Spain from the hand of a prince of the house of Bonaparte; so that at Madrid the administration which governed till Joseph should arrive conceived that it might reckon upon him. But when he saw the insurrection so general, so violent, so imperative, and the army disposed to join in it, he hesitated no longer, and submitted to the orders of the junta of Seville, censuring at the bottom of his heart, but in profound secrecy, the conduct which in public he appeared to pursue with warmth and conviction. There were in the camp of St. Roque eight or nine thousand regular troops. There were as many at Cadiz, without reckoning the corps scattered over the rest of the provinces, which formed a disposable total of fifteen to eighteen thousand organised troops, fit to serve for a support to the popular rising, and for the nucleus of a numerous army of insurgents. When the title of captain-general was decreed to Thomas de Morla, the chief command of the troops was reserved for General Castaños, and by him accepted. He was ordered to concentrate them between Seville and Cadiz.

The example set by Seville was followed by all the cities in Andalusia. Jaen and Cordova declared themselves in insurrection, and acknowledged the supremacy of the junta of Seville. Cordova, seated on the Upper Guadalquivir, entrusted the command of its insurgents to an officer usually employed

in the pursuit of the smugglers and banditti of the Sierra Morena: this was Augustin d'Echavarri, accustomed to partisan warfare in the famous mountains of which he was the guardian. Out of the banditti, whom it was his business to put down, he made soldiers, uniting with them the peasants of Upper Andalusia; and he proceeded to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, to bar the access against the French.

Estramadura had participated in the general emotion, for in that remote province, frequented by herdsmen and scarcely at all by traders, the new spirit had penetrated in a less degree than in the others, and the hatred of foreigners had retained all its energy. Though strongly agitated by the intelligence of the abdications and by the consequent insurrection at Seville, it did not declare itself till the 30th of May, the feast of St. Ferdinand. As at Coruña, the populace at Badajoz were irritated at not seeing the flag and effigy of the saint displayed on the walls of that fortress, and at not hearing the guns fire as usual on the anniversary of that solemnity. The people proceeded to the batteries, where they found the artillerymen beside their pieces, but not daring to discharge them in token of rejoicing. A bold woman, loading them with reproaches, seized the match which one of them was holding, and fired the first gun. At this signal the whole town was astir, assembled, and rose. The people ran according to custom to the residence of the governor, Count de la Torre del Fresno, to enrol him in the insurrection or put him to death. He was a courtier-soldier, of extremely mild disposition, suspected as a friend to the Prince of the Peace, and reputed to be not very favourable to the rash idea of a general rising against the French. The people began to parley with him, and were soon dissatisfied with his ambiguities. A courier bringing despatches having arrived at the moment, they took umbrage at this circumstance, alleging that they were communications brought from Madrid—that is to say, from the French authority, which, they said, had more empire over the captain-general than the inspirations of Spanish patriotism. Under the influence of these imputations they broke into his hotel, and obliged him to flee. Finally, having pursued him to a guard-house, where he had sought an asylum, they murdered him in the very arms of his soldiers. After the death of this unfortunate officer, a junta was formed, and acknowledged without hesitation the supremacy of that of Seville. The people were invited to take arms; all those in the arsenal of Badajoz were distributed among them, and as they were close to the frontier of Portugal, near Elvas, where Kellermann's division, detached from the army of General Junot, was then stationed, all well-disposed men were called upon to assist in the repair of the walls of Badajoz. The

junta sent an address to the Spanish troops in Portugal, exhorting them to desert. Badajoz offered them a secure asylum on the frontier, and useful employment for their devotion.

At the other extremity of the southern provinces Grenada likewise rose, but as in the provinces least prompt to bestir themselves, it needed, besides the emotion of the abdications, the feast of St. Ferdinand to produce an insurrection there. It was agitated like all Spain when, on the 29th of May, an officer from the junta of Seville entered the city in an ostentatious manner, amidst a populace disposed to turbulence, and drew the crowd after him to the residence of the Captain-General Escalante, a prudent and timid man, who was extremely embarrassed by the proposal brought by that officer from Seville, which was nothing less than to rise and to declare war against France. He deferred his answer till the following day. The following day, the 30th, was the feast of St. Ferdinand. The people assembled tumultuously, and demanded a procession in honour of the saint. From the saint they passed on to the royal prisoner, whom they proclaimed by the title of Ferdinand VII.; and then obliged the Governor-General Escalante to form an insurrectional junta, of which he became president. A levy en masse was immediately ordered, and followed by a declaration of war. A young professor of the university, since ambassador and minister, M. Martinez de la Rosa, was sent to Gibraltar to obtain arms and military stores. They were most cheerfully granted. A numerous population was immediately regimented, and assembled every day to exercise. There were, as we have already observed, three fine Swiss regiments, one at Malaga, another at Carthage, and the third at Tarragona, which Napoleon intended to concentrate at Grenada for the purpose of placing them on the high-road to Andalusia, in order that Dupont, who had already rallied to him the two at Madrid, might pick them up on his way. Napoleon conceived that by placing these five regiments along with French, they would follow precisely the impulsion of the latter. This combination was thwarted by the insurrection at Grenada. The regiment from Malaga was taken to Grenada, and Theodore Reding, Governor of Malaga, a native of Switzerland, was appointed commandant-general of the troops of the province.

Blood flowed horribly in these parts, as in the others. At Malaga, the French vice-consul and another person, a Spaniard, were murdered. At Grenada, Don Pedro Truxillo, formerly Governor of Malaga, suspected on account of his friendship for the demoiselles Tudo, to whom he was related, was by desire of the populace apprehended and taken to the Alhambra. The junta wishing to save him, determined to transfer him to a

safer prison. Carried off on the way by the populace, he was basely assassinated, and his body dragged about the streets. Two other suspected persons, the corregidor of Velez Malaga, and one Portillo, a skilful agriculturist, employed by the Prince of the Peace to introduce the cultivation of cotton in Andalusia, were also apprehended in compliance with the like demands, but placed out of the city in a Carthusian convent, where it was conceived that they would be safer. The monks taking advantage of a feast-day, when the assembled people came to buy and drink their wine, excited the drunken peasants to murder the two unfortunate men confined in their convent, and were instantly obeyed. The hapless corregidor of Malaga and the accomplished Portillo were basely slaughtered. In all parts, ravage and murder accompanied and sullied the noble movement of the Spanish nation. Not far from Grenada, at Jaen, which had already risen, an odious crime marked the new revolution. In order to get rid of its corregidor, Jaen had sent him to Val de Peñas, and he had been there shot by the peasants of La Mancha.

Previously to all the risings which we have enumerated, Carthagena had hoisted the standard of insurrection. It was on the 22nd of the month of May, on the news of the abdications and the arrival of Admiral Salcedo, who was about to sail, in order to conduct the squadron which had previously left Carthagena, from the Balearic Islands to Toulon, that Carthagena rose from the double motive of proclaiming the true king and of saving the Spanish fleet. A junta was formed immediately, the levy en masse was ordered, and counter-orders were despatched to the Spanish fleet. This rising at Carthagena put into the hands of the insurgents an immense quantity of arms and warlike stores, which were immediately distributed among the inhabitants of the whole neighbouring country. At the call of Carthagena, Murcia rose two days afterwards, that is to say, on the 24th of May. The volunteers of the two provinces united under Don Gonzales de Llamas, formerly colonel of a regiment of militia, appointed to command them. The rendezvous assigned was on the Xucar, in order to give a hand to the Valencians.

At the same instant, in fact, Valencia also had risen, and with the accompaniment of horrible circumstances. The rich and populous Valencia, seated amidst its beautiful Huerta, had not less pretension to rule than Seville or Grenada. Its population, lively, ardent, tumultuous, was not capable of suffering itself to be outstripped by any other. It was on the very day of the arrival of the courier announcing the abdications that the rising took place. In one of the principal public places of Valencia, a popular haranguer, reading to the assembled crowd

the *Madrid Gazette* containing the abdications, tore the paper in pieces, crying "Down with the French! Ferdinand VII. for ever!" An immense multitude gathered round him, and ran to the authorities, to engage them in the insurrection. But first of all these people resolved to give themselves a chief. They chose Father Rico, a Franciscan monk, who was eloquent and daring, and put himself at their head to go and speak to the authorities. He then proceeded to the residence of the captain-general, Count de la Conquista, whom he found, like all the captains-general, not disposed to comply, from prudence and aversion for the mob. He prevailed over him, nevertheless, without murdering him, promising himself to do something better shortly, and then repaired to the tribunal of Accord, the principal magistracy of the province, and dictated to it his resolutions, he, Rico, the monk, still talking, ordering, deciding for all. The formation of a junta was immediately resolved upon and executed. The highest nobles of the country had seats in it along with the vilest agitators of the streets. The Count de la Conquista not appearing zealous or energetic enough, a grandee of Spain, a rich proprietor of the province, the Count de Cerbellon, was chosen to command the troops. A levy en masse was ordered, and application was made for arms to Carthagena, whence they were most cheerfully sent.

So far all was well in reference to the insurrection and Spanish patriotism. But the authorities, though subjugated, appeared liable to suspicion. It was, in fact, only against their will that they had followed a movement which they regarded as mischievous, because it placed Spain between the French armies on the one hand and a furious populace on the other. It was therefore thought desirable to ascertain the nature of their reports to Madrid, and a courier was stopped and his despatches were carried to the Count de Cerbellon, to be read before the assembled multitude. These despatches were actually of such a nature as to have caused the slaughter of the most exalted functionaries, for they solicited assistance from Madrid against the people who were rising. The daughter of Count de Cerbellon, who was present at this scene, perceiving the danger, snatched up those despatches, and tore them into a thousand pieces before the eyes of the astonished crowd, disconcerted by the courage of that noble lady. Singular nation, which, like all yet simple nations, having only the vices and virtues of nature, blended the example of the most atrocious barbarity with that of the noblest devotedness.

But the Valencian populace soon made itself amends for the blood which it had been prevented from spilling. It had been remarked that a nobleman of the province, Don Miguel de Saavedra, Baron of Albalat, was very remiss in attending the

meetings of the junta, of which he had been nominated a member. He went to them very rarely, because, as colonel of militia, he had a few years before ordered his men to fire upon the populace of Valencia for the purpose of restoring order. This recollection made him uneasy, and he remained in preference in the country. Presently a report was circulated that the Baron of Albalat was betraying the cause of the insurrection. Messengers came to fetch him from his residence; they conducted him to Valencia, and he was conveyed to Count de Cerdellon's, where those who interested themselves for him hoped that he would be safer. Father Rico had hastened forward to save him. The Count de Cerdellon, less courageous than his daughter, showed no disposition to compromise himself in behalf of an old friend who came to him to beg his life. He resolved to send him to the citadel, of which, owing to the complicity of the troops, the people had made themselves masters, and where all whom it was wished to save from the fury of the multitude were crowded together. Father Rico, full of zeal for the defence of this unfortunate gentleman, put himself at the head of the escort, and brought him unharmed through the streets of Valencia, notwithstanding the efforts of the populace athirst for blood. But on reaching the principal place of the city, the mob, having increased and become more compact, broke the square of soldiers in which the unfortunate Baron of Albalat was, tore him from the hands of those who were defending him, despatched him without mercy, and carried his head about on the end of a pike.

The consternation was general at Valencia, especially among the higher classes, who found themselves treated as suspected persons, like the French noblesse in 1793. To avert the danger, they multiplied their voluntary donations, and enrolled themselves in the new levies, without succeeding in soothing the distrust and the rage of the people, which increased every day. It became evident, in fact, that one victim would not appease their sanguinary fury. Rico, the Franciscan monk, already found his authority undermined by a rival. This rival was a fanatic who had come from Madrid, the Canon Calvo, whose passions were heated by a contest between the Jesuits and the Jansenists, in which he had supported the former against the latter. He had repaired to Valencia, conceiving apparently that he should there find a more extensive field for the exercise of his rage. He affected extreme devotion, took more time than any other person in saying mass, and had become the principal idol of the populace. Calvo adopted the usual theme of those who in revolutions wish to surpass others, and accused Father Rico of lukewarmness. In the citadel of Valencia there were three or four hundred French traders attracted by commerce to

that city, and many of whom had been long settled there. They had been put into this place out of humanity and to withdraw them from the ferocity of the multitude. The atrocious Calvo had persuaded a fanatical band that here was the only holocaust well-pleasing to God, the only one worthy of the cause which they were serving. Doubting whether he should be able to penetrate into the citadel with his troop of assassins to consummate the abominable crime which he meditated, he stationed his band at a postern-gate opening upon the sea-shore: he then introduced himself into the citadel; and affecting humanity, he persuaded the French that they should all be slaughtered unless they fled in all haste by the postern leading to the shore. The unfortunate creatures, following his advice, sallied forth, women, children, and all, by the fatal outlet, which they considered as the only one to save their lives. No sooner did they appear than muskets, swords, knives, were pitilessly plied for their destruction. The murderers, gorged with blood, exhausted with fatigue, solicited mercy for about sixty who were not yet despatched. Calvo, perceiving that the zeal of his cut-throats had cooled, feigned compliance with their wish, and intimated that he would take with him the sixty victims thus spared. He conducted them to a by-place, where a fresh band completed the execrable sacrifice. Thus did our unfortunate countrymen expiate the faults of their government without having any share in them!

All in Valencia not belonging to the vilest of the populace were deeply afflicted. Next day Rico the monk, incensed at these acts which disgraced the cause of the insurrection, attempted to denounce to the public honour the crimes of Calvo; but he could not prevail, Calvo got the better of him, and Father Rico was obliged to conceal himself. Calvo was audaciously proclaimed a member of the junta, to the great scandal and the great alarm of all honest men. Eight of the unfortunate French, who had escaped as by miracle from the general massacre, still lived. Not knowing where to take refuge, they went and threw themselves at the feet of the murderer in the very bosom of the junta. Calvo ordered or suffered them to be slaughtered, and their blood spirted on the garments of the members of the junta, who fled, seized with dread and horror.

So many crimes, however, at length produced a reaction. Father Rico took courage, issued from his retreat, repaired to the junta, attacked Calvo to his face, denounced him, compelled him to defend himself, completely disconcerted him, and obtained an order for his arrest. Conveyed first to the Balearic Islands, then brought back to Valencia, Calvo was tried, condemned, and strangled in his prison. Honest men regained some ascendancy over the villains who had ruled Valencia. For

the rest, extraordinary zeal in arming, for they were aware that they should soon have to defend themselves against the just vengeance of the French, though it did not excuse, yet made some slight amends for the atrocious crimes of which Valencia had just been the odious theatre.

All the towns on that part of the coast, such as Castellon de la Plana, Tortosa, Tarragona, followed the general example. The powerful Barcelona, containing as large a population as the capital of Spain, accustomed, if not to command, at least never to obey, burned with impatience to rise. Upon the arrival of the news of the abdications, on the 25th of May, all the posting-bills were torn down; an immense population thronged the public places, hate in their hearts and indignation in their eyes. But General Duhesme, at the head of 12,000 men, partly French, partly Italians, repressed the movement, and from the lofty site of the citadel and the fort of Mont Jouy, threatened to burn the city if it stirred. Under this iron hand Barcelona trembled, but took no pains to dissemble its rage. Murat, still under illusion in regard to Spain, had granted to the Catalans the right to wear arms, which had been taken from them under Philip V., meaning thereby to reward them for their apparent submission. To this testimony of confidence they responded by immediately buying up all the muskets that were to be had, all the powder and lead for sale in the public depôts, and the peasants of the mountains and the people of the towns were seen parting with the most valuable things they possessed, in order to procure the means of obtaining arms. Every day the most trifling accident at Barcelona became an occasion for riot. A stone that fell from the fort of Mont Jouy had struck a fisherman. The poor fellow, wounded, it was alleged, by the French, was carried on a hand-barrow over the whole city to excite the public indignation. The presence of our troops repressed the rising commotion. On another day a fifer of one of the Italian regiments observing a Spanish boy mimicking him in mockery, drew his sword to enforce respect: a fresh tumult ensued, and threatened this time to become general. But the French army again succeeded by its attitude in stopping the insurrection. The indiscipline of the Italian troops, less reserved in their conduct than ours, contributed also to the irritation of the Spaniards. The most turbulent of them, however, finding themselves too tightly curbed, fled to Valencia, Manresa, Lerida, and Saragossa; and Barcelona became not more friendly to the French, but more quiet.

The other towns of Catalonia, Girona, Manresa, Lerida, rose in insurrection. All the villages did the same. Barcelona, however, was kept down; Catalonia could not undertake any-

thing very serious; and this proves that if precautions had been better taken, and that if sufficient forces had been timely placed in the principal cities of Spain, the general insurrection might have been, if not prevented, at least quelled and greatly retarded in its progress.

Lastly, Saragossa, the immortal Saragossa, had not been the last, as it may well be supposed, in responding to the cry of Spanish independence. It was on the 24th of May, two days after Carthagena, two days before Seville, and as soon as the Asturias, that it had risen. On the arrival of the courier from Madrid bringing the news of the abdications, the people, as in the other provinces, had thronged to the hotel of the captain-general, Don Juan de Guillermi, and finding him timid like the other captains-general, had deposed him, and placed General Mori, chief of the staff, in his room. The latter on the following day, the 25th, convoked a junta to satisfy the people, and to surround himself with a council that should share his responsibility. General Mori and the junta, sensible of the twofold danger of being at the same time under the hand of the populace and under the hand of the French, who filled Navarre, were much perplexed. The people, whom the most ardent zeal would scarcely have satisfied, resolved to get rid of the chiefs who did not participate in its own excitement, but without murdering them, and gave the command to a celebrated personage, Joseph Palafox de Melzi, own nephew of the Duke de Melzi, vice-chancellor of the kingdom of Italy. He was a handsome young man of twenty-eight, had served in the life-guards, and was known for having boldly withstood the desires of a dissolute queen whose notice he had attracted. Attached to Ferdinand VII., whom he went to visit at Bayonne, and whom he had found a captive and in duress, he had come to Saragossa, his native place, awaiting, concealed in the environs, the moment for serving him whom he regarded as the only legitimate sovereign. The people, informed of these particulars, hastened to seek and to appoint him captain-general. Palafox accepted the office, called around him a monk, very clever and very brave, an old experienced officer of artillery, and a professor from whom he had formerly received lessons; and availing himself of their knowledge to supply his own deficiency, for he knew nothing of war or of politics, he placed himself at the head of the affairs of Aragon. His heroic soul soon enabled him to make amends for the want of the qualifications for command. Palafox convoked the Cortes of the province, ordered a levy en masse, and called the fine and valiant Aragonese population to arms. His appeal was not only listened to, but anticipated everywhere. In short, such were the agitation and excitement, that on the confines of Aragon and Navarre,

at Logroño, only five or six leagues from the French troops, the people rose. They did the same at Santander, on our right, and even in the rear of our columns.

Thus, in eight days, from the 22nd to the 30th of May, all Spain, without any concert between one province and another, had risen under the impulse of one sentiment, that of indignation excited by the events at Bayonne. The characteristic traits of this national insurrection had been everywhere the same—hesitation of the higher classes, unanimous and irresistible indignation of the inferior classes, and very soon equal devotedness of all; local formation of insurrectional governments; levy en masse; desertion of the regular army to join in the insurrection; voluntary donations of the higher clergy, fanatical ardour of the inferior clergy; in short, everywhere patriotism, infatuation, ferocity, noble actions, atrocious crimes; a non-archival revolution, proceeding like a democratic revolution, because the instrument was the same, that is to say, the people, and because the result promised to be so too, namely, a reform of the ancient institutions which Spain was taught to hope for, in order to oppose France with her own weapons.

These spontaneous insurrections, which broke out between the 22nd and the 30th of May, were known only successively and tardily at Bayonne, where Napoleon resided, and where he continued to reside during the whole month of June and the first days of July. At first those only were heard of which took place on the right and left of the French army, that is to say, in the Asturias, Old Castille, and Aragon. The difficulty of communication, always great in Spain, having been much increased at that moment, for the couriers were not only stopped but most frequently murdered, was the cause that at Madrid even the French staff knew scarcely anything of what was passing beyond New Castille and La Mancha. They learned only that in the other provinces great disturbance, extreme agitation prevailed; still they were ignorant of the details; and it was but by degrees and in the course of June that they were informed of all that had happened up to the end of May, and this knowledge they derived only from confidential communications, or from the bravadoes of Spaniards repeating at Madrid what private letters brought by messengers had revealed to them.

As soon as Napoleon was apprised at Bayonne of the events at Oviedo, Valladolid, Logroño, and Saragossa, which had occurred close to him, and of which he was not informed till seven or eight days after they happened, he gave prompt and energetic orders for stopping the insurrection before it had spread and become consolidated. He had taken care to place between Bayonne and Madrid, on the rear of Marshal Moncey and of General Dupont, the corps of Marshal Bessières, composed of

Merle's, Verdier's, and Lasalle's divisions. Merle's division had been formed of some third battalions drawn from the coasts, and of the fourth battalions of the legions of reserve; Verdier's division of the provisional regiments from No. 13 to No. 18,* the first twelve composing, as we have seen, the corps of Marshal Moncey. At this moment the Polish corps admitted into the service of France were arriving: they consisted of a superb regiment of cavalry, 900 or 1000 strong, since celebrated by the name of Polish lancers; of three good regiments of infantry of 1500 to 1600 men each, and known by the appellation of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of the Vistula. Lastly, Napoleon had successively brought, either from Paris or from the camps established on the coast, the 4th light and the 15th of the line, the 2nd and 12th light, the 14th and 44th of the line, making them succeed one another from Paris to the camp of Boulogne, from the camp of Boulogne to the camps in Bretagne, from the camps in Bretagne to Bayonne, so as to afford them time to rest themselves, and occasion to be useful where they made any stay. He ordered, moreover, two seasoned battalions of the guard of Paris to be despatched by post. If, therefore, he had not at hand the amount of resources that might have been sufficient to suppress the Spanish insurrection immediately, he made amends for the deficiency by his genius of organisation; and he had already found means to collect some forces, which enabled him to apply a first remedy to the evil by the arrival of six French regiments of old formation and three Polish regiments. There arrived also, by the name of marching regiments, numerous detachments destined to recruit the provisional regiments,† and which before

* In fact, there were no more formed than the 13th, 14th, 17th, and 18th regiments, the detachments for the 15th and 16th being wanting.

† From these various designations one may form some idea of the complication which the extent of the wants and the resources had produced in the organisation which Bonaparte managed with so much genius. There were old French regiments of the line, numbered 1 to 112, besides light regiments, numbered 1 to 32, which were scattered in Poland, Germany, Italy, and Illyria, and which had their dépôt battalions on the Rhine or on the Alps. There were, moreover, regiments called provisional, which had been formed of companies drafted from dépôt battalions, and which were detached into Spain to serve there under a temporary form. There were, besides, the detachments subsequently drafted from these same dépôts to reinforce the provisional regiments, and which during their passage formed marching regiments. The five legions of reserve, the first three battalions of which composed the corps of General Dupont, the fourth battalions of which formed one of the divisions of Marshal Bessières, the fifth and sixth battalions of which remained to be organised, came under a new head. There were, lastly, the Italians, the Poles, the Swiss, who concurred on their parts in the composition of the forces which Napoleon had at his disposal. It is necessary, therefore, to follow with sustained attention these heads, so diverse and so numerous, if one would appreciate the prodigious art with which Napoleon managed his forces, and if one wishes above all to comprehend how it happened that notwithstanding this prodigious art his resources began to be below the immensity of the task which he had unfortunately undertaken.

their incorporation with the latter rendered services all along the route which they had to traverse.

Napoleon immediately ordered General Verdier to hasten to Logroño with 1500 infantry, 300 horse, and four pieces of artillery, and to make a severe example of that town. He ordered General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, a brilliant officer commanding the horse chasseurs of the imperial guard, to proceed to Pampeluna, with the Polish lancers, some battalions of provisional infantry, and six pieces of cannon, to collect, moreover, in that place some third battalions which formed its garrison, the whole composing a total of about 4000 men, and to fly to Saragossa, to restore order in that capital of Aragon. A deputation composed of several members of the junta was to precede General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, and to employ persuasion before force; but if persuasion proved unavailing, force was to be energetically applied to the evil. Napoleon prescribed to Marshal Bessières, as soon as General Verdier should have finished with Logroño, to fall back with General Lasalle's cavalry upon Valladolid, to restore tranquillity in Old Castille. He despatched General Savary to Madrid, to supply the place of Murat, who was ill, to issue orders in his name, so as that the command should not appear to be changed. He enjoined him to direct Frère's division, the third of General Dupont's, to march back from the Escorial to Segovia, which had risen, and to despatch a column of 3000 or 4000 men upon Saragossa by a backward movement to the left on Guadalaxara. Having picked up some vague reports of the insurrection at Valencia, he ordered Marshal Moncey's first division to be despatched from Madrid, with a Spanish auxiliary corps, with directions to proceed to Cuença, to halt there if the reports of an insurrection at Valencia were not confirmed, and to push forward for that city if they were confirmed. Yet as it was a small force for reducing a city of 100,000 souls (60,000 in the city, 40,000 in the Huerta), Napoleon ordered General Duhesme to send Chabran's division from Barcelona upon Tarragona and Tortosa, which by the way would repress the movements in Catalonia, fix the Swiss regiment of Tarragona in the cause of France, and debouch by the coast upon Valencia, while Marshal Moncey would debouch upon that city by the mountains.

But it was particularly towards Andalusia and the French fleet at Cadiz that the solicitude of Napoleon was directed. Ever since the first moments he had thought of ordering Dupont towards Andalusia, where it appeared to him that too many Spanish troops had been suffered to accumulate, and where he apprehended, besides, some attempt of the English. He had placed that general in advance with a first division at Toledo, a second at Aranjuez, a third at the Escorial, so as to be en

échelon on the road from Madrid to Cadiz, recommending to him expressly to hold himself in readiness to start at the first signal. On the news of the insurrection the order for departure had been despatched, and General Dupont had marched (at the end of May) towards the Sierra Morena. Napoleon reckoned upon this general, who had hitherto been always brave, brilliant, and successful, and for whom he destined a marshal's baton on the first eminent occasion. Napoleon had no doubt that he would find it in Spain. That unfortunate general had no doubt of this himself. Horrible and cruel mystery of Fate, always unforeseen in its favours and in its severities!

Napoleon, who would not urge him too far into the extremity of Spain without sufficient means for maintaining his ground there, sent him several reinforcements. Having despatched him with his first division only, that of General Barbon, he ordered the second to be marched to Toledo, that it might rejoin him if he had need of it. He directed, moreover, that there should be given to him immediately the whole of the cavalry of the *corps d'armée*, the seamen of the guard, who were to man the two new ships prepared at Cadiz; lastly, the two Swiss regiments of the old garrison of Madrid (those of Preux and Reding), at that moment united at Talavera. Kellermann's division, belonging to Junot's *corps d'armée*, stationed at Elvas, on the frontier of Portugal and Andalusia, the three other Swiss regiments from Tarragona, Carthagena, and Malaga, which Napoleon supposed to be concentrated at Grenada, might make General Dupont's corps amount to 20,000 men at least, even without the junction of the second and third divisions—a force assuredly sufficient to keep down Andalusia, and to save Cadiz from any *coup de main* of the English. General Dupont was enjoined to march with the utmost haste towards the object which most engaged Napoleon's thoughts, that is to say, towards Cadiz and the squadron of Admiral Rosily.

In consequence of these orders, there were to be left at Madrid two of Marshal Moncey's divisions and two of General Dupont's divisions, for these latter, placed between the Escorial, Aranjuez, and Toledo, were considered as being at Madrid itself. There were, moreover, to be left there the cuirassiers and the imperial guard, that is to say, about 25,000 or 30,000 men, exclusive of the escort of old regiments that was to accompany King Joseph. There was good ground to believe that this would be sufficient to guard against unforeseen cases; for it was not yet known how intense, how daring, and above all, how general the insurrection was. Orders were despatched afresh to construct in Madrid, either at the royal palace or at Buen Retiro, real *places d'armes*, in which might be deposited the wounded, the sick, the military stores, the chests, and lastly, the baggage of the army.

These orders, given directly for the northern provinces, and indirectly through the medium of the staff of Madrid for the southern provinces, were immediately executed. General Verdier marched first, with the 14th provisional regiment, about 200 horse, and four pieces of cannon, from Vittoria for Logroño. On reaching Guardia, not far from the Ebro, he learned that the bridge over the Ebro, which must be crossed to go to Logroño, was occupied by the insurgents. He crossed the river at El Ciego in a ferry-boat, and on the morning of the 6th of June he advanced towards Logroño. The insurgents, composed of the populace and peasants of the environs, to the number of 2000 or 3000, had obstructed the entrance of the town by an accumulation of all sorts of materials. They had placed in battery seven old pieces of cannon, mounted by cartwrights of the place upon carriages of their own making, and they kept behind their rude entrenchments, animated by much enthusiasm but little bravery. After the first discharges they ran away from our young soldiers, who removed on the run all the obstacles with which the insurgents had endeavoured to stop them. The rout of these first opponents was so prompt that General Verdier had not time to turn Logroño, to envelop and take them prisoners. Our infantry in the interior of the town, our horse outside the place, killed about a hundred of them with the bayonet and the sword. We had only one man killed and five wounded, but among them two officers. From the insurgents were taken their seven pieces of cannon and 80,000 infantry cartridges. The Bishop of Calahorra, who had against his will been put at their head, obtained mercy for the town of Logroño, which at his solicitation was exempted from pillage, and merely subjected to a contribution of 30,000 f. for the benefit of the soldiers, among whom this sum was immediately distributed.

This conduct of the insurgents was not apt to produce any high idea of the resistance that the Spaniards could oppose to us. General Verdier returned immediately to Vittoria, in order to replace in Marshal Bessières' corps the troops of Generals Merle and Lasalle, which had just started for Valladolid. General Lasalle, with the 10th and 22nd chasseurs, and the 17th provisional infantry borrowed from Verdier's division; General Merle, with his whole division, composed of one battalion of the 47th, one battalion of the 86th, one marching regiment, one regiment of the legions of reserve, had proceeded for Valladolid by way of Torquemada and Palencia, following the two banks of the Pisuerga, which runs from the mountains of Biscay into the Duero, after passing through Valladolid. While they were thus moving forward, General Frère, on leaving the Escorial, made, on the contrary, a retrograde movement upon Segovia, which was in insurrection. Old Castille was therefore

traversed by two columns, one advancing upon the road from Burgos to Madrid, the other turning back upon the same road. General Frère having a shorter distance to travel, arrived first at Segovia, which he found occupied by the pupils of the college of artillery and by a host of peasants, who had possessed themselves of the town, and were committing all sorts of excesses. They had completely barricaded the city, and placed in battery the artillery served by the pupils of the college. These obstacles could not long check our troops, who had all the ardour of youth, and who had been for a year in the ranks of the army without having fired a shot. With incredible spirit they scaled the barricades of Segovia, killed a certain number of peasants with the bayonet, and drove off the others, who fled after plundering the houses which they were charged to defend. The unfortunate inhabitants had dispersed, that they might not be exposed to all the excesses of the defenders and of the assailants of their city. They did not escape the excesses of the former, and were, for this time at least, treated very indulgently by the latter. It was easy to comprehend why the wealthier classes inclined to submission to France, placed as they were between a sanguinary and plundering populace and the exasperated French armies. General Frère treated the city of Segovia very mildly, but seized the immense artillery stores kept in the military college.

The pretended defenders of Segovia had fled dispersed towards Valladolid as if they had been pursued by General Frère, who, however, had no cavalry to despatch after them. The director of the military college of Segovia, Don Miguel de Cevallos, had retired with them to Valladolid. According to the custom of soldiers who have fled before an enemy, the insurgents who escaped from Segovia pretended that M. Cevallos, by his cowardice or his treachery, had been the cause of their defeat. He was no such thing ; but he was constituted prisoner and thus conducted to Valladolid. At the moment when he was entering the city a great bustle took place. The new recruits of the insurrection were performing their exercise on an open place which he had to cross. They rushed upon him, and in spite of the cries of his wife, who accompanied him, in spite of the efforts of a priest, who upon pretext of receiving his confession begged of them to grant him a few moments, he was mercilessly murdered, and then dragged through the streets. Bleeding fragments of his flesh were carried about by furious women in Valladolid.

This melancholy event, following so many others of the same kind, made a painful and a deep impression upon Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, who had become against his will the head of the *insurrection* of Old Castille. He durst not therefore withstand

123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100



GENERAL LASALLE



an extravagant populace, who insisted on his hastening with the utmost speed to meet the French column marching from Burgos upon Valladolid. It was, as we have said, that of Generals Lasalle and Merle, who had left Burgos with several thousand infantry, and about a thousand horse, that is to say, twice or thrice as strong a force as was needed for putting to flight all the insurgents in Old Castille. The old and soured captain-general thought with reason that the utmost that could be attempted was to make head against the French in a well-barricaded city, and with the resolution to defend themselves to the death. But he considered it as senseless to go out and defy in the open field the most efficient troops in Europe. Threatened, however, with a fate similar to that of Don Miguel de Cevallos if he resisted, he marched with five or six thousand citizens and peasants, assisted by a few deserters from the regular troops, a hundred life-guards who had fled from the Escorial, a few hundred horse of the queen's regiment, and several pieces of cannon. He posted himself at the bridge of Cabezón, on the Pisuerga, about two leagues in advance of Valladolid, over which passed the highroad from Burgos to that city.

General Lasalle had swept off the bands of insurgents posted in his way, especially at the village of Torquemada, which he had treated very roughly. At Valencia, the bishop had come forth to meet him at the head of the principal inhabitants, imploring mercy for the town. It was granted by General Lasalle, who merely required some provisions for his soldiers. On the morning of the 12th of June he came in sight of the bridge of Cabezón, where Don Gregorio de la Cuesta had taken a position. The measures of the Spanish general denoted neither much experience nor great judgment. He had placed his cavalry in advance of the bridge, behind his cavalry a line of 200 infantry, his cannon on the bridge itself; some peasants as *tirailleurs* along the fords of the Pisuerga, and in rear, on the other side of the river, upon the heights which command its course, the rest of his little corps. General Lasalle, bringing two regiments of cavalry and the *voltigeurs* of the 17th provisional, led them on to the attack with his accustomed resolution. His cavalry upset that of the Spaniards, which it threw back upon their infantry. Our *voltigeurs* then charged that infantry, and drove it partly upon the bridge, partly upon the fords of the river. There was a horrible confusion, for foot, horse, cannon were jammed together upon a narrow bridge, under the volleys of the Spanish troops on the opposite bank, who fired indiscriminately on friends and foes. General Merle having supported General Lasalle with his whole division, the bridge was crossed and the position beyond the Pisuerga quickly

carried. The cavalry cut down the fugitives, a considerable number of whom were killed. Our loss consisted in fifteen killed, and twenty or twenty-five wounded; that of the Spaniards in five hundred killed and wounded. General Lasalle, without striking a blow, entered Valladolid, dismayed, but almost happy in being delivered from the banditti who had occupied upon pretext of defending it. The chief mortification of the Spaniards was to see their principal general beaten so speedily and so completely. Don Gregorio de la Cuesta retired with a few horse by the Leon road, surrounded by insurgents running off across the country, and telling them all that they were but rightly served for going with untrained bands to defy regular troops accustomed to conquer Europe.

General Lasalle picked up in Valladolid a great quantity of arms, ammunition, and provisions, and spared the city. The actions of Logroño, Segovia, and Cabezon indicated thus far great presumption, ignorance, and foolhardiness, and above all, none of that tenacity which was subsequently met with. Accordingly, though it began to be understood in the army that the insurrection was universal, this excited little uneasiness, because it was imagined that there would be an outbreak indeed, but one as easily quelled as promptly produced. What was then occurring in Aragon was of such a nature as to inspire the same confidence. General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, having arrived at Pampeluna, had there organised his little column, consisting, as we have said, of three thousand foot and artillery, one thousand horse, and six pieces of cannon. Having completed his dispositions, he set out on the 6th of June from Pampeluna, leaving in that city the deputation which had undertaken to convey words of peace to Saragossa, for the violence everywhere shown by the insurgents plainly indicated that the lances of the Poles were the only means to which recourse could be had at the moment. In his march for Valtierra on the 7th, General Lefebvre found everywhere the villages empty, and the peasants joined with the rebels. On reaching Valtierra itself he learned that the bridge of Tudela over the Ebro was destroyed, and that all the craft on that river had been secured and taken to Tudela. He halted at Valtierra, to procure the means of crossing the Ebro. He had large barks, which served for ferry-boats, brought down the river of Aragon into the Ebro, drew them up opposite to Valtierra, and passed the Ebro at that point. Next day, the 8th, he appeared before Tudela. A host of insurgents were scouring the country, and firing from lurking-places behind the bushes. The main body of the assemblage, eight or ten thousand strong, was posted on the heights in advance of that city. The Marquis de Lassan, brother of Joseph Palafox, commanded them. General Lefebvre,

sending before him his voltigeurs and numerous parties of cavalry, led them from position to position till they were under the walls of Tudela. On arriving there he opened a parley, with a view to avoid violent means, and above all, the necessity of entering Tudela by main force. His flags of truce were answered by musket-shots, and the Spaniards even fired upon him. He then ordered a charge with the bayonet. His young soldiers, always ardent, dashed away on the run to the enemy's positions, and took his cannon. The lancers threw themselves at a gallop upon the fugitives, and despatched some hundreds of them with their lances. The French entered Tudela at the charge step, and in the first moments the soldiers began to plunder the city. But order was soon re-established by General Lefebvre, and mercy granted to the inhabitants. We had not above a dozen men killed and wounded, while the insurgents lost three or four hundred killed, some behind their entrenchments, others on their flight across the country.

When master of Tudela, finding the bridge of that city destroyed, and the whole country to a distance in insurrection, General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, before he proceeded further, conceived that it behoved him to ensure the safety of his march by disarming the surrounding villages, and by repairing the bridge of Tudela, which is the necessary communication with Pampe-luna. He employed, therefore, the 9th, 10th, and 11th of June in re-establishing the bridge, in scouring the country, in disarming the villages; putting to the sword the obstinate insurgents who would not surrender. On the 12th, having ensured his communications, he resumed his march, and on the morning of the 13th arrived before Mallen, where he again met with the insurgents, having the Marquis de Lassan at their head, and consisting of two Spanish regiments and from eight to ten thousand peasants. Having beaten back the bands which had spread themselves in advance of Mallen, he caused the position itself to be attacked. This was not difficult, for those undisciplined insurgents, after one discharge, retired behind the troops of the line, firing over their heads, and killing more Spaniards than French. General Lefebvre, having attacked the enemy in flank, overthrew him without difficulty, and upset everything before him. The Polish lancers, sent in pursuit of the fugitives, gave them no quarter. Animated in this pursuit, they swam across the Ebro to get at them, and killed or wounded more than a thousand. Our loss was almost as inconsiderable as in the affair of Tudela, amounting to no more than about twenty men. The briskness of the attacks, the unsteadiness of the Spanish peasants, the embarrassment of the troops of the line, placed most frequently between our fire and that of the enemy, in short, the confusion in everything among the insurgents, account

for the brevity of these petty combats, the insignificance of our losses, the importance of those of the enemy, who fell not so much in action as in the flight and by the lances of the Poles.

On the 14th, General Lefebvre, continuing his march towards Saragossa, again fell in with the insurgents posted on the heights of Alazon, treated them as at Tudela and at Mallen, and obliged them to make a precipitate retreat. However, on account of the fatigue of the troops, he did not pursue them so far as on the preceding days, and deferred till the next day his appearance before Saragossa.

He arrived there on the 15th of June. He would fain have entered by main force; but to penetrate with 3000 infantry, 1000 horse, and six four-pounders into a city containing from 40,000 to 50,000 souls, full of soldiers, and above all, of peasants resolved to defend themselves with desperation, into a city about the destruction of which they cared but little since all of them were inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, was no easy matter. An old wall, flanked on one side by a strong castle, and from distance to distance by several massive convents, and terminating at both extremities at the Ebro, encompassed Saragossa.

Though great confusion prevailed in the city, and the regular troops, the insurgents, and the inhabitants were extremely dissatisfied with each other; the troops complaining of the banditti, who plundered, murdered, and were fit for nothing but to run away; the banditti complaining of the troops for not preventing their being beaten—only one sentiment prevailed upon the question of defence, that of resisting to the last extremity, and not surrendering the city but in ashes. These predatory and fanatical peasants, spurred by the need for excitement after long inactivity, though useless and cowardly in the bare field, proved gallant defenders behind the walls of a city of which they were masters. The brave Palafox, moreover, shared their sentiments, and the resolution to sacrifice the city being taken by those to whom it did not belong, it became impossible to surprise it. Accordingly, no sooner had General Lefebvre appeared under its walls with his little force than he beheld it filled to the very house-tops with a population of infuriated foes, and heard an incredible shower of balls issuing from all quarters. He was obliged to pause, for his principal force consisted of cavalry, and he had, in fact, no artillery but six four-pounders. He encamped upon the heights on the left near the Ebro, and reported immediately his operations to headquarters at Bayonne, desiring that more considerable force in infantry and artillery might be sent him, in order to batter the walls before him, which consisted not only in the wall surrounding Saragossa, but in a multitude

of extensive edifices, which, when the wall was taken, must be conquered one after another.

In Catalonia the situation presented difficulties of another kind, but perhaps still more serious. Instead of finding everything easy in the country, and everything difficult before the capital, it was precisely the reverse; for the capital, Barcelona, was in our hands, and the country presented a mountainous face, studded with fortresses and large insurgent villages. General Duhesme, with about 6000 French and 6000 Italians, found himself blockaded, as it were, in Barcelona ever since the general insurrection in the last days of May. Girona, Lerida, Manresa, Tarragona, and nearly all the principal villages were in full insurrection, and the peasants came down even to the foot of the city walls to fire at our sentinels. Nevertheless, having on the 3rd of June received orders to send off Chabran's division towards Valencia, that it might lend a hand to Marshal Moncey, he despatched it on the 4th, prescribing to it the route of Lerida, so as that it might observe by the way what was passing in Aragon. General Chabran, at the head of a good French division, met with not many obstacles along the high-road, to which he constantly kept, treated the inhabitants well, obtaining from them provisions, which they could not refuse to a division of such strength, and reached Tarragona almost without striking a blow. He arrived there very opportunely to prevent the insurrection, for the Swiss regiment of Wimpfen, which occupied the town, was still hesitating. General Chabran pacified Tarragona, exacted from the Swiss officers their word of honour to continue faithful to France, who consented to take them into her service, and set all to rights, at least for a moment, in that important place.

But it was precisely his departure from Barcelona and the division of the French forces that the insurgents were awaiting, in order to overwhelm our troops. The famous convent of Montserrat, situated amidst rocks in the girdle of mountains that encompasses Barcelona, was reputed to be the focus of the insurrection. The river Llobregat, which intersects this belt of mountains before it falls into the sea, is one of the obstacles which must be surmounted before one can reach Montserrat. The aim of the insurgents was to make themselves masters of the course of that river; to establish themselves strongly there; thus to shut up General Duhesme in the capital, and to cut him off from Tarragona: for the Llobregat runs to the south of Barcelona, between that city and Tarragona. General Duhesme, desirous of searching Montserrat, and preventing the insurgents from taking a position between him and General Chabran, despatched General Schwartz, at the head of a column of infantry and cavalry, with orders to proceed to the Llobregat, to cross it, and

then to go by way of Bruch and make his appearance at Montserrat. That officer, setting off on the 5th of June, met at first with none but insurgents who gave up the ground to him without disputing it. He crossed the Llobregat, passed with equal ease through Molins del Rey, Martorell, Esparraguera, and thus reached Bruch. But on arriving at that place, the moment he began to direct his course towards Montserrat he heard the alarm-bells ringing in all the villages, found himself assailed by a host of riflemen, learned that all around him they were barricading the villages, destroying the bridges, making the roads impassable, and for fear of being enveloped, he resolved to turn back. He had then all sorts of difficulties to conquer, especially in the village of Esparraguera, which formed one long barricaded street. He had at every step to fight obstinate battles. The men fired from the windows, the women and boys threw stones and boiling oil from the house-tops upon the heads of the soldiers. Lastly, in passing a bridge which had been so damaged as to give way at the first strain, one of our guns, in the act of passing, sank along with the bridge. General Schwartz, after losing many killed and wounded, reached Barcelona again on the 7th of June worn out with fatigue. It was evident that these fanatical peasants, useless in the open country, might prove very formidable behind houses, barricaded streets, obstructed bridges, rocks, bushes, any obstacle, in short, by which they could cover themselves while fighting.

On the 8th and 9th of June, the insurgents, emboldened by the retreat of General Schwartz, had the audacity to come and establish themselves on the Llobregat, occupying in force the villages of San Boy, San Felice, and Molins del Rey. Their plan still was to envelop General Duhesme, and to intercept the communication between him and General Chabran. General Duhesme was sensible that it was impossible to suffer them to accomplish such a design, and on the 10th of June he marched out of Barcelona, in three columns, to take the position of the insurgents. Arriving at daybreak on the bank of the Llobregat, our soldiers crossed it with the water as high as the waist, and then rushed upon the villages occupied by the enemy, carried them with the bayonet, took many insurgents, of whom they killed a considerable number, and punished San Boy by consigning it to the flames. In the evening they returned triumphant to Barcelona, bringing with them the enemy's artillery, to the great astonishment of the people, who had hoped not to see them again. This feat somewhat awed the tumultuous population of that great city, and kept up a wavering disposition in the superior classes, who there, as everywhere else, were divided between their deeply wounded national pride and the dread of a contest with France under the sway of an unruly

multitude. Meanwhile General Duhesme, anxious about General Chabran, who was far from him, at Tarragona, wrote to Bayonne, that the course prescribed to this general for lending a hand to Marshal Moncey under the walls of Valencia was attended with too great danger, as well for Chabran's division itself as for the troops left at Barcelona. For these reasons he begged permission to recall him.

Such were the events in the north of Spain in consequence of the orders sent from Bayonne to the troops which were between the Pyrenees and Madrid. The orders transmitted through the medium of the staff of Madrid to the troops that were to act in the south were executed with the same punctuality. Murat was still in such a state as to be unable to issue any orders; but General Belliard, acting till the arrival of General Savary, himself despatched the emperor's orders to Marshal Moncey and to General Dupont. Marshal Moncey, with his first division, commanded by General Musnier, left Madrid to proceed by way of Cuença towards Valencia. General Dupont set out from Toledo with his first division, under the command of General Barbou, to direct his course through La Mancha towards the Sierra Morena. There were left therefore at Madrid two of Marshal Moncey's divisions, the imperial guard and the cuirassiers. Vedel's division, the second of Dupont's corps, took the position at Toledo left vacant by Barbou's division. Frère's division, the third of Dupont's, on its return from Segovia to the Escorial, took at Aranjuez the position left vacant by Vedel's division. In the capital and its environs there were consequently left nearly 30,000 infantry and cavalry, a force sufficient for the moment. From it was detached only one column of nearly 3000 men, with directions to proceed by way of Guadalaxara to Saragossa, but which got no farther than Guadalaxara.

Marshal Moncey commenced his march on the 4th of June, with a French corps of 8400 men, 800 of whom were hussars, and 16 pieces of cannon. He was to be followed by a body of 1500 good Spanish infantry, 500 horse of the same nation, which would have made his corps amount to more than 10,000 men, and to 15,000 or 16,000 under the walls of Valencia, in case of its junction with General Chabran's. Unluckily this junction was extremely doubtful, and what is more, in the night preceding the departure of the French division two-thirds of the Spanish troops deserted—a defection which so weakened the auxiliary corps, that it was not worth while to send it. Marshal Moncey, therefore, undertook his expedition with 8400 French troops, young, but ardent and highly disciplined. He passed the first night at Pinto, the second at Aranjuez, the third at Santa Cruz, the fourth at Tarancon, marching a very short dis-

tance every day, to avoid fatiguing his soldiers, and to accustom them to the heat as well as to marching. Arriving on the 7th at Tarancon, Marshal Moncey granted them a halt, and allowed them to remain there on the 8th. Marshal Moncey was anxious to spare both his soldiers and the inhabitants: he obtained everywhere provisions and a good reception. The Spaniards knew him from the war of 1793, and he had preserved a reputation for humanity which gained him favour with them. It is right to add that in these central provinces, no important city having given a patriotic impulsion, great tranquillity continued to prevail. Marshal Moncey had therefore no difficulty to overcome either for marching or for subsistence. He passed the night of the 9th at Carrascosa, of the 10th at Villar del Horno, and arrived on the 11th at Cuença.

On reaching that town he resolved to stop there, to procure intelligence as well concerning Valencia as General Chabran, on whom he reckoned for accomplishing his mission; but the mountains which separated him on the left from Lower Catalonia, on the right from Valencia, prevented all intelligence from finding its way to him. As for Valencia, nothing passed the defile of Requena. All that was known was, that the insurrection was violent and persevering there, that horrible massacres had been perpetrated, and that nothing could be done with the insurgent population but by force. Marshal Moncey, who was informed of the arrival of General Chabran at Tarragona, and who calculated that it would take that general till the 25th of June to proceed along the sea-coast to Tortosa and Castellon de la Plana, despatched an order to him to repair thither without delay, and made dispositions for not debouching himself into the plain of Valencia before the 25th of June. He resolved to stop at Cuença till the 18th, then to leave it for Requena, and not to force the defiles of the mountains of Valencia till a favourable moment for acting in concert with General Chabran. He purposed during these six days passed at Cuença to allow his troops to rest, to provide means of conveyance, and to procure information concerning the difficult and unfrequented road which he was about to travel. This methodical mode of proceeding might assuredly have its advantages, but also baneful consequences; for it gave the insurrection time to organise and to establish itself solidly at Valencia.

Meanwhile General Dupont was advancing at a very different rate towards Andalusia. Having left Toledo towards the end of May, he had been joined on the road by General Pryv's dragoons, who supplied the place of the cuirassiers for his corps, and by the two Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding. Barbou's division might be estimated at 6000 men present under arms; the seamen of the guard at about 500 or 600 men, excellent

for all services either on land or sea; the cavalry, composed of chasseurs and dragoons, at 2600; the artillery and engineers at 700 or 800; the Swiss at 2400; present under their colours.* General Dupont crossed La Mancha without difficulty, finding that province, generally deserted, still more deserted than usual, perceiving everywhere in the villages and hamlets signs of a repressed but violent hatred, and obliged to march with infinite precautions, so as not to leave any laggards in the rear. He passed, without encountering any resistance, the formidable defiles of the Sierra Morena, and arrived on the 3rd of June at Baylen, a place of sinister memory, and which, though he foresaw it not, was destined to become the theatre of the greatest calamities for him. There he was informed of the insurrection at Seville and in the south of Spain, the rising of the whole population, and the uniting of the troops of the line with the insurgents. There were still doubts, however, of the conduct of General Castaños, commandant of the camp of St. Roque, and hopes were entertained that he might still be retained for the cause of the new royalty; for several recent conversations between him and French officers had betrayed much hesitation and even a decided disapprobation of the insurrection. So much was certain that the three Swiss regiments of Tarragona, Carthagena, and Malaga, which were supposed to be collected at Grenada, and ready to join the French army on its route to Seville, had been enveloped in the insurrection, and hurried away by it. There might be danger for the fidelity of the two Swiss regiments which Dupont had with him, and there was nothing but victory that could attach them to us. The rising of Badajoz and Estramadura left little chance of being joined by Kellermann's division, sent from Lisbon to Elvas. These considerations, though far from cheering, were not of such a nature as to make General Dupont flinch; for after having so often encountered the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian armies, and always conquered them in spite of the disproportion of numbers, he cared but little for the mobs of peasants that he had before him. But while boldly marching towards them, he thought it right to apprise the general staff at Madrid of the extent of the insurrection, and to make application for the union of his whole corps, that he might be able to control Andalusia, in which, as he said, he should only have to take a conquering walk (*promenade conquérante*).

* These numbers are taken from the most authentic statements, and have not been adopted by me till after numerous verifications. It is important that they should be accurately given, because General Dupont, on his trial, attributed to himself a much less force than these figures assign, and because the accusation made it much greater. The strict truth is what I here give, after having verified the statements furnished by General Dupont, those which proceeded from the ministry of war, and lastly, those which formed the private statements of Napoleon.

Having debouched from the defiles of the Sierra Morena upon Baylen, and finding himself in the valley of the Guadalquivir, he turned to the right, and resolved to follow the course of the river, and proceed to Cordova, to deal a severe blow upon the advanced guard of the insurrection. Arriving on the 4th of June at Andujar, he there learned further particulars of the events in Andalusia, persisted more strongly in his resolution of marching sharply against the insurgents, but persisted still more strongly in claiming the speedy union of the three divisions which composed his *corps d'armée*.

At Andujar he learned with greater precision the difficulties which he should meet with on his way to Cordova. Augustin d'Echavarri, formerly employed, as we have related, in clearing the Sierra Morena of the banditti that infested it, had put himself at the head of these banditti, of the peasants of the country, and of the people of Cordova and the surrounding towns. He had, moreover, two or three battalions of provincial militia and some cavalry, the whole composing about 20,000 men, 15,000 of whom at least were undisciplined bands. This assemblage was called the army of Cordova, which was at this moment encamped on the Guadalquivir, at the bridge of Alcolea. Thoroughly despising such adversaries, General Dupont hastened to march straight up to them and to take the bridge, which could not equal that of Halle, taken by him with 8000 French from 20,000 Prussians. He continued therefore to descend the Guadalquivir, to approach Alcolea and Cordova. On the 5th he was at Aldea del Rio, on the 6th at El Carpio, at dawn on the 7th right facing the bridge of Alcolea.

The position which the insurgents had taken for covering Cordova was not ill chosen. The highroad to Andalusia, which as far as Cordova almost always follows the bottom of the valley of the Guadalquivir, is sometimes on the left, sometimes on the right of the river, running with it along the foot of the most beautiful, most luxuriant hills of that country, covered with olive and orange trees, superb pines, and some palms. Beyond these hills are perceived on the right and very near you the dark summits of the Sierra Morena, on the left and at a great distance the misty and bluish tops of the mountains of Grenada. The road, which is at first on the right of the Guadalquivir, crosses to the left at Andujar. At the bridge of Alcolea it again passes to the right, and runs to Cordova, situated in fact on that side, and on the very bank of the river, which it commands with its Moorish towers. Though in this part the Guadalquivir is everywhere fordable, especially in summer, it is nevertheless an obstacle of some consequence, and the possession of the bridge of Alcolea, affording a clear passage to artillery, had a sort of importance. This bridge is

long and narrow, and terminates at the village of Alcolea itself. The Spaniards had closed the entrance by means of a fieldwork consisting of an epaulement of earth and a deep ditch. They had manned and armed it with troops and artillery, and had taken care to scatter in advance, both on the right and left, a host of riflemen ambushed in the olive plantations. They had, moreover, obstructed the bridge, filled the village of Alcolea with peasants who were skilful marksmen, placed beyond it twelve pieces of cannon on a hill which commanded both banks, and drawn up, farther on, the rest of their force, upon an extensive plateau. To distract the assailants, they had prepared a diversion by making a column of three or four thousand men cross the Guadalquivir below Alcolea, and who, ascending the left bank which the French occupied, were to pretend to take them in flank while they were attacking the bridge of Alcolea in front.

It was necessary therefore for the French to clear away the swarm of riflemen posted in the olive-grounds, to attack the work, storm it, pass the bridge, make themselves masters of Alcolea, throw into the Guadalquivir the corps which had crossed it, then make a dash upon Cordova, which is only two leagues distant. They had time, for they had arrived at five in the morning in face of the enemy, on a splendid day in the month of June. General Dupont placed foremost Pannetier's brigade, formed of two battalions of the Paris guard and two battalions of the legions of reserve. He distributed some riflemen on the right and left, drew up Chabert's brigade in the second line, the Swiss in the third, and ranged on his left all his cavalry, under General Fresia, to be a check upon the corps that was ascending the Guadalquivir. He had taken the precaution to send the intrepid Captain Baste, with about a hundred seamen of the guard, to slip under the bridge for the purpose of examining whether it was undermined. He gave orders that the attack should be sudden and brisk, so that men might not be lost in skirmishing.

At a given signal, the French artillery and the tirailleurs having begun firing, the battalions of the Paris guard, commanded by General Pannetier and Colonel Estève, advanced upon the redoubt. The grenadiers threw themselves gallantly into the ditch, in spite of a smart fire of musketry, and mounting on one another's shoulders got into the work by the embrasures, while Captain Baste, having finished his reconnaissance, entered at the side. The redoubt being thus stormed, the grenadiers ran to the bridge, passed it with bayonets fixed, lost a few men, and particularly their captain, who had led them valiantly to the assault, and arrived at the village of Alcolea. The third legion followed them: it attacked with them the village of

Alcolea, defended by a host of insurgents. More men were lost here than in the attack of the bridge; but if we lost more, the insurgents also had more killed, and a great number of them were taken and put to death in the houses of the village. Alcolea was soon in our possession. During this warm engagement, General Fresia, on the other side of the Guadalquivir, had stopped the Spanish corps employed to make a diversion. Under the vigorous charges of our dragoons that corps soon fell back, and recrossed the Guadalquivir in disorder.

This brilliant action had not cost us more than 140 men killed and wounded. We had killed more than thrice as many in the interior of the village of Alcolea.

The bridge of Alcolea being carried, it took a few moments to fill the ditch of the redoubt, and to form a passage for the artillery and cavalry of the army. This was immediately done; the bridge was passed, and a battalion of the seamen of the guard left in charge of it. The main body of the Spaniards had rallied on the road to Cordova, on the summit of a plateau, which on one side was bounded by the Guadalquivir, and on the other connected with the Sierra Morena. The French army was at the foot of the plateau in close column, in battalions, the cavalry and artillery in the intervals. After allowing it to take breath, General Dupont gave orders to advance. At the mere sight of these troops, marching as if on parade, the Spaniards fled in confusion, abandoning to us the road to Cordova. Some more prisoners and part of their artillery were taken.

Our troops marched without intermission notwithstanding the scorching heat of the middle of the day, and at two in the afternoon came in sight of Cordova, its towers, and its beautiful mosque, now the cathedral, which overlooks the city. General Dupont had no notion of giving the insurgents time to recover themselves, and to occupy Cordova in such a manner as to render its reduction difficult to an army provided with field artillery alone. In consequence, he resolved to storm it at once. He purposed, however, to summon it, with a view to spare a capture by assault. He sent for the corregidor, who had secreted himself, as much for fear of the Spaniards as of the French. That magistrate did not make his appearance. The insurgents refused to listen to a priest who was sent to them, and fired upon all the French officers who approached to parley. Force was therefore the only means of getting into Cordova. Cannon were brought forward, and the gates broken open; and the French entered the city in column. They had to take several barricades, and to attack one by one many houses in which the banditti of the Sierra Morena posted themselves. The battle became furious. Our soldiers, exasperated by this

resistance, penetrated into the houses, killed the banditti who occupied them, and flung a great number of them out of the windows. While some maintained this conflict, the others had pursued in column the mass of the insurgents, who had fled by the bridge of Cordova to the Seville road. But the fight soon degenerated into a downright pillage; and that unfortunate city, one of the most ancient and most interesting in Spain, was sacked. The soldiers, after storming a certain number of houses at the cost of their blood, and killing the insurgents by whom they were defended, had no great scruple to establish themselves in them, and to exercise all the rights of war. Finding the insurgents whom they slew laden with pillage, they pillaged too, but rather to procure food and drink than to fill their knapsacks. The heat was suffocating, and what they most needed was drink. Going down to the cellars, stored with the best wines of Spain, they stove in the casks with the butt-end of their muskets, and several of them were drowned in the wine thus wasted. Others, completely drunk, paying respect to nothing, stained the character of the army by falling foul of the women, and subjecting them to all sorts of outrages. Our officers, always worthy of themselves, made incredible efforts to put an end to these horrible scenes, and some of them were obliged to draw their swords upon their own soldiers. The troops who had pursued the fugitives beyond the bridge of Cordova wished to enter the city in their turn to procure refreshment also—for they had received no distribution since the preceding day—and thus increased the desolation. The peasants, on their part, had fallen to plundering, and the unfortunate city of Cordova was at this moment ravaged at once by the Spanish banditti and by our exasperated and famished soldiers. It was a painful scene, and had most mischievous consequences, from the outcry which it subsequently produced in Spain and in Europe. General Dupont ordered the *générale* to be beaten to call the soldiers to their colours; but either they heard it not or they refused to obey, and of the whole army no part remained orderly but the cavalry and the artillery, which were outside Cordova, and attached to their ranks, the one by their horses, the other by their cannon. An enemy's corps, had it come back, would have caught all the infantry dispersed, gorged with wine, overcome by sleep and intoxication. It was this very fatigue, this hideous drunkenness, that put an end to the disorder; for our soldiers, unable to hold up any longer, had thrown themselves on the ground amidst the killed and the wounded, side by side with the Spaniards whom they had taken or slain.

Next morning, at the first sound of the drum, those same men, having become docile and humane as usual, repaired all of

them to their colours. Order was immediately re-established, and the unfortunate inhabitants of Cordova were rescued from the desolation into which they had been plunged for some hours. Excepting the archbishop's palace, which had been taken by assault, and where the staff of the revolt had its quarters, the sacred edifices in general had escaped the devastation, though the convents were reputed to be the principal focuses of the insurrection. The soldiers were separated from the inhabitants and lodged in huts in the public places. Their knapsacks were examined, and the money which they were found to contain was thrown into the chest of each regiment. Several depôts of specie had been taken, some belonging to the insurgents, and arising from the voluntary donations made by individuals and the clergy to the insurrection, others belonging to the public treasury. The whole of these funds went to the general chest of the army, to clear off the arrears of pay.* The inhabitants, taking courage by degrees, returned, and even formed a wish to keep the French army with them, that they might not be liable to have fresh battles fought in their streets and in their houses. It is a singular fact, and one which may enable us to appreciate the services that are to be expected of the Swiss, that two or three hundred of them who were serving with Augustin d'Echavarri came over to our side after the capture of Cordova; and that, at the same time, a nearly equal number of men of the two regiments which we had with us (Preux and Reding) left us to go over to the enemy. It was evident that these foreign soldiers, divided between their predilection for the French service and their old attachment to Spain, would waver between the two parties, and side definitively with that which should prove victorious. One could, therefore, scarcely rely upon them in case of reverses, notwithstanding the known and justly esteemed fidelity of the soldiers of their nation.

The thunderbolt which had struck Cordova had at once terrified and exasperated the Spaniards. But their hatred far surpassing their terror, they had soon formed throughout all Andalusia the plan of uniting in mass to crush General Dupont, and to revenge upon him the sack of Cordova, which they depicted everywhere in the darkest colours. They recapitulated even in the smallest villages the massacre of women, children, and aged men, the rape of virgins, the profanation of the sacred buildings—assertions atrociously false; for though the confusion had been very great for a moment, the pillage had been inconsiderable, the massacre null, with the exception of some insur-

* The only diversion, if such it were, consisted in the grant of a gratuity to the generals and superior officers, mentioned elsewhere in the accounts of the army, and for which they had the most urgent necessity. It varied between three and four thousand francs per head. This fact results from a strict and very detailed examination.

gents taken with arms in their hands. Throughout all Andalusia there was, nevertheless, but one cry against the French, who were already too much detested to need any false statements to augment the hatred which they excited. The people vowed to destroy them to the last man, and as far as they were able they kept their word.

No sooner had our troops passed the Sierra Morena, leaving scarcely any post on their rear, on account of their small number, than swarms of insurgents, driven from Cordova, spread themselves over their line of communication, occupying the defiles, taking possession of the villages which border the highroad, and murdering without pity all the French travellers, sick, and wounded, whom they met with. General René was thus assassinated with atrocious circumstances. At Andujar, the revolters of Jaen, taking advantage of our departure, made themselves masters of the town, and slaughtered a whole hospital of sick. But for the interference of a priest, the wife of General Chabert would have been murdered. At the village of Montero, between Andujar and Cordova, occurred an event worthy of cannibals. A detachment of 200 men had been left to guard a bakery, where it was intended that bread should be made for the army till it reached Cordova. The day before it was to enter that city, and consequently before the alleged ravages which it committed there, the inhabitants of the environs, some of whom had come from the Sierra Morena, while others issued from the neighbouring villages, fell unexpectedly and in considerable number upon the French post, and slaughtered the whole. With an unparalleled refinement of cruelty, they crucified upon trees several of our unfortunate soldiers. They hung up others, kindling fires beneath their feet. They buried several half alive, and sawed others between two planks. The most brutal, the most infamous barbarity spared these hapless victims of war no sufferings. Five or six soldiers who escaped as by miracle from the massacre brought the army this intelligence, which made it shudder, and disposed it to anything but clemency. Thus the war assumed an atrocious character, without, however, changing the hearts of our soldiers, who when the heat of battle was over again became mild and humane as they were accustomed to be, as they have been over all Europe, which they have traversed as conquerors, never as barbarians.

General Dupont, established at Cordova, availing himself of the resources of that large city to recruit his army, to repair his matériel, but having no more than about 12,000 men, including upward of 2000 Swiss upon whom he could not depend, could not prudently advance into Andalusia before the junction of Vedel's and Frère's divisions, left, the one at Toledo, the other

at the Escorial. He had most urgently applied for them, and with this reinforcement of 10,000 or 11,000 infantry, which would have raised his corps to at least 22,000 men, he calculated upon traversing Andalusia as conqueror, on extinguishing the flame raging at Seville, on bringing back General Castaños to King Joseph and the regular troops, on pacifying the south of Spain, on saving the French squadron of Admiral Rosily, and thus thwarting all the designs of the English upon Cadiz. He awaited, therefore, with impatience the demanded reinforcements, having no doubt of their speedy arrival after such despatches as he had sent to Madrid. It was, nevertheless, a question whether those despatches would arrive, all the old banditti of the Sierra Morena having become its defenders, and slaughtering the couriers without suffering one to pass.

But while General Dupont, who entered Cordova on the 7th of June, was waiting for reinforcements, the insurrection in Andalusia acquired greater consistence. The troops of the line, to the number of from twelve to fifteen thousand men, were concentrating around Seville. The new levies, though less numerous than had been hoped for, were nevertheless organising and began to be trained. Some of them were introduced into the ranks of the army to increase its effective, the others formed into battalions of volunteers. They were supplied with arms, and were receiving instruction. Time was therefore entirely to the advantage of the insurrection, which was preparing its means, and to the disadvantage of the French army, whose situation became worse every moment; for independently of the non-arrival of the reinforcements, the constantly increasing heat augmented the number of the sick, and especially affected the spirits of the soldiers. At the same time our squadron was exposed to great danger at Cadiz.

Ever since the unfortunate murder of Solano, the agitation had kept increasing in that city, where the lowest of the rabble had the rule. The new captain-general, Thomas de Morla, endeavoured to support himself by flattering the multitude, and by allowing it every day such an amount of excesses as could satisfy it. Immediately after butchering the Captain-General Solano, this multitude had set about demanding the destruction of our fleet and the massacre of the French seamen. It was a thing natural enough to desire, but difficult of execution, against five French ships of the line and a frigate, manned by three or four thousand seamen, who escaped from Trafalgar, and mounting from four to five hundred guns. They would have fired the Spanish ships and the whole arsenal of Cadiz before they would have suffered a single man to come on board of them. Add to this that, placed at the entrance of the road of Cadiz, near the city, mixed with the Spanish division, which was in

a state of equipment, they might destroy that and batter the city with their guns. The English, it is true, would have been called in, and our seamen would have succumbed under the cross-fires of the Spanish forts and the English ships; but they would have severely revenged themselves before they died on blind allies and barbarous enemies.

Thomas de Morla, who appreciated this situation better than the populace of Cadiz, was not willing to run the risk of such extremities; and he had, with his usual shrewdness, undertaken to negotiate. He had proposed to Admiral de Rosily to move his ships a little to one side, while working higher up into the road, to leave the Spanish division at the entrance, so as to separate the two squadrons and to prevent collisions between them, and thus to consign to the Spaniards alone the task of closing Cadiz against the English. It was said that they had resolved to do so; for though they had concluded a truce with the latter, they disclaimed all intention of putting into their hands the great naval establishments of Spain. They persisted, in fact, in refusing the aid of 5000 land-troops which had been offered them. Admiral Rosily, expecting every moment the arrival of General Dupont, whom he knew to be on march, had agreed to these proposals, certain of being in a few days master of the port and of the establishment of Cadiz. In consequence, he had separated his ships from the Spanish ships, and taken a position in the interior of the road, while the Spanish division continued to occupy the entrance.

Thus had passed the first days of June, which time General Dupont had employed in reducing Cordova. But Admiral Rosily had soon perceived that all the apparent intentions of the Captain-General Thomas de Morla were but a device for gaining time, and for preparing the means of overwhelming the French squadron in the interior of the road, while no great harm could result from it to Cadiz and its vast arsenal.

In order to form an idea of this situation, you must know that the harbour of Cadiz, resembling in this respect that of Venice and all those of Holland, is composed of spacious lagoons which have been formed by the alluvions of the Guadalquivir. Amidst these lagoons have been constructed basins, canals, building-yards, and superb magazines; and advantage has been taken of a group of rocks, situated at some distance in the sea, and connected with the shore by a pier, to form an immense road and to close it. Upon this group of rocks Cadiz is built. It is from the top of this group that it commands the road which bears its name, and that crossing its fires with the low ground of Matagorda, situated opposite, it renders entry impracticable to hostile fleets. The road opens to the west, and on the east extends a vast inlet, communicating by passages and

canals with the great establishments known by the general name of the arsenal of the Caracas. From this entrance, of which Cadiz has the command, to the Caracas is a distance of three leagues. The guns near the entrance are very numerous, for the purpose of beating off an enemy; but on penetrating into the interior, and amidst the lagoons, which have been made subservient to the formation of basins, the impossibility of pushing so far has rendered it needless to be prodigal of defences and batteries.

On seeing the mortars and howitzers brought by the united efforts of many hands to all the batteries which could act upon the middle of the road, on observing the equipment of gunboats and bomb-vessels, Admiral Rosily had no further doubt of the object of these preparations, and he formed the plan, at full moon, when the tides would be higher, to take advantage of the draught of water to push with his ships, completely armed, into the channels terminating at the Caracas. He should there be covered from the most formidable fires, able to defend himself for a considerable time, and to do a great deal of mischief before he yielded. But for this purpose he should have needed a west wind, and none but easterly winds were blowing. He was therefore obliged to suspend the execution of his design. Besides, the foresight of the Spanish officers soon rendered this manœuvre impossible. They sank old ships in the passages leading to the Caracas; they placed at anchor a line of gunboats and bomb-vessels carrying very heavy artillery. They did the same on the other side towards Cadiz, where they placed another line of gunboats and bomb-vessels, and also sank old ships. The squadron, therefore, was shut up in the centre of the road, fixed in a position which it could not quit, exposed to the fire of all the batteries on shore and of all the gunboats, and cut off from the means of moving to a spot where it might have done the greatest mischief.

On the 9th of June, all these preparations being finished, M. de Morla, without taking the trouble to parley, issued orders for the fire upon the squadron of Admiral Rosily to commence. Twenty-one gunboats and two bomb-vessels on the side next to the Caracas, twenty-five gunboats and twelve bomb-vessels on the side next to Cadiz, opened their fire upon our vessels. The *Prince of the Asturias* had been brought near to the line of gunboats next to Cadiz, to serve them for a support. The land-batteries, covered with strong epaulements which screened them from our projectiles, added to all these fires those of sixty pieces of cannon of large calibre, and of forty-nine mortars. Under a shower of balls and bombs our five ships and the frigate, which completed the squadron, behaved with a coolness and vigour worthy of the heroes of Trafalgar.

Unfortunately, the state of the tide prevented them from reaching the land-batteries, which they would have demolished, and they received the fire of the latter without being able to return it in an efficacious manner, on account of the thickness of the epaulements; but they revenged themselves on the bomb-vessels and the gunboats, a good number of which they shattered and sunk. The firing, commenced on the 9th at three in the afternoon, lasted till ten at night. Next day, the 10th, it began again at eight in the morning, and was kept up without intermission till three in the afternoon, and with the same circumstances as on the preceding day. At the conclusion of this dreary combat, we had received 2200 bombs, of which only a few had fallen on board, without doing any considerable damage. We had thirteen men killed and forty severely wounded. But fifteen gunboats and six bomb-vessels were destroyed, and fifty Spaniards were hors de combat. It would have been of little consequence had there been any prospect of obtaining a great result: it was too much, a thousand times too much, for a fight without any possible result, and which could only terminate in a useless butchery. Thomas de Morla, who conceived he had done enough to satisfy the populace of Cadiz, and who dreaded some act of despair, sent an officer with a flag of truce to summon Admiral Rosily to surrender; representing the impossibility for the French to defend themselves in the middle of a closed road, and in which they were prisoners. He then caused it to be insinuated that the Spaniards were dissatisfied, if the admiral assented, to offer an honourable arrangement. Admiral Rosily sent for answer that to surrender was inadmissible, for the crews would mutiny and refuse to obey; that he offered the choice of two conditions—either to leave Cadiz upon a promise from the English that they would not pursue him for four days; or to remain motionless in the road, the general events of the war should have decided his fate. He then proposed that of Cadiz, engaging to send his guns ashore, that no harm might be felt on that score. M. de Morla replied that he would not assent to either the one or the other of these conditions, and that he was obliged to refer the matter to the junta of Seville, which had become the absolute authority, and was obeyed by everybody in the south of Spain. Whether the proposal of this new delay was a feint or not on the part of M. de Morla, who perhaps sought again to gain time for preparing her means of destruction, it suited Admiral Rosily to agree to it; for it was known that General Dupont entered Cordova on the 7th of June, and his arrival was momentarily expected. He consented, therefore, waiting every day, as one awaits the announcement of life or death, for the report of the distant gun, signal of the presence of the French army.

Having entered Cordova on the 7th, it was, in fact, likely enough that General Dupont might be on the shore of Cadiz by the 13th or the 14th. But during this interval the environs became covered with redoubts, cannon, and formidable means of destruction. The admiral, aware that, unless he were delivered by General Dupont, he should sink under that mass of fires, and lose to no purpose three or four thousand sailors, the best belonging to France, formed a desperate plan, which was not calculated to save them, but which offered at least a chance of salvation, and at any rate, the satisfaction of revenging himself by destroying many more men than he should lose. Though the passages on the side next to Cadiz for sailing out of the road were obstructed, the admiral had discovered a practicable outlet, and resolved, whenever the firing recommenced, to fall furiously upon the Spanish division, which was very ill armed and not more numerous than his own, to burn it before the arrival of the English, to attack these latter the moment they appeared, to destroy, or to get destroyed, trusting to chance to save the whole or part of his squadron. But for this act of despair was required a first fortunate accident—a favourable wind. He waited, therefore, after making all the preparations for departure, either for the appearance of General Dupont, or for an acceptable answer from Seville, or for a fair wind.

The 14th of June arrived, and neither of these circumstances was realised. General Dupont had not appeared; the junta of Seville required a pure and simple surrender; and as for the wind, it blew from the east, towards the furthest extremity of the road, instead of impelling towards the outlet. It was precisely the wind that could have been wished for a few days earlier, for falling upon the Caracas, before the channels were obstructed. The enemy's means were trebled. Nothing was left but to submit to a slow and infallible destruction, under a cannonade to which it was impossible to reply in such a manner as to be revenged. Surrender would leave at least a chance of being released from prison in a few days by a victorious French army. The admiral was therefore obliged to strike his flag without any other condition than that life should be spared. The brave sailors of Trafalgar, always unfortunate through the combinations of a policy which had the continent in view much more than the sea, were again sacrificed here and made prisoners by an allied nation, which, after having so ill seconded them at Trafalgar, revenged upon them general events of which they were not the authors. The ships were disarmed, and the officers conducted prisoners into the forts, amidst the frantic plaudits of a ferocious populace. Thus terminated at Cadiz itself the maritime alliance of the two nations, to the great joy of the French who had landed, and who were conducting themselves

port of Cadiz as though it had belonged to them. Thus vanished one after another the illusions which had been formed concerning the Peninsula, and each of them, as it vanished, left behind a prospect of immense danger.

Admiral Rosily had succumbed, because General Dupont had not arrived in time to lend him a hand. What was about to happen to General Dupont himself, thrown with 10,000 young soldiers amidst insurgent Andalusia? It had been calculated that all would go on smoothly with him; that five or six thousand Swiss would reinforce him by the way; that a French division, quietly traversing Portugal, would join him by Elvas, and that he might thus march upon Seville and Cadiz with 20,000 men. But the greater part of the Swiss, enveloped by the insurrection, had given themselves up to it. Portugal, beginning to participate in the emotion of Spain, was not easier to traverse, and General Kellermann had scarcely been able to reach Elvas with his cavalry. All the facilities anticipated from the ancient submission of Spain were transformed into difficulties. Every village became a den of cut-throats for our soldiers; provisions disappeared, and nothing was left but a burning climate.

General Dupont, when he paused in Andalusia, had been far from suspecting such a state of things. He had never relied much either upon the Swiss, who were to meet him at Grenada, or on the French division from Portugal that was to join him. He had reckoned upon his own troops, upon the junction of his two divisions, and at the head of 20,000 French he had not doubted for a moment of accomplishing the object of his mission to Andalusia. But it was a question whether his couriers could have reached Madrid, where his two divisions had been detained, in the uncertainty of what might have happened in the centre of Spain. He tarried, therefore, for about ten days at Cordova, awaiting instructions and succours, which did not arrive. Meanwhile the intelligence of the disaster of the squadron, that of the defection of the Swiss and of the troops in the camp of St. Roque, and the answer given by General Castaños to an envoy whom he had sent to him, proving that he was irrevocably engaged in the insurrection, completely revealed to General Dupont the danger of his situation. On one side he beheld the army of Andalusia coming against him, on the right, from Seville, and on the other the army of Jaen, on the left, from Grenada. The latter was for the moment the most dangerous, for it was but a step from Jaen to Baylen, at the head of the defiles of the Sierra Morena, from which the general was about twenty-four leagues distant while staying at Cordova. Such a situation was not tenable, and he could not abandon to the enemy the possession of the passes of the Sierra Morena without perishing. It was bad

enough to leave there the undisciplined bands of Augustin d'Echavarri which infested them, and stopped couriers and convoys. He took, therefore, though with regret, the resolution to leave Cordova, and to fall back to Andujar, where he should be upon the Guadalquivir, seven leagues from Baylen, and much nearer to the defiles of the Sierra Morena. Thus, instead of the *conquering walk* through Andalusia, he was obliged to make a retrograde movement.

As nothing pressed him, he executed this retreat slowly and orderly. He set out in the evening of the 17th of June, purposing to march during the night, as it is customary to do at this season in so hot a climate. From what had been heard of the cruelty of the Spaniards, none of the sick or wounded who could bear the fatigue of removal would be left behind. It was necessary, therefore, to be followed by an immense train of carts, which took above five hours to file off, and which the Spaniards and English in their newspapers afterwards called ammunition waggons filled with the plunder of Cordova. The troops had found 600,000 francs at Cordova, and carried off very little church plate. Most of this plate had been restored, and three or four waggons would have been sufficient to carry away the greatest possible booty in valuable effects. But the wounded, the sick in considerable number, many officers' families, who had accompanied our army into Spain, where it seemed destined for a long occupation rather than for an active war, were the cause of that endless train of baggage. Some sick and wounded, however, were left at Cordova, under the care of the Spanish authorities, who, for the rest, kept their word given to General Dupont, to have the greatest attention paid to them. If, in fact, the odious massacres which we have related were to be feared in Spain, in the hamlets and villages of which ferocious peasants were masters, they were less to be apprehended in the large towns, habitually under the rule of a humane and respectable *bourgeoisie*, who were strangers to the atrocities committed by the populace.

The troops had no hostility to repel during the march; but on reaching Montero the army was horror-struck on beholding the bodies of Frenchmen, surprised singly by the enemy, suspended to trees, half buried in mould, and torn to tatters. Never had our soldiers committed or suffered anything of that kind in any country, though they had warred everywhere—in Egypt, in Calabria, in Illyria, in Poland, in Russia. The impression produced upon them was profound. Though violently exasperated, they were far more grieved about the fate which awaited such of them as might be either wounded or sick, or delayed upon a road owing to fatigue, hunger, or thirst. A sort of dejection seized the army, and left behind it mischievous traces.

They arrived the next day, June the 18th, at Andujar on the Guadalquivir. All the inhabitants, fearing that vengeance would be wreaked upon them for the massacres committed as well at Andujar as in the neighbouring hamlets, had fled, so that this little town was found absolutely deserted. Search was made in it for provisions, and a sufficiency was discovered for the first days. General Dupont placed in Andujar itself the seamen of the guard, who were the most steady and best conducted troops that he had with him. He sent out emissaries to persuade all the inhabitants to return, promising that no harm should be done to them, and he actually succeeded in bringing them back. The town of Andujar afforded some resources for the sick and wounded, which were used sparingly, so as not to be uselessly exhausted. Efforts were also made to procure means of subsistence, either with money, a certain sum of which the army had brought with it, or by well-organised marauding expeditions. Andujar had an old bridge over the Guadalquivir with Moorish towers, which served for *tête de pont*. The towers were filled with picked troops. Some works were thrown up on the right and left. The first brigade was then posted upon the river, and a little in advance the second, to the right and left of Andujar, the Swiss in rear of that town, the cavalry at a distance in the plain, observing the country to the foot of the mountains of the Sierra Morena. In short, such an establishment was formed that, with much activity in procuring supplies of provisions, the force under General Dupont might have maintained its ground for a considerable time, and awaited in security the reinforcements solicited at Madrid.

In this resolution to fall back in order to be nearer to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, all would have been well had the best position with respect to those defiles been taken. Unluckily this had not been done, and it was a first fault of which General Dupont had afterwards to repent. The real motive for leaving Cordova and the resources of that large city was the fear of seeing, on the left of the army, the insurgents of Grenada, advanced as far as Jaen, passing the Guadalquivir at Menjibar proceeding to Baylen, and closing the defiles of the Sierra Morena. As at Cordova Dupont was 24 leagues from Baylen, that distance rendered the danger immense. At Andujar, it is true, he was not more than seven leagues from Baylen; but at seven leagues there was left a chance of seeing the enemy make a sudden dash upon the defiles. Moreover, beyond Baylen there were other avenues by which it was possible also to penetrate into the defiles of the Sierra Morena: there was the Baeza and Ubeda road running to La Carolina, the point at which the defiles really begin. It was therefore necessary to watch from Andujar over Baylen, and not over Baylen alone, but over

Baeza and Ubeda, which would require redoubled attention. The course most fitting to be pursued on leaving Cordova would have been to adopt in its fullest extent the prudent idea which induced the abandonment of that town, and to have proceeded at once to Baylen, where the French force by its mere presence would have guarded the head of the defiles, and where by means of patrols of cavalry one might easily have observed the secondary road to Baeza and Ubeda. Baylen had other advantages besides. It presented a fine position, on lofty hills, in good air, whence one could perceive the whole course of the Guadalquivir, and fall upon any enemy that attempted to cross it. No doubt if this river had not been fordable in more than one place, one might have taken post on its very banks for the purpose of being nearer at hand to defend the passage of it; but as the Guadalquivir could be crossed at an infinite number of points, the best plan would have been to establish one's self a little in rear, on a commanding position, from which one might see everything, and fall upon any corps that should have passed the river and flung it into the ravine that serves for its bed. Baylen possessed precisely all these advantages. The sacrifice of Andujar, as the centre of resources, was too unimportant a matter to cause the reasons which we have just enumerated to be overlooked. It was therefore, we repeat it, a real fault to stop at Andujar instead of going to Baylen itself, to cut short any attempt of the enemy upon the defiles. For the rest, it would not have been impossible, with a vigilant superintendence, to repair this fault and to prevent its consequences. General Dupont, then, established himself at Andujar, awaiting intelligence from Madrid which did not arrive, for rarely did a courier succeed in crossing the Sierra Morena.

Such was, at the end of June, the result of the first efforts that were made to suppress the Spanish insurrection. General Verdier had dispersed the assemblage at Logroño, General Lasalle that at Valladolid and in Old Castille. General Lefebvre had driven back the Aragonese into Saragossa, but had been stopped before that city. General Duhesme, at Barcelona, was obliged to fight every day to keep himself in communication with General Chabran, who had been despatched toward Tarragona. Marshal Moncey, marching upon Valencia, had proceeded no further than Cuença, waiting there till Chabran's division should have approached nearer to him. Lastly, General Dupont having arrived victorious at Cordova, after taking and sacking that city, had fallen back towards the defiles of the Sierra Morena, on account of which he had apprehensions, and had changed the position of Cordova for that of Andujar. The French squadron at Cadiz had just surrendered for want of succour.

All these details were not known at Madrid and Bayonne. There nothing more was known than what related to Segovia, Valladolid, Saragossa, and at farthest Barcelona. Entire or nearly entire ignorance prevailed respecting the south of Spain. If anything was learned at Madrid, it was by means of secret emissaries belonging to the convents or to the great houses of Spain. Among the Spaniards devoted to Ferdinand VII. were joyfully circulated tidings that the French squadron was destroyed; that the regular troops of Andalusia and from the camp at St. Roque were advancing upon General Dupont; that he had been obliged to decamp; that he was blockaded in the defiles of the Sierra Morena; that Marshal Moncey would not get out of other defiles quite as difficult, those of Requena; that Saragossa continued invincible; that the check received by Don Gregorio de la Cuesta at Valladolid was nothing; that this general was coming with General Blake at the head of the insurgents of the Asturias, Galicia, and Leon, to cut off the French from the road to Madrid; that the new King Joseph, who had been to set out every day from Bayonne, would not set out at all; and that the formidable French army would probably soon be obliged to evacuate the Peninsula. These tidings, false or true, having once reached Madrid, were inserted in manuscript bulletins, or in newspapers printed in the recesses of convents, and circulated throughout the whole Peninsula. Abundant collections made for the benefit of the insurgents indicated the joy that was felt at Madrid on account of their successes, and the desire that prevailed to furnish them with all possible succours.

The French staff collected these reports, and though wholly disbelieving them, it was nevertheless uneasy, and transmitted them to Bayonne. The unfortunate Murat had so strongly insisted on returning to France, that notwithstanding the desire which was felt to retain at Madrid this phantom of authority, he received permission to set out, and availed himself of it with the eagerness of a child. General Savary had, therefore, become the avowed head of the French administration, and made all Madrid tremble at his threatening countenance, and his reputation of being an inflexible executer of the commands of his master. Full of sagacity, he perfectly appreciated the situation, and disguised nothing of its alarming nature from Napoleon. Having conceived apprehensions for the advanced corps of Marshal Moncey and General Dupont, he resolved to spare troops from Madrid, and to send off two divisions for the south of Spain. A convoy of biscuit and ammunition already despatched to General Dupont had been stopped at Val de Peñas, and an obstinate battle had to be fought before it could pass that village. General Savary directed Vedel's division,

consisting of nearly 6000 infantry, from Toledo upon the Sierra Morena, with orders to clear the defiles and to join his general-in-chief. It was calculated that the latter, having set out with 12,000 or 13,000 men, and having, with Vedel's division, 17,000 or 18,000, would be enabled to maintain his ground in Andalusia. He was enjoined, at any rate, to secure the defiles of the Sierra Morena, to prevent the insurgents from penetrating into La Mancha. General Savary, however, endued with a very sure tact, and guessing that General Dupont was most compromised, on account of the regular troops of the camp of St. Roque and Cadiz, was preparing to send to him to Madridejos, that is to say, half-way to Andujar, his third division, that commanded by General Frère, which would have made his corps amount to 22,000 or 23,000 men, and would have placed him above all events. Upon an observation of Napoleon's, however, he sent Frère's division not to Madridejos, in the centre of La Mancha, but to San Clemente. At San Clemente it would not be further from General Dupont than at Madridejos, and it might, in case of need, go to the assistance of Marshal Moncey, of whose situation no more was known than of General Dupont's, and whom there was no further hope of succouring by Tarragona, for General Chabran, obliged to fall back upon Barcelona, had returned to that city.

These precautions being taken, General Savary conceived that he might be easy about the two French corps sent to the south of Spain, and await the course of events. At Madrid there were left but two divisions of infantry, the second and the third of Marshal Moncey's corps, the imperial guard, and the cuirassiers. These were sufficient for the moment; for the arrival of King Joseph with fresh troops would soon replace the forces of the centre on a respectable footing. General Savary, however, with the approbation of the emperor, renounced the idea of sending a column toward Saragossa, and left to the staff of Bayonne the duty of bringing before that insurgent city a force capable of reducing it.

At this moment the constitution of Bayonne, as we have seen in the preceding Book, was just completed. It was of importance to hasten the departure of Joseph for Madrid for two reasons: in the first place, the necessity of transferring to a successor Murat's authority of lieutenant-general; and secondly, the urgency of forwarding to Madrid the reinforcements detained for the purpose of escorting the new king. Napoleon had, in fact, made arrangements for procuring him a reserve of old troops, one part of which was to accompany him to Madrid, another to reinforce Marshal Bessières, by the way, in order to make head against the insurgents of the Asturias and Galicia, who were bringing up to the fight the insurgents of Old

Castille, beaten at the bridge of Cabezon under Gregorio de la Cuesta; while a third and last was to go before Saragossa and contribute to the reduction of that important city. Napoleon, as we have said, had brought from Paris to the camp of Boulogne, from the camp of Boulogne to Rennes, from Rennes to Bayonne, six old regiments, the 4th light and 45th of the line, the 2nd and 12th light, lastly, the 14th and 44th of the line, two battalions of the guard of Paris, the troops of the Vistula, and several marching regiments. To the six regiments of old formation ordered to Spain, he had added two taken from the Rhine, the 51st and the 49th of the line; and he had directed that there should be drawn from the banks of the Elbe four others of the greatest value, the 32nd, 58th, 28th, and 75th of the line, which formed part of the troops of observation of the Atlantic: this was a total of twelve old regiments added to the provisional corps originally sent to Spain. He thus prepared at Bayonne a considerable reserve to meet the difficulties of that war, which had greatly increased in magnitude. He did not limit his precautions there. Apprehensive lest the bands of Navarre, Aragon, and Upper Catalonia might come and insult the French frontier, which would be a severe mortification for a conqueror who, two months before, fancied himself master of the Peninsula from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar, he formed four columns along the Pyrenees, each from 1200 to 1500 strong, composed of horse gendarmerie, national guards of the élite, mountaineers of the Pyrenees, organised in rifle companies, lastly, some hundred Portuguese, relics of the Portuguese army carried to France. These columns were to keep guard on the frontier, to repel any insult of the guerillas, and to descend the back of the Pyrenees, to lend a hand to the French troops if they were in want of it.

For the Eastern Pyrenees, however, this was not sufficient; and it was necessary to afford succour to General Duhesme, blockaded in Barcelona. Things had come to such a pass in this province, that the fort of Figueras, into which a small garrison had been introduced when the Spanish fortresses were surprised in March last, was completely blockaded, and likely to be obliged to surrender for want of provisions.

Napoleon resolved to form there a small corps of seven or eight thousand men, under one of the ablest of his aides-de-camp, General Reille, to send him with a convoy of provisions to Figueras, and to unite him afterwards, under Girona, with General Duhesme, in order to increase the corps of Catalonia to about 20,000 men. But it was not easy to collect such a force in Roussillon, no troops being in general stationed either in Provence or in Languedoc. Napoleon nevertheless found means to accomplish this. To the column of gendarmerie, national

guards, mountaineers, and Portuguese, under General Ritay, which was to guard the Eastern Pyrenees, he added two new Italian regiments, one of cavalry, the other of infantry, which formed part of the Tuscan troops, and which he had taken the precaution to move off early for Avignon. There were in Piedmont the corps from which Chabran's French division and Lechi's Italian division had been taken. Napoleon borrowed from them fresh detachments, easily found owing to the abundance of conscripts in the dépôts, and directed them towards Languedoc, by the designation of marching battalions of Catalonia. He took, moreover, at Marseilles, Toulon, and Grenoble several third battalions, which were in dépôt in those cities, a battalion of the 5th legion of reserve, stationed at Grenoble, and lastly, addressing himself to all the regiments which had their dépôts on the banks of the Saone and the Rhone, and which could send in a few days detachments to Avignon, he borrowed one company from each, and formed with them two excellent battalions, which he called the first and second provisional battalions of Perpignan. It was with this industry that he contrived to collect a second corps of seven or eight thousand men for Catalonia, without weakening either Italy or Germany in a perceptible manner. Fortunately for him, the tranquillity prevailing in France allowed him to spare without inconvenience even troops in dépôt. These troops, it is true, of all countries, of all formations, some of them Italians, others Swiss, Portuguese, and French, mostly young and not seasoned, exhibited odd assemblages, and would not have been good for much but for the ability of the officers appointed to command them.

These measures being taken for bringing the requisite forces upon the frontier of Spain, Napoleon turned his attention towards disposing of them conformably to the wants of the moment. He had successively directed upon Saragossa the three infantry regiments of the Vistula, part of Verdier's division, with General Verdier himself, a great quantity of siege artillery, and a column of national guards of the élite, raised in the Pyrenees, the whole forming a corps of ten or eleven thousand men. He commissioned General Verdier to take the direction of the siege, General Lefebvre-Desnoettes being only a cavalry officer, and gave him one of his aides-de-camp, General Lacoste, to direct the operations of the engineers. There was every reason to hope that, with such a force and abundance of artillery, that insurgent city would be reduced. Napoleon, however, destined for it some more of his old regiments on march toward the Pyrenees.

He then turned his attention to organising with the regiments arrived at Bayonne the corps of Marshal Bessières, which was commissioned to cover the march of Joseph to Madrid, and to make head against the revolvers of the north, the reports con-

cerning whom became daily more and more alarming. Of the six old regiments sent for, four had arrived—the 4th light and the 15th of the line, and the 2nd and 12th light—and the two Paris battalions. Napoleon placed them under the command of the brave general of division, Mouton, who had been in Spain ever since the French entered that country, and formed two brigades out of them. The first, composed of the 2nd and 12th light, and detachments of the imperial guard, was commanded by General Rey. The second, composed of the 4th light and the 15th of the line, with a battalion of the guard of Paris, was commanded by General Reynaud. The old division of General Verdier, part of which had accompanied him to Saragossa, was wholly joined to Merle's division, and formed into four brigades, under Generals Darmagnac, Gaulois, Sabattier, and Ducos. The cavalry general, Lasalle, who had already the 10th and 22nd chasseurs, and a detachment of grenadiers and horse chasseurs of the imperial guard, was to join with them the 26th chasseurs and a provisional regiment of dragoons. Mouton's division might be computed at 7000 men, that of Merle at 8000 and some hundred, that of Lasalle at 2000, in all 17,000 men. Various small corps, composed of dépôts, convalescents, marching battalions and squadrons, formed at St. Sebastian, Vittoria, and Burgos garrisons for the safety of those towns, and increased to 21,000 men the corps of Marshal Bessières, destined to keep down the north of Spain, to repress the revolt of Castille, the Asturias, and Galicia, to cover the road to Madrid, and to escort King Joseph.

Thus Napoleon had already sent successively more than 110,000 men into Spain, 50,000 of whom, spread beyond Madrid, were divided between Andujar, Valencia, and Madrid, under General Dupont, Marshal Moncey, and General Savary; 20,000 of whom were in Catalonia, under Generals Reille and Duhesme; 12,000 before Saragossa, under General Verdier; 21,000 or 22,000 around Burgos, under Marshal Bessières; and some thousand scattered in the various dépôts on the frontier. Against troops of the line, and for a regular war with Spain, this would have been a large force, perhaps even larger than would have been needed, though our soldiers were young and unseasoned. Against a whole nation in insurrection, keeping nowhere in the open country, barricading every town and every village, intercepting convoys, murdering the wounded, obliging every corps to send out detachments, which weakened it to such a degree as to reduce it to nothing, we shall see that it was far too small. It would have required immediately 60,000 or 80,000 men, and veteran troops too, to suppress this formidable insurrection, and probably they might have succeeded. But Napoleon would not draw from any other source than the dépôts on the

Rhine, the Alps, and the coasts, and had no idea of diminishing the great armies which ensured his empire in Italy, Illyria, Germany, and Poland; a new evidence of that truth so often repeated in this history, that it is impossible to act at once in Poland, Germany, Italy, and Spain without running a risk of being insufficient upon one or other of these theatres of war, and soon perhaps on all.

The moment having arrived for making Joseph enter Spain, Napoleon decided that one of the two brigades of Mouton's division, Rey's brigade, taking the new king to Irun, should escort him through the whole extent of Marshal Bessières' command, which comprehended from Bayonne to Madrid. His new ministers, Messrs. O'Farrill, Azanza, Cevallos, and Urquijo, some of them taken from the very council of Ferdinand VII., the others from anterior cabinets, all united by the pressing interest of sparing Spain a horrible war by rallying about the new dynasty, accompanied him, with the members of the former junta. More than a hundred carriages, travelling at the same pace as the troops, composed the royal train. Joseph was mild, affable, knew very little of Spanish, and still less of Spain itself, and by his face, his language, his questions, showed but too plainly that he was a foreigner. Received, therefore, and judged of with a malevolence that was quite natural, he furnished matter for the most unfavourable interpretations. Stopping every night in a small town or a large village, attempting to hold conversations with the principal inhabitants in which he had difficulty to join, he afforded subject for mirth by his strange manners and his un-Spanish accent. Though he sometimes touched them by his visible good-nature, on leaving him they nevertheless drew a thousand pictures, more or less ridiculous, of the *intruder* king, as they called him. Most of them chose to say that Joseph was an unhappy man, forced to reign against his will in Spain, and a victim of the tyrant who oppressed his family as well as the world.

The impressions experienced by Joseph at Irun, Tolosa, Vittoria were deeply melancholy, and his weak soul, which had already regretted more than once the kingdom of Naples during the days passed at Bayonne, was filled with poignant grief on seeing the whole nation over whom he was called to reign risen in arms against him, slaughtering the French soldiers, or getting slaughtered by them. From Vittoria, Joseph's letters evince deep affliction. *I have nobody for me*, were the first words which he addressed to the emperor, and which he most frequently repeated. *We want fifty thousand old troops and fifty millions; and if you delay, we shall want a hundred thousand men and a hundred millions*—such was daily the conclusion of all his letters. Leaving to the French generals the cruel task

of suppressing the rebellion, he naturally reserved for himself the part of clemency, and to all his demands for men and money he began to join daily complaints of the excesses in which the French military indulged, setting himself up for their constant accuser, and the equally constant apologist of the insurgents—a species of crimination which could not fail soon to produce mischievous differences between him and the army, and to irritate Napoleon himself. It is too true that our soldiers committed many excesses; but those excesses were far less than what the atrocious cruelty of which they were the victims might have deserved.

There was no need of this correspondence to reveal to Napoleon the full extent of the fault which he had committed, though he would not acknowledge it. He now knew all: he knew the universality and the violence of the insurrection. But he had found the insurgents so prompt to run away in the open field, that he hoped to be able to reduce them without too great an expenditure of strength. "Have patience," he replied to Joseph, "and have good courage. I will not let you want any resource; you shall have troops in sufficient quantity; with a tolerable administration, you will never be at fault for money in Spain. But do not set yourself up for the accuser of my soldiers, to whose devotedness you and I owe what we are. They have to do with brigands, who murder them, and whom they must repress by terror. Strive to gain the affection of the Spaniards, but do not discourage the army; that would be an irreparable fault." To these lectures Napoleon added the most rigid instructions for his generals, expressly recommending to them not to take anything, but to exercise merciless severity against revolters. Not to plunder, but to shoot, in order to take away the motive and the disposition to revolt, became the order most frequently expressed in his correspondence.

While Joseph's journey was performing at the pace of the infantry, the contest continued with various vicissitudes in Aragon and Old Castille. General Verdier, arriving before Saragossa with 2000 men of his division, and finding the different reinforcements successively sent by Napoleon, such as the Polish infantry and the marching regiments, had about 12,000 men and a numerous artillery brought from Pampeluna. He had already caused the outer positions to be carried by General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, cooped up the besieged in the place, and erected numerous batteries through the exertions of General Lacoste. On the 1st and 2nd of July he resolved, on the urgent importunity of Napoleon, to try a decisive attack with twenty pieces of cannon of large calibre, and 10,000 foot-soldiers led to the assault. The city of Saragossa is situated wholly on the

right of the Ebro, and has but one suburb on the left. Unfortunately General Verdier had not succeeded, notwithstanding the repeated orders of the emperor, in throwing a bridge over the Ebro, so as to be able to move the cavalry to any quarter, and to deprive the besieged of their communications outside the city. Provisions, stores, reinforcements of deserters and insurgents reached it, therefore, without difficulty, by the suburb on the left bank, and almost all the insurgents of Aragon had by degrees collected in the place. Situated entirely, as we have said, on the right bank, Saragossa was surrounded by a wall, flanked on the left by a strong castle, called the castle of the Inquisition, in the centre of a massive convent, that of Santa Engracia, and on the right by another solid convent, that of St. Joseph. General Verdier had ordered a powerful breaching battery to be directed against the castle, and had reserved for himself this attack, the most difficult and the most decisive. He had directed two other breaching batteries against the convent of Santa Engracia in the centre, and against the convent of St. Joseph on the right, and had confided these two attacks to General Lefebvre-Desnoettes.

On the 1st of July, at a given signal, the twenty mortars and howitzers, supported by the whole of the field artillery, opened a violent fire, as well upon the strong buildings which flanked the wall of the enclosure as upon the city itself. More than 2000 bombs and 1200 balls were thrown into that unfortunate city, and set it on fire in several places without daunting in the least its defenders, who were mostly strangers, and who, posted in the houses contiguous to the points of attack, had not much to suffer. Under the direction of some Spanish engineer officers they had placed in battery 40 pieces of cannon, which punctually replied to ours. They had, at those points where we could have presented ourselves, columns composed of soldiers who had deserted from the Spanish army, and not fewer than 10,000 peasants in ambush in the houses. On the morning of the 2nd of July, large breaches having been made in the castle of the Inquisition and the two convents which flanked the enclosure, our troops rushed to the assault with the ardour of young and inexperienced soldiers. But they were received on the breach of the castle of the Inquisition with so terrible a fire that they were quite staggered; and in spite of all the efforts of the officers, they durst not penetrate any further. The result was the same at the centre, at the convent of Santa Engracia. On the right only General Habert succeeded in forcing the convent of St. Joseph, and in procuring entrance into the city. But when he attempted to penetrate into it, he found the streets barricaded, the houses furnished with a thousand loopholes, and vomiting showers of balls. The soldiers of Austerlitz and

Eylau would, no doubt, have endured this fire with greater coolness; but before material obstacles of this kind, they might not perhaps have made more progress. It was evident that against such a resistance new and more powerful means of destruction were required, and that instead of marching men uncovered past such houses to be killed, they must be battered down by cannon-balls over the heads of those who defended them.

General Verdier, retaining the convent of St. Joseph, which he had taken on the right, ordered his troops to return to their quarters, after losing from four to five hundred men killed and wounded—a very serious loss out of an effective of 10,000 men. The great number of officers who had suffered proved what efforts they had had to make to support their young soldiers in the face of such difficulties.

General Verdier resolved to wait for reinforcements, and particularly for more powerful means in artillery, before he renewed the attack upon a place which it had been at first thought possible to reduce in a few days, and which held out much better than a regularly fortified town. Napoleon, apprised of this state of things, sent him immediately the 14th and 44th of the line, which had just arrived, and several convoys of heavy artillery.

The tidings of this resistance excited extreme emotion throughout all the north of Spain, and greatly increased the boasting of the Spaniards. Joseph, on arriving at Briviesca, received on all sides proofs of their hatred of the French, and their confidence in their own strength. He everywhere met with either solitude, or coldness, or an incredible degree of pride; as if the Spaniards had gained over us the thousand victories which we had gained over Europe. It was, in particular, the army of Don Gregorio de la Cuesta and of Don Joaquin Blake, composed of the insurgents of Galicia, Leon, the Asturias, Old Castille, coming towards Burgos by Benevente, that was the principal foundation of their hopes. They had no doubt that a signal victory would soon be gained by this army over the troops of Marshal Bessières; and then this victory, added to the resistance of Saragossa, could not fail, according to them, to set at liberty all the north of Spain. There was no certain intelligence from the south; but the sinister rumours concerning the situation of Marshal Moncey at Valencia, of General Dupont in Andalusia, redoubled, and were aggravated from day to day; and at all events, said the Spaniards, they would both be obliged very soon to retreat, in order to repair the checks sustained in the north. It was, in fact, the opinion of Napoleon that the danger was now greatest in the north, for the north was the base of operations of our armies; and he had

ordered Marshal Bessières to take with him Merle's and Mouton's divisions, excepting Rey's brigade, left for Joseph; to join with them Lasalle's division of cavalry; to march briskly to meet Blake and Cuesta, to dash upon them, and to beat them at any price. To be master in the north, on the route from Bayonne to Madrid, was, according to him, the primary interest of the army, the first condition for maintaining itself in Spain. While strongly recommending to General Savary's attention that south, so impenetrable, so little known, he had enjoined him to send to Marshal Bessières by way of Segovia all the forces which were not indispensably needed in the capital; for, said he, a check in the south would be a misfortune, but a serious check in the north would be perhaps the loss of the army, at least the loss of the campaign, for they should be obliged to evacuate three-fourths of the Peninsula, to recover the position lost in the north.

Accordingly, Marshal Bessières left Burgos on the 12th of July, with Merle's division, with half of Mouton's division (Reynaud's brigade), and with Lasalle's division, forming a total of 11,000 infantry and 1500 horse, as well chasseurs and dragoons as cavalry of the guard. With these forces he marched resolutely towards the great assemblage of the insurgents of the north, commanded, as we have said, by Generals Blake and de la Cuesta.

The captain-general, Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, had retired into the kingdom of Leon after his mishap at the bridge of Cabezon; and though extremely dissatisfied with the insurrection, the imprudence of which had exposed him to a disastrous check, he was anxious to repair it, and had endeavoured to introduce some order into the confused elements of which the insurgent army was composed. He had two or three thousand regular troops, and about seven or eight thousand volunteers, citizens, students, men of the lower classes, peasants. To this assemblage he purposed to add the levies of the Asturias, and in particular those of Galicia, much more efficient than those of the Asturias, because they comprehended a great part of the troops of Taranco's division, which had returned from Portugal. The Asturians, thinking first of themselves, and fancying that they were invincible in their mountains so long as they continued shut up in them, had refused to comply with the invitation of Cuesta, and merely sent him two or three battalions of regular troops. But the junta of Coruña, less prudent and more generous, had decided, in spite of General Don Joaquín Blake, who had succeeded the Captain-General Filangieri, that the forces of the province should be sent in a body into the plains of Old Castille, to try there the fortune of arms. Don Joaquín Blake, sprung from one of those English Catholic

families which went to seek their fortune in Spain, was a soldier by profession, for which he had been well educated. In employing the troops of the line which he had at his disposal, he had exerted himself to compose a regular army capable of making head against an enemy so broken in to war as the French. He had swelled the skeletons of his troops of the line with a part of the insurgents, and with the rest formed battalions of volunteers, which he exercised every day, in order to give them some consistency. Whether he was desirous not to measure his strength too early with the French, or whether he was really aware how far a good organisation decides everything in war, he solicited a few months more before descending into the plains of Castille, and he proposed in the meantime to have his army trained behind the mountains of Galicia. Overruled by the will of the junta, he was obliged to march, and to advance as far as Benevente. He might have taken with him 27,000 or 28,000 troops, half old battalions, half new ones; but he left behind two divisions at the débouche of the mountains, and with three, which formed an effective of 15,000 or 18,000 men, he pursued his march along the road to Valladolid. He formed his junction with Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, in the environs of Medina de Rio Seco, on the 12th of July. These two generals were not formed to agree. One was imperious and testy, the other displeased at being obliged to come and risk himself in the open country against an enemy hitherto invincible, and consequently was not disposed to be particularly compliant. Gregorio de la Cuesta assumed the command as being senior officer, and he had an interview with his colleague at Rio Seco to concert operations. Between them they could bring into line from 26,000 to 28,000 men. With better soldiers they might have had some chance of success against the French, who numbered no more than from 11,000 to 12,000.

Medina de Rio Seco is seated on a plateau. On the left (for the Spaniards) runs the Burgos and Palencia road, by which the French under Marshal Bessières were coming; on the right, that of Valladolid. At dawn of day, which at that season of the year takes place very early, the Spanish generals discovered that they were mistaken, and de la Cuesta, who had set himself in motion last, halted, taking care to appuy to the left towards the Palencia road, by which the French were advancing. Conceiving himself to be more in danger, he applied for assistance to Blake, who hastened to send him one of his divisions. The Spanish generals therefore found themselves ranged in two lines; the first of which, placed in advance and more to the right, was commanded by Blake; the second, considerably in rear and more to the left, was commanded by de la Cuesta. They continued motionless in this situation, awaiting the French

on the summit of the plateau, and too much accustomed to manœuvres to rectify so close to the enemy the position which they had taken.

Marshal Bessières, who after a rapid march had 9000 or 10,000 infantry and 1200 horse left, in presence of 26,000 or 28,000 men, felt not the slightest uneasiness on that account; for he had the highest opinion of his soldiers. With two old regiments, the 4th light and the 15th of the line, and some squadrons of the guard, he deemed himself capable of overturning all before him. The brave Bessières, a cavalry officer, brought up in the school of Murat, born, like him, in Gascony, had much of his brag, his promptness, and his bravery. He was advancing with his troops to the foot of the plateau of Medina de Rio Seco, when he perceived in the distance the two Spanish lines, one behind the other, the second with its left projecting considerably beyond the first. He resolved to take advantage of the distance left between them to get upon the flank of the first, and after breaking it, to dash in mass upon the second. He advanced immediately; General Merle, on his left, being to attack Blake's line; General Mouton, on his right, being to flank Merle, and then to throw himself upon de la Cuesta's line. The cavalry followed under the brave and brilliant Lasalle.

Our young troops, sharing the confidence of their generals, climbed the plateau with extraordinary assurance. They resolutely attacked Blake's line by its left, under a violent fire of artillery, for the artillery was the best thing about a Spanish army. Having come within musket-shot, they poured in a well-directed fire, having been much exercised since they entered Spain. They then marched up to the enemy's line and attacked it with the bayonet. The Spaniards gave way; a charge by General Lasalle with the chasseurs completely upset them, and the left of the first Spanish line being overthrown, the second was left uncovered. At this sight, part of the latter spontaneously moved forward and gallantly endeavoured to make head against our troops, taking advantage of the disorder which success itself had produced in our ranks. It checked them in fact for a moment, and the Spaniards succeeded in laying hands on one of our batteries which had followed the movement of our infantry. It was supported in this effort by the life-guards and the royal carabineers, who charged valiantly. The Spanish foot, supposing themselves conquerors, were already throwing their hats into the air and shouting *Viva el rey!* But Marshal Bessières had in reserve 300 horse, as well grenadiers as horse chasseurs of the imperial guard, who started off at a gallop, shouting on their part, *Vive l'Empereur! Plus de Bourbons en Europe!* They overturned in an instant the life-guards and

the royal carabineers, treating them as they had treated at Austerlitz the horse-guards of the Emperor Alexander. General Merle, having completed the overthrow of the first line, that of Blake, then fell upon the centre of the second, de la Cuesta's; General Mouton attacked on his side. It could not hold out long against this double attack of the young soldiers of General Merle and the veteran soldiers of General Mouton. The second Spanish line, overthrown like the first, gave way entire, and fled in disorder over the plateau of Medina de Rio Seco, seeking to escape towards that town. At that instant Lasalle's 1200 horse, rushing upon a mass of 25,000 fugitives, seized with inexpressible terror, throwing away their arms, setting up howls of despair, made a horrible carnage among them. Presently this immense plain exhibited a most lamentable spectacle, for it was strewed with four or five thousand wretched men cut down by the swords of our cavalry. The vast fields of battle in the north which we had covered with so many corpses were not a more hideous sight. Eighteen pieces of cannon, many colours, and a great quantity of muskets thrown away in the flight, were left in our hands. While the cavalry, having no other means of making prisoners but to strike the fugitives, furiously plied their swords, the infantry had hastened to the town of Medina. Its inhabitants, on the false report of some soldiers who had left the field of battle before the end of the action, conceived that the Spanish army was victorious, and were all at the windows; but they were soon undeceived on seeing the torrent of fugitives pouring along before their eyes. Part of the Spanish soldiers, recovering their courage behind walls, stopped to make resistance. General Mouton, with the 4th light and the 15th of the line, entered at the point of the bayonet, and overthrew all the obstacles that were opposed to him. Amidst this tumult, the soldiers, behaving as in a town taken by assault, fell to pillaging Medina, which was given up for a few hours to their discretion. The Franciscan monks, who had fired upon the French from the windows of their convent, were put to the sword.

This sanguinary victory, which subjected to us the whole north of Spain, and for some time discouraged the insurgents of those parts from descending into the plain, had cost us but 70 killed and 300 wounded. It was the successful effect of an attack well conceived and executed with great vigour.

The news of the victory of Rio Seco produced, at least for the moment, a notable change in the language and dispositions of the Spaniards. They were not quite so confident that the north—that is to say, the Madrid road—would soon be wrested from us, and that our whole establishment in the Peninsula would be razed to the foundation.

Joseph, continuing to proceed at the same slow rate, had reached Burgos. He had endeavoured to gain hearts on the way by dint of obligingness and affectation of humanity, always allowing the French soldiers to be in the wrong and the insurgents in the right. Perceiving, however, that the conquests which he made were an inadequate compensation for the time which he lost, receiving also repeated solicitations from General Savary to come and show himself in his new capital, and emboldened, above all, by the victory of Rio Seco, he put an end to his useless caresses of people who made no return for them, and repaired at once from Burgos to Madrid. He entered the city on the evening of the 20th, amidst a cold curiosity, hearing not a shout except from the French army, which, though far from pleased with him, hailed in his person the glorious emperor, for whom it was ready everywhere to fight and to die. Joseph, though he had entered Madrid after a victory of the French army, which ought to have restored the balance of opinion in his favour, found there, as everywhere else, a repugnance to approach his person that was truly mortifying. The ministers who had accepted office were dismayed, and declared to him that had they foreseen to what a degree the country would have been inimical to the new royalty, they would not have espoused his cause. The members of the junta of Bayonne dispersed by degrees. The magistrates composing the Council of Castille, who had been so bitterly accused of complying with all Murat's wishes, refused the oath. The members of the clergy alone, obeying the injunction to *render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's*, had come to greet in him the royalty *de facto*, and especially the brother of the author of the Concordat. Joseph expressed himself before them in the most emphatic manner in favour of religion; his words, and especially his attitude, affected them, and their language, after their interview with him, had produced a good effect in Madrid. The diplomatic body, out of courtesy, not to the new King of Spain, but to the Emperor of the French, were eager to pay their homage to him. Some of the grandees of Spain, habitual and inevitable associates of the court, could not refrain from presenting themselves, and out of all these—French generals, foreign ministers, superior clergy, courtiers coming from habit—Joseph had been enabled to form a court of tolerably respectable appearance, which speedy victories would easily have changed into a court respected and obeyed, if not beloved.

But if the French had gained a signal victory in the north, they felt great doubt of obtaining a similar victory in the south. A month had elapsed without receiving intelligence from General Dupont, and to learn what had become of him, his second division, General Vedel's, which had been sent to release him

from blockade, had been obliged to pass by main force the defiles of the Sierra Morena. Tidings had thus been gained of the capture of Cordova, the subsequent evacuation of that city, and the establishment of the army at Andujar. Ever since the insurrection had closed upon him and General Vedel, like the sea upon a ship that is ploughing its billows, and again no information was received concerning him. As for Marshal Moncey, nothing had been known for a long time about his situation, of which, at length, intelligence was obtained. What had befallen him during the very different events in Castille, Aragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia was as follows.

We have seen him waiting at Cuença till General Chabran should be able to advance to Castellon de la Plana; while General Chabran had been obliged to turn back, lest he should be definitively cut off from Barcelona. The latter had even been obliged to exert considerable vigour to pass through the insurgent hamlets of Ambos, Vendrell, and Villafranca, and to rejoin his general-in-chief, who had gone as far as Bruch to meet him. Both had entered Barcelona, where they were obliged every day to fight obstinate battles with the insurgents, who came to the very gates of the city to attack them.

Marshal Moncey, who was ignorant of these circumstances, had waited from the 11th to the 17th of June at Cuença, and then conceiving that sufficient time had elapsed for General Chabran to be approaching Valencia, he had set himself in motion upon the almost impassable road of Requena, adding to his too protracted stay at Cuença a slowness of march beneficial, no doubt, for his troops, who left not a man behind, but very detrimental to the general plan of operations. He had passed through Tortola, Buenache, and Minglanilla, where he had arrived on the 20th. On the 21st he was on the bank of the Cabriel, having before him several battalions of the enemy, one of which consisted of Swiss troops, in ambuscade at the bridge of Pajazo, in one of the most difficult of positions to be forced. The Cabriel rolls at this place amidst frightful rocks. You have to pass through a narrow defile to the bridge which crosses it, and after passing this bridge another quite as difficult defile remains to be cleared. The insurgents of Valencia, who had been allowed time to establish themselves in this position, had obstructed the bridge, planted cannon in advance of it, and placed thousands of tirailleurs on the neighbouring rocks. Marshal Moncey brought to this point by a very rugged road some pieces of cannon drawn by hand, caused the obstacles accumulated upon the bridge to be removed, then detached to the right and left columns which, fording the Cabriel, turned the posts in ambush on the rocks, killed a great number of the enemy, and thus made himself master of the position.

The 22nd was passed by Marshal Moncey in resting himself, and in rendering the road more passable for his artillery and baggage. On the 24th he arrived in front of a long and narrow defile leading through the mountains of Valencia into the famous plain, so renowned for its beauty, called the Huerta of Valencia. This defile, known by the name of the defile of Las Cabreras, and formed by the bed of a rivulet which must be forded six times, was reputed to be impregnable. Marshal Moncey had by his dilatoriness allowed the insurgents to take post and to multiply their means of resistance there. To overcome in front the obstacles which were opposed to us was almost impossible, and must have cost enormous losses. Marshal Moncey directed General Harispe, the hero of Biscay, to take with him the nimblest men, the best marksmen, and after making them put off their knapsacks, to conduct them over the surrounding heights on the right and left, to dislodge the Spaniards from them, and to neutralise the defences of the defile by turning them. General Harispe, after incredible efforts and a thousand petty fights, conquered, rock by rock, the approaches to the position, and at length succeeded in descending upon the rear of the Spaniards who were defending the defile. At this sight the enemy fled, leaving to the army a pass which could not have been forced if the attack must have been made in front. Marshal Moncey, victorious, again halted at the Venta of Buñol, to give time for the baggage to rejoin and for his artillery to be repaired. The roads which he had travelled had, in fact, put it into a very bad state. The wild country which they had been traversing was destitute alike of the means of repair and the means of subsistence. But the whole of the Spanish artillery, having fallen into the hands of the French, furnished a change of pieces; and on the 26th the column set itself in motion for Chiva. Next day, the 27th, it debouched in the beautiful plain of Valencia, intersected by a thousand canals by which the water of the Guadalquivir is distributed in all directions, covered with hemp of extraordinary height, studded with orange-trees, palms, and the whole vegetation of the tropics. This was a sight to cheer our soldiers, tired of the dreary places which they had traversed. But if, thanks to the slowness of their march, they arrived in tolerably good condition, all rallied to their colours, sufficiently fed, and quite capable of fighting, they also found, in consequence of this same tardiness, the enemy well prepared, and able to defend his capital. At the village of Quarte, two leagues from Valencia, they had to cross the great canal which turns off the waters of the Guadalquivir, to repair the bridge over that canal, which was broken down, to carry the village of Quarte, besides a multitude of petty posts ambushed on the right and left in the houses on

the plain, or hidden by the height of the hemp. These obstacles detained our men not long; they crossed the canal, repaired the bridge, carried the village, and running over the fields and the small canals, killed, with the loss of some of their own men, the numerous *tirailleurs*, who poured a shower of balls upon them from every side.

At night they bivouacked under the walls of Valencia. Marshal Moncey resolved to storm the city by attacking the two gates of Quarte and St. Joseph, which were the first that presented themselves to him in coming from Requena. Valencia was surrounded by a massive wall having water at its foot. *Chevaux-de-frise*, obstacles of all sorts covered the gates; and thousands of insurgents, posted on the roofs of the houses, were ready to pour down a most murderous fire of musketry.

On the 28th, at daybreak, Marshal Moncey, having obliged the enemy's *tirailleurs* to fall back, directed two columns of attack against the gates of Quarte and St. Joseph. The first obstacles were speedily overcome; but on approaching the gates it was necessary before employing cannon to wrench off the *chevaux-de-frise* which covered them. Our gallant young fellows dashed several times through the fire with hatchets to perform these perilous operations. But after several attempts directed by the engineer General Cazals, and productive of considerable losses, it was found to be impossible to force the gates, the object of our attacks. Had they even proved successful, it would have been discovered, as at Saragossa, that the ends of the streets beyond were barricaded, and there would have been so many new assaults to make. After acquiring this conviction, Marshal Moncey called off his troops, remaining, however, master of the suburbs which he had taken.

This sanguinary attempt, which had cost him 300 men killed and wounded, furnished him with a subject for much reflection. He had brought with him eight thousand and some hundred men. He had already left behind on his route a thousand sick or hors de combat. He had just learned from prisoners that General Chabran had fallen back upon Barcelona. He had before him a city of 60,000 souls, increased to at least 100,000 by the assemblage within its walls of all the husbandmen of the plain, determined to defend themselves to the death, from the apprehension which they entertained that the French would revenge upon them the odious massacre of their fellow-countrymen. For conquering such a resistance the marshal had no heavy artillery. He very wisely renounced, therefore, all idea of renewing an attack which had no chance of success, and which would only have augmented the difficulties of his retreat by augmenting the number of the wounded to be carried along with him. He had the good sense, when this resolution was

once taken, to execute it without delay. He had been informed that the Captain-General Cerbellon, who was not in Valencia, but in the open country, at the head of the insurgents of the province, was then with 7000 or 8000 men on the banks of the Xucar, a small river, which, after turning the mountains of Valencia, falls into the sea a few leagues from that city at Alcira. The presumed intention of the captain-general was to cross the Huerta, and to post himself in the defiles of Las Cabrerias, in order to bar the passage of them against the French. This would have been a serious difficulty; for Marshal Moncey, having already lost the best soldiers of his *corps d'armée*, and carrying with him a great quantity of wounded, might possibly fail in an operation in which he had once been successful. Besides, the highroad, which, to avoid the mountains of Valencia, crosses the Xucar at Alcira, and runs through the province of Murcia to Almansa, though rather longer, was much better. Marshal Moncey resolved, therefore, to march direct for Xucar, to force the defile of Almansa, and to return by Albacete.

Arriving on the 1st of July on the banks of the Xucar, there found the insurgents of Valencia and Carthagea posted behind the river, the bridge of which they had broken down. The army forded the Xucar at three points, then repaired the bridge, and sent over its immense baggage. It rested on the 2nd. On the 3rd, apprised that other insurgents purposed to defend the pass of the mountains of Murcia, called the defile of Almansa, he hastened to get through it, met with no serious difficulty, repulsed the insurgents everywhere, and even took from them their artillery. Resuming his slow and methodical march, he arrived on the 5th at Chinchilla, on the 6th at Albacete. There he learned with real joy that Frère's division, which at first had been placed at Madridejos *en échelon* on the road to Andalusia, and which had since been placed, by order of the emperor, at San Clemente, was close to him; and on the 10th of July he effected his junction with it.

He brought back his division in good condition, though fatigued, and had not left behind either one wounded man or one gun. But we must repeat it, if his tardiness had allowed him to bring back his division entire, it had caused him to fail in reducing Valencia, which he would certainly have taken, as General Dupont had taken Cordova, if he had marched briskly enough to surprise the insurgents before they had had time to make their preparations for defence. At any rate, his slow and firm manner of marching amidst insurgent provinces, beating the enemy everywhere, and not strewing the roads with baggage, wounded, sick, had a merit which Napoleon took a certain pleasure in acknowledging and proclaiming.

While Marshal Moncey was executing this difficult march,

the province of Cuença, at first quiet, then rising, had taken the hospital which Marshal Moncey had established there for the reception of his sick. General Savary had been obliged to send General Caulaincourt with a column of troops to punish it. The latter had inflicted on the town of Cuença two hours' pillage, of which the soldiers had availed themselves to their great material profit, but to the great moral injury of the army.

The events at Valencia had preceded by some days the battle of Rio Seco, but they were not known at Madrid till nearly about the same time as that battle. Though the Spaniards triumphed much in the obstinate resistance which we had met with before Saragossa and Valencia, and though this resistance revealed the necessity for serious attacks, in order to the reduction of great insurgent cities, still we kept the field everywhere in a victorious manner. The insurgents could not make their appearance in any quarter without being immediately dispersed. General Duhesme, rejoined by General Chabran, had left Barcelona along with him, stormed the fort of Mongat, taken and sacked the little town of Mataro, and though he had failed in the escalade of Girona, he had returned to Barcelona, spreading terror upon his route, and exercising an energetic repression. General Verdier, still detained before Saragossa, had sent a column under General Lefebvre which had chastised the town of Calatayud. Lastly, at Rio Seco, as we have seen, we had annihilated the only considerable army that had yet appeared before us. Our ascendancy was therefore ensured in the north. The difficulty lay in the south. There General Dupont, encamped on the Guadalquivir, and backed on the Sierra Morena, had to do with an army which appeared numerous, composed not only of insurgents, but of troops of the line. The Spaniards did not merely keep the field before him, but reduced him to the defensive in the position of Andujar; and if any disaster happened at this point, the insurgents of Andalusia and Grenada, joining those of Carthagen and Valencia on the one hand, those of Estramadura on the other, could cross La Mancha and appear before Madrid in considerable force, which would give the war a totally new aspect. Such a misfortune, indeed, was far from being apprehended, notwithstanding the reports circulated by the Spaniards on this subject. General Dupont, in fact, had received Vedel's division, which raised his *corps d'armée* to 16,000 or 17,000 men. Confidence was placed in his tried ability: it was not imagined that the general who before Albeck had found himself with 6000 men opposed to 60,000 Austrians, who had extricated himself from this situation and taken 4000 prisoners, could succumb to undisciplined insurgents, among whom Marshal Bessières, with so few soldiers, had just made such frightful slaughter. But if confidence was felt, it was not

wholly unmixed with anxiety. In accordance with Napoleon, who could only direct the military operations from a distance, and with that uncertainty of direction produced by time and distances, General Savary had sent General Gobert to Madridejos, to replace there Frère's division, the third of General Dupont's, employed, as we have seen, in aiding Marshal Moncey towards San Clemente. General Gobert had orders to proceed to the middle of La Mancha, and if circumstances rendered it necessary, to advance to the Sierra Morena, and there join General Dupont. He went, therefore, to do the duty of third division under that general, instead of Frère's division, engaged elsewhere. One of his regiments having already been sent off as convoy to Andujar, he brought with him only three regiments of infantry, but very fine ones, though young, and a superb provisional regiment of cuirassiers, commanded by an excellent officer, Major Christophe. This junction effected, no doubt seemed possible respecting events in Andalusia. But General Savary's precautions were not limited to this. He had brought under Madrid Musnier's division, returned from Valencia, Frère's division, sent to its support, Caulaincourt's column, directed to punish Cuença. He had always had Morlot's division of Moncey's corps, the imperial guard, and he had just received Rey's brigade, which had served as escort to King Joseph. This still formed a total of 25,000 men, which, had there not been many wounded and sick, would have exceeded 30,000. With this force he had sufficient to baffle all the hopes of the Spaniards. The latter persisted, nevertheless, in asserting that Saragossa would not surrender any more than Valencia; that General Dupont would be obliged to repass the Sierra Morena; that the insurgents of Estramadura, Andalusia, Grenada, Carthagená, and Valencia would presently be at his heels; that those of the north would soon make their appearance again on the Burgos road; and that before this mass of forces the new royalty would be obliged to return from Madrid to Bayonne. The French, on the contrary, expected soon to see Saragossa carried by assault; General Verdier's army, set at liberty, marching back to Valencia with Marshal Moncey's corps; General Dupont, victorious, advancing into Andalusia, and reducing the whole south of Spain to submission. One or other of these alternatives must be realised, according to what was to happen in Andalusia. All eyes, both of Spaniards and French, were, in consequence, at this moment (from the 15th to the 20th of July) exclusively directed towards that quarter.

General Dupont, as we have already had occasion to relate, had come, on leaving Cordova, and established himself at Andujar on the Guadalquivir, an ill-chosen position, for he had much better been at Baylen itself, at the entrance of the defiles, which

he would have closed by his mere presence, and where he would have found himself in a healthy, elevated, and commanding position, from which he could throw into the Guadalquivir all who should attempt to pass it. This general, as we have likewise said, had placed Pannetier's brigade a little to the left and in advance of the bridge of Andujar, Chabert's brigade a little in rear and on the right, the seamen of the guard in Andujar itself, the two Swiss regiments in rear of the town, the cavalry at a distance in the plain. He had been left there, without any attempt to disturb him, during the whole of the concluding part of June and the first half of July, because the insurgents of Andalusia and Grenada had need of that time to organise themselves, to concert measures, and to effect a junction between Cordova and Jaen. The only hostility that he had experienced was the occupation of the Sierra Morena by a host of banditti, who murdered couriers and intercepted convoys. Echavarri's men were so intently on the watch that not a single horseman could pass between Puerto del Rey and La Carolina without being robbed; women and even children mounting guard incessantly, and giving notice of every individual the moment he came in sight. During this pernicious inaction of nearly a month, partly occasioned by the delay of the reinforcements applied for, General Dupont had sent out several detachments round about him to chastise the insurgents and to procure provisions. He had sent to Jaen, Captain Baste, of the seamen of the guard, an officer equally intelligent and intrepid, with the commission to punish that town, which had contributed to the massacres of our wounded and our sick, and to draw from it the resources in which it abounded. Captain Baste, with a battalion, two pieces of cannon, and about a hundred horse, had daringly entered Jaen, put the inhabitants to flight, and brought back an immense convoy of provisions, wine, and all sorts of medical stores.

Unfortunately, General Dupont, not considering the inconveniences attached to the position of Andujar, but having a confused notion of them, was always uneasy about Baylen and the ferry of Menjibar, which affords a passage across the Guadalquivir before Baylen. In consequence, he had not failed to place a detachment there, and to make incessant reconnaissances in that part. His anxiety extended still further, for he was obliged to push his reconnaissances to the left of Baylen, as far as Baeza and Ubeda, whence ran a cross-road, by Linares, in the rear of Baylen, to the environs of La Carolina, quite close to the entrance of the defiles. Here we may repeat that he would not have been under this concern had he taken post at Baylen itself, which he would have guarded by his mere presence, and where a few patrols of cavalry sent towards

Baeza and Ubeda would have been sufficient to secure him from all surprise. His most usual concern, however, was about provisions, though he was in rich Andalusia. Sheep, which abounded in Castille and Estramadura, were not so plentiful in the Sierra Morena, where scarcely any animals but goats were to be met with, the flesh of which is not wholesome or nutritious. Wheat was scarce, the crop of the preceding year having been consumed or destroyed by the insurgents. That of the current year was still standing. The soldiers were obliged to cut the corn themselves in order to have bread, and in general they had but half rations. They had barley given them instead, which they boiled with their meat. They had but a single mill for grinding their corn, on the bank of the Guadalquivir, and they had frequently to defend this mill against the attacks of the enemy. On this parched soil they were destitute of fresh vegetables. The wine, though excellent at some distance, at Val de Peñas could come only through the Sierra Morena, for Val de Peñas is in La Mancha. It was not obtainable but by means of money, and was reserved exclusively for the sick. Vinegar, so useful in hot countries, was not to be had. The water of the Guadalquivir was almost always lukewarm. For the young soldiers, not accustomed to extreme climates, this long stay at Andujar became detrimental and dangerous. Independently of the wounded, there were a great number of sick, attacked by dysentery. The privation of all news added to bodily suffering a feeling of profound dejection. Still the soldier, though not much seasoned by war, had a sense of his own superiority and great confidence in his general, and was desirous of having occasion to measure his strength with the enemy.

The arrival of Vedel's division soon afterwards served to increase this confidence. Having set out in the last days of June, it had arrived on the 26th at Despeña Perros, at the entrance of the defiles, had forced them, killing some of Augustin d'Echavarri's men, and had then debouched on La Carolina, a pretty German colony, founded towards the end of last century by Charles III. The narrow valley by which you cross the Sierra Morena somewhat widens at La Carolina, a little more at Guarroman, and still more at Baylen, where it opens completely, debouching on the Guadalquivir. Between La Carolina and Baylen terminates that cross-road which we have mentioned, and which leads from Baeza or Ubeda to the entrance of the defiles.

Vedel's division, having halted at La Carolina, and put itself in communication with General Dupont, had taken position at Baylen itself, having one battalion in rear to guard the entrance of the defiles, and two in front to guard the ferry of Menjibar across the Guadalquivir.

No sooner had General Vedel joined than General Dupont assigned him his position, recommending to him extreme vigilance on his rear and on his left, lest the enemy should possess himself of the defiles, and close them against the French army. After the arrival of General Vedel, the inconvenience of leaving Baylen unoccupied was less, but there was still that of being in a defensive position, six leagues from one another, behind a river that was everywhere fordable. A daring enemy could, in fact, pass it in the night, and place himself between our two divisions. Now, notwithstanding the junction of General Vedel, the number of the French troops in presence of the insurgents of Andalusia was not so considerable that they could divide without danger. The corps of Dupont was much weakened by sickness. Barbou's division could not present more than about 5700 men to the enemy, 6400 including the engineers and artillery; the seamen were at most 400, the dragoons and chasseurs 1800, which formed a total of 8600 French. The Swiss, sometimes sending deserters to the insurgents, sometimes receiving deserters from them, were reduced to 1800, and in a sort of wavering state which forbade their being trusted in all cases. Vedel's division brought 5400 men of all arms and twelve pieces of artillery. With General Dupont's 8600 men, and General Vedel's 5400, there were 14,000 combatants, 16,000 including the Swiss. This number was not too large, even if kept united, before the 40,000 or 50,000 insurgents, whose coming was announced. Gobert's division having soon afterwards arrived, and brought a reinforcement of about 4700 men, infantry and cavalry included, the corps of General Dupont was gradually augmented to the desired force (which, however, was not more than 18,000 French and 2000 Swiss) at the very moment when the insurgents were deciding to take the offensive. With Gobert's division, General Dupont received intelligence of the check sustained before Saragossa and Valencia, of the retreat of Marshal Moncey upon Madrid, of the insulated situation in which this retreat placed the army of Andalusia, and at the same time a recommendation to keep firmly upon the Guadalquivir, but not to penetrate further into Andalusia. It would have been imprudent, in fact, in the then state of things, to advance further into the south of Spain.

At this moment there appeared favourable opportunities for striking severe blows at the insurrection without abandoning the defensive. The insurgents of Grenada under General Reding, partly Swiss, partly Spaniards, had marched to Jaen to the number of 12,000 or 15,000. While the insurgents of Grenada were thus advancing towards Jaen, those of Andalusia, under General Castaños, to the number of twenty and odd thousand, having ascended the Guadalquivir, arrived before Bujalance,

and from some bands of *tirailleurs* and some patrols of cavalry it might be inferred that they were not far off. Though military espionage was impossible in Spain, for not a peasant would betray the cause of his country (a noble sentiment, which redeemed the ferocity of that people, and accounted for it), yet it was easy, from the signs picked up every moment of that double march, to form a correct idea of it, and consequently to oppose it. General Dupont might very well, by leaving Gobert's division at Baylen and Menjíbar, advance with Barbou's and Vedel's divisions beyond the Guadalquivir, place himself with 14,000 or 15,000 men between the enemy's two armies, beat them one after the other or both together, and return to his position after mauling them roughly. Whatever might be their force, there was no rashness in encountering them in the proportion of one against two. This operation, which would have obliged him to make a forward movement of three or four leagues, was assuredly no infraction of the order not to penetrate into the south of Spain. If, however, this resolution appeared to him too bold, he could, while keeping a strict defensive and waiting for the enemy, unite with Vedel and Gobert at Baylen itself, and he was very certain, with 20,000 men in that position, to crush any force that should present itself. To leave Andujar for Baylen was no infraction either of the order not to repass the Sierra Morena, any more than to advance four leagues to oppose an active defensive to the enemy was an infraction of the order not to penetrate into Andalusia.

Motionless in presence of the Spaniards, conceiving nothing, ordering nothing, General Dupont, who had at last three divisions at hand, made no other disposition than that of remaining for his own person at Andujar, leaving Vedel at Baylen, Gobert at La Carolina, recommending to each of them to be vigilantly on his guard, to keep a continual look-out around him, lest the defiles should be turned by Baeza, Ubeda, and Linares.

On the 14th of July, in the evening, the enemy appeared on the heights that border the Guadalquivir opposite to Andujar. The troops of Grenada, under General Reding, had remained at Jaen, preparing to form their junction with those of Andalusia. The latter, who were perceived before Andujar, and who were commanded by General Castaños, came from Lower Andalusia by Seville and Cordova. They had, like those of Grenada, a junction for their object, but they purposed first to examine the position of Andujar, to ascertain whether it were possible to carry it. They were about 20,000 strong, partly regular troops augmented by new enrolments, partly volunteers recently regimented in skeletons of recent creation. They had more steadiness and solidity than any of those that

we had yet seen, for they were chiefly composed of troops from the camp at St. Roque, and of the division which was to have invaded Portugal under General Solano.

On the morning of the 15th of July, appearing in mass, they forced our advanced posts to retire, and to abandon to them the heights that command the banks of the Guadalquivir. Each then took his position for battle, the Paris guard in the works in advance of the bridge, the third legion of reserve on the bank of the river, the seamen of the guard in Andujar, Chabert's brigade on the right of the town, the Swiss in rear, the cavalry, with the 6th provisional, at a distance in the plain, to observe the undisciplined guerillas hovering around the Spanish army like the Cossacks about the Russian army.

The sight of the enemy rejoiced the French soldiers by dispelling their ennui; though many of them were ill, they had an extreme desire to come to blows. But the Spaniards were not able to pass the river in the face of the French army. They confined themselves to an insignificant cannonade which did us no great harm, and which was but coolly replied to, in order to avoid expending our ammunition; but our balls, being well directed, and falling among the thick masses, swept off many men at once. The guerillas showed themselves on the right of the river, which we occupied. Some had crossed the Guadalquivir at a distance; the others descended upon our rear from the gorges of the Sierra Morena. General Fresia directed his squadrons upon them, while the 6th endeavoured to come at them with the bayonet. Some of them were killed, and these flocks of birds of prey were soon obliged to fly off into the mountains.

This affair denoted nothing more than a preparatory trial of the enemy's strength against our position, and an endeavour to ascertain the point at which he might attack it with the least difficulty. There was reason, however, to expect a more serious effort on the following day. General Dupont despatched, therefore, one of his officers to General Vedel, to learn what was passing as well at Baylen as at the ferry of Menjibar, and to desire him, in case he had no enemy before him, to send to his aid either a battalion or even a brigade—a precaution which would have been superfluous, as we have already several times observed, had all been united at Baylen. The close of that day passed off at Andujar in the profoundest tranquillity.

Towards Baylen, the insurgents of Grenada, established in advance of Jaen, had appeared along the Guadalquivir, feeling their way everywhere, and everywhere seeking the weak side of our positions. Before Baylen they had passed the ferry of Menjibar, and repulsed the advanced posts of General Vedel. But the latter, hastening up with the bulk of his division, and

deploying his battalions in a very ostensible manner, had so intimidated the Spaniards that they had completely disappeared. Further to our left, towards Baeza and Ubeda, points that still occasioned uneasiness, the insurgents had crossed the Guadalquivir, and had detached some of those bands of scouts, who were little to be feared, but who might at a distance afford occasion for strange mistakes. General Gobert, posted at Carolina, being informed of their presence, had hastily sent cuirassiers to observe and to awe them.

In this state of things General Vedel, seeing no longer any enemy before him, was about to ascend again from Menjibar to Baylen, when an aide-de-camp of General Dupont's arrived to desire the reinforcement of a battalion or a brigade, according to circumstances. Learning from this aide-de-camp that the main body of the enemy had appeared before Andujar, supposing the danger to be there only, and prompted by an inconsiderate zeal, he resolved to proceed with his whole division for Andujar, and sent word to General Gobert to come and occupy Baylen, which would be left vacant by the departure of the second division. Setting off immediately, towards the close of the 15th, he marched the whole night between the 15th and 16th. Though an honourable sentiment actuated General Vedel, his conduct was nevertheless imprudent, for he knew not what might happen at Baylen after his departure, and what was to befall in his absence that point so important for the safety of the army.

On the morning of the 16th he came in sight of Andujar with all his troops. General Dupont, so far from reprimanding him for his precipitation, was gratified to find himself reinforced in presence of an enemy who appeared more numerous than on the preceding day, and more disposed to a serious attack: he approved what General Vedel had done, and even thanked him. The soldiers, who had seen no French for two months, shouted for joy on perceiving their comrades, and imagined that they were going at last to punish the Spaniards for their boasting. It was really an occasion for repairing the faults committed, to fall upon the enemy with 14,000 French and 2000 Swiss, and to beat them off for a long time to come. With the ardour that animated all our young soldiers, nothing would have been easier. But General Dupont suffered the Spaniards to cannonade Andujar the whole day, merely enjoying their hesitation, their inexperience, without doing anything more than firing volleys of cannon at them from time to time. The Spaniards would have forced the position of Andujar, but not daring to attempt it, they descended and ascended several times in the course of the day the heights which they occupied, to and from the bank of the river, but never tried to cross it in presence of our bayonets. For a moment they showed an inclination to cross

the Guadalquivir higher up, but from that point was descried Vedel's division marching on the opposite bank, and this sight damped their courage. This day, therefore, ended as peaceably as the preceding, with very few dead and wounded on our side, but a considerable number on that of the Spaniards, who had suffered infinitely more by our cannonade though it was more rare and slacker than theirs.

Things had not gone off so well about Baylen and the ferry of Menjibar. On the morning of the 16th, when General Vedel was marching without necessity to Andujar, General Reding, who, at the head of the army of Grenada, had also made on the 15th some attempts before Baylen, renewed them with rather more boldness than on the preceding day. After crossing the ferry of Menjibar, he found at the foot of the heights of Baylen nobody but General Liger-Belair, with one battalion and a few companies of élite. He then debouched in force, and appeared with several thousand men before General Liger-Belair, who, having scarcely a few hundred, could do no other than retire in good order. At this moment arrived General Gobert, apprised by General Vedel of the evacuation of Baylen, and bringing, in order to provide for it, three battalions with some cuirassiers. General Gobert's division, already reduced by several detachments that had been left behind—for it had been obliged to leave detachments at La Carolina, Guarroman, and Baylen—Gobert's division had been thinned in passing through the gorges of the Sierra Morena, and could not get at the enemy but with the head of one column. Nevertheless, this young general, full of intelligence and fire, with his three battalions and his cuirassiers, stopped short the Spaniards. Major Christophe, commanding the cuirassiers, made a vigorous charge, and drove back the Spanish infantry, unused to the rude shock of those heavy horse. But while he was himself directing these movements, he received in the middle of the forehead a ball, which issued from a bush where was concealed one of those Spanish marksmen who were found everywhere in ambush. He fell insensible, having but a few hours to live, and was bitterly regretted by the whole army.

General Dufour, whose rank pointed him out for General Gobert's successor, hastened to the ground, found the French troops shaken by the loss of their general, and conceived that he could not do better than make them fall back upon Baylen. The Spaniards, who were seeking the weak point of our positions, without having resolved upon an attack in earnest, went no further; but they felt convinced that if thrust on this side, the sword would enter.

General Dufour returned to Baylen, where he had a considerable part of Gobert's division. Perceiving that the Spaniards did not follow him, but continued fixed on the bank of the

Guadalquivir, he was led to believe that their serious attack was directed elsewhere. In fact, while the danger had appeared so small towards Menjibar, it assumed alarming proportions on the side next to Baeza and Ubeda. The reconnaissances sent in that direction, whether the officers who executed them were not intelligent men, or whether the irregular bands which had crossed the Guadalquivir, above Menjibar, made a great appearance, all denounced the presence of a real army on the cross-road, which, running from Baeza and Ubeda by Linares, terminates at La Carolina, passing behind Baylen. To these indications were added the reiterated instructions of General Dupont, who, having committed the fault of not placing himself at Baylen, aggravated instead of repairing it by the continual apprehensions which he felt, and which he communicated to his lieutenants. On the preceding day, and on that same day, he had written to General Gobert to keep his eye incessantly upon that cross-road from Baeza and Ubeda to Linares; that on the first sign of the movement of the enemy on that side he must fall back in mass from Baylen to La Carolina, for there was the salvation of the army; and that this point must be preserved at any price—strange precaution, and which lost the army that it was intended to save!

General Dufour, to whom were transmitted of right the instructions of the general-in-chief, after the death of General Gobert, receiving the most alarming information concerning the cross-road from Baeza to Linares, would wait no longer, but set out the same evening for Baylen, purposing to proceed to La Carolina, imagining that he should thus preserve the army from the misfortune of being turned. That fatal Baylen, where we were destined to meet with the first rock of our greatness, was therefore once more evacuated and exposed to the invasion of the enemy.

General Dufour had, it is true, for excuse the instructions which he had received, the tidings that had been brought him, the certainty he felt of the speedy return of General Vedel to Baylen. He set out, therefore, in the evening of the 16th, to hasten to La Carolina, leaving scarcely a detachment on the heights commanding Menjibar and the Guadalquivir.

The intelligence of the death of General Gobert and of the falling back of his division reached Andujar in the very evening of the 16th, for they were but six or seven French leagues distant, and that an officer on horseback would travel in two or three hours. These tidings arrived just at the close of day, and with it that of the sterile cannonade, the insignificant effects of which we have related. General Dupont, who had shared the fault of General Vedel in approving it, began to regret that the latter had left Baylen and come to Andujar. Though

detachment sent out could not discover anything either at the foot of the heights or on the Guadalquivir itself. Not the slightest doubt could then be felt: the entire force of the enemy, according to General Vedel, had passed through Baeza and Linares in its progress to La Carolina, for the purpose of closing the defiles of the Sierra Morena on the rear of the French army. He hesitated no longer, and but for the mid-day heat, which was not less than 40 degrees of Réaumur, and under which men and horses sank struck with apoplexy, he would have set out instantly. But at the close of that same day, the 17th, he left Baylen, taking with him even the post that guarded the heights above the Guadalquivir, so apprehensive was he that he should not arrive in sufficient force at La Carolina. Generals-in-chief in their prosperous days find lieutenants who correct their faults; General Dupont on this occasion found such as cruelly aggravated his.

Of all these alleged movements of the Spaniards towards La Carolina by Baeza and Linares, not one was true. Bands of guerrillas, more or less numerous, had inundated the banks of the Guadalquivir, gained the Sierra Morena, and misled officers either unintelligent or inattentive. But the two principal armies had moved, that of Grenada before Baylen, that of Andalusia before Andujar. Their real intention had been to sound the position of the French, to ascertain on which side it might be attacked with the greatest probability of success. The impatience of the insurgents urged them to demand an immediate attack, no matter on what point, and the prudence of the general-in-chief, Castaños, had to battle with the declaimers of the staff, to spare himself a check, like that of Cuesta's and Blake's. His soundings were a mode of occupying the impatient, and of seeking the point where the imprudence of the offensive would be least serious. The imposing attitude of the French before Andujar on the 15th and 16th, their resistance less invincible between Menjibar and Baylen, since one of their generals had been killed there and the ground abandoned, indicated that to Baylen they must proceed if they would risk an effort which had any chance of success. This reasoning of General Castaños did honour to his military perspicacity, and he was about to be favoured by Fortune for a moment of clear-sightedness, while General Dupont was doomed by her to suffer for a moment of error. A council of war was convoked at the general-in-chief's. There the impatient insisted on attacking the position of Andujar in front without further delay. The wise and wary Castaños conceived that it would be tempting Fortune much too far, and would not run the risk of a reverse so easy to be foreseen. The events of the preceding day promised, according to him, much more success to an attack on the side of Baylen, and

this plan suited him the better, inasmuch as it threw the responsibility on General Reding and the insurgents of Grenada. To second this attempt it was agreed that the army of Andalusia should strengthen General Reding with Coupigny's division, one of the best organised in the army of Andalusia, and that General Castaños should remain with the two divisions of Jones and La Peña before Andujar, in order to deceive the French respecting the real point of attack. General Reding having already about 12,000 men, and being reinforced by 6000 or 7000, would have under him at least 18,000. The commander-in-chief would have about 15,000 left to occupy the attention of the French at Andujar.

This plan being agreed upon, they proceeded forthwith to its execution, and while Coupigny's division was marching to ascend the Guadalquivir, as high as Menjibar, to join General Reding and to concur in the attack of Baylen, on the following day, the 18th, the troops of General Castaños deployed with ostentation on the heights which face Andujar.

Meanwhile, in the course of this same day, the 17th, there might be discerned, with some attention, in the French camp, a movement of the Spaniards towards their right, a consequence of the plan which they had just adopted. General Fresia, commanding the French cavalry, had sent a regiment of dragoons over the bridge of Andujar to the other side of the Guadalquivir, with directions to approach very near to the Spaniards, who, on seeing them, drew up in order of battle, and saluted our horse with discharges of musketry. But the colonel of that regiment of dragoons clearly discerned the movement of the Spaniards from their left to their right, towards Menjibar, that is to say, towards Baylen, and instantly made his report to the general-in-chief, Dupont. The latter, struck at first by this circumstance, took for a moment the salutary resolution, which would have changed his destiny and perhaps that of the empire, to decamp during the day and march to Baylen. Without knowing the enemy's secret, it was evident, from the direction which the Spaniards were pursuing, and even from the false reports of an attempt upon La Carolina, that the danger was accumulating towards the left of the French, towards Baylen, towards La Carolina, and that to concentrate himself upon those points was the safest of all manœuvres. Moreover, the intelligence which General Dupont received on the evening of General Vedel's departure for La Carolina after General Dufour, and of the complete evacuation of Baylen, ought to have decided him to set out immediately. There was still time in the evening of the 17th to proceed to Baylen, since the Spaniards were not to enter it till the 18th.

But General Dupont, still bewildered by the mass of enemies

that he had before him at Andujar, having difficulty to believe that the danger had removed to another place, having above all an immense quantity of sick to carry away, and determined not to leave any behind, for every unfortunate creature so left was sure to be murdered, deferred till the morrow the execution of his first idea, with a view to give the administration of the army twenty-four hours, which it needed for the evacuation of the hospitals and the baggage—a fatal and ever-to-be-lamented delay!

The resolution to decamp was postponed, therefore, till the next day, July the 18th. On that day General Dupont received intelligence from Generals Dufour and Vedel: he learned that they were still seeking the enemy in the bottom of the gorges; that they had advanced to Guarroman without finding him; that they should march to La Carolina and St. Helena, to every point, in short, where he was said to be; that they would attack him with impetuosity, destroy him, and then take their position at Baylen, either to remain there or to rejoin the general-in-chief at Andujar. But meanwhile Baylen was uncovered, liable to fall before the weakest detachment, and everything indicated that the Spaniards were marching thither in force. A patrol had pushed, in the course of the day, to the bank of the Rumblar, a torrent which must be crossed in going from Andujar to Baylen, and had fallen in with troops of the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to hasten to leave Andujar without losing a moment, in order to reach Baylen before the Spaniards.

General Dupont, not yet entertaining any serious uneasiness, and supposing that the troops seen on the bank of the Rumblar were only a detachment sent on reconnaissance, gave his orders for the 18th. He would not set out till night, in order to conceal his movement from General Castaños, and to get seven or eight hours' start of him. He might have blown up the bridge of Andujar, which would have delayed the pursuit of the Spaniards; but fearful of apprising the enemy by such an explosion, he contented himself with obstructing the bridge in such a manner that it would take some time to clear it; and at night-fall, between eight and nine o'clock, he began to decamp. Unfortunately he had, as we have said, an immense quantity of baggage, the number of the sick having singularly increased owing to the heat and bad provisions. Half of the corps was attacked with dysentery. None but the weakest had been admitted into the hospitals, and a great number of men who could scarcely carry their arms had been left in the ranks. The worst of the sick were placed in carriages, and five or six hundred men, for whom there were no means of conveyance, followed the baggage on foot, wasted, pale, and piteous to be

seen. The heat had never been more intense; it exceeded 40 degrees. The oldest Spaniards did not recollect to have ever experienced the like. At night, then, the French set out, oppressed with the heat of the weather, men and horses scarcely able to breathe, and moving in an atmosphere of fire, though the sun had sunk beneath the horizon. The army had not had its entire ration. The soldier set out on his march hungry, thirsty, and deeply depressed at a retreat which did not denote that affairs were in a good situation.

It was necessary to keep vigilant watch over the rear; for General Castaños, being better served than General Dupont, might receive from Andujar itself information of the retreat of the French, and start in pursuit of them. General Dupont, therefore, placed at the head of the baggage only one brigade of infantry, Chabert's brigade, that which was in rear and to the right of the bridge. This brigade was farthest from the enemy, and its departure would be least remarked. It moved off silently from right to left, in rear of Andujar, and formed the head of the column. It was composed of two battalions of the fourth legion of reserve, and of a French Swiss battalion—Freuler's regiment—a regiment to be depended upon, because it had been long in the service of France. A battery of six four-pounders accompanied this brigade, about 2800 strong. Then came the baggage, covering two or three leagues of ground. The Spanish Swiss regiments (of Preux and Reding), reduced by desertion to about 1600, marched after the baggage. They were followed by Pannetier's brigade, composed of two battalions of the third legion of reserve, and of two battalions of the Paris guard, forming about 2800 men. Lastly, the cavalry, consisting of two regiments of dragoons, two of chasseurs, and a squadron of cuirassiers, reduced from 2400 horse to 1800, closed the march with the seamen of the guard and the rest of the artillery. This *corps d'armée*, which comprehended more than 10,000 French and 2400 Swiss on leaving Toledo, 8600 French and 2000 Swiss on leaving Cordova, scarcely contained 7800 French and 1600 Swiss, in all 9400 men, when it left Andujar. Besides the smallness of their number, they were divided by the baggage into two masses, one of which, that marching at the head, was by far the weaker, and that which formed the rearguard by far the stronger from the number and quality of the troops. The general, as we have just seen, had so arranged it, because, apprehensive of being pursued, he beheld danger in rear and not in front.

The troops proceeded all night amid the heat, which not a breath of air arose to diminish, and through a cloud of dust raised by the marching columns. The horses, exhausted, dripping with sweat, swallowed nothing but dust instead of air when

they breathed. Never did a more miserable night precede a more frightful day.

About three o'clock the corps reached the banks of the Rumblar. This torrent, when it contains water, rolls between steep rocks and in a deep ravine. A small bridge thrown over its bed conducts from one bank to the other. The soldiers on arriving at it expected to quench their thirst, but it was found completely dried up. They were obliged to march on. Having crossed the bridge, the road rises over heights covered with olive-trees. Here were usually stationed the advanced posts of the French division charged to guard Baylen, which is only three-quarters of a league distant from the Rumblar. Instead of General Vedel's advanced posts, were perceived, by the daylight which began to peep, Spanish posts, which received our troops with a discharge of musketry. General Chabert's advanced guard immediately put itself in a posture of defence, and replied to the fire of the enemy. The road, jammed between heights, was barred by several Spanish battalions drawn up in close column. If these battalions had defended the banks of the Rumblar, we should certainly not have been able to cross it. They formed the advanced guard of Generals Reding and Coupigny, who, conformably to the plan adopted by the Spanish staff, had crossed at the ferry of Menjibar in the daytime of the 18th, marched immediately to Baylen, found it abandoned, and established themselves there. They had in the evening placed several battalions in close column on the Andujar road, and it was these that we found on the morning of the 19th barring the Baylen road against us.

The French advanced guard immediately stood upon its defence on the left of the road and in the olive plantations. It was composed of a battalion of Chabert's brigade, four companies of voltigeurs and grenadiers, a squadron of chasseurs, and two four-pounders. It commenced a very brisk fire of tirailleurs, while an aide-de-camp galloped off to fetch General Chabert's three other battalions, the rest of his artillery, and the brigade of chasseurs. While waiting for this reinforcement, the advanced guard did its best, kept up the tirailleur fire for an hour or two, killed a good many of the Spaniards, lost many itself, and maintained its ground. At length, about five in the morning, the sun being already high above the horizon, the rest of Chabert's brigade arrived. The soldiers of that brigade, though out of breath, which they had not had time to recover, neither could they quench their thirst, charged through and through the Spanish battalions, either in front or in flank, and obliged them to abandon that cooped-up road, and to fall back upon their main body. Our soldiers then came to the entrance of a small undulated plain, bordered on the right and left by heights

covered with olive-trees, and terminated at the further end by the village of Baylen. The Spanish army under Reding and Coupigny, 18,000 strong, having in front an artillery formidable by its number and the calibre of its guns, appeared drawn up in three lines. It was about to march for Andujar, to take us in rear, while General Castaños was to attack us in front, when our advanced guard had put a stop to this intended movement.

No sooner had we beaten back the Spanish battalions which obstructed the road, and debouched in this plain, than the artillery of the Spaniards poured a horrible fire of balls and grape upon our troops. General Chabert immediately ordered six four-pounders to be placed in battery; but before they had fired more than a few rounds, they were dismounted and rendered unserviceable. What, in fact, could six four-pounders do against upwards of twenty-four well-served twelve-pounders? About eight in the morning, when this battle had already lasted for four hours, arrived the rest of the artillery, the cavalry, and the Swiss brigade, composed of the regiments of Preux and Reding. Pannetier's brigade, which closed the march with the seamen of the guard, had orders, on its arrival, to take post as rearguard at the little bridge of Rumblar, so as to prevent the troops of General Castaños from crossing, if it should turn out that he was in pursuit of the army. It was a new mishap, after so many others, not to have employed in mass all the troops there were to force a passage through Baylen, and thus to rejoin Vedel's and Dufour's divisions.

Be this as it may, on the arrival of the reinforcements the fight became more animated and more general. Chabert's brigade, the Swiss brigade, and the cavalry debouched in the little plain of Baylen, striving at the same time to gain ground. Our artillery had in vain endeavoured to silence with four and eight pounders the formidable battery of twelve-pounders which covered the middle of the Spanish line. It beheld every moment some of its pieces dismounted without doing much harm to those of the enemy. It threw balls, indeed, amidst the deep mass of the Spaniards, and swept away whole files. The Swiss brigade of the regiments of Preux and Reding, placed at the centre, behaved with firmness, though it was grieved to fight against the Spaniards whom it had always served, and against its countrymen, of whom there were several battalions in the enemy's army.

At this moment the Spaniards, purposing to take advantage of their great number in order to surround us, attempted to ascend a small height which rises on our left. General Dupont immediately sent thither General Pryvé's dragoons, the French Swiss battalion of Freuler, and a battalion of the 4th legion of reserve. These two infantry battalions advanced resolutely,

while on their right General Pryvé led up his squadrons on the trot. The road, covered with brushwood and olive-trees, preventing the cavalry from marching in good order, General Pryvé directed it to disperse as *tirailleurs*, and to get forward as it could, while the two battalions sustained, deployed, the fire of the Spaniards. Our horse, having arrived at the height, formed, and then dashing at a gallop upon the Spanish battalions, broke them, and obliged them to fall back upon their line of battle, after taking from them three colours.

The attempt which had just been repulsed on our right was repeated by the Spaniards upon our left on some heights which commanded it. General Dupont, who had at length decided to bring into line all the rest of his troops excepting a battalion of the Paris guard, left in observation at the bridge of Rumblar, opposed Pannetier's brigade to this new movement of the Spaniards, and ordered the dragoons, drawn from the right to the left, to repeat the manœuvre, which had already succeeded with them.

While the three battalions of Pannetier's brigade were making head against the Spaniards, who threatened our left, by keeping up a fire of small arms with them, General Pryvé, recommencing what he had before done, led his horsemen as *tirailleurs* through the thorns and olive-trees, formed them when they had arrived on the plateau, and then directed them upon the Spaniards, who, broken by the shock, again fell back upon their main body. Meanwhile the Swiss brigade continued to maintain its ground in the midst of the plain with the same firmness, while the brave General Dupré, brought into line with his horse chasseurs, made brilliant charges upon the centre of the Spaniards. But every time that they were charged on the right, on the left, at the centre, either with bayonet or sword, they fell back on two immovable lines, which were perceived in the background of the field of battle like an impenetrable wall of brass. These two lines, independently of their number, three or four times as large as ours, were appuyed in rear on the village of Baylen, protected on their wings by wooded heights, lastly, covered in front by a formidable artillery. At this sight our soldiers began to feel their courage fail them. It was ten in the morning, the heat overwhelming, men and horses gasping for breath, and on that field of battle parched by the sun, there was nowhere a drop of water or a patch of shade to cool them during the short intervals of a horrible combat.

But what was General Vedel doing—he who yesterday and the day before was so prompt to march when there was no occasion for him, but who came not now when his presence would have been so serviceable? He was expected, however,

for he could not refrain from hastening up on the report of the cannon, which in those deep gorges must have been heard at La Carolina. General Dupont directed his coming to be announced in the ranks, in order to animate his soldiers, and then decided to try a general movement with a view to carry the position by assault. He went along the front of his troops, and had the colours taken by the cavalry brought before them. At this sight, their young courage reviving, burst forth in shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!* Some officers, excited by the danger, then advised that they should form in close column on the left, and charge upon one point—that one which could afford a passage to the road from Baylen to La Carolina, that is to say, towards Vedel's division, and save themselves by submitting to a painful but necessary sacrifice, that of the baggage full of our sick. General Dupont, ever blind on those fatal days, was not sensible of the merit of this counsel. He persisted in charging the whole line of the Spaniards in front, as if he meant to take their entire army at a blow. At a given signal his soldiers rushed in mass upon the enemy, but they were met by a murderous fire of musketry and grape, and their line wavered and reeled. The officers set them to rights and led them forward, while the brave General Dupré dashed with his horse chasseurs through the intervals of our infantry, and set an example by charging through the Spanish line. He made breaches in it, which he entered, taking even some guns, which he could not bring away; but when he attempted to proceed further he was always stopped by a solid, impenetrable barrier, which there was no hope of breaking through. The unfortunate general, after heroic efforts, fell from his horse struck by a ball in the abdomen.

It was now noon. This so unequal combat had already lasted eight or nine hours. Almost all the superior officers were killed or wounded. Captains were commanding battalions, serjeant-majors companies. All the artillery was dismounted. General Dupont, in despair, having received two gunshot wounds, redeemed his faults by his valour. He required one more proof of devotedness from his soldiers. He led them back into line. They marched, supported by the example of the seamen of the imperial guard, who never ceased to be worthy of themselves. But after a fresh effort on the first line, they perceived the second still immovable; and they again returned to the entrance of that melancholy and fatal plain which they had not been able to pass. At this horrible moment an event, unexpected, though easy to be foreseen, completed their demoralisation. The Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding, which at first behaved honourably, were nevertheless deeply grieved to be obliged to fire upon Swiss and

upon Spaniards, the one their countrymen, the other their old companions in arms. Though the French Swiss of Freuler fought by their side with rare fidelity, they could not bear up either against grief or ill fortune, and in spite of the efforts of their officers, almost all of them deserted. In a few moments 1600 men quitted the field of battle, where our number was already so small. In fact, not 3000 men were left on their legs upon that ground out of 9000 who appeared there in the morning. Eighteen hundred, struck down by the fire, were dead or wounded; 1600 had gone over to the enemy. Two or three thousand more, worn out with fatigue, overcome by heat and the dysentery, had sunk to the ground and dropped their arms beside them. Despair had seized every soul. General Dupont went through the thinned ranks of his army, and found every face impressed with the same grief that was consuming himself. Still he clung to a last hope, and listened to catch the sound of General Vedel's cannon. But he listened in vain. On that scorching and blood-drenched plain not a sound was to be heard but that of single musket-shots, for the fight had ceased on one side as well as on the other. All at once, however, reports of artillery broke the dull silence that began to prevail. An additional cause for despair! those sounds came not from the left, but from the rear, that is to say, from the bridge of Rumblar. General Castaños, apprised at two or three o'clock in the morning of the evacuation of Andujar by the French, had immediately sent in pursuit of them all the troops he had left, under the command of General de la Peña, who by a concerted signal gave notice to General Reding of his approach by discharges of artillery. All, therefore, was lost. The three thousand men left in the ranks, the three or four thousand dispersed over the country, the wounded, the sick, must all be slaughtered between the armies of General Reding and General de la Peña, amounting to about 30,000 men. At this idea, General Dupont's affliction was at its height, and he perceived no other resource than that of treating with the enemy.

He had among his officers an equerry of the emperor's, M. de Villoutreys, who, desirous of engaging in active service, had been attached to his *corps d'armée*: he charged him to go to General Reding, to propose a suspension of arms. M. de Villoutreys traversed that melancholy plain, the theatre of our first disasters. He went to General Reding, and applied in the name of the French general for a truce of a few hours on the ground of the fatigue of both armies. General Reding, extremely glad to have done with the French, for he was still fearful of a change of fortune with such adversaries, assented to the truce, on condition of its being ratified by the general-

in-chief, Castaños. For the moment, he promised to suspend his fire.

M. de Villoutreys returned to General Dupont, who gave him a fresh commission, that was to go and meet General de la Peña, and to stop him at the bridge of Rumblar. Villoutreys hastened to the bridge of Rumblar, and there found the troops of General de la Peña skirmishing already with some soldiers of the Paris guard. General de la Peña, less accommodating than M. de Reding, and full of Spanish passions, declared that he was willing to accede to the truce, but provisionally, and till the adhesion of the general-in-chief. He likewise intimated that the French would obtain quarter only by surrendering at discretion. The firing was suspended on both sides. The French rested themselves at last on that fatal plain upon which lay pell-mell so many dead and dying, where a consuming heat prevailed, where an awful silence reigned, and where no water was to be found but in some muddy holes of the Rumblar, and the possession of which was violently disputed. All else was motionless; but joy filled the hearts of the one, despair those of the others.

M. de Villoutreys, returning to his general-in-chief, was directed to follow the Andujar road, to meet General Castaños, and to obtain his ratification of the truce agreed to by his lieutenants. The unfortunate General Dupont, hitherto so brilliant, so successful, retired to his tent, overwhelmed by moral pains which rendered him almost insensible to the physical pains of two severe wounds. Such is the mutability of fortune, in war as in politics, as in everything else in this world, an agitated world, a changeful theatre, where prosperity and adversity are linked together, succeed, efface each other, leaving after a long series of contrary sensations only nothingness and misery. Three years before, on the banks of the Danube, this same General Dupont, arriving breathless to the succour of Marshal Mortier, saved him at Diernstein. But other times, other places, another spirit. It was in December and in the north; they were veteran soldiers, full of health and vigour, braced by a colder atmosphere, instead of being depressed by an enervating climate, accustomed to all the vicissitudes of war, actuated by a high sense of honour, never hesitating between death and surrender. If the position of these men became bad for a moment, one had time to come up to their aid and to save them. And then Fortune again smiled and made amends for all: none came too late, none made a mistake; or, if this did happen to one, the other corrected his fault. Here, in this Spain, which had been so foully entered, the men were young, weak, sickly, oppressed by the climate, new to suffering. They began to be no longer prosperous; and if the one committed a

fault, the other aggravated it. Dupont had come to succour Mortier at Diernstein; Vedel did not come to succour Dupont till it was too late.

What, then, we again say, was General Vedel doing, who, but a few leagues off, with two divisions, one of which only would have changed the issue of that fatal day, never made his appearance? Twice he had already deceived himself; and he deceived himself a third time. Setting out from Baylen in the evening of the 17th, he arrived in the night at Guarroman; resuming his march on the 18th for La Carolina, pursuing the phantom of an enemy who had gone, it was said, to secure the defiles, he had at length, on the 18th, acquired the conviction that he and General Dufour were running after a chimera. The supposed Spanish army which had proceeded entire to the defiles, to shut up the French army in them, turned out to be a few guerillas, whom some officers, either incompetent observers or easily frightened, had taken for formidable masses. Reconnaissances sent out in every direction, prisoners examined, peasants questioned, had at length convinced Generals Dufour and Vedel of the truth. They immediately formed the plan of returning to Baylen, for it was not in zeal that they were deficient. General Vedel, setting out last, and not having entered so deeply into the gorges, had to fall back first upon Baylen. But by these multiplied goings and comings he had exhausted his unfortunate soldiers with fatigue. Almost without eating, without halting, they had marched from Baylen to Andujar, from Andujar to Baylen, from Baylen to La Carolina, and he could not help granting them the remainder of the 18th to rest themselves. The coolness of the place, the fruit, the vegetables, the provisions, which they had at La Carolina, were at the moment a strong reason for making a halt there. Moreover, the artillery carriages, broken in consequence of the bad roads and the dry weather, required some repairs. Lastly, they were ignorant of the melancholy secret of events, and imagined that they should be in time if they arrived at Baylen on the morrow. It might not have been too late, indeed, had they started at three o'clock the next morning, the 19th; for they would have reached Baylen by eleven, they would have caught M. de Reding between two fires, and have converted the fatal day of Baylen into another battle of Marengo.

At three in the morning of the following day, the 19th, some diligent officers, stirring before the others to attend to their troops, heard the cannon at Baylen, the sound of which, transmitted from echo to echo, was reverberated to the furthest extremity of the gorges of the Sierra Morena. These guns, according to them, could be no other than those of the general-in-chief engaged with the Spaniards, for none but he had been

left behind on the Guadalquivir. Yet how was it possible that he who had been left with the Spaniards at Andujar should be firing his cannon in a position which must be that of Baylen? This they could not make out; but certain it was that they heard repeated discharges of artillery, and the vulgar precept of going straight up to cannon, so often cited and so often misunderstood, did not permit them to hesitate. By setting off immediately in the cool of the morning, and hastening their steps, they might arrive in time to deal the enemy decisive blows. General Vedel, so prompt in forming a resolution on the 16th and 17th, manifested on this occasion an inexplicable indecision. He lost two hours in rallying his column, and did not start before five o'clock. The heat was already great; the troops, marching in columns near to each other, on account of the proximity of the enemy, raised a dust that suffocated them. It was, therefore, not till about eleven o'clock that they reached Guarroman, midway between La Carolina and Baylen. At this moment, the fight having slackened at Baylen, the echoes of the guns were much less heard. Still, however, the reports of guns continued to be heard, sometimes more distinct, sometimes more faint, according to the direction of the wind.

General Vedel, without any ill intention, for he was, on the contrary, deeply devoted to the honour of the French arms, but from an infatuation similar to that which had persuaded General Dupont that the danger was at Andujar alone, persisted in doubting and in considering what was heard as only an affair of advanced posts on the banks of the Guadalquivir. He resolved, in particular, not to return to Baylen till he had completely explored the gorges and ascertained that the enemy was not in the cross-road of Linares, which terminates exactly at Guarroman, and he sent thither a reconnaissance of cavalry. By this time it was noon. The guns ceased to roar, for the battle was over at Baylen. This silence of defeat and despair left no doubt in the mind of General Vedel, and he concluded definitively that people had been mistaken. At this moment his troops had just got hold of a flock of goats; they were hungry; he allowed them two hours to make their soup. In two hours they again started. They marched without impatience, for the most profound silence everywhere prevailed. About five o'clock they debouched on Baylen and perceived the Spaniards. Without figuring to themselves precisely what might have happened, they imagined that the enemy had placed himself between General Dupont and Vedel's and Dufour's divisions. General Vedel hesitated no longer, and would have passed the main body of the Spanish army to rejoin his general-in-chief. He was preparing, therefore, to attack by the right, for it was on this side that, by turning Baylen, he could force a passage to the Andujar road,

and meet with General Dupont, no matter at what point of that road. At the moment when he was giving his orders, a Spanish flag of truce came to inform him that there was a suspension of arms. General Vedel refused to believe it, and despatched one of his officers to General Reding's camp to ascertain what was the real fact; declaring that he would grant a delay of half-an-hour, after which, if he received no answer, he should open his fire. While waiting, he continued to make his dispositions, and the half-hour having elapsed, as the officer whom he had sent had not returned, he attacked vigorously. His troops marched up with ardour, enveloped a battalion of infantry, and made the men prisoners. The cuirassiers charged and overturned all before them. But all at once a group of Spanish officers, in which was an aide-de-camp of General Dupont's, came to him to desire him to cease his fire, and to replace all in its former state. Before this order of the general-in-chief's, General Vedel, though highly animated for fighting, was obliged to desist. But such was the power of his illusions, that he could not yet imagine the extent of the misfortune of the army; and he fancied that the truce referred to in order to stop him was but a commencement of negotiations with General Castaños, whose zeal for the insurrection had always been deemed doubtful in the French army, and who was believed to be disposed to treat on the first occasion.

Such was the manner in which General Vedel had employed his time on the 19th, such the manner in which he finished that fatal day. On learning that Vedel's division had arrived, the Spaniards were seized with fear, and transported with rage at the news that the men of one of their battalions were already prisoners. They would have fallen upon Barbou's division, and slaughtered the whole of it, supposing that the truce demanded had only been a feint to give General Vedel time to arrive and to renew the fight the moment he appeared. They raised furious outcries, which General Dupont hastened to appease by giving the order that we have just reported. It was a fitting occasion for taking counsel from the terror and the very rage of the Spaniards to renew the fight while moving in close column upon his left. General Pryvé, commanding the dragoons, made this proposal to General Dupont, and even pointed out to him the heights by which they might rejoin Vedel's division. But the unfortunate general, himself weakened by the disease which had for some time past prevailed in the army, suffering severely from his wounds, and seized with the general dejection, was absorbed in his affliction, and heard what General Pryvé said to him without making any reply. He seemed in his despair no longer to comprehend the words that were addressed to him.*

* All these particulars are extracted from the very curious, very secret, and voluminous proceedings instituted against General Dupont from 1808 to 1811.

The night was passed on the field of battle, awaiting the negotiations of the morrow. But while the Spaniards were enjoying abundance, our soldiers were destitute of everything, and they passed the night as they had passed the day, without bread, without water, without wine. Those only who still had some remnants of their ration in their knapsacks, or some drink in their gourds, had anything to refresh themselves with.

Next morning, the 20th, M. de Villoutreys, who had been sent to the Spanish headquarters to obtain the ratification of the truce, returned, intimating that General Castaños was ready to treat on equitable bases, and with this view he would come himself to Baylen. General Dupont thought of employing on this occasion the celebrated engineer, General Marescot, who was on passage in his division on a mission to Gibraltar, and who had been well acquainted with General Castaños in 1795. He sent for him and urged him to use his influence with the Spanish general, in order to obtain the better conditions. General Marescot, having no desire to negotiate and sign a capitulation which could not be advantageous, at first refused the mission that was offered him, but afterwards yielded to the solicitations of the general-in-chief, and consented to proceed to the Spanish headquarters.

In order to come at General Castaños, it was necessary to take the road to Andujar, and to pass through La Peña's division. General Marescot found General de la Peña at the bridge of Rumblar, indignant, threatening, complaining of alleged movements of the French army to escape, saying that he had powers for treating, requiring that all the French divisions should immediately surrender at discretion, and declaring that if he had not an answer in two hours he should attack and crush Barbon's division. To stop him, General Marescot was obliged to promise that an answer should be given in two hours.

He returned, therefore, without loss of time to report these melancholy details to General Dupont. At this intelligence the latter roused himself, exclaiming that he would rather perish with the last of his men than surrender at discretion. He summoned to him all his generals of division and of brigade, to ascertain if he could rely upon their devotedness and that of their soldiers; but almost all of them replied that the soldiers, worn out with fatigue and famine, and utterly discouraged, wished for no more fighting. General Dupont, to assure himself of this, went out of his hut, walked through the bivouacs with his lieutenants, and strove to revive the depressed courage of his young troops. Veteran soldiers of Egypt or of St. Domingo, accustomed to defy hunger, thirst, and heat, would not have been deaf to his voice. But what was to be expected of boys of twenty, dispirited by the excessive heat, who had

neither eaten nor drunk for thirty-six hours, knowing that they were placed between two fires, and must fight in the disproportion of one to five or six, and with their artillery dismounted? They complained to their generals that they had been sacrificed: some of them, in their despair, even flung their arms and their cartouch-boxes on the ground. Instead of raising the spirits of others, General Dupont needed some one to raise his own. He returned in dismay. The officers, who had behaved the most gallantly on the preceding day, themselves declared the case desperate, and maintained that they might treat honourably after they had fought so valiantly. They forgot that the last act always effaces those which precede it, and that it is by the last that we are judged. In another situation, without General Vedel on their left, it would have been excusable in them to treat, for there would have been no other resource but to provoke their slaughter, though that is sometimes a resource which succeeds. But with General Vedel on their left, and having a chance of rejoining him by a last effort, they were inexcusable to surrender till they had made that effort. Physical exhaustion and moral depression could alone account for such a weakness. Besides, they flattered themselves that the enemy would be satisfied with their evacuation of Andalusia, and allow them to retire to the north of Spain, without requiring the surrender of their arms. They were, therefore, in favour of treating with the enemy instead of recommencing what in their opinion was an impossible combat.

The unfortunate General Dupont, carried away by the general demoralisation, yielded, and gave his powers to General Chabert, who was selected because on the preceding day he had conducted himself at the head of his brigade with extreme intrepidity. General Marescot had declined accepting any other mission than that of accompanying, advising, and supporting General Chabert. M. de Villoutreys, who had already carried proposals to the commanders of the Spanish armies, was associated with Generals Chabert and Marescot.

They set out immediately to treat, not with General de la Peña, but with General Castaños himself, whom they found at the post-house half way between Baylen and Andujar. He had with him the Count de Tilly, one of the most influential members of the junta of Seville, and the captain-general of Grenada, Escalante. General Castaños, a mild, humane, and discreet man, received the French officers with a politeness which they did not experience from the Captain-General Escalante, who made up for his weakness by his violence, or from Count Tilly, who conducted himself as a demagogue. Agreeably to their instructions, the French officers required, in the first place, that Vedel's and Dufour's divisions, which had taken

no part in the battle, were not enveloped, and might therefore escape the fate of Barbou's division (that which had fought under General Dupont), should not be comprehended in the capitulation, and that, as for Barbou's division, it should be allowed to retire upon Madrid, either laying down or not laying down its arms, according to the result of the negotiation. The Spanish generals obstinately refused these propositions, for they had in their hands the fate of Barbou's division; and if they consented to treat, it was to acquire the disposal of Vedel's and Dufour's divisions, which were not in their power. They insisted, therefore, that these should be included in the capitulation, granting in other respects to each of the French divisions a treatment conformable to its actual situation. They proposed, therefore, that Barbou's division should remain prisoners, while Vedel's and Dufour's divisions should be conveyed to France by sea.

The French negotiators strongly opposed these various pretensions, and at length, after long discussion, the parties agreed to the two following conditions: in the first place, that the three divisions should retire upon Madrid; secondly, that Vedel's and Dufour's divisions should make their retreat without laying down their arms; while Barbou's division, being enveloped, should surrender theirs. These conditions, grievous to the honour of the French arms, would save the three divisions, and they were subscribed to. The negotiators were just proceeding to digest them when a fresh incident occurred to crown the misfortunes of that army of Andalusia, on which Fortune seemed to wreak her malice without pity. General Castaños received a note taken upon a young French officer who had been sent from Madrid by General Savary to General Dupont. This note contained instructions despatched on the 16th or 17th of July, before the favourable news of the battle of Rio-Seco had reached Madrid. Before intelligence of this success was received there, great anxiety had been felt, many doubts entertained respecting the reduction of Saragossa, a general concentration of the troops of the south upon Madrid ordered, and, in consequence of this order of concentration, it was intimated to General Dupont that, notwithstanding anterior instructions, it was time that he should return to La Mancha. On reading this precious despatch which accident put into his hands, General Castaños comprehended perfectly well that to grant the return to Madrid would not be obtaining the voluntary evacuation of Andalusia and La Mancha on the part of the French, but merely lending one's self to their plan of concentration; that, even without the events of Baylen, they would have retired; that consequently the Spaniards would gain nothing by this capitulation but the sterile honour of taking

Barbou's division, its artillery, and its small arms, with which it would soon be supplied again at Madrid; that the return of these twenty thousand men to the north of Spain must therefore be prevented, as their presence there would not fail to re-establish the affairs of the new king.

When, therefore, the negotiators were proceeding to digest the conditions of the capitulation, and it was proposed to specify the return by land of the three divisions, one without arms, the two others with arms, General Castaños, always moderate in form, but this time peremptory in substance, declared that this article was not agreed to. The French generals then exclaimed against this sort of breach of faith, observing that, some moments before, the condition now contested had been admitted. This M. de Castaños acknowledged; but to prove his good faith, he gave General Marescot General Savary's intercepted letter to read, and asked if, after what he had just learned, he could require him to adhere to the conditions first granted. General Marescot read the letter, and communicated it to his dismayed colleagues, who were obliged to treat upon new bases. In consequence, it was stipulated that Barbou's division should remain prisoners of war; that Vedel's and Dufour's divisions should merely engage to evacuate Spain by sea; that they should not lay down their arms, but that, in order to prevent all quarrels, they must be given up, and restored to them on their embarkation at San Lucar and Rota; that they should sail under the Spanish flag, and the Spanish generals engaged to cause this flag to be respected by the English. They then proceeded to some material details, and our negotiators obtained what is customary—permission for the officers to keep their baggage, and for the superior officers to have a waggon exempt from examination; but the knapsacks of the soldiers were to be searched, to ascertain that they were not carrying away any sacred utensils. A warm discussion took place on this article, defamatory of the soldiers, and which ought never to have been subscribed to. M. de Castaños, always extremely shrewd, alleged the fanaticism of the Spanish populace, to which it was necessary to give some satisfaction, and said that if they could not announce that the knapsacks of the soldiers had been searched, the people would imagine that they were carrying away the sacred vessels of Cordova, and would not fail to fall upon them; that, for the rest, the French officers themselves should make this search, and that of course there would be nothing in it to wound the honour of the army. The French negotiators were disposed to yield; they did yield, and the whole was settled, except the definitive drawing up, which was postponed to the following day, the 21st.

While the grievous conditions of this capitulation were under

discussion, and getting accepted one after another, an aide-de-camp of General Vedel's, and Captain Baste, of the seamen of the guard, arrived at the place of the conferences. These officers came to plead the interests of Vedel's division on the following grounds. When on the morning of the 20th, General Vedel, better informed, had learned the misfortune which had befallen General Dupont's division, partly through his fault, he was sorely grieved, and he immediately offered to renew the attack in the night of the ensuing day (that between the 20th and 21st), promising to cut his way through General Reding's corps, and to extricate his general-in-chief, if the latter would but make an effort on his part. He added that if the general-in-chief would not venture, he ought at least not to sacrifice Vedel's division, which, from its situation, totally different from that of Barbou's division, for it was not enveloped, had a right to totally different treatment. He directed Captain Baste and one of his aides-de-camp to convey this message to General Dupont. Captain Baste, intelligent, intrepid, fond of mixing himself up in matters of command, urged General Dupont to authorise a desperate attack to be attempted in the following night, abandoning all the baggage and even the artillery, if he must, setting in motion all who were able to stand, and endeavouring to force a passage, General Dupont by his left, General Vedel by his right. It is evident that success was possible; but General Dupont, still overwhelmed with dejection, scarcely heard what was said to him, alleged the deep discouragement of his army, a negotiation already begun, a treaty almost concluded, perhaps even signed on the road to Andujar, and sent off Captain Baste to the negotiators themselves to plead the cause of Vedel's division.

It was in consequence of this reference that Captain Baste appeared at the place of the conferences. He first addressed himself to the French negotiators, whom he found fatigued by a long disputation, and not capable of renewing a discussion in which they had always been beaten. Captain Baste, having come from a place where the greatest ardour and indignation were felt at the bare idea of surrender, and transferred to another where all was dejection and despair, could not comprehend sentiments which he did not feel, and returned indignant to General Dupont.

After this incident the three French negotiators accompanied the three Spanish negotiators to Andujar, where was to be definitively drawn up the capitulation devoted to so grievous an immortality; and Captain Baste returned to Baylen to the camp of General Dupont, to report what had passed. At this account, General Dupont, awakened to all his sentiments of honour, directed Captain Baste to advise General Vedel to set out immediately for La Carolina and the Sierra Morena, in order to

get away in all haste towards Madrid. Generals Vedel and Dufour might take back nine or ten thousand men to Madrid, and by gaining the start of the Spaniards, it is beyond doubt that they would have many chances of successfully effecting their retreat. This would be more than half the French army saved from that cruel catastrophe by a noble inspiration of General Dupont's, who well knew to what a degree he should thereby aggravate the lot of the other half.

Captain Baste set out instantly for General Vedel's camp, situated between Baylen and La Carolina, and brought him, along with the melancholy result of the conferences at Andujar, the authorisation to retire upon Madrid. Without losing a minute, General Vedel issued orders for departure, and in that same night all his troops set themselves in motion with those of General Dufour. In consequence of the continual marches backward and forward of these two divisions, six hundred men at least were lame. They had had some wounded in the action at Menjibar, and so they must leave behind seven or eight hundred men destined for slaughter. It was a sore affliction to part from them, but such is war! The welfare of all, constantly placed above the welfare of some, hardens the heart, or disposes it at least to a continual resignation to each other's misfortunes. They left their unhappy comrades in the villages bordering the road, and pursued with incredible precipitation the route for Madrid. By daybreak next morning, the 21st, they were at La Carolina, and pushed on, notwithstanding the heat of the weather, to St. Helena.

A few hours after the departure of the column, the Spaniards at Baylen were informed of it, both in General Reding's camp and in that of General de la Peña, which soon rang with the cries of cannibals. The French, it was alleged, had broken the truce, a charge for which there was very little foundation; for nothing prevented Vedel's division, which was out of reach, from moving, and the Spaniards, moreover, did not impose upon themselves that immobility, since they had been for thirty-six hours incessantly manœuvring about Barbon's division, for the purpose of investing it more completely; which really constituted an infraction of the truce, but which the French had neither complained of nor revenged, for want of the means of enforcing respect under their calamity. But no reason, no sense of justice, were left to those furious foes, who had become conquerors by chance. They all cried out that Barbon's entire division must be exterminated. They forgot that six thousand French, pushed to extremity, were capable of being roused from a temporary despondence by a noble despair, and of cutting their way through their enemies. Perhaps it is to be regretted that they did not follow up the suggestions of their barbarity,

and give rise to that noble despair which, by raising the courage of all, would have saved all. Be this as it may, numerous officers hastened to Andujar to carry the news of the departure of Vedel's and Dufour's divisions, and to report the exasperation of the Spanish army. The Spanish negotiators immediately made themselves the organs of an ignoble military populace, declaring that the most terrible treatment should be inflicted on Barbou's division unless Vedel's and Dufour's divisions returned to their first position. The answer was easy; for what more could be done against Barbou's division than make prisoners of it? To threaten to put prisoners to death would have been infamous; and it would have been necessary to reply to those who dared utter such a threat as one replies to murderers. But the hero of Genoa, the inflexible Massena, was not there. His officers hurried to the unhappy Dupont; they beset him with fresh importunities; they told him that he was likely to occasion the massacre of his faithful division, that which had fought so gallantly by his side, and all for the purpose of saving two divisions which were the real cause of the ruin of the army; and this, indeed, was true in regard to the latter. Yielding once more, he sent a formal counter-order to General Vedel.

On the arrival of the counter-order there was a unanimous outbreak in Vedel's division, which insisted on continuing its march upon Madrid. Another officer had to be despatched after it, charged to render General Vedel responsible for all consequences if he persisted in retiring. General Vedel then assembled his officers, communicated to them the situation in which they stood, represented the danger in which they should place their brethren in arms, and prevailed upon them to submit. The troops, less compliant, would not accede to these proposals, and in a country where solitary individuals would not have been murdered, they would almost all have deserted. In Spain they were obliged to keep together and to act all in common. They submitted, therefore, and returned from St. Helena to La Carolina, and from La Carolina to Guarroman, resigned to share the lot of Barbou's division.

At length, on the 22nd, that fatal capitulation was brought from Andujar to Baylen, to General Dupont. He hesitated several times before he signed it. The unhappy chief struck his forehead and flung down the pen; then urged by those men who had all been so brave under fire, and who were all so weak out of fire, he wrote his name, once so glorious, at the foot of that document, which was destined to be the everlasting torment of his life. Why had he not fallen at Albeck, at Halle, at Friedland, or even at Baylen? How deeply he regretted it subsequently, before judges who inflicted on him a dishonouring condemnation!

Hunger had been the cruel ally of the Spaniards in this

negotiation. While Barbon's division was kept blockaded, it had not been allowed a morsel of bread, and ever since the evening of the 18th our poor soldiers had not received any distribution. They had nothing but a few remnants of rations to subsist on, so that on the 22nd there were many of them who had not tasted food for three days. They were under the olive-trees, dying of hunger, gasping for breath, without even a draught of water to allay their thirst.

The capitulation being signed, General Castaños consented to grant them provisions. He could be humane, since Fortune had just prepared for him such a triumph that he could afford to be generous, as men are when the heart is satisfied. For the rest, he showed himself worthy of a triumph owing more to chance than to valour and genius by genuine humanity, perfect modesty, and a conduct which denoted extraordinary discretion. He said to our officers with the most honourable frankness, "De la Cuesta, Blake, and I were not in favour of the insurrection. We yielded to the national movement. But this movement is so unanimous that it acquires chances of success. Let not Napoleon insist upon an impossible conquest; let him not oblige us to throw ourselves into the arms of the English, who are hateful to us, and whose assistance we have hitherto rejected. Let him restore our king to us, requiring such conditions as can satisfy him, and the two nations will be reconciled for ever."

On the following day our soldiers filed before the Spanish army. They were cut to the heart. They were too young to be able to compare their present humiliation with their past triumphs; but among the officers there were some who had seen Melas's and Mack's Austrians, Hohenlohe's and Blücher's Prussians, file off before them, and they were overwhelmed with shame. Vedel's and Dufour's divisions did not lay down their arms, which, however, they would have to do by-and-by; but Barbon's division underwent that humiliation, and at this moment was sorry that it had not rather perished to the last man.

The French troops were immediately marched off for San Lucar and Rota, where they were to be embarked for France in Spanish vessels. Their route was made to avoid the two great cities of Cordova and Seville, in order to withdraw them from the popular fury, and lay through the less important towns of Bujalance, Ecija, Carmona, Alcalá, Utrera, and Lebrija. In all these places the conduct of the Spanish populace was atrocious. Those unfortunate French, who had behaved like brave men, who had made war without cruelty, who had suffered without revenging the massacre of their sick and wounded, were pelted with stones, and often attacked with knives, by men, women, and children. At Carmona, at Ecija, the women spat in their faces, and children flung mud at them. They trembled with

rage, and though disarmed, were more than once tempted to take a terrible revenge by seizing such as they could lay hands on and making weapons of them; but their officers restrained them, in order to prevent a general massacre. Care was taken to make them pass the night outside villages and towns, and to collect them in the open field like droves of cattle, to spare them still more cruel treatment. At Lebrija and in the towns near the coast, they were stopped and doomed to tarry, upon pretext that the Spanish vessels were not ready. But they soon learned the cause of this delay. The junta of Seville, governed by the lowest demagogue passions, had refused to acknowledge the capitulation of Baylen, and declared that the French should be detained prisoners of war, under various pretexts, all illusory, and false even to impudence. One of the reasons alleged by this junta was, that they were not sure of obtaining the consent of the English to the passage by sea—a false reason, for the English, notwithstanding their animosity, manifested a generous pity for our prisoners, and as we shall see, soon suffered other troops, which they would have been greatly interested in detaining, to pass by sea. Our officers addressed themselves to the captain-general, Thomas de Morla, remonstrating against this unworthy violation of the law of nations, but received from him only the most indecorous answers, to the effect that an army which had violated all laws, divine and human, had forfeited the right of appealing to the justice of the Spanish nation.

At Lebrija the furious populace broke in the night into a prison in which was one of our regiments of dragoons, and slaughtered seventy-five, of whom twelve were officers. But for the clergy, they would have put all of them to death. Lastly, the generals, who had committed the serious fault of separating themselves from their troops, in order to travel apart with their baggage, were severely punished for having thus withdrawn themselves. No sooner had they arrived at Port St. Mary, with their waggons exempt from examination, than the people, unable to contain themselves at the sight of those vehicles, crammed, as they said, with all the riches of Cordova, fell upon them, broke them in pieces, and plundered them. Men belonging to the Spanish authorities were not the last to assist in this pillage. But though these waggons contained the whole of the savings of the officers, and even the chest of the army, no more was found in them than eleven or twelve hundred thousand reals, according to the Spanish newspapers themselves, that is to say, about 300,000 francs. That was the whole result of the sacking of Cordova. The French generals had well nigh been slaughtered, and they escaped the fury of the populace only by throwing themselves into boats. They were conducted to

Cadiz, and detained prisoners till their embarkation for France, where other hardships not less cruel awaited them.

Such was that famous capitulation of Baylen, the name of which in our boyhood rang in our ears as frequently as that of Austerlitz or Jena. At this period the ordinary persecutors of misfortune, judging of that deplorable event without knowledge and without pity, imputed to cowardice and to anxiety to save the waggons laden with the spoils of Cordova the terrible disaster which befell the French army. Thus it is that the baseness of courtiers, ever rancorous against those whom power gives it the signal for immolating, is accustomed to judge! There were many faults, but not a single infraction of honour, in that deplorable campaign of Andalusia. The first fault was that of Napoleon himself, who, after exciting by the events of Bayonne an unparalleled popular fury before which every operation of war became extremely perilous, contented himself with sending 8000 men to Valencia and 12,000 to Cordova, apparently conceiving that these were sufficient. After this fault of Napoleon's came the military fault of General Dupont and his lieutenant, General Vedel. General Dupont, leaving Cordova, to move nearer to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, ought, from this very motive, to have drawn so near to them as to close them completely, and to this end to have placed himself at Baylen, which would have rendered all separation of his divisions impossible. After committing the fault of establishing himself at Andujar and not at Baylen, it was a fault not less serious not to have followed General Vedel when he sent him back in the evening of the 16th to Baylen, and this fault committed, in not decamping on the 17th instead of having decamped on the 18th, in having, on the day of the battle of Baylen, engaged partially, successively, and in parallel line to the enemy, with the forces at his disposal, instead of making an attack and in close column on his left; * lastly, in having, after the most honourable efforts of valour, given way too much to the general despondency. The fault of General Vedel was his coming on the 16th with his whole division to Andujar, and leaving Baylen uncovered (for which the approbation of the general-in-chief himself was but a very imperfect excuse); his great fault was following General Dufour to La Carolina, thus leaving Baylen a second time without any precaution for

* If I venture to express these opinions on purely special questions, it is because they are conformable to plain common sense, and supported by the soundest of all irrefragable authorities, Napoleon and Berthier. In fact, in all that relates to the military operations of General Dupont, these judgments are but the ideas of Napoleon and Berthier, drawn for the former from the questions which the *procureur-général* put by his direction to the accused, and for the second, from the speech which he delivered during the proceedings.

defending it; and lastly, when undeceived at La Carolina, not having returned immediately, but on the contrary, wasted the whole of the 19th in vain loitering. Lastly, the fault of the generals about General Dupont was, to urge him to the capitulation, and after fighting valiantly on the field of battle of Baylen, showing the most culpable weakness in the general negotiation, yielding to the threats of the Spanish generals like the most cowardly of men, while they were some of the bravest: a fresh proof that moral courage and physical courage are two very different qualities.

Thus a serious error of Napoleon's in regard to Spain, a military position ill chosen by General Dupont, too great delay in changing it, an ill-planned battle, false movements of General Vedel's, demoralisation of generals and soldiers—such were the causes of the cruel reverse of Baylen. All that has been said in addition is mere calumny. The long file of baggage, it has often been repeated, brought upon us all our misfortunes. Supposing that a general had been capable of so stupid a calculation as to sacrifice his honour, his military profession, the marshal's baton that was reserved for him, for a few hundred thousand francs, a sum far inferior to what Napoleon gave to the least favoured of his lieutenants, eight or ten waggons would have carried all the pretended riches of Cordova in gold and silver plate, and the question related to several hundred carriages, the extraordinary number of which was evidently occasioned by the moral state of the country, in which not a sick or wounded man could be left behind. At last, as we have seen, those famous baggage-waggons were plundered, and the chest of the army carried off: it contained not more than three or four hundred thousand francs. All that can be said, in short, is, that General Dupont, intelligent, capable, brilliant under fire, had not the indomitable firmness of Massena at Genoa and Essling. But he was ill, wounded, exhausted by a heat of forty degrees; his soldiers were boys, worn out with fatigue and hunger; disasters followed close upon disasters, accidents upon accidents; and if we sound this tragic event to the bottom, we shall see that the emperor himself, who placed so many men in a false position, was not in this case the most irreproachable. Still we must add, for the interest of military morality, that in these extreme situations the resolution to die is the only worthy, the only salutary resolution; for certainly on General Vedel's arrival the resolution to die in the attempt to cut a passage through Reding's division would have enabled the two parts of the French army to join, and to get triumphantly out of the scrape, instead of finding themselves humbled and prisoners. By sacrificing on the field of battle one-fourth of the men who afterwards died in a cruel captivity, one might

have transformed into a triumph the most signal of the reverses of that extraordinary period.*

The news of this strange disaster, deemed impossible at Madrid, since the army of General Dupont had been increased to 20,000 men by the successive despatch of Vedel's and Gobert's divisions, spread rapidly, at first by the secret communications of the Spaniards, then by some officers who had escaped and got from post to post into La Mancha, and lastly, by the arrival of M. de Villoutreys himself, who was commissioned to carry to the

* I here express, from pure love of truth, and especially from the disgust that I have always felt for injustice towards the unfortunate, this opinion concerning the affair of Baylen, which will shock all the prejudices of the imperial period. But every man of upright mind, after reading the documents which I have had in my possession, will not be able to pronounce any other judgment than I here pronounce myself. These documents have been of different sorts, and are infinitely curious and conclusive. In the first place, there are in the dépôt of war several volumes of papers relative to the affair of Baylen, with the models of the interrogatories, which were dictated by the emperor, and which reveal the opinion that he formed respecting the military faults committed in that campaign. There is his correspondence with General Savary, which forms not the least important of these documents, the correspondence of General Dupont with his lieutenants, and lastly, the proceedings instituted against Generals Dupont, Marescot, Vedel, Chabert, &c. Napoleon had resolved in a first paroxysm of rage to have all the authors of the capitulation shot. Very soon, on the remonstrances of the wise, and always wise, Cambacérés, and under the inspiration of his own heart, which would have been sufficient to stop him after the first moment was past, he referred the decision on the affair of Baylen to a tribunal of honour composed of *grandses* of the empire. The sentence pronounced was degradation, and an imperial decree ordered three manuscript copies of the entire proceedings to be deposited, one with the Senate, one in the dépôt of war, and the third in the archives of the high imperial court. When, after the Restoration, General Dupont was taken into favour (and at that moment he became, in my opinion, more culpable than at Baylen), he obtained an ordinance from the king cancelling the imperial decree, and prescribing the destruction of the three copies of the proceedings. The two copies belonging to the Senate and the dépôt of war were readily found and destroyed. The third, assigned to the high imperial court, was not in the archives of that court, because it had never been organised. It was in the hands of one of the great families created by the empire, and there it has remained. It is this valuable manuscript, in which everything is found, in my opinion, completely cleared up, which contains the justification of General Dupont, that, at least, which one can furnish with reason and justice. If General Dupont had succeeded in destroying it, he would have destroyed the elements of his reinstatement with posterity; an evident proof that we ought always to trust to truth, and to leave that to act. For the rest, whoever reads in these proceedings the judgment of Prince Berthier, for each of the *grandses* of the empire delivered his own, will there find, besides a rare superiority of reason and an honourable humanity, of which other personages, and particularly personages of the civil order, did not set an example, nearly the same judgment that I express here. Let me add that Napoleon himself, subsequently influenced by more justice, frequently repeated, "Dupont was more unfortunate than culpable." He then felt himself the assaults of misfortune, and with his great mind and his great heart, he appreciated better to what point one ought to make allowance for circumstances, in order to judge more equitably. For the rest, I have not in my career met with any of the actors who figure in this narrative, either with them or their families, and what I say proceeds from a pure feeling of impartiality.

emperor the convention of Baylen. The details of such a reverse struck with dismay all who were French or attached to the fortune of France. The Spaniards were intoxicated with pride, and they had a right to be proud, not of the ability or valour displayed on this occasion, though they had behaved gallantly, but of the obstacles of all kinds which their patriotic insurrection had created for us—obstacles which had been the principal cause of General Dupont's misfortunes. The twenty thousand men who were destined to conquer Andalusia, and in case of ill success, to fall back upon La Mancha and cover Madrid, being all at once withdrawn, the situation became most difficult. It was evident that the insurgents of Valencia, Carthagena, and Murcia, giving a hand to those of Grenada and Seville, elated by their unforeseen triumph, drawing after them those of Estramadura and La Mancha, who had not yet ventured to show themselves, would soon march upon Madrid. Though the number of those who were regimented with troops of the line was greatly exaggerated, and there were no numerous bodies but the bands of rovers, who, by the title of guerillas, covered the country, intercepting convoys, slaughtering the wounded and the sick, and ravaging Spain much more than the French armies themselves, still General Castaños might arrive with the troops of Valencia, Murcia, Carthagena, Grenada, Seville, Badajoz, that is to say, at the head of sixty or seventy thousand men, greatly encouraged by the events at Baylen, and all we had to oppose to them were Musnier's, Morlot's, and Frère's divisions, Rey's brigade, and the imperial guard. All these corps, without wounded and sick, ought to have furnished about 30,000 men in line, and in the then state of health of the troops would supply 20,000 or 25,000 at most. Nevertheless, with an energetic general, Murat, for instance, instead of Joseph, one might beat 60,000 Spaniards with 20,000 French, and make the conquerors of Baylen fall back upon La Mancha and Andalusia, if they should appear before Madrid. The French, it is true, had behind them a great capital which they were obliged to guard and to awe, but it was possible (as Napoleon has since observed) to bring towards that capital a considerable reinforcement, sufficient to daunt the enemy within or without. Marshal Bessièrès, after his victory at Rio Seco, had marched towards Galicia, and was preparing to penetrate into it. It was necessary to call him back to Burgos, and to limit his part to the covering of the road to Bayonne. There might then be taken from him Lefebvre's brigade, temporarily detached from Morlot's division before the victory of Rio Seco was known, Mouton's division composed of old regiments, the 26th chasseurs recently arrived, the 51st and 43rd of the line ready to arrive at Bayonne (and forming part of twelve old regiments called to Spain),

which would present a reinforcement of about 10,000 excellent troops capable of fighting against all the armies of Spain. Marshal Bessières would besides have, with the marching troops and the movable columns placed at Vittoria, Burgos, and Aranda, about 14,000 or 15,000 men. Lastly, the 14th and 44th of the line, also forming part of the old regiments called to Spain, had strengthened the corps of General Verdier before Saragossa and increased it to 17,000 men. One might in strictness, whether the new attack prepared against Saragossa, and the success of which was daily announced as probable and near at hand, were executed or deferred, detach these two regiments and take them to Madrid. In case of the reduction of Saragossa, they would arrive with their material force and a great moral effect to boot. In the contrary case, the capture of Saragossa would only be retarded, and Madrid would be covered from any attempt, and the enemy, whoever he might be that should approach it, must be driven off to a distance. Spain, after all, with the 30,000 men who might be collected at Madrid, the 14,000 who would be left with Marshal Bessières, General Verdier's 17,000, General Duhesme's 11,000 in Catalonia, and General Reille's 7000, would still contain about 80,000 French; and assuredly it was possible with such a force to make head against the Spaniards, without taking into account that fresh reinforcements, prepared by Napoleon, would be arriving every moment at Bayonne. But there was required a military prince, we repeat it, not a mild, discreet, well-informed prince, but no soldier, though in moments of peril he might recollect that he was the brother of Napoleon.*

There was consequently no reason to despair, since by calling back Marshal Bessières from Galicia to Old Castille, by limiting his duty to guarding the Madrid road, by drawing to one's self part of the forces under him, besides a portion of the troops besieging Saragossa, and lastly, those that were soon to pass through Bayonne, one would be enabled to keep Madrid, and to beat the insurgents who should dare to show themselves under its walls. But the unfortunate King of Spain had not the case-hardened character of his brother. The joy of the Spaniards

* These observations are not wholly derived from my own mind. When reflecting upon these events, I always thought that there were left, even after the disaster of Baylen, sufficient forces to continue to occupy Madrid; but I have lately found a note of the emperor's, dated Bordeaux, the 2nd of August, which confirms me in this opinion, and it is from this very note that I extract the calculations which I have just given, as well as the indication of the concentrations that might be effected. I have only reduced a few exaggerated figures in that note relating to the force of the corps remaining in Spain. Napoleon, solicitous to induce his brother to be firm, naturally flattered the situation in some degree, and between doubtful figures, always preferred the highest. Though he reckoned more than 80,000 men in Spain, after the loss of Dupont's 20,000, there was scarcely that number, diseases and the fire had made such ravages.

who were hostile to him, and they were far the greater number, the despondence of those who had attached themselves to his cause, the perplexity of his ministers, the want of firmness of the French generals about him, his embarrassment in finding himself amidst a city that was strange to him, all contributed to shake his soul profoundly, and to impel him to take the disastrous resolution to leave his new capital ten days after he had entered it. He ought to have braved everything rather than resolve to evacuate Madrid, for the mere moral effect could not fail to be immense. While he was there, the events of the war might be considered as alternations of misfortune and success. Rio Seco might be opposed to Baylen, though not so important; the justly anticipated reduction of Saragossa might soon be set down against the resistance of Valencia; and Madrid continuing to be occupied, served for a proof of the superiority of the French in the Peninsula. The insurrection might still feel doubtful of its cause, and the English, presuming less on its power, would not have made such mighty efforts to second it. But the evacuation of Madrid looked like a formal avowal of the new royalty that it was incapable of retaining by force the kingdom which it pretended to have received from Providence. What Providence wills, it knows how to sustain, and suffers it not to fall. From this moment all Spain would be astir, and the particular disgrace of Baylen, which lighted upon a few generals, was destined to be succeeded by a cruel confusion for Napoleon, the confusion of his policy, a consequence of the total evacuation of almost the whole of Spain.

General Savary was still at Madrid, though Joseph, disliking both his person and his way of thinking and acting, had done his best to get rid of him. General Savary was the representative of the system of military executions, of application to keep the French army well, let it cost Spain what it might, of absolute submission to the will of Napoleon, and of indifference to the orders of Joseph when they were not strictly conformable to those emanating from the imperial staff. Joseph, desirous to make himself popular in Spain, and consequently disposed to sacrifice the interest of the army to that of the Spaniards, felt a deep aversion for General Savary and the whole of the things which he represented at his court. Accordingly, he applied to Napoleon to grant him Marshal Jourdan, whom he had been in the habit of employing at Naples, who was upright, discreet, quiet, not more active than was requisite for the indolence of his master, and not at all disposed to prostrate himself before Napoleon, whom he comprehended little and liked still less. Joseph, impatient to have Marshal Jourdan, and to have done with General Savary, had given the latter to understand that he might as well set off; and General Savary, always intractable unless

towards Napoleon, replied that he should be delighted to leave him as soon as he should receive permission from the emperor, his only master. While awaiting this permission, he had remained at Madrid, drawing every day, in his correspondence with the emperor, pictures of men and things that were far from flattering. After the disaster of Baylen, Joseph was too happy to have General Savary about him, to share the responsibility of the important resolutions which he had to take, and he consulted him with much more deference than usual. General Savary, who was not a weak man, but who saw how incapable this unfortunate monarch was to maintain himself in Madrid with 20,000 men, thought it more prudent to let him leave it, and he even advised him to retire as soon as possible. "And what will the emperor say?" asked Joseph meanwhile with some uneasiness. "The emperor will scold," replied General Savary; "his fits of anger are boisterous, you know, but they don't kill. He, no doubt, would stay here; but what is possible for him is not so for others. One disaster like that of Baylen is enough; let us not have a second. When we shall be upon the Ebro, well concentrated, solidly established, and able to resume the offensive, the emperor will decide what is to be done, and send you the necessary reinforcements."

King Joseph afforded General Savary no occasion for repeating this advice a second time, and issued orders for retreating from Madrid. But there were at Madrid more than 3000 sick and wounded, and an immense quantity of military stores accumulated in the Buen Retiro, which had begun to be converted into a fortress. It would take, therefore, much time, and require great exertion, to remove so many men and such a mass of matériel. They fell to work without delay. Unfortunately the ill disposition of the inhabitants added to the difficulty of the operation. The rumour of the retreat of the French soon spread at sight of their preparations, and the Spaniards, transported with joy, resolved to render this retreat as disastrous as they could, collected all their carts, piled them up in heaps, and set fire to them. They chose rather to destroy those vehicles than to suffer them to be serviceable to the French. Hence the transport of the wounded, the sick, the administrations, was attended with much more difficulty, and it was several days before the troops could be allowed to march.

On the mere rumour of such a resolution, all who had for a moment espoused the cause of the French disappeared. Two of Joseph's ministers, Messrs. Pinuela and Cevallos, absented themselves without the slightest explanation. The latter, in particular, who afterwards became a pamphleteer, intent on defaming France, held a conduct worthy of the rest of his life. Long the base flatterer of the Prince of the Peace, afterwards his im-

placable enemy, the obsequious servant of Ferdinand VII. during his two months' reign, a minister of Joseph's, whom he ought never to have thought of serving, he went off disgracefully on the news of Baylen, saying nothing to the French whom he was leaving, but telling the Spaniards, to whom he went back, that if he had consented to be Joseph's minister, it was that he might have permission to return to Spain, and the occasion to attach himself again to a cause the triumph of which he had always foreseen and desired. Old Azanza, and Messrs. O'Farrill and Urquijo, acting like grave men who had known their own mind in accepting the French royalty, that is to say, who aimed at the regeneration of Spain, did not desert Joseph, but followed him with hearts rent with grief. M. de Caballero, treated by his comrades with an insulting contempt, which he deserved much less than M. de Cevallos, remained at Joseph's court as in an asylum. Among the *grandees*, the Prince of Castel Franco, who had confronted the storm, found his courage fail him at the last moment, and did not depart after promising to do so. Not one of those who followed Joseph could take a Spanish servant along with him. All persons of that condition stayed at Madrid. There were more than two thousand individuals employed in the palaces and the stables of the crown, on account of the great number of magnificent horses usually kept by the Spanish royal family. For fear of being carried away, almost all of them stole off in one night. Joseph could scarcely obtain any attendance in his retreat.

He set out on the 2nd of August for Chamartin, without any insulting demonstration, for his person had gained a sort of respect. The people beheld the French troops march away with a perfectly natural joy, but durst not offend them, for they trembled at the mere sight of them, and notwithstanding a well-founded presumption on this occasion, they had a vague impression that they might see them again. From the time of this retreat, Joseph had not a creature in Spain on his side, neither the populace, whom he had never had, nor the middling and higher classes, who, after hesitating a moment for fear of France, and in the hope of the meliorations which might be expected from her, now hesitated no longer, since France herself seemed to acknowledge that she was conquered by retiring from Madrid.

The army fell back slowly, by way of Buytrago, Somosierra, Aranda, and Burgos. Having found numerous traces of cruelty upon its route, it could not repress its exasperation, and revenged itself in more than one place. Rage being aggravated by hunger, the troops destroyed a great deal upon their passage, and left everywhere marks of their presence, which increased the hatred of the Spaniards to the highest degree. Joseph, apprehensive

of the effects which would thus be provoked, strove in vain to prevent the excesses committed along the route; but he only offended the army itself, the soldiers saying that he ought to interest himself a little more about them by whom he was supported than about the Spaniards who rejected him. When things go on ill, disharmony is associated with disaster. Joseph's ministers agreed very ill with the French generals, and the new court of Spain with the army, which was its sole stay. Sadness prevailed among the chiefs, irritation among the soldiers, the fury of revenge among the populations through which they passed.

King Joseph and those about him, more and more disheartened at every step, did not conceive themselves in safety even at Burgos. They were afraid lest they should still have upon their rear the whole country comprehended between Burgos and the Biscayan provinces; and they judged it proper to proceed to the line of the Ebro, taking Miranda for the headquarters. They had brought Marshal Bessières upon their right, and purposed to bring General Verdier upon their left, caring little about throwing away all the efforts which had hitherto been made for taking Saragossa, and which at this moment were on the point of being crowned with success. Not till they were behind the Ebro did they recover some assurance, having, besides the 20,000 men from Madrid, the twenty and odd thousand of Marshal Bessières, General Verdier's 17,000, and all the reserves at Bayonne.

To all these faults was to be added that of abandoning so much ground, so many works, and in particular those accumulated before Saragossa. Since the last attacks, the means of all kinds had been considerably augmented for reducing that obstinate city, which proved that the most skilfully combined defences of art are less powerful than the courage of inhabitants determined to perish in their houses. Two old regiments, the 14th, so fortunate and so heroic at Eylau, and the 44th, which distinguished itself in the same battle and at Dantzic, had just arrived, and increased the besieging corps to sixteen or seventeen thousand men. The heavy artillery, necessary for battering down the convents which flanked the wall enclosing the city, had been conveyed from Pampeluna by the Ebro and the canal of Aragon. The emperor's aide-de-camp, Colonel Lacoste, of the engineers, had made skilful dispositions for effecting in a short time large breaches in the outer wall, and battering down the strong buildings which served it for a support. All being ready, on the morning of the 4th of August, sixty pieces of ordnance, mortars, howitzers, sixteen-pounders, poured their fire upon the city and the convent of Santa Engrazia, which is in the centre of the enclosing wall, at a salient angle which it forms at about the

middle of its extent. On the left and right of this convent are two gates, by which it was proposed to penetrate, and then to proceed rapidly through a tolerably wide street toward the Cosso, a sort of inner boulevard which runs through the whole length of Saragossa; and once masters of that, the besiegers might consider themselves in possession of the whole city. The French artillery having about noon silenced that of the enemy, and made large breaches in the wall of enclosure, the columns for storming were formed, and two of these columns, one on the right under General Habert, one on the left under General Grandjean, rushed to the battered wall, shouting *Vive l'Empereur!* The Spaniards, who had not made their resistance consist in the defence of an enclosure which was neither bastioned nor terraced, but in their barricaded streets and their embattled houses, awaited our soldiers on the other side of the two breaches, and as soon as they had passed them, received the assailants with a shower of balls. The right column, the more fortunate of the two, entered first, and destroying the obstacles that stopped the left towards the gate of the Carmelites, assisted it to enter in its turn. In spite of the fire from the houses, it then threw itself into the street, that of Santa Engrazia, which descended perpendicularly towards the Cosso, the principal object of our attacks. Three great barricades, armed with cannon, divided that street. Our soldiers, hurried away by their ardour, carried these barricades by assault, took thirteen pieces of cannon, killed the Spaniards who served them, and debouched on the Cosso, considering themselves already as masters of the city. But on their rear they left insurgents, some peasants and monks, others soldiers of the line, entrenched in the houses, and resolved to let them be set on fire before they would leave them. The French were therefore obliged to turn back to dislodge them before they established themselves on the Cosso. This they did, fighting from house to house, losing men in taking them, and revenging themselves when they were taken by the death of those to whose fire they had been exposed.

The left column had found a serious obstacle in its way: this was a vast edifice, the convent of the Carmelites, which had been surrounded with a ditch, and in which were lodged many Spanish troops under experienced officers, as in an entrenched camp. It had been necessary to take this convent, which had been done with vigour, but not without great loss. This business being finished, they, and the right column as well, had begun to attack with small arms one house after another, while the artillery continued to throw in bombs and balls, which, passing over the heads of our soldiers, proceeded to punish and ravage the city. This horrible conflict had been kept up ever since morning with incredible animosity, when our weary soldiers

began to disperse themselves in the houses which they had conquered, to seek provisions, which they were in great need of, particularly wine, with which they knew that all the towns of Spain were abundantly supplied. In this interior search they found unfortunately the wreck of their valour; for presently half our troops were overpowered with sleep and intoxication. In spite of all the exertions of our generals, most of them wounded, they could not rouse the soldiers either to the fight or at least to provide for their own safety. If the Spaniards had suspected the state in which the assailants were, they might have made them repent the sanguinary success of the day. It was necessary to wait till morning to recommence and to prosecute the difficult conquest of Saragossa, house by house, and street by street. We had, besides many officers wounded, and especially the two generals-in-chief, Verdier and Lefebvre-Desnoettes, the first by a ball in the thigh, the second suffering from a violent contusion of the ribs—we had about eleven or twelve hundred men hors de combat, three hundred of whom were dead, and eight or nine hundred wounded. The two old regiments, the 14th and the 44th, fancied that in the streets of Saragossa they found themselves again in the musketry fire of Eylau.

Next morning, General Verdier being unable from his wound to resume the command of the attacks, General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, taking his place, rallied the troops dispersed in the houses, barricaded himself, for the account of the French, the conquered streets leading to the Cosso, and resolved, in order to spare blood, to employ sapping and mining, conceiving that he was not bound to show much tenderness for a Spanish city for which the Spaniards felt none themselves.

In this state of things arrived the news of the disaster of Baylen, of the evacuation of Madrid, and of the general retreat upon the Ebro. Our generals and our soldiers were extremely mortified to see so much blood spilt to no purpose, and the prey on which they had been so obstinately bent ready to escape from their clutches. As the corps of Saragossa was to form at Tudela, on the Ebro, the left of the new position which the French army was about to occupy in Spain, the wounded were first sent off, then the artillery that could be removed, the rest being spiked, and the troops marched, vexation in their hearts and grief in their faces, humbled to the lowest point at having to fall back before soldiers whom they held of little account, notwithstanding the obstinacy displayed in the streets of Saragossa by peasants and monks. They brought back about 16,000 men to Tudela, some of old, the others recently, seasoned to war, but all capable of beating in the open field three or four times as many Spaniards as they numbered men in their ranks.

In Catalonia the French had been obliged to shut themselves up within the walls of Barcelona. General Duhesme had at first endeavoured to suppress the insurrection in the south of that province, that he might be able to communicate with Valencia; but having no need to concern himself about what was passing in that quarter since the retreat of Marshal Moncey, he had then attempted to act in the north, in order to maintain his communications with France, and to give a hand to General Reille's column. He had marched at the head of the principal part of his troops by Mataro and Hostalrich upon Girona, with the intention to possess himself of this latter place, one of the most important in Catalonia, which the French had been wrong not to occupy. On reaching Mataro he had been obliged to take that little town by assault, and to give it up to the fury of the soldiery, daily more exasperated at the barbarous war that was carried on against them. From Mataro he had marched upon Girona, which he had hoped to surprise and to carry by escalade. His grenadiers, provided with ladders, had already climbed the enclosure of the town, and were about to enter it, when they were repulsed by the people, mixed with soldiers and monks. Without heavy artillery, and despairing of carrying the place by main force, General Duhesme returned to Barcelona, obliged to fight incessantly by the way, and to sack villages, to revenge the murder of his soldiers. During this incursion it had not been possible for him to communicate with General Reille, who had gone, on his part, to Figueras, but not been able to advance further. All that the latter could do had been to revictual the fort of Figueras, occupied by a small French garrison, and to deposit there a sufficient quantity of provisions and ammunition. But whenever he had attempted to push further, he had been assailed on all sides by the bold Miquelets, baffling by their swiftness and their skill in firing the courage of our young soldiers, who were not qualified to run after mountaineers accustomed to the hunting of the chamois.* General Reille had thus sustained considerable losses to no purpose; and being informed of the return of General Duhesme to Barcelona, he had confined himself to the guarding of the frontier, waiting before he attempted anything for new means and new orders.

Such was our situation in the month of August 1808 in that Spain which we had so rapidly overrun, and which we had deemed it so easy to conquer. We had lost the whole of the south, after leaving one of our armies prisoners in it. Under the impression of that check we had abandoned Madrid, broken off the siege of Saragossa when nearly finished, and fallen back

* I employ the most general appellation; but in the Pyrenees the chamois is called *izard*.

to the Ebro; and the only one of our corps which had not evacuated the province which it was charged to occupy, that of Catalonia, was shut up in Barcelona, blockaded on land by innumerable Miquelets, by sea by a British fleet, which had come in all haste from Gibraltar on the report of the Spanish insurrection.

At the furthest extremity of the Peninsula was left a French army, respecting the fate of which serious uneasiness might justly be felt: it was Junot's, peaceably established in Portugal before the terrible commotion which had so violently shaken all Spain. No intelligence was received from it, neither could any be transmitted to it, Andalusia and Estramadura having risen in the south, Galicia and the kingdom of Leon in the north, and intercepting all communications.

As soon as the insurrection of the month of May had broken out, the Spaniards, according to their custom, claiming the victory before they had won it, had not failed, through Galicia and Estramadura, to fill Portugal with sinister news for the French army. The juntas had written to all the Spanish corps to induce them to desert in mass, and to come and join the insurrection. General Junot, soon informed confusedly of what was passing in Spain, without knowing all the details, had felt the necessity of taking the strictest precautions against the Spanish troops which had been sent to second him, and which, instead of affording him any assistance, became in the present state of things the principal of his difficulties. He had near Lisbon Caraffa's division of three or four thousand men, charged to assist in reducing the Alentejo. He surrounded it unawares by a French division, and on the ground of circumstances summoned it to lay down its arms, which it did shuddering. However, several hundred foot and horse contrived to escape across Alentejo towards Spanish Estramadura. A French regiment of dragoons, sent in pursuit of them, retook some; the others succeeded in reaching Badajoz.

General Junot had collected in the Tagus a certain number of vessels past service. These were anchored in the middle of the channel, and in them he placed the Spanish soldiers, deprived of their arms, but sufficiently provided with all necessities.

During these proceedings at Lisbon, Caraffa's division, Taranco's division, comprehending sixteen battalions, and which there were no French troops to control at Oporto, had risen, made the French general Quesnel and all his staff prisoners, and set out for Galicia to join General Blake, at the same time calling the Portuguese to arms; not that the Portuguese wanted inclination to rise, for the Portuguese, though enemies to the Spaniards, are at bottom only Spaniards, who detest all other nations. At

the sight of the French they had certainly felt that they were of that race of Christian Moors who inhabit the Peninsula and hate whatever is beyond it. They would have desired nothing better than to rise, but before the face of the French army they had not dared, and the good order maintained by Junot among his troops had contributed to render this submission less galling. But when informed of the rising in Spain, on hearing the Spaniards told that they had conquered the French, they had naturally conceived a desire to follow such an example, and nothing was wanting but the appearance of their old allies the English, at once allies and tyrants, to produce a general insurrection among them.

Admiral Sir Charles Cotton was cruising, in fact, from Cape Finisterre to Cape St. Vincent; nothing, however, was yet to be seen but ships sailing in the offing, not making for the shore, and the Portuguese waited with impatience for the convoy that should bring at last an English army. Lisbon, which Junot kept down with the bulk of his troops, could not well permit a rising; whereas at Oporto, which had all the Portuguese sentiments in its heart, and moreover the mortification of no longer seeing the English in its port—Oporto was ready to break out on the first signal of England.

The brave General Junot was fully sensible of the critical nature of this situation. At the moment of General Dupont's catastrophe he had been a month without news from France, for the sea, subject to the English, suffered not a vessel to pass, and the Spanish insurrection, which enveloped Portugal from north to south, suffered not a courier to pass. The report of the event at Baylen, transmitted by Spanish enthusiasm to Portuguese hate, spread with incredible celerity throughout Portugal, and excited an extraordinary commotion there. On the contrary, the victory of Rio Seco, though much anterior to the disaster of Baylen, was not yet known; for the human mind propagates facts which flatter it, and has no echo for others. There was no harm in this, however, and that success, which the public was soon to be informed of, was destined to become, as we shall presently see, a resource for the encouragement of our soldiers. Though young, they had been already seasoned by a difficult march to Portugal. They had recruited themselves, and reorganised, trained, and habituated to the climate, they exhibited the finest aspect. Having entered to the number of 23,000, being joined by 3000 more, they still found themselves, after their disastrous march last autumn, amounting to 24,000, perfectly capable of supporting the honour of the French arms before they surrendered, if they too were doomed to succumb, in expiation all over the Peninsula of the outrage at Bayonne.

General Junot, seeing himself so far from France, shut up between the Spanish insurrection which proclaimed itself victorious, and the sea which appeared covered with English sails, did not delude himself respecting his dangers; but he was intelligent and brave, and he resolved to conduct himself in such a manner as to obtain the approbation of Napoleon. He held a council of war composed of generals brought up in the school of Napoleon, and the resolutions adopted in this council were conformable to the true principles of war. Unfortunately, if the true principles were recognised in theory, they were not followed up in practice with the vigour and precision which the master alone was capable of applying. To abandon all the accessory points which they occupied, to concentrate themselves in mass at Lisbon in order to control the capital, and to put themselves into a posture to fling into the sea the first English troops that should land, naturally constituted the plan which every one would conceive and adopt. It was therefore resolved to evacuate the Algarves, Alentejo, the Beyras, in short, all the parts where they had troops, excepting the two fortresses of Almeida to the north, Elvas to the south, excepting also the positions of Setubal and Peniche on the coast, and to concentrate themselves between Lisbon and Abrantes. The resolution was a good one, but not complete enough, for there was still at those points what would absorb 4000 or 5000 men of the 20,000 or 22,000 effectives; and reckoning what would be requisite for Lisbon itself, they could not have more than 10,000 or 12,000 soldiers wherewith to oppose a landing, whereas 15,000 or 18,000 ought to have been reserved for a decisive action.

They had near them an ally who could have rendered great service; this was the Russian admiral Siniavin, with his squadron, manned by crews which were indifferent sailors but excellent soldiers. Had he frankly espoused the common cause, it would have been easy for him singly to have guarded Lisbon, and then 3000 or 4000 more French troops would have been disposable. But he insisted, as he had already done, on returning to Russia, being strongly attached to England, full of hatred against France, and quite disposed to open his arms to the enemy. He replied coldly or negatively to all the proposals for concurrence that were addressed to him, although from his position in the middle of the Tagus it behoved him to defend the entrance more than Junot himself. For the latter it was a serious difficulty, especially as he had to control a hostile population of 300,000 souls, in which were comprehended 20,000 mountaineers of Galicia, engaged, like the Savoyards and Auvergnats at Paris, in laborious occupations, who manifested no very amicable dispositions. However, as the principal establishment of the French army was at Lisbon, Junot hoped, with

the depôts, the sick, and the storekeepers, to repress the disaffection of the capital. He ordered General Loison to quit Almeida with his division, General Kellermann to quit Elvas with his, leaving only a garrison in those two places. His plan was, when once those two divisions had returned, to keep a mass in constant readiness to act upon the coast against the English army, the speedy landing of which was announced.

The insurrection, though it had not yet broken out, was at this time secretly hatching in Portugal; and it was almost impossible to effect the arrival of a courier. So many messengers, however, were sent to General Kellermann, and particularly to General Loison, who was more difficult to reach than General Kellermann on account of the remoteness of the province which he occupied, that both received timely notice. General Loison, at the moment of departure, was already surrounded by insurgents, infected by the contagion of the Spanish insurrection. The priests, not less ardent in Portugal than in Spain, had put themselves at the head of the peasantry, and guarded all the passes, carrying on the same kind of warfare that was then practised all over the Peninsula; that is to say, barricading the entrances of the villages, carrying away the provisions, murdering the sick, the wounded, and stragglers. But General Loison was as vigorous as any officer of his time. He left in the forts of Almeida fourteen or fifteen hundred men, the least capable of sustaining the fatigues of a long march, supplied them with provisions and ammunition, and proceeded with three thousand to traverse the whole north of Portugal, by way of Almeida, La Guarda, Abrantes, and Lisbon. He had several times to cut a passage through the revolted, and to punish them severely; but he knew how to enforce respect everywhere, to open the roads for himself and to procure subsistence; and he at length reached Abrantes, having lost but two hundred men during this toilsome and perilous march.

General Kellermann withdrew quite as successfully from Elvas. On the report of the insurrection in Andalusia and Estramadura, the Algarves and Alentejo had already begun to rise. General Kellermann sent detachments in various directions, particularly to Bega, where he inflicted a severe execution, found means to repress the revolted, then left at Elvas, as General Loison had done at Almeida, all who were least capable of marching in the suffocating heat of July, and arrived without obstacle at Lisbon, by the left bank of the Tagus. There were then no French troops but at Almeida, Elvas, Setubal, Peniche, Lisbon, and the environs.

Accounts from all quarters actually announced as certain the arrival of a British army, coming, according to some, from Gibraltar and Sicily, coming, according to others, from Ireland

and the Baltic. Admiral Sir Charles Cotton had touched several times upon the coast, parleyed, now at the mouth of the Tagus, now at that of the Douro, and everywhere promised a speedy landing. The intelligence of General Dupont's disaster, received at the same time, acted as a last stimulant to the minds of the people, and in the twinkling of an eye Portugal, which had as yet but partially revolted, rose universally from the Minho to the Algarves.

It was at Oporto that the flame first burst forth. A convoy of bread was preparing there for a detachment of French troops. At this sight the people rose, seized the carriages, plundered them, and in an instant the whole city was astir. The bishop put himself at the head of the insurrection, and the Portuguese flag was everywhere hoisted, amidst shouts of "Long live the Prince Regent!" The conflagration spread into the provinces, had well nigh communicated to Lisbon itself, crossed the Tagus, extended into Alentejo, and at length joined the flames, kindled a second time towards Elvas by the contact with Estramadura. At Oporto the authorities were in open communication with the English; at Elvas they entered into quite as open communication with the Spaniards. A corps of the latter, composed of regular troops, advanced even from Badajoz to Evora, to serve for a support to the Portuguese insurrection.

Junot, who was brisk and enterprising, unluckily yielded to a desire to suppress the insurrection wherever it might show itself. He despatched General Loison with his division to disperse the insurgents of Alentejo, who were in the environs of Evora. He directed General Margaron, with the cavalry, against an assemblage that was coming from Coimbra towards Lisbon. It had been much better in that intensely hot season to keep his troops fresh and resting around Lisbon, than to diminish their number by fighting and fatigue, for the purpose of suppressing seditions as ready to break out again the moment they were gone as to submit when they were marching against them.

General Margaron had but to appear with his cavalry in order to disperse and cut down the few hundred insurgents collected towards Coimbra. As for General Loison, he was obliged to traverse the whole of Alentejo to come at the insurrection of that province, assembled near Evora, and supported by a corps of Spanish troops. After a difficult and fatiguing march he arrived before Evora, and there found the Spaniards and Portuguese in order of battle. He attacked them in flank, overthrew them, took their artillery, and killed a good number of them. The gates of Evora having been closed, he scaled the walls, entered the town, and sacked it. In a few days the Spaniards were sent home, and the Portuguese reduced to a momentary obedience. The soldiers were laden with booty, but

exhausted with fatigue, and had to march back to Lisbon in an overpowering heat.

Meanwhile the English, so often announced, made their appearance at last. On the insurrection of the Asturias and the mission of two deputies to London to make known there the general rising of the Spanish provinces, the English government had been apprised of the unforeseen occasion that presented itself for multiplying our embarrassments. The Canning and Castlereagh administration had naturally resolved to transfer all its efforts to the Peninsula, and to raise up there, in far more enlarged proportions, and in a much more durable manner, the obstacles which it had for a moment raised against us in the Calabrias. Orders were sent to all the British forces, military and naval, scattered in the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Gascony, the Channel, and the Baltic, to concur towards this single object. Cargoes of arms, supplies of money, were despatched to the coasts of Spain and Portugal. All the troops for the organisation of which the Boulogne [query, Baltic?] expedition had furnished occasion, and part of which had recently distinguished itself at Copenhagen, were destined to act on this new field of battle. It was impossible, in fact, to offer England one that was better chosen or more convenient for her. With a fair wind one might pass in four days from the coast of England to Cape Finisterre, to the bays of Coruña and Vigo, to the mouths of the Douro and the Tagus. The immense navy of England, cruising incessantly around this girdle of coasts, might at all times supply an army there with provisions and ammunition, while the adversaries of that army, in a half wild country, destitute of roads, would have the greatest difficulty to procure subsistence. The heavy and solid British battalions, disembarked in the numerous gulfs of the Peninsula, setting foot on landing in well-entrenched posts, advancing boldly in case of success, falling back promptly if they experienced a reverse, to reach that sea which was their appui, their refuge, their magazine of provisions and ammunition, supporting in offensive operations the nimble Spaniards against the impetuous onset of the French army, or perhaps leaving them in case of retreat to get off as they could, by dispersion or by a momentary submission, beginning this manœuvre again without tiring, till the French force succumbed from exhaustion—the British battalions, we say, were about to wage the only war which they are fit for, and in which they could be successful on the continent.

All the orders for a great expedition were issued with extreme despatch. Five thousand men, under General Spencer, who had come from Egypt to Sicily, had been conveyed from Gibraltar to Cadiz, where the Spaniards, scrupling to receive

them, had deferred the acceptance of their services. These five thousand English, refused at Cadiz, had landed at the mouth of the Guadiana, on the territory of Portugal, till a favourable moment for acting should arrive. Ten thousand men were at Cork, in Ireland. These were immediately embarked in a flotilla escorted by several ships of the line; for their commander was selected an officer who had already distinguished himself in India, and who had recently rendered important services to General Cathcart before Copenhagen; this was Sir Arthur Wellesley, since celebrated for his good fortune, as much as for his eminent military qualities, by the title of Duke of Wellington. His instructions were to sail for Coruña, to offer the Spaniards of the Asturias and Galicia the concurrence of the English forces, and to exert himself, in short, everywhere against the French to the utmost of his power. General Spencer had orders to place himself under the command of Sir Arthur, as soon as he should be required. Sir Arthur Wellesley would then find himself at the head of 15,000 men. But these troops were only a part of those which were destined for the Peninsula. Five thousand men, under Generals Anstruther and Acland, were at Ramsgate and Harwich. Transports were already ordered to those points of embarkation, to convey them to Sir Arthur Wellesley. Owing to the proximity of the places and the vast means of the English navy, it was an operation of ten or twelve days only to assemble all these forces at one spot. Lastly, Sir John Moore, returning from the Baltic with 11,000 troops, was to be sent soon to the point which the English generals should have designated on the coast of the Peninsula for there effecting a general concentration.

It was not thought fitting to put this entire force of about 30,000 men, when united, under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, still too young in age and renown to be placed at the head of an army which, in the estimation of the English, might be reckoned very considerable. The supreme command of it was therefore assigned to Sir Hew Dalrymple, then Governor of Gibraltar, who was to have under him Sir Harry Burrard as chief of the staff. Till all these troops should be assembled, and Sir Hew Dalrymple should arrive, Sir Arthur Wellesley was to direct the first operations, with the 10,000 men who sailed from Cork, and the 5000 landed on the coast of the Algarves. Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, commanding the naval forces of England in those seas, had orders to second all the movements of the armies.

Embarking on the 12th of July, the English troops from Cork were, on the 20th, off Coruña, and exhibited to the Spaniards, delighted to find themselves so well supported, an immense flotilla. The sight of this considerable force, which

foreboded many more, had somewhat cheered them under the defeat of Generals Blake and de la Cuesta at Rio Seco, and had caused them to conceive new and great hopes of the contest in which they were engaged against Napoleon. Still they had not consented, any more than the Andalusians, to admit the English troops into their territory, especially so near the arsenal of Ferrol. They had, therefore, accepted a large quantity of arms, money to the amount of £500,000 sterling (12½ million francs), but they had recommended to the English to turn all their efforts towards Portugal, which it was not less important to wrest from the French than Spain itself.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had immediately proceeded to Oporto, where he had been received with extreme joy; for the Portuguese merchants, living entirely by their commercial connection with the English, felt at sight of the latter their interests as much gratified as their passions. From that moment the action of the British army had been decidedly directed towards Portugal. This resolution, which suited the Spaniards, always jealous of foreigners, suited the English also, who could not but desire above all things the deliverance of Portugal, and it served the common cause in an equal degree, the aim of the new coalition being to expel the French from every part of the Peninsula. It was left to be seen what part of Portugal they would choose for landing in presence of a French army, without running a risk of being flung unceremoniously into the sea.

Sir Arthur Wellesley left his convoy cruising between the mouths of the Douro and those of the Tagus, and repaired personally to Sir Charles Cotton, off the Tagus, to concert with him his plan of debarkation. To land at the entrance of the Tagus would be attended with the advantage of disembarking very near the goal, since Lisbon is but two leagues off; and one could, moreover, give the numerous population of that capital such an impulsion, that the French would not be able to withstand the commotion which it would excite; for they were 15,000 at most, including the sick, amidst 300,000 inhabitants, all enemies. In fact, if this population were to rise at a moment when the English army should be advancing to support it, the business might perhaps be finished in a single day. But the French occupied all the forts; they had acquired the habit of controlling the people of Lisbon; the coast on the right and left of the mouth of the Tagus is abrupt, exposed to breakers, and a change of weather might put one part of the English army into the hands of the French before the other part had completed its landing. It would, moreover, be coming ashore very near to a strong and formidable adversary, whom the English were not yet accustomed to challenge and to fight.

From all these considerations, Sir Arthur Wellesley, in concert with Sir Charles Cotton, resolved to land between Oporto and Lisbon, at the mouth of the Mondego, near a very commodious bay, commanded by the fort of Figuera, which was not occupied by the French. The choice of this point, situated at a certain distance from Lisbon, gave Sir Arthur Wellesley time to land before the French could come to meet him, to await General Spencer's corps, which he had sent for, and when once on the soil of Portugal, to advance towards Lisbon, following the coast in order to take advantage of such occasions as Fortune might offer. The French, whom he knew to be at most 20,000 or 22,000 strong, having several places to guard, particularly the capital, never could march against him with more than 10,000 or 12,000; and by keeping constantly near the sea, either for the sake of receiving supplies or of re-embarking in case of need, he had a chance of approaching Lisbon, and there making some attempt that might succeed, without running too much risk. Knowing that Sir Hew Dalrymple was soon to supersede him, he was impatient to achieve something brilliant before he passed under superior command. These resolutions were most judicious, and denoted those qualities in the English general which his career soon revealed—good sense and firmness, the first of all next to genius.

He began to land on the 1st of August at the mouth of the Mondego. That sea, so frequently agitated by gales from the west, several times interrupted the disembarkation of the men and the matériel.

Nevertheless, in five or six days the English troops that came from Cork were all put on shore to the number of nine or ten thousand men, with the immense train that always follows English armies. At this moment General Spencer's corps arrived at the same anchorage. General Spencer, before he received Sir Arthur Wellesley's orders, on the news of General Dupont's disaster, had embarked to transfer his efforts to some other quarter, well aware that there was no further service to render in Andalusia, delivered for the moment from the presence of French troops. Apprised of the arrival of the Cork convoy, he had come to join it off the mouth of the Mondego; and on the 8th of August he had finished his disembarkation, and effected his junction with the corps of Sir Arthur Wellesley. The latter thus found himself at the head of an army of about 14,000 or 15,000 men, composed almost entirely of infantry and artillery. It numbered at most 400 horse; and this is the usual state of every expedition by sea, the transport of cavalry being difficult, and even impossible to any great distance. But that infantry was very fine, possessing all the qualities of the English army.

That army, as everybody knows, is composed of men of all sorts, enlisting voluntarily into its ranks, serving for the whole of life or nearly so, subject to a formidable discipline, which flogs them to death for the slightest faults, which out of the good or the bad subject makes a uniform and obedient subject, marching to danger with invariable submission, led by officers full of honour and courage. The English soldier, well fed, well trained, firing with remarkable precision, travelling slowly, because he is not formed for marching, and wants the requisite ardour, is solid, almost invincible in certain positions where the nature of the place seconds his resisting character, but becomes weak if forced to march, to attack, to conquer those difficulties which are not to be overcome without animation, hardihood, and enthusiasm. In short, he is firm, not enterprising. In like manner, as the French soldier, by his ardour, his energy, his disposition to brave everything, was the predestined instrument of the genius of Napoleon, so the solid and slow soldier of England was formed for the limited capacity, but discreet and resolute mind of Sir Arthur Wellesley. Such a soldier one ought, if one could, to draw away from the sea, to oblige him to march, to be enterprising; in short, to show his defects, instead of running one's head against his qualities by attacking him in strong positions. But the brave and boiling Junot was not a man to conduct himself with so much prudence and calculation, and there was reason to fear that he would come and wreck his impetuosity upon the cold obstinacy of the soldiers of England.

On the 8th of August Sir Arthur Wellesley commenced his march along the sea-coast, so as to be always within reach of his supplies and of his means of retreat. He had from his first arrival rather warm disputes with the Portuguese army. The insurgents of Portugal had formed, by uniting all their forces in the north of their territory, an army of five or six thousand men, under General Freyre. Sir Arthur Wellesley was desirous to have it with him, to cover his flanks. But they, whether they were afraid, as the English general in writing to his government accused them of being,* to meet the French too close, or had no great confidence in these auxiliaries, ever ready to retire to their ships on the first reverse, and to leave their allies exposed by themselves to the blows of the enemy, made demands with which the English general would not comply—namely, to be subsisted by the British army with the supplies drawn from the ships. This requisition being rejected, the Portuguese resolved to act for themselves, and took the roads

* Such is the assertion of the Duke of Wellington in his correspondence with the British cabinet, recently printed in England, as everybody knows, and containing a mass of documents equally valuable and interesting.

to the interior, leaving to their allies the route along the coast. They gave them, however, 1400 light infantry and 400 horse to serve for scouts.

No sooner was Junot apprised at Lisbon, at first by the ill-dissembled joy of the inhabitants, and soon by positive intelligence, of the landing of the British army, than he formed the resolution to hasten to it and throw it into the sea. To concentrate himself, to withdraw the soldiers to the very last man from all posts of secondary importance, to confine himself to the guard of Lisbon alone, to leave there none but such as were incapable of marching, that he might advance against the English with 15,000 or 18,000 men, to choose for the purpose of fighting them a moment when they should not have their natural advantages, those of the defensive, was the only wise resolution that could be adopted. Unluckily Junot concentrated himself very incompletely, and he was seized with an extreme impatience to attack the English, no matter where, no matter how, and fling them into the sea as soon as possible.

Between Almeida, Elvas, Setubal, Peniche, and various posts, Junot had already sacrificed four or five thousand men. By the expeditions which he had recently sent out under Generals Loison, Margaron, and others, he had many soldiers, too valuable not to have been preserved, put hors de combat or worn out with fatigue; and he had at most about 10,000 men to oppose to an enemy who already numbered 14,000 or 15,000, and could soon increase his force to 20,000 or 30,000. Junot recalled General Loison from Alentejo, and he sent off General Delaborde with his division to go and meet the English, to observe them, to harass them, till all the disposable troops could be collected against them. He prepared to march himself with the reserve when they should be nearer to Lisbon; and then to meet them, to fight them, to beat them would not require him to be absent from Lisbon more than three or four days. He thought, and justly, that his presence and that of the reserve could not long be spared at Lisbon without serious inconveniences.

In consequence, General Delaborde, with the troops of General Margaron, was to proceed first, by way of Leiria, to meet the English; while General Loison, returning from Alentejo by forced marches, was to rejoin him by Abrantes, and Junot himself would go and complete this concentration of forces, by taking with him all that he could abstract from the guard of Lisbon.

General Delaborde, on his march upon the Leiria road, came in sight of the English on the 14th or 15th. He waited before he came to closer quarters with them for the junction of General Loison, who was doing his best to arrive, but whose troops were exhausted with fatigue and overcome by the heat. On

the 16th of August he fell in with the enemy's advanced posts, and on the 17th he had to fight them in a manner which proved what advantages are to be gained by leaving to the English the initiative of attacks.

General Delaborde, an old officer, full of energy and experience, kept alongside of the English upon that coast-road, which terminated near Torres Vedras, at the mountains with which Lisbon is surrounded; and in the evening of the 16th he had met with them in the environs of Obidos. He retired quietly before them till a favourable position should offer for making them feel the valour of his soldiers without engaging in any decisive action, which he ought not and would not risk before the general concentration of the French troops. In the environs of Roliça he found the position which he sought, in the midst of a sandy plain, crossed by several streamlets, closed by heights on which the highroad rose in a serpentine line, and descended again to the village of Zambugeiro. On the morning of the 17th the English army followed General Delaborde's division, not three thousand strong, across this plain of Roliça. The English marched slowly and collectedly after nimble, resolute Frenchmen, in no wise intimidated by their numerical inferiority, though they were but one to five, three thousand against fourteen or fifteen thousand. General Delaborde thought that he ought not to make a point of defending Roliça in the middle of the plain, for even in defending this point successfully he could not fail to be soon surrounded, and to avoid being taken, obliged to leave it precipitately and in confusion. He preferred retiring to the extremity of the plain, to the heights which the road ascends before it runs down to Zambugeiro. Accordingly, he placed himself on the summit of the hills along which the road ascended, and there waited resolutely for the English. General Nightingale's brigade marched first in a single line, supported by Hill's and Fane's brigades in close columns, while on its left Craufurd's brigade made a circuit to turn the French, and on its right the Portuguese detachment did the same, to get to Zambugeiro before them.

General Delaborde, leaving the English to pursue their toilsome course through ravines full of myrtle, cistus, and other large shrubs which grow in southern countries, chose the moment when they were most impeded by the obstacles of the ground for attacking them. He first had a fire of musketry poured upon them by dexterous tirailleurs, and then caused them to be briskly charged with the bayonet by his battalions, and thrown to the foot of the heights. He repeated this manœuvre several times, and in this manner killed or wounded twelve or fifteen hundred of the enemy. He kept up this fight for four successive hours, always manœuvring with

extraordinary art and precision, and destroying twice or thrice as many men as he lost himself. He did not retire till he found himself in danger of being turned by the columns that were marching on the right and left upon Zambugeiro. Several detachments attempted in vain to stop him : he forced his way through them, and arrived at Zambugeiro, having himself five or six hundred men hors de combat, but leaving behind the dead only, carrying off all his wounded, and impressing the heart of the enemy with a dread of what French troops, well conducted, were capable of doing ; for what was there not to fear from a general union of their forces, when fewer than three thousand men had made so vigorous a resistance !

General Delaborde proceeded to Torres Vedras, where he was to be joined by General Loison coming from Abrantes, and by General Junot coming from Lisbon.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had learned from his own experience in this fight what he before knew, that he had to do with an enemy very difficult to conquer, and he had determined not to advance but with extreme circumspection. A numerous convoy, bringing fresh troops, had just been descried at sea. These were Anstruther's and Acland's brigades, recently embarked, and followed very closely by the main body of Sir John Moore's army. These two brigades brought him a reinforcement of 5000 men at least, but did not bring Sir Hew Dalrymple, which had the twofold advantage of strengthening him without rendering him dependent. He resolved therefore to approach the sea by Lourinha, in order to pick up Anstruther's and Acland's two brigades ; and for this purpose he took a position on the heights of Vimeira, which cover an anchorage favourable for landing. In the evening of the 19th he was joined by Anstruther's brigade, and on the 20th by Acland's brigade. Deducting the killed and wounded at Roliça, this reinforcement increased his army to 18,000 men present under arms.

General Junot, on the news of the approach of the English, had hastened to leave Lisbon with all the force disposable, and directed his course towards Torres Vedras, where General Loison had just arrived. From having endeavoured to retain too many posts, though he had evacuated many, from having run to suppress the principal insurrections, though he had neglected secondary insurrections, General Junot could not collect more than nine thousand and some hundred men present under arms. He would therefore have to fight that redoubtable English infantry brought by Sir Arthur Wellesley in the proportion of one against two. He had a great superiority over him in cavalry, an arm of not much utility in the positions that were about to serve for fields of battle. Nine thousand French, however, conducted as General Delaborde's

three thousand had been, would be able, by stoutly defending the positions which are in advance of Lisbon, to make head against 18,000 English, and to render it impossible for them to conquer the capital of Portugal, provided that their ground were chosen as skilfully as it had been at Roliça.

The English had to cross the promontory which forms the right of the Tagus, and on the back of which Lisbon is seated. This promontory presents narrow defiles, which must be passed in order to reach Lisbon, and in which the English might have been overwhelmed when they had once entered them, by leaving to them all the inconveniences of the offensive. Junot, hurried away by his excessive ardour, would not wait for them in these passes, where it would have been possible to beat them, and resolved to go and seek them in their position, to storm them there, and to throw them into the sea. He arrived on the evening of the 20th before the heights of Vimeira.

Sir Arthur Wellesley would have been in a critical situation, if he had been vigorously attacked and with sufficient forces; for he occupied heights the back of which rose perpendicularly from the sea. If forced in these positions, he might be precipitated into the waves before he had time to embark. He was therefore between a victory and a disaster. But he had 18,000 men, a numerous artillery, positions of very difficult access. He knew from various reports that he should have to fight an enemy inferior by half; lastly, he was endowed with a firmness of character which equalled that of his soldiers. He was therefore not at all uneasy. The chain of positions which he occupied was cut in two by a ravine which formed the bed of the little river Maceira. The village of Vimeira was at the bottom of this ravine. But he possessed sufficient means of communication for going from one of these groups of heights to the other. He had four brigades on the group situated on his right, two on the group situated on his left. His infantry, ranged in three lines, with a formidable artillery in the intervals, exhibited three stages, rising one above another, and one strengthening the other.

Had this position, strong as it was, been previously reconnoitred, the French must either have abandoned the idea of taking it, or have attacked it on one side only with their whole united force. The English, when once partly dislodged, might have been completely shaken and precipitated into the abyss which they backed. But the French arrived at daybreak on the morning of the 21st, without having taken suitable precautions, and without concealing their movements from the enemy. General Junot, perceiving that the left of the English was their least defended wing, ordered a movement from his left to his right, that he might be more numerous on that side,

a movement which Sir Arthur Wellesley, discovering it from the heights that he occupied, hastened to imitate, for the purpose of restoring the balance of forces, but much more rapidly than his adversary; for he had only the cord of the bow to describe, and it took him less time by half to move his troops from one wing to the other.

The French, while their right was manœuvring, attacked Vimeira with their left. Vimeira formed the right of the English, and their strongest side. Thomière's brigade, of Delaborde's division, marched resolutely towards the enemy. The brave General Delaborde conducted this attack with extreme vigour; but the ground, which he had not chosen, as at Roliça, presented almost insurmountable obstacles. Besides the difficulty of climbing a steep position, he would have to brave two lines of infantry, an artillery powerful by number and calibre, and then find, without being discouraged, a third line, formed by Hill's brigade, crowning the heights in rear. The French dashed gallantly forward, liable to fall first under the fire of grape, and then under the continuous and well-directed musketry fire of the English; but they could not even reach their lines. When they found themselves thus stopped, General Kellermann, who commanded the reserve, composed of two regiments of grenadiers picked out of all the corps, proceeded with one of these regiments to the attack of the plateau of Vimeira. He was preceded by a battery of artillery, which attempted to place itself in position. The tremendous fire of the English soon dismounted it. Colonel Foy was severely wounded. General Kellermann nevertheless pushed forward with the grenadiers. He climbed the hill, debouched on the plateau, but encountered such a fire in front, in flank, and from all directions, that his brave soldiers, flung back upon one another and unable to advance, were driven to the foot of the plateau. On seeing this four hundred dragoons, composing the whole of the English cavalry, would have taken advantage of the dangerous situation of our grenadiers to charge them; but General Margaron, who was at that point with his brave cavalry, rushed at gallop upon the English dragoons, and cutting them in pieces, revenged on them the reverse of our infantry. The second regiment of grenadiers marched in its turn to attack the enemy, though without hope of carrying the position. During these occurrences on the left, Solignac's brigade, of Loison's division, met with the same obstacles on the right. Everywhere three lines of infantry, a formidable artillery, a steep hill which it was impossible to climb under the downward fire, stopped our brave soldiers, foolishly directed against a position where the enemy fought with all his advantages, and where we had none of ours.

It was noon. This combat, so unfortunately commenced, without the least chance of our conquering the difficulties opposed to us, had already cost us 1800 men, that is to say, a fifth part of our effective. To persist further in it would be to risk the destruction of the whole army to no purpose. General Junot, therefore, made up his mind, on the advice of his bravest officers, to retreat, which he did in good order to Torres Vedras, his cavalry cutting down the tirailleurs or the English horse who had the boldness to follow us.

After this fruitless attempt to throw the English into the sea, the French had no further hope of maintaining their ground in Portugal. On assembling all the disposable force at Lisbon, there were found to be not more than 10,000 men in a condition to fight, and these 10,000 men had to control a hostile population of 300,000 souls, and to stop an English army which in a few days would be increased to 28,000 or 29,000 combatants. One resource, it is true, was left: that was, to make a retreat through the north of Portugal and Spain, similar to that of the Ten Thousand, through insurgent populations, leaving several thousand sick in the hands of the Portuguese, and strewing the roads with dead and dying. One would thus have lost more than half the army. These two resolutions were therefore impossible to be fulfilled. To enter into negotiation with the English nation, which performed the engagements which it contracted, would therefore assuredly be a step that honour would not condemn, especially after the battle of Roliça and the battle of Vimeira.

In consequence, General Kellermann, who united extreme shrewdness with great military talents, was selected and sent to the English headquarters to treat respecting the fate of the prisoners and wounded. At this moment a change had just taken place in the British army. Sir Hew Dalrymple had arrived with Sir Harry Burrard, chief of his staff, to assume the command. Sir Arthur Wellesley, always fortunate in his brilliant career, was not superseded till after a victory, chiefly due to the faults of the enemy. He was not sorry that the campaign should cease with this victory, and that the conquest of Portugal should be exclusively attributed to him. Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard, on their part, unacquainted with the state of things, ignorant of the difficulties which might be left for them to conquer, were delighted at their outset to find the French ready to give up Portugal to them and to have no new risks to run. If, however, they had appreciated the situation, and what it was about to become for them by the arrival of the army of Sir John Moore, they might not have shown themselves so easy. In a long conversation with General Kellermann, whom they treated with all the distinction

that he deserved, they suffered their disposition to negotiate to be perceived. The latter, with great tact, seized the opportunity, and at first agreed with them upon a suspension of arms, reserving a definitive arrangement for the evacuation of the country for future negotiation.

General Kellermann, returning to the French headquarters, informed the commander-in-chief and his companions-in-arms of the disposition of the English, and it was agreed that they should treat for the evacuation of Portugal, if the conditions were perfectly honourable. He returned to the headquarters of the enemy, and the meeting for the conferences was fixed at Cintra. They lasted several days, and displayed not less courtesy in the forms than vivacity in the discussion of subjects. The English would not grant so many advantages in regard to military honour as the French demanded. They refused in particular to treat the Russian admiral Siniavin so well as Junot required, from a scruple of honour much more than from duty; for that admiral, who might have saved the common cause by seconding the French, and who had ruined it by not doing so, did not deserve that the negotiations should be rendered more difficult on his account. Junot, nevertheless, demanded that the Russian admiral should be at liberty to retire to the North Sea with his squadron, and he threatened to destroy all with fire and sword, not to surrender Lisbon till it was half in ruins, if what he claimed were not granted. Fortunately Admiral Siniavin, an ally as disagreeable as he was backward at assisting, expressed a desire to negotiate on his own account, apparently unwilling to owe anything to the French army, from which he was sensible that he had not deserved anything. Junot hastened to assent to it, and then, the principal difficulty being removed, the parties speedily came to an agreement.

The convention, dated from Cintra, was signed on the 30th of August. It stipulated that the French army should retire with all the honours of war, taking with it all that belonged to it; that it should be conveyed in English vessels to the nearest ports of France, those of La Rochelle, Lorient, or others; that it might serve immediately; that the wounded and the sick should be treated with care, and sent home in their turn, as soon as their state would allow them to bear the voyage; that this should apply also to the garrisons of Almeida and Elvas, left in the interior of the country. It was agreed, moreover, that the French should not carry away anything belonging to Portugal, the finances of which they had administered with equal regularity and integrity, and where they left nine millions in the chests which they had found absolutely empty on their arrival. Lastly, it was stipulated that no inquiry should be made into the past, and that the Portu-

guese who had sided with the French should not be molested in person or property.

This arrangement was as honourable as could be desired for the French army, for it was saved entire, and replaced in a state to resume arms against Spain in a month. The English were incapable of imitating the Spaniards and violating the Convention of Cintra, as the latter had violated the capitulation of Baylen. Accordingly, they assembled at the mouth of the Tagus the numerous vessels which had just landed 30,000 of their soldiers upon the coasts of Portugal, and prepared them to convey the 22,000 French left of the 26,000 which had accompanied General Junot. They took them on board in the first days of September, and landed them faithfully on the coasts of Saintonge and Bretagne.

Thus the whole Peninsula, overrun so easily in February and March, was evacuated by the end of August as far as the Ebro. Two French armies had capitulated, the one honourably, the other in a humiliating manner; and the others occupied on the Ebro nothing more than the débouche of the Pyrenees. Of the 130,000 men who had crossed the Pyrenees, there were not 60,000 under arms, though 80,000 were left, exclusively, it is true, of the 22,000 returning to France under the British flag.

Such was the recompense of an enterprise undertaken with raw troops and too few of them, planned, moreover, by a knavish and iniquitous policy. We had lost in a moment our renown for honour, the spell of our invincibility; and Europe had a right to believe for an instant that the French army had lost its superiority. This, however, was not the case, and that heroic army was about to prove again in a hundred fights that it was still the same.

To crown the confusion, those rich Spanish colonies which occupied so large a space in the projects of Napoleon were escaping from us in all quarters. Mexico, the vast southern continent, from Peru to the mouths of the La Plata, rose on the news of the events at Bayonne, opening their ports to the English, and embracing the cause of the captive dynasty.

Thus all the combinations of Napoleon were baffled at once by the indignation of a deceived and exasperated people. Thus nothing was wanting to the chastisement of his fault, assuredly nothing; for his brother himself, terrified at the task which he had imposed upon him, deeply regretting the quiet and peaceful kingdom of Naples, wrote him on the 9th of August, from the banks of the Ebro, a most distressing letter, which was no doubt to him the most poignant of reproaches: "I have not a single Spaniard left who is attached to my cause. Philip V. had but one competitor to conquer; while I—I have a whole nation. As general, my part would be endurable, nay, easy, for with a

detachment of your veteran troops I would conquer the Spaniards, but as king my part is insupportable, since I must slaughter one part of my subjects to make the other submit. I decline, therefore, to reign over a people who will not have me. Still I desire not to retire as conquered. Send me, therefore, one of your old armies; I will return at its head to Madrid, and there I will treat with the Spaniards. If you wish it, I will restore Ferdinand VII. to them in your name, but retaining part of their territory as far as the Ebro; for France victorious will have a right to exact payment for her victory. She will thus obtain the price of her efforts, of her blood spilt, and I—I shall demand back from you the throne of Naples. The prince for whom you destined it has not yet taken possession of it. I am, besides, your brother, your own blood; justice and consanguinity require that I should have the preference, and I will then go and continue, amidst the quiet which suits my tastes, the happiness of a people that consents to be prosperous under my care." Such was the substance of what Joseph wrote from the banks of the Ebro to Napoleon. No judgment could be more severe and more just than that which resulted from this language of a deeply afflicted king, forced against his will to reign over a people in revolt. Napoleon comprehended it, and proved by the answer, which the reader will find by-and-by, how keenly he felt the involuntary harshness of this judgment pronounced by his own brother.

END OF VOL. V.

